

MEMOIRS

TO ILLUSTRATE

THE HISTORY OF MY TIME.

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TRANSLATED BY J. W. COLE.

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CHAPTER I.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1830.

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(From JULY 26 to AUGUST 11, 1830.)

I now reach the epoch at which I became closely, and

with a certain degree of influence, connected with the affairs of my country. If I had issued from the arena as a vanquished combatant, utterly overthrown by my conquerors, I should cease to speak at present of the struggles I had maintained. But the catastrophe by which I was assailed and crushed, equally affected all around me,—kings as well as their counsellors, my adversaries with myself. Engaged together, we yielded to the same assault, and suffered shipwreck in the same tempest. I do not flatter myself that the greatest and rudest vicissitudes of fortune carry with them, ~~at~~ once and everywhere, the light of conviction. I fear that the ideas, the passions, and interests with which I have been in contest, may still occupy and disturb the hearts of many. Human nature is as obstinate as volatile, and party feelings have deeply-seated roots which the most violent shocks cannot utterly eradicate. Nevertheless I feel confident that in the higher walks of public life, clear daylight has risen in its full grandeur, and minds at present are sufficiently unshackled to look back into the past for lessons of experience rather than to seek weapons for fresh encounter. With this sentiment, and this alone, I undertake to review our old conflicts. I promise to be faithful to my friends, just towards my adversaries, and severe in judgment on myself. If I carry out this design, my work perhaps, when completed, may reflect honour on my own name, and confer some advantage on my country.

I left Nismes on the 23rd of July, 1830, satisfied with the elections in which I had taken part, with the state of feeling I had found, and entirely occupied with

the thought of how it was necessary to proceed in order to obtain for the decided, but at the same time moderate and honestly expressed, wishes of the country, a predominant influence in the Chambers, and a favourable reception from the King. It was only on the 26th, while passing through Pouilly, that I obtained from the guard of the mail the first intelligence of the decrees. I reached Paris on the 27th, at five in the morning, and at eleven, a note from M. Casimir Périer invited me to his house, where a meeting of several of our colleagues was appointed.

The struggle had scarcely begun, and already the entire establishment of the Restoration,—persons and institutes,—was in visible and urgent danger. A few hours before, and within a short distance of Paris, the decrees were unknown to me; and by the side of legal opposition I saw, on my arrival, revolutionary and unchained insurrection. The journals, the courts of justice, the secret societies, the assemblies of peers and deputies, the national guard, the citizens and the populace, the bankers and the labouring classes, the drawing-rooms and the streets, every regulated or unlicensed element of society either yielded to or pushed forward the general movement. On the first day, the cry was, *Long live the Charter! Down with the Ministers!* On the second, *Up with Liberty! Down with the Bourbons! Long live the Republic! Long live Napoleon the Second!* The decrees of the preceding eve had been seized on as the signal for exploding all the irritations, hopes, projects, and political desires accumulated during sixteen years.

Amongst the evils with which our age and country

are afflicted, one of the heaviest is, that no serious trouble can burst forth in any part of the social edifice, but immediately the entire building is in danger of subversion; there exists a contagion of ruin which spreads with terrible rapidity. Great public agitations, extreme abuses of power, are not new facts in the world. More than once nations have had to struggle, not only by law but by force, for the maintenance and recovery of their rights. In Germany, in Spain, in England before the reign of Charles I., in France as far back as the seventeenth century, the political bodies and the people have often opposed the King, even by arms, without feeling either the necessity or right of changing the dynasty of their Sovereigns or the form of their government. Resistance and insurrection had their curbs and limits, whether arising from the state of society, or the conscience and good sense of men: the entire system was not continually in the hazard. In the present day, and with us, each important political struggle resolves itself into a question of life and death. People and parties, in their blind excitement, rush on the instant to the last extremes; resistance suddenly transforms itself into insurrection, and insurrection into revolution. Every storm becomes the deluge.

From the 27th to the 30th of July, while the popular feeling exhibited itself here and there in the streets, extending and increasing from day to day and from hour to hour, I was present at all the meetings of deputies held in the houses of MM. Casimir Périer, Laffitte, Bérard, and Audry-Puyraveau, with no object beyond that of discussing the conduct we ought to pursue, and no connected plans except the notification transmitted

from one to the other that we should repair at such a time to such a place. According to the incidents of the day, and the aspect of chances, these meetings were very unequally anxious and numerous. At the first, held on the 27th at M. Casimir Périer's, I had been selected, in conjunction with MM. Villemain and Dupin, to draw up, in the name of the deputies present, a protest against the decrees. This I prepared, and it was adopted on the 28th following, at two meetings held at the residences of MM. Audry-Puyraveau and Bérard, when it received, between members present and the authority of others unable to attend, sixty-three signatures.¹ But on the same evening, having again repaired, by agreement, to the house of M. Audry-Puyraveau, I found that the assembly had dwindled down to eleven. The diversity of opinions was not less than that of numbers. Some wished to carry resistance to the utmost limit of legal order, but not further. Some were determined on a change of dynasty, not desiring more, in a revolutionary sense; but considering the step as necessary as the occasion seemed favourable, and flattering themselves that they might stop at that point. Others again, more inclined to revolution without showing it, promised themselves all kinds of indefinite reforms in the institutions and laws, commanded as they thought by the interests and desires of the nation. Finally, a few unquestionably sighed for a Republic, looking upon every other issue to the struggle maintained by the people in the name of liberty as an abortive deception. The gravity of the situation, the rapidity and uncertainty of passing events,

¹ See Historic Documents, No. I.

imposed some restraint on the expression of these different views, but they appeared in proposals, discussions, and private conversations; they proclaimed the opposite feelings that would manifest themselves as soon as minds and passions were liberated from the pressing danger; they demonstrated the necessity of quickly bringing to a close the crisis which suspended anarchy, but evidently could not suspend it long.

When we looked beyond our assemblies on what was passing in the streets, the urgency of a solution appeared still more imperative. The rights of the nation violated, and its honour insulted,—just and generous sentiments—had roused the public in the first instance and led to the original opposition. But the enemies of established order, the professional conspirators, the secret societies, the revolutionists at any price, the dreamers of an imaginary future, had rapidly thrown themselves into the movement, and became hourly more influential and exacting. At one moment they noisily proclaimed their designs, caring no more for us Deputies than if we had no existence; at the next, they surrounded and besieged us with their messages and clamours, calling upon us vociferously to execute their wishes without delay.

On the evening of the 28th of July, while we were consulting in a very small body at the residence of M. Audry-Puyraveau, and in a drawing-room of the ground-floor, with open windows, a crowd of labouring people—youths, children, and combatants of every kind—surrounded the house, filled the court-yard, obstructed the doors, and addressed us through the windows, ready to assist in our defence, if, as the report went, police-officers

and soldiers were coming to arrest us ; but at the same time demanding our instant adhesion to their revolutionary movement, and declaring loudly what they would do if we did not instantly comply with their demands. It was not alone in the streets that this violent and decided spirit so unequivocally displayed itself. On the 29th July it took root in the only active authority of the moment, in the municipal Commission established at the Hôtel de Ville, to watch over, as it was said, the interests of the city. Two members out of six became there its interpreters, M. Audry-Puyraveau, and M. Mauguin, a ready, bold speaker, pretentious, conceited, without judgment or scruple, well calculated in those days of general perturbation to excite the irrational, to intimidate the weak, and to inflame the idle. Some firm, well-regulated minds—amongst others, M. Casimir Périer and General Sébastiani—ventured to resist, and show themselves resolved not to become revolutionists even while promoting a revolution. But with no fixed basis, all opposition is vain ; and they had none prepared. With incessantly increasing rapidity, the tide of anarchy ascended to the higher classes, and spread with astounding echo through all the lower departments of society.

In the hope of checking it, some enlightened Royalists, the Duke de Mortemart, Messrs. de Sémonville, d'Argout, de Vitrolles, and de Sussy, attempted to give legal satisfaction to the country, and to bring about an arrangement between the inert royalty at Saint-Cloud and the boiling revolution at Paris. But when they demanded an audience of the King, they were met by the unseasonable hour, by etiquette, the countersign, and re-

pose. Admitted, nevertheless, they found the King, at once tranquil and irritated, obstinate and hesitating. After a long struggle, they extorted from him the dismissal of the Polignac Cabinet, the repeal of the ordinances, and the nomination of the Duke de Mortemart as first Minister. But this being accorded, the King still lingered and delayed the necessary signatures. He gave them at last, but encumbered with many verbal restrictions, and the Duke de Mortemart, ill, and consumed by fever, departed for Paris without having obtained from the Dauphin the free passport that he required. Arrested at every step on his road by the Royal troops as well as by the voluntary guardians of the barricades, he was unable to reach the assembly of the Deputies, and with great difficulty conveyed to them, as also to the municipal Commission, through M. de Sussy, the decrees of which he was the bearer. These concessions were rejected in every quarter : at the Palais-Bourbon and at the Hôtel de Ville they were with difficulty taken note of. M. de La Fayette committed a bold act in writing to the Duke de Mortemart to acknowledge their reception ; and two men on horseback having loudly proclaimed on the Boulevard, " All is over ; peace is concluded with the King ; M. Casimir Périer has settled everything,"—General Gérard and M. Bérard, who happened to be present, with much difficulty rescued these individuals from the fury of the mob, who would have massacred them upon the spot. At Saint-Cloud there no longer existed a power,—I shall not say capable of acting, but of even parleying with the country.

It was in the midst of this menacing position, and to

bring it to an end, that issuing forth from our meetings, without any defined character or object, we met on the 30th of July at the Palais-Bourbon, in the hall of the Chamber of Deputies, inviting our absent colleagues to join us there, and to raise the great public authority of which we were the scattered members. The peers then in Paris assembled in a similar manner at the palace of the Luxembourg. We placed ourselves in communication with them; and on the same day before noon, being informed that the Duke of Orleans, who until then had held aloof, inactive and invisible, was disposed to come to Paris, we adopted the resolution expressed in these terms: "The Assembly of Deputies actually present has decided on the urgency of soliciting his Royal Highness the Duke of Orleans to repair to the capital, to assume the functions of Lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and of conveying to him their determination to preserve the national colours. The Assembly has, moreover, felt the necessity of securing to France, without delay, during the approaching session of the Chambers, all the guarantees indispensable to the full and entire execution of the Charter."¹

This resolution, precise though somewhat reserved, was sanctioned on the instant by forty signatures. Although they would have desired a different vote conveyed in other words, MM. Eusèbe Salverte, de Corcelle, Benjamin Constant, and de Schonen, signified their adhesion. Three only of the deputies present, MM. Villemain, Le Pelletier d'Aunay, and Hély d'Oissel, considering this as a decisive step towards a change of dynasty, declined being parties to it.

¹ See Historic Documents, No. II.

At this period of the crisis, it would undoubtedly have been a great benefit to France, and on the part of the nation an act of sound sense and political virtue, to have confined opposition within the limits of monarchical right, and to have recovered liberty without overthrowing the existing government. We never secure our own privileges more firmly than by respecting those with which they are balanced, and when monarchy is desirable, it is more easily maintained than founded. But there are difficult points of wisdom which we cannot prescribe on settled rules to nations, and which the controlling hand of Providence, the disposer of events and time, can alone teach them. On the side of the throne, a gross violation of right had revived and given vent to all the ardent instincts of the people. The armed insurgents evinced profound mistrust and antipathy towards the house of Bourbon. The negotiations attempted by the Duke de Mortemart were merely vain appearances. Despite the mutual esteem of individuals and the courtesy of words, the question of an accommodation with the elder branch of the royal family was never for a moment sincerely considered or debated. The abdication of the King and the Dauphin came too late. The succession of the Duke of Bordeaux, with the Duke of Orleans for Regent, which would have been not only the constitutional but the best political solution of the difficulty, appeared to the most moderate even more impossible than a treaty with the King himself. At this epoch, neither the liberal nor the royalist party would have had judgment enough, nor the Regent sufficient strength, to conduct and sustain a government so complicated, di-

vided, and disturbed. The opposition, too, held itself legal in its origin, and felt confident of success if it pushed on to revolution. The masses gave themselves up to the old exciting passions, and the leaders yielded to the impulse of the masses. They held it for certain that there were no means of treating safely with Charles X., and they had another king ready in hand to occupy his throne. In the actual state of facts and minds, there was no choice except between a new monarchy and the republic, between the Duke of Orleans and M. de La Fayette. "General," said his grandson-in-law, M. de Rémusat, to the latter when he called upon him at the Hôtel de Ville, "if a monarchy is proclaimed, the Duke of Orleans will be King; if a republic, you will be the President. Take upon yourself the responsibility of the republic."

M. de La Fayette assumed more hesitation than he really felt. Nobly disinterested, although relying much on his own views, and almost as fearful of responsibility as enamoured of popularity, it gratified him more to treat for and in the name of the people, than to aspire to the government in his own person. That a republic under his presidency should be formed, he looked upon as a possible chance, if he wished to promote it; and also that no monarchy should be established except under his consent, and on the condition of resembling a republic. Either alternative would satisfy his wishes; I will not say ambition, for ambition he had none. M. de La Fayette desired to be the popular patron of the Duke of Orleans, and not his rival.

Many will disbelieve me, and yet I do not hesitate to

affirm that the Duke of Orleans was also unambitious. Moderate and prudent, notwithstanding the activity of his mind, and the changeable vivacity of his impressions, he had long foreseen the chance which might elevate him to the throne, but without seeking it, and more disposed to dread than desire its fulfilment. After the long calamities of emigration, and the recent trial of the Hundred Days, one predominant idea possessed him:—he was determined not to be again and necessarily involved in the errors which the elder branch of his house might commit, and in the consequences to which those errors might lead. On the 31st of May, 1830, he gave a fête at the Palais-Royal to his brother-in-law, the King of Naples, who had arrived in Paris a few days before. Charles X. and all the royal family were present; the display of magnificence was great, the assembly brilliant and animated. “Monseigneur,” said M. de Salvandy to the Duke of Orleans, as he passed near him, “this is truly a Neapolitan festival; we are dancing on a volcano.” “Be it so,” replied the Duke; “I think with you; but at least the fault is not mine; I shall not have to reproach myself with making no effort to open the eyes of the king. But what am I to do? nothing is listened to. Heaven only knows where they will be in six months! But I well know where I shall be. Under any circumstances, my family and I remain in this palace. No matter what danger may arise, I shall not stir from hence. I will never separate my own lot and that of my children from the fate of the country. Such is my fixed determination.” This thought had held the foremost place in the conduct of the Duke of Orleans through the

whole course of the Restoration; he was equally decided not to become a conspirator or a victim. At that time I was completely a stranger to him. Before 1830, I had only seen him twice accidentally. I was unable to appreciate the different sentiments which might have occupied his mind; but after having for so many years had the honour of serving him, I retain a conviction that, if it had rested with him to consolidate the Restoration definitively, he would have preferred without hesitation, for himself and family as for France, the security of that future to the perspective which a new revolution might open to him.

When these prospects actually presented themselves, another sentiment powerfully influenced his conduct. That country, from which he had resolved never again to alienate himself, was in imminent danger,—in danger of relapsing into chaos. The repose as well as the liberties of France, order within and peace without, were equally compromised. We had nothing before us but tempests and darkness. Devotion and duty to our country are certainly not feelings of modern growth, unknown to our ancestors. But on these points there is a profound difference between their ideas and dispositions and ours. Fidelity to particular persons, superiors or equals, constituted the dominant principle and feeling under the old state of French society. This was derived from its origin and early institutions. Personal and social ties were identical. During the long course of our history, civilization expanded; the number of independent and influential persons increased immensely. Individuals separated themselves from the private groups to which

they had hitherto belonged, to live and mix in a general sphere. National unity raised itself above hierarchical organization. The state, the nation, the country, those collective and abstract existences, became real, living beings, objects of respect and affection. Duty and devotion to France, assumed, with a great majority of minds, an empire superior to that of the ancient attachments and ties of fidelity to persons. Noble and disinterested sentiments animated reciprocally on the banks of the Rhine, the republican levies and the army of Condé, in their lamentable combats; but their moral and political faith differed as much in nature as in object. The last suffered and died to remain faithful to their king, their class, and their name; the first, to defend and save that country, an idea without form, a name common to all, from which they had only received the honour of being born in its bosom, and to which, from the single motive that it was France, they believed themselves to be entirely devoted. The same transformation had taken place in civil life. The influence of public interests, desires, and dangers, had become stronger than that of private relations and affections. It was from profound causes, and under the dominion of great social facts, that instinctively and without premeditation, the two parties in 1789 called themselves royalists and patriots. With the one, duty and attachment to the King, the head and representative of the country,—with the other, duty and direct attachment to the country itself, formed the principle, the bond, and prevailing sentiment. A royalist by position, the Duke of Orleans, through events and the influences of his life, had become

a patriot. The country was seriously compromised; he alone could extricate it from the peril. This was not the only motive, but undoubtedly the most powerful one, which guided his determination.

There is little sense and honour in forgetting or misrepresenting, when the spur no longer presses, the true causes of events. Necessity weighing equally upon all, on royalists as well as liberals, on the Duke of Orleans and on France,—the necessity of choosing between the new dynasty and anarchy,—such was, in 1830, with honest minds, uninfluenced by revolutionary passion, the determining cause of the change of government. At the critical moment, this necessity was universally felt,—by the attached friends of King Charles X., as also by the most ardent spirits of the Opposition. What power but the conviction of a paramount emergency could have led to such a prompt and general adhesion of the very men who deplored the event? How can we otherwise interpret the words uttered in the Chamber of Peers by the Duke de Fitz-James, the Duke de Mortemart, the Marquis de Vêrac, and so many other honourable royalists, when swearing allegiance to the new system?¹ Others

¹ Of these speeches I shall only quote here that of the Duke de Fitz-James, at the sitting of the Chamber of Peers on the 10th of August, 1830, bearing the impress of a loyalty and patriotism at once sincere and sad:—

“Absent for a few days only, on a journey of short continuance, I suddenly learned that a terrible thunderclap had burst over France, and that the family of our kings had disappeared in the tempest. The cannon which proclaimed a new sovereign seemed to await me yesterday on my arrival in the capital, and today I am called to this Chamber to take a new oath of allegiance.

“I have never trifled with my pledged faith, and with me the sanctity of an oath has been held inviolable. I have taken only two during •

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who, through attachment or a sense of honour, retired entirely from public life, by that very retirement, as inactive as it was voluntary, established the true and elevated character of the event that had taken place. On that day all thinking men were governed by the same conviction. Through monarchy alone France could escape from the yawning abyss, and but one monarchy was possible. Its establishment was a universal deliverance. "I also," said M. Royer-Collard to me, "am amongst the conquerors, but I am mournful in the midst of triumph."

In matters that relate to myself, I wish to conceal no particle of the truths which time has taught me. In presence of this certain and urgent necessity, we were

my life. The first, to Louis XVI., of blessed memory, when I had scarcely emerged from infancy; the second, in 1814, to the constitutional Charter, the principles of which had long penetrated my heart, and which I saw with transport become the law of France. I defy any living being to accuse me of infidelity to these two oaths. Perhaps you will do me the justice of admitting that in this Chamber I have never delivered an opinion not based upon the very text of the Charter, and I affirm upon my honour that since the age of sixteen my heart has never recognized a thought except in perfect accordance with its principles. Tried by misfortune from my entry into life, I was soon taught by adversity to submit to the decrees of Providence, and to fortify myself against storms. My family has long known what it is to adhere to the losing cause, and in that respect we are not now in our novitiate.

"Undoubtedly I deplore, and shall continue to lament, the fall of Charles X. Long honoured by his notice, no one is better acquainted than myself with the virtues of his heart; and even when deceived by ministers, more weak if possible than treacherous,—when, too vainly alas! I endeavoured to make him listen to the truth which had been so criminally withheld, I protest once more, and I shall ever continue to do so, that I never heard him utter a wish but for the happiness of the French nation and the prosperity of France. Duty calls upon me to render him this justice; these sentiments, which will live for ever in my heart, and would suffocate me if I restrained them, I delight in giving

too ready to acknowledge and act on it. It is one of the chief advantages of liberal institutions, that men long accustomed to their exercise yield slowly to the yoke of emergency, and struggle much before they resign themselves to it; in such manner that reforms and revolutions are only brought about when they are really imperative and recognized beforehand by public opinion strongly tested. We were very far from that clear and determined wisdom. Our minds were full of the English Revolution of 1688, of its success, of the noble and free government it had founded, and of the glorious prosperity it had purchased for the nation. We were inspired with the ambition and hope of accomplishing a similar work, of securing the greatness with the liberty

vent to before this assembly, and I pity those to whom they could give offence.

"Yes, to my last breath, while a drop of blood circulates in my heart,—on the scaffold, should I be doomed to carry my head there,—I will loudly assert my love and respect for my old master. I will proclaim his virtues, I will say that he merited a different fate, and that the French people, who knew him not, have treated him with injustice.

"But, at this moment, I am exclusively a Frenchman, and I feel that at the crisis in which my country is placed, I owe myself entirely to France.

"This grand consideration for the national safety is undoubtedly the only cause which can have moved so many prudent minds to promulgate with such precipitation the acts which, during the last six days, have decided the destiny of France. All was consummated, and seeing anarchy ready to invade and devour us, carrying in its train despotism and foreign invasion, they have doubtless said, 'Let us place ourselves even above laws and principles to save the country.' Such motives could not find me deaf to their influence.

"To them alone I sacrifice the feelings which for fifty years have attached me to life. Acting upon me with irresistible force, they have opened my mouth to pronounce the oath I am now required to take."

of our country, and of advancing ourselves in the pursuit of this design. We had too much confidence in our foresight and strength. We were too much occupied with the views of our own minds, and thought too little of the real state of facts around us. In 1688, there were in the constitution of society and the state of public feeling in England, means of government, and restraining points on the brink of revolution, which have no existence in France at the present day. Neither was it a sudden and isolated act, such as the decrees of July, which roused the English nation. At the close of the reign of Charles II., and under that of James, his successor, they had known all the excesses, and suffered all the evils, of a long, cruel, and varied tyranny. Every right had been violated, every interest wounded, every party smitten by turns: and it was against the royalist section itself, against the most confidential friends and zealous servants of the Crown that the first blows had been directed. The necessity and the spirit of resistance had become profound and inveterate, expanding itself through every gradation of society, overpowering even the memory of ancient struggles and the ties of earlier associations. To such an extent had this been carried, that when the Revolution of 1688 exploded, it was anticipated and received by men of the most opposite tendencies, by many Tories as well as by the Whigs, by the aristocracy and the people. It obtained partizans and defenders from all points of the political horizon, and from the united feelings of the country. For our Revolution of 1830 we had neither the same profound causes, nor the same varied supports. We were not

delivering ourselves from an intolerable tyranny. All classes were not combined in opposition to a common oppressor. We attempted a far greater enterprise with very inferior forces, much less capable either of supporting the contest with energy or of restraining it within the limits of justice and sound judgment.

We were not even impressed with the weight of the burthen we assumed, for we took pains to increase it. Not content with having a monarchy to found, we desired also to make a new constitution, and to change the Charter with the dynasty. For this, no necessity whatever existed. The Charter had passed with power and credit through the rudest trials. In spite of obstacles and hostile attempts, it had been found sufficient, during sixteen years, to defend the rights, liberties, and interests of the country. Alternately appealed to, with different views, by opposite parties, it had protected and restrained them all, by turns. The King, to escape from its dominion, had been constrained to violate its conditions, but it had not perished under this attack. In the streets as in the Chambers it had remained the flag of resistance and victory. We ourselves were mad enough to hurl down and rend this standard.

But to speak the truth, with the greater part of those who lent their hands to the work, it was not pure fantasy. Profound instincts were concealed under this movement. The predominating desire and crime of revolution is the love and sin of destroying, for the boastful pleasure of creating again. In times tainted by this malady, man looks upon all that exists before his eyes, persons and things, rights and facts, the past and the

present, as so much inert matter, of which he may dispose freely, and mould and remould according to his own will. He persuades himself that the mind contains isolated and perfect ideas which give him absolute control over everything, and by authority of which he can destroy at any cost or hazard all that now is, to reproduce it according to their impression. Such had been, in 1789, the capital mistake of France. In 1830, we endeavoured to fall into it once more.

I may here assume a new form of language, and no longer use the term *we*. As soon as this essentially revolutionary tendency manifested itself, the parties engaged in the great work then in progress of accomplishment, saw at once how widely they differed amongst themselves, and separated in consequence. The policy of resistance dates from the revision of the Charter.

Many were desirous that this revision should be slowly carried out, submitted to solemn debates, and that an entirely new constitution should spring from thence, which might be called the work of the national will. We had just been furnished with a ridiculous example of the obstinate and unintelligent susceptibility of these lovers of revolutionary creations. The Duke of Orleans, when accepting, on the 31st of July, the office of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, terminated his first proclamation with these words :—“ *The Charter will henceforward become a truth.*” This implicit recognition of the Charter, even for its reformation, displeased some of the commissioners who had repaired to the Palais-Royal ; and I know not through what agency or at what precise moment they substituted in the ‘*Moniteur*’ of the 2nd

of August this absurd phrase :—"A Charter will henceforward become a truth ;" an alteration which the ' *Moniteur*' on the following day, the 3rd of August, denied by a formal *erratum*. While they repudiated thus the old Charter, they wished to introduce into the new one many changes, all favourable to the abrupt extension of popular liberty; and the exclusive supremacy of the democratic principle.

Our resistance on these points was decided, although incomplete. We maintained the Charter as the pre-existing and permanent constitution of the country ; but we did nothing to prevent the puerile gratification of calling it "*Charter of 1830* ;" as if a constitution sixteen years old wanted to be refreshed. Amongst the changes which were here introduced, some, on experiment, were found to be more injurious than useful ; others were premature ; two or three only might have been considered necessary. The complete fixity of the Charter, proclaimed on the day following the Revolution, would certainly have availed more, both for the liberties and repose of the country. But no one would have ventured such a proposition. While we were deliberating, revolutionary passions and pretensions murmured round us, even to the door of our assembly-room ; and beyond its walls, the new government, still unsettled and almost unknown, had neither strength nor means of action. We were unable to maintain the Chamber of Peers on its constitutional basis ; and with great difficulty and to no purpose, adjourned the inquiry on the question. Through the strenuous efforts of M. Dupin and M. Villermain, the permanence of the magistracy was secured. On a single

point our success was complete,—we got rid of all delay and futile debate. In two sittings the Charter was modified; in eight days the Revolution was closed, and the Government established. While struggling against these initiatory storms, a party began to form itself, as yet ill-combined, inexperienced, and uncertain, but seriously resolved to support constitutional monarchy, and to defend it with firmness against the spirit of revolution.

Since that epoch, and particularly since 1848, a question has been often agitated. When the Charter had been thus revised, and the Crown offered by the Chambers to the Duke of Orleans, ought we to have demanded from the people, under some form of universal suffrage, the sanction of these acts, and the acceptance of the new Charter and the new King?

If I could satisfy myself that the omission of this formality had in the slightest degree influenced, in 1848, the fall of the Government established in 1830, I should feel deep regret. I know the value that sometimes attaches to appearances, and I should consider as senseless obstinacy, and not as well-founded pride, the pretence of despising them, when they are in reality important. But the more I reflect on the subject, the more strongly I remain convinced, that the want of a vote by the nation at large occasioned no weakness to the monarchy of July during its course, and had no influence on its final reverses. The adhesion of France, in 1830, to the new Government, was perfectly free, general, and sincere.¹ The country was more desirous of

¹ A witness above suspicion, M. de La Fayette, wrote thus on the 26th of November, 1830, to the Count de Surveilliers (Joseph Bona-

seeing it established, than jealous of an express voice in the matter; and we obeyed the true wishes, as well as the clearly understood interests of France, by putting a speedy end to the revolution, without complicated conditions or delay, and by giving a regular authority to the head of the State. But this motive, although extremely powerful, was not the only one which determined us to abstain from any appeal to popular intervention, and to wind up the drama without submitting it to the official and explicit suffrage of the public.

We believed that a monarchy was necessary to, and desired by France; and this we intended to establish. I honour a republic; it has its vices, its inherent and inevitable dangers, in common with all human institutions; but it is a noble form of government, which responds to many exigences of our nature, to many of the great interests of society, and may harmonize with the position, antecedents, and tendencies of any defined epoch or of any specific nation. I should undoubtedly have been a republican in the United States of America when they separated themselves from England. A federative republic was, for them, a natural and consistent government, the only form suited to their habits, their requirements, and their feelings. I am a monarchist in

parte):—"With respect to the general consent, it is not only the Chambers and the population of Paris, the 80,000 national guards, and 300,000 spectators at the Champ-de-Mars; but it is the deputations from all the towns and villages of France, which my duties place me in the way of receiving in detail;—in a word, it is a pile of adhesions, voluntary and indisputable, which confirms me more and more in the conviction that whatever we have done is in unison with the true wishes of a great majority of the French people." (*Memoirs of General La Fayette*, vol. vi. p. 471.)

France, for the same reasons and the same interests. As a republic was to the United States in 1776, so is a monarchy, in our days, the obvious and true system for France, the most favourable to public liberty and peace, the best suited for the development of salutary and legitimate strength, and for the repression of perverse and destructive agencies.

But monarchy, in fact, is very different from a word and a semblance. There was as much thoughtlessness as confusion of ideas in continually speaking of a throne encompassed by republican institutions as the best of republics. Free institutions are not of necessity republican. Whatever may be the analogy of certain forms, constitutional monarchy and republicanism are essentially different, and both are compromised and altered in their true character when associated together.

The monarchy we proposed to found was neither elective nor republican. Compelled by extreme measures to break violently with the elder branch of our reigning dynasty, we called in the younger to maintain royalty while defending our liberties. We did not adopt a King of our own selection ; we treated with a prince who stood near the throne, and who alone, by ascending it, could guarantee our public rights, and secure us from revolutions. An appeal to popular suffrage would have given to the reformed monarchy the precise character we ardently desired to detach from it. Such a course would have been an adoption of the republican principle, profiting by the check which the monarchical system had just undergone, to extinguish the latter completely, and to take possession of the country under the royal title.

Between the two lines of policy which at that time stood opposed to each other, destined to a long and doubtful contest, my personal choice was soon made. Beyond the general position of affairs, some particular facts, little important in appearance and scarcely noticed, struck me on the instant, as a light from above, and at once decided my course.

While, by our acts and words in the capacity of Deputies, we endeavoured to preserve the Charter by modifying it, and to restore the tottering monarchy, revolutionary ideas and passions boldly manifested themselves around us in declared opposition to our views. On the 31st of July, a few hours after the deputation from the Chamber had invited the Duke of Orleans to assume the office of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, the walls of Paris were covered with the following placard :—

*“ The Central Committee of the Twelfth Division of Paris to their Fellow-Citizens :—*A proclamation has been issued in the name of the Duke of Orleans, who announces himself as Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, and who, as a sole advantage, offers to concede the Charter without amelioration or preliminary guarantees. The French people ought to protest against and annul an act which violates their true interests. The nation, which has so energetically conquered its rights, has not been consulted as to the form of government under which it is called upon to live. It has not been consulted, because the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Peers, who held their authority under the Government of Charles X., have fallen with him, and, in

consequence, are incapable of representing the people of France."

At the same moment another committee, known under the title of the *Assemblée Lointaine*, and which included some important persons, amongst whom were Deputies, decided, "That a deputation should wait on the Duke of Orleans, to apprise him that the nation refused to acknowledge him as Lieutenant-General; that the Provisional Government alone ought to be invested with the necessary powers for assuring public tranquillity, and the formation of popular assemblies; and that the nation would continue in arms to maintain its rights by force, if compelled to have recourse to violent measures."

Even amongst the avowed partisans of the Duke of Orleans, the enthusiasm or habit of the revolutionary feeling extended so far, that in the proclamation issued on his behalf these words were included:—"At this moment the Peers and Deputies are assembled in their respective chambers, to proclaim the Duke of Orleans, and to impose on him a Charter in the name of the people."

On the same day, as soon as he had accepted the office of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, his Royal Highness mounted on horseback, to proceed to the Hôtel de Ville, as a mark of deferential courtesy to the national guard and their commandant M. de La Fayette. We all accompanied him on foot across the barricades, which were scarcely opened. There was little appearance of strength in this anxiety of the rising power to seek an investiture of greater popularity than that which it held from the elected representatives of the country. But the

aspect of the people was even more significant,—they pressed round us, without violence but without respect, and as if feeling their sovereignty in the streets through which we passed to present them with a King. We were compelled, for our own preservation, and also to protect the Duke of Orleans, to grasp each other firmly by the hand, and thus to form on his right and left two moving hedges of Deputies. As we reached the quay of the Louvre, a mass of women and children rushed upon and surrounded us, exclaiming, “*Long live our Deputies!*” They attended us to the Place de Grève, dancing and singing the *Marseillaise*. Cries and questions of every kind burst incessantly forth from this mob. Pointing to the Duke of Orleans, they demanded, “Who is that mounted gentleman? Is he a general? Is he a prince?” “I hope,” said a female to the man whose arm she held, “he is not a Bourbon!” I was much more deeply impressed by our situation in the midst of that crowd and their attitude, than even by the scene which followed a few moments after at the Hôtel de Ville, and the apostrophes addressed by General Dubourg to the Duke of Orleans. What future perils already revealed themselves for that new-born monarchy, which alone seemed capable of conjuring down the present dangers of the country!

During the following days, when the government had commenced to act, I went frequently to the Palais-Royal, at first as a commissioner, and afterwards as minister of the Interior. At the gates of the palace, in the vestibule, there were no sentinels, no police, no official guardians of order and security. Simple citizens, custodians

of their own accord, or placed there by I know not who, were seated or laying on the benches and the stairs, playing at cards and receiving their comrades. There was nothing of importance to reprehend in the demeanour of these voluntary guards, and if their ascendancy had been but a momentary accident I should probably have lost remembrance of it; but the expression of their faces, their manners, their words, all indicated that even there they still considered themselves the masters, and that great would be their discontent on the day when order, which they maintained as much for evil as for good, would no longer lie at their disposal.

From the 5th to the 7th of August, while the Chamber was occupied with the revision of the Charter, groups assembled in the approaches to the hall, in the court, and in the garden, conversing with excitement on the questions debated within. They comprised nearly all the *young members of the bar, the schools, and the press*; not tumultuous, but ardent and imperious in the expression of their ideas and wishes. Armand Carrel and Godefroy Cavaignac might occasionally be seen amongst them. Of the deputies, they considered M. de La Fayette and Dupont de l'Eure as their standard-bearers. In going in and coming out, I paused in the midst of these parties, with whom my lectures and writings had obtained for me some consideration. We spoke of the Monarchy, of the two Chambers, of the electoral system, and of the hereditary peerage, which question happened to be the order of the day. I thus ascertained to what extent republican prejudices and projects had taken root with this generation, brought up in the bosom of secret societies

and conspiracies. In their idea, monarchy was merely a nominal and temporary concession, accorded against their will, and which they intended to sell dearly. The hereditary peerage they refused to admit on any terms, or any other element opposed to pure democracy. They were prepared to repeat the insurrection rather than yield this point, and with great difficulty conceded the adjournment of the question. Their political creed, at every hazard, was summed up in the entire possession of the elective power, emanating from universal suffrage, and in an appeal to resistance if this legitimate supremacy, as they interpreted it, should assume the appearance of being violated. This was, in fact, to demand the permanent empire of force under the pretext of right, and the continuance of revolution in place of social security.

I received a written evidence of this diseased state of many minds, which impressed me so strongly that I have preserved the document. On the 6th of August, as I repaired to the Palais-Royal to attend a council, one of the most sincere and distinguished of these young men stopped me at the foot of the staircase, and placed a paper in my hands, which, with a tone of strong emotion, he recommended to my most serious notice. The contents were literally these:—

“The position of affairs is misunderstood entirely.

“We must be national and strong, above all other considerations, and without delay.

“The debates are interminable, and will wear out the firmest.

“The Chamber of Deputies is worthless; this is evident now, and will become more so shortly.

“The governing power, whatever it may be, should act on the instant. We are pressed forward, and in three days, perhaps, we shall no longer be able to restrain those who are behind us, and who wish to advance still further.

“Let the Lieutenant-General propose this evening or tomorrow to the *single* Chamber of Deputies, a republican constitution under the monarchical form, and a declaration of rights, to be submitted to the acceptance of the people through a simple *yes* or *no*, within six months.

“During the interval, let the Lieutenant-General be considered the *authorized* provisional government.

“Let the Chamber be dissolved immediately after *this* announcement.

“Let us brand the Restoration, the men and the acts of the Restoration.

“Let us march boldly towards the Rhine, carry our frontier there, and continue the national movement by open war: let this be carried on by what has provoked it. We have only to take the initiative, to rally and recruit the army, to hold it in hand, to associate it with the Revolution. We shall thus speak to Europe, caution and compel her to go with us.

“To organize and rely on the nation is indispensable, and presents no danger.

“There is no modification in the property to be actually realized; and consequently no civil discord to apprehend.

“Let these measures be adopted, and embarrassments disappear: the position is great, solid, and without peril. It is only to *will*, and all is done.

- “ On these terms, we, declared republicans, pledge ourselves to the service of the Government, our persons, our abilities, and our means; *and we hold ourselves responsible for internal tranquillity.*”

This text requires no commentary. It was the republic, at once timid and haughty, not daring to proclaim its proper name, and impose itself openly on France, but arrogantly demanding to be taken, under the mantle of royalty, to dream and expand at its ease. If such views had prevailed, what would have become of society in France and peace in Europe? It is not the Republic that would have been established. Neither in 1830 nor in 1848 was that form in harmony with the situation, the interests, the natural instincts, the general ideas, and the liberal sentiments of the country. Under a false name we should have had nothing but a revolutionary chaos, a deplorable mixture of anarchy and tyranny, a continual nightmare of turbulent and futile movements, projects upon projects, lies upon lies, with every possible variety of suffering and danger rapidly succeeding each other, after the explosion of a thousand chimeras and the display of innumerable pretensions.

I will not say that I saw clearly, and to the end, into this future; but I caught glimpses enough to devote myself, body and mind, to resistance, as to the duty of a rational, civilized being, of an honest man and a good citizen. And when we applied ourselves in earnest to the task,—the new Government in its collective strength, and I in my individual capacity as Minister of the Interior,—the course of events and the experience of affairs confirmed me fully in my presentiments and resolutions.

CHAPTER II.

MY MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.

MY FIRST CONSIDERATION ON ASSUMING THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.—JOURNEY AND EMBARKATION OF CHARLES X.—COMPOSITION AND INHERENT QUALITIES OF THE CABINET OF THE 11TH OF AUGUST, 1830.—ITS DIFFERENT ELEMENTS.—MM. LAFFITTE, DUPONT DE L'EURE, MARSHAL GÉRARD, AND BIGNON.—MM. CASIMIR PÉRIER, THE DUKE DE BROGLIE, BARON LOUIS, COUNT MOLÉ, GENERAL SÉBASTIANI, DUPIN, AND MYSELF.—POSITION OF THE KING IN THIS COUNCIL.—EXTENSIVE DUTIES AND DEFECTIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.—MY LABOURS.—THE OPPOSITION ACCUSES ME OF DOING NOTHING.—MY STATEMENT OF THE CONDITION OF THE KINGDOM IN SEPTEMBER, 1830.—MY RELATIONS WITH THE PREFECTS.—MY COMMUNICATIONS WITH M. DE LA FAYETTE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE NATIONAL GUARDS.—MY ADMINISTRATION WITH REGARD TO LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND THE ARTS.—MY PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.—EUROPE DESIRES THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE.—DISPOSITIONS OF ENGLAND.—OF RUSSIA AND THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.—OF AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA.—THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY IN FRANCE COMPLETELY MISTAKES THE STATE OF EUROPEAN POLICY.—KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE COMPREHENDS AND TURNS IT TO ACCOUNT.—SENTIMENTS OF FRANCE WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN REVOLUTIONS.—M. DE TALLEYRAND AMBASSADOR IN LONDON.—WHY HE WAS SUITED TO THAT MISSION.—IS IT TRUE THAT KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE ALONE SELECTED HIM?—OUR POLICY TOWARDS BELGIUM, PIEDMONT, AND SPAIN.—MY CONDUCT TOWARDS THE SPANISH REFUGEES.—RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CABINET AND THE CHAMBERS.—THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES IS COMPLETED BY NEW ELECTIONS.—M. PASQUIER IS APPOINTED PRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER OF PEERS.—BILLS PRESENTED TO THE CHAMBERS.—PROPOSITIONS ORIGINATING IN THE CHAMBERS.—MY FIRST APPEARANCES IN THE TRIBUNE.—AGITATION OF PARTIES.—DEBATE UPON THE CLUBS.—CLOSING OF THE CLUBS.—THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES IMPEACHES THE MINISTERS OF CHARLES X.—PROPOSITION OF M. DE TRACY AND ADDRESS OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES FOR THE ABOLITION OF THE PUNISHMENT OF

DEATH.—REVOLUTIONARY TUMULTS.—THEY ARE DIRECTED AGAINST
THE CASTLE OF VINCENTES AND THE PALAIS-ROYAL.—DISSOLUTION OF
THE CABINET.—ITS CAUSES.—MY FEELING ON LEAVING OFFICE.—
LETTER OF M. AUGUSTIN THIERRY.

(From JULY 31 to NOVEMBER 2, 1830.)

ON the 31st of July, the eve of its dissolution, the municipal Commission, assuming, under the arrogant influence of M. Mauguin, the airs of a provisional government, indulged in the frivolous pleasure of appointing to various ministerial offices, commissioners even more provisional than themselves, for they did not exercise, even for a single day, the functions delegated to them. Amongst the number, I had been named commissioner for Public Instruction. On the following morning, August the 1st, the Duke of Orleans, in his capacity of Lieutenant-General, called me under the same title to the Interior; and on the 11th, after he had accepted the crown, I entered the Cabinet he then formed as minister for that department.

At that moment, and despite the multitude and urgency of the affairs with which I was overwhelmed, one subject in particular occupied my attention above all others. The revolution was accomplished. No resistance presented itself from any quarter. The King, the Charter, the Chambers, the Cabinet, all the new powers were in vigorous action. But Charles X. was still in France, manifestly incapable of maintaining his ground, yet giving no indications of an intention to move. In vain four commissioners, Marshal Maison, General Jacqueminot, Messrs. Odilon-Barrot and de Schonen, had repaired to the castle of Rambouillet to persuade him to

depart, and to watch over his safety: they returned to Paris without success. Nevertheless, on the 3rd of August, disquieted at the approach of the popular chaos which verged towards Rambouillet, whither the commissioners had gone a second time, moved by some pressing words of M. Odilon-Barrot, and the statements, more opportune than exact, of Marshal Maison, respecting the number of the assailants, Charles X. resolved to quit his last royal residence, and to move to some point on the coast for embarkation. But he travelled slowly, stopping here and there, hesitating as to his route, *evading the remarks* which the commissioners sometimes pressed on him to regulate and hasten his march, and appearing to expect the intervention of some favourable incident to change his determination and destiny.

We also, in Paris, were anxiously engaged in watching possible events, but with very different impressions and expectations. No chance of a rising or civil commotion in favour of the fallen royalty presented itself; its most devoted adherents remained in profound repose. M. de La Rochejaquelein wrote thus to several journals:—"You have been misinformed in stating that the Marquis and Marchioness of La Rochejaquelein had arrived in La Vendée to excite an insurrection; they are residing quietly in their own house near Paris." The army was equally anxious with the country to adhere to the new Government. The very regiments that, with a noble sentiment of discipline and honour, had remained in attendance on Charles X., received from him, as a deliverance, the order to return to their quarters. We were

much more apprehensive of revolutionary passions than royal regrets. It was a dangerous task to conduct the dethroned King for thirteen through numerous masses of people everywhere in a state of ferment, given up to anger, to menaces, to the evil promptings of revenge or precaution, excited by the struggle of the eve or the uncertainty of the morrow. However, the honour of the new sovereignty, of its councillors, and of all the honest men who had adopted it, was engaged in this difficult trial. It was absolutely necessary that Charles X. and the royal family should arrive at the termination of their bitter journey, not only without obstacle or insult, but with tranquillity and public respect. I was assailed with alarming reports. Crowds were assembled on different points of the road, threatening alternately to arrest Charles X. and to hasten his departure by violence. The commissioners who accompanied him, Marshal Maison, MM. Odilon-Barrot, de Schonen, and de La Pommeraye, exercised a generous and skilful activity in dissipating these dangers; but could they always succeed? Their moderation sometimes threw suspicion on themselves. It was complained that in the midst of the royal train they did not always display the tricoloured cockade and scarf. I wrote to them, to quicken their movements, to avoid all pretext for popular irritation, and to do all in their power to place Charles X. and his family beyond the risk of danger. M. Odilon-Barrot answered me on the 9th of August, at the very moment when King Louis-Philippe solemnly accepted the crown and swore fidelity to the Charter. "You know," said he, "that our mission is

entirely one of deference and humanity; the private recommendations of the Duke and Duchess of Orleans have made us still more scrupulous. A sentiment of respect and deference has restrained us from ostentatiously displaying, before an aged, unfortunate monarch, and the ladies who accompany him, these symbols which deeply wound them; but in public, and in presence of his suite, we have never concealed our colours." M. de Schonen also said, "As to the slow progress of this funeral procession of royalty, it arises from no want of remonstrances on our part; but what can we reply to an unhappy old man who says, 'I am fatigued'?"

On the 17th of August, when I learned that Charles X. had embarked on the previous evening at Cherbourg, in presence of a silent and respectful crowd, I experienced a real sensation of deliverance. The note which, at the same time, the King, Louis-Philippe, addressed to me, began with this sentence:—"At last, here are despatches from our commissioners which relieve my heart." A sincere emotion, however it may be judged by vulgar minds. The King, at that period, dreaded some tragical catastrophe much more than he feared a rival.

While two American packets, escorted by two French men-of-war, rapidly conveyed the old King and his family from France, all France hastened to Paris. From every part of the country thousands of visitors flocked in daily: some, to be present at a grand spectacle; some, to satisfy that necessity of motion without definite object which great events excite; and the greater number, to seek their portion in the fruits of a victory which they considered the triumph of their cause and party. It is a

strange chaos which springs from revolution in a country where centralization predominates. Agitation extends in all quarters to concentrate again on a single point. In every family and in every head, all ideas and plans, desires and hopes, feel themselves incited to revival. And these collected pretensions, these wild reveries of imagination or interest, pressed round the new power, demanding aliment.

The Cabinet just formed was more calculated to augment than diminish this confused fermentation. Composed of eleven Members, seven ministers with portfolios, and four for consultation, they had no unity beyond that which their first steps absolutely required during the first days. We were all sincerely anxious to consolidate the constitutional monarchy which sprang up from the Revolution. But when from this general desire it became necessary to pass to defined and daily action; when we were called upon to settle in detail the Government of this monarchy and to put it in practice, animated and important differences burst forth, and were repeated at every moment. Not only were we divided between two tendencies which had exhibited themselves ever since the revision of the Charter,—progress and resistance, the desire of reform and respect for traditional laws,—but in each of these distinct sections, combination was alike deficient; important varieties of opinion presented themselves, rendering it apparent that men outwardly agreed would speedily differ and perhaps contend, and which deprived the existing authorities of the power of escaping from the same confusion of ideas, pretensions, and chances that fomented round them.

Of the eleven Ministers, governing or consulting, who held seats in the Cabinet, eight are dead : MM. Laffitte, Dupont de l'Eure, Marshal Gérard, Baron Bignon, Count Molé, Baron Louis, Marshal Sébastiani, and M. Casimir Périer. Three only, the Duke de Broglie, M. Dupin, and myself, still survive. When I commenced these Memoirs, I asked myself, not without perplexity, with what degree of liberty I should speak of men, friends or adversaries, whom I had closely studied, whether in the exercise or the struggles of power. The dead belong to history ; they have a right to justice, and history has an equal claim to freedom. I shall use the joint privilege with candour. But the living still elbow each other in this world ; they demand mutual forbearance, and this I have promised myself never to forget.

Between the four members of the Council of 1830 who were claimed by the progressive party, personal importance and political ardour were unequally divided. A brave soldier of the Revolution and the Empire, Marshal Gérard remained faithful to the instincts and friends of his youth, without taking much interest in debates on principles or party struggles. From military habits he had learned to love order and support power ; but in this course he more readily compromised his person than his popularity. With a just and even a delicate mind in practical life, but inactive and restricted, he was averse to seeking, amidst complicated situations and questions, the line dictated by duty and honour. He paid little attention to arguments which opposed his ideas and tastes, and entered less into discussions on the policy he served, provided that there

was nothing in it to detach him from his standard. M. Bignon, on the contrary, brought to the aid of his party a superabundant power of dissertation; not in the interior of the Council or in private conversation: there he was brief and embarrassed, not liking to engage in personal contest, or to commit himself on special subjects by positive opinions. It was in the repose of his study, while writing pamphlets for the public or speeches for the Chamber, that he applied the resources of an information more specious than solid, of a diplomatic experience somewhat inferior, and of a mind solemnly superficial. He thus acquired, amongst the bulk of his readers and listeners, the reputation of a deep politician, and supplied them with facts and arguments without exercising real influence. Neither Marshal Gérard nor M. Bignon were, in the Cabinet of 1830, ready and effective leaders of the party of movement.

MM. Dupont de l'Eure and Laffitte alone possessed and merited solid weight. I have watched too closely the audacity and time-serving of personal interests not to place full value on the sincerity and constancy of convictions, even when opposed to my own. While we were acting together, every sitting of the Council taught me more and more how great was the difference between M. Dupont de l'Eure and myself. Whether he was aware of it or not, the ideas and reminiscences of 1792 governed his conduct and his thoughts. He was not intentionally and of his own knowledge either a revolutionist or a republican; but he brought to the dawning Cabinet of the constitutional monarchy, the prejudices, mistrusts, demands, and antipathies of a vulgar demo-

cratic opposition ; and he was unable to find within himself that elevation of mind and manners which in his novel situation could alone have enabled him to understand the conditions of a free government. On the contrary, the more he became practised in the exercise of power, the more he recoiled within his old habits, *with a certain degree of rough pride* ; for while he suffered himself to be governed by coarse, ignorant advisers, he held an honest and obstinate faith in his own ideas, believing them conformable to justice, and advantageous for the public good, and feeling himself ever ready to sacrifice to that object the interests of his ambition or his fortune. These qualities sufficed to win for him popular esteem, and to render him important to his party, although incapable of leading or restraining them.

M. Laffitte owed his popularity and influence to very different causes. He had infinitely more intelligence, and a mind more liberal, varied, and elevated than that of M. Dupont de L'Éure. An intelligent and decided man of business, a free and agreeable converser ; anxious to please all who came in contact with him, and kind to those he liked, he was ever ready to understand and gratify the whole world. Although, in fact, extremely susceptible to the revolutionary influences that surrounded him, he had, on his own account, no general or defined ideas ; no determined or obstinate party views : he was neither an aristocrat nor a democrat, neither a monarchist nor a republican ; attached to progressive movement by natural instinct, and more for personal gratification than from any profound design ; seeking importance from vanity rather than ambition ; mingling,

weakness with carelessness, and impertinence with good nature; a veritable financier of high comedy, engaged in politics as his parallels under the old system were with worldly and literary indulgences; desirous, above all things, of being courted, flattered, and praised; trusting as much to success as to merit; the same with the King and the people, in revolutions as in matters of speculative business; and treating all questions, whether monetary or political, with a presumptuous levity which believed that it could reconcile everything; dreaming of no obstacles, and foreseeing no reverses. In 1830, he had reached the summit of his destiny, happy and proud at having witnessed, or rather, as he tried to think, produced, a revolution which satisfied the country, and a King who pleased himself; and, expecting to remain powerful, popular, and rich, without bestowing much thought or care on the labours of government.

As partisans of the policy of resistance, we had in the Council the advantage of numbers over the patrons of progressive movement. But number is not always strength. If not disunion, great diversities of position and inclination existed amongst us, and produced weakness in a contest which became more ardent from day to day. Much opposed, in reality, to the spirit of revolution, Marshal Sébastiani and M. Casimir Périer maintained a certain degree of reserve: the one to be in a condition to remain in the Cabinet under any circumstances, and to support the King, whose confidence he had already acquired; the other, with a more elevated foresight, thinking that a day would come when he might be called upon to resist the anarchy he detested,

and wishing to hold himself in for that emergency. Baron Louis resolutely practised, in the financial department, the policy of order, and adhered to it in all other matters, but without taking much share in the contest, and always following behind M. Casimir Périer. M. Molé possessed this advantage, that all the members of the Council, partisans within of movement or resistance, had declared, externally, for the policy of peace, and were thankful to him for carrying it out with dignity. M. Dupin held himself rather aloof and on the watch, a friend to order and the King, but cautious and changeable, careful not to compromise himself beyond what was absolutely necessary, and deciding, on all occasions, according to his estimate of the comparative strength of the forces engaged, or his impression of the moment, without pledging himself to any system or any ally. As minister of the Interior, I was required incessantly to take part between the two rival policies, and my resolution was formed from the first day. Upon instinct and reflection, I had an antipathy to disorder; a contest engages more than it disturbs me, and my mind cannot resign itself to inconsistencies. Not that the policy of resistance was without its peculiar difficulty in my case; I had served the Restoration, and on that account I was disliked, and even suspected by the revolutionists. M. Molé and M. Louis had also served the Restoration, and more ostensibly than I, since both had been ministers under Louis XVIII. But their past career presented fewer points of attack. I soon became the standard-bearer of resistance, and against me the blows of its enemies were specially directed. The Duke de

Broglie supported me in this difficult struggle: he had held no office under the Restoration, and in 1830 only desired to fill the unpretending department of Public Instruction. On his own account he had few contests to engage in. But he was more a liberal than a democrat; and of a refined and elevated nature, incoherent and revolutionary policy was as unacceptable to him as to myself. Although of different origin, position, and character, we were already united, not only by a friendship already old, but by an intimate community of principles and generous sentiments, the most powerful of all ties when it really exists, as it very rarely does. We alone, in the Cabinet of 1830, acted invariably in concert and on the same side.

In the midst of a council thus divided and unsettled, the King, Louis-Philippe, had a difficult part to play. No one at that moment troubled himself with thinking of the influence that he might, or actually did, possess there. Necessity and danger were too near and too urgent to allow place for the jealousies of tranquil times. The most suspicious felt distinctly, that more compromised than any other person, both as regarded his family and himself, his honour and his safety—the prince who had just made common cause with the country had truly a right to participate in the debates and resolutions by which his own fate and that of the nation was equally to be decided. The King, therefore, presided at the Council, and entered into all discussions as freely as his ministers, without constraining them in the slightest degree. But in his personal position and in himself there were causes of serious embarrassment. Revolutionary

reminiscences had held a considerable share in the movement which called him to the throne; too much so for the mission which the throne imposed. To these reminiscences he owed the support of a host of men who flocked round him as his natural friends, but whose habits and prejudices might soon change them into vexatious, adherents or perhaps dangerous enemies.

Many of these, under the Empire, had served absolute power without scruple; but returning back to a liberal system, they resumed their original ideas and passions, and the King found them at once attached to his cause, and little calculated to serve it politically. The Revolution of 1789 had left on his own mind contradictory and weighty impressions. As a young man, he had participated with sympathy in that explosion of so many lofty expectations. The great principles of justice and humanity, of respect for the dignity and happiness of men, which form the glory and strength of that powerful epoch, had taken root in his mind. As time went on, the course of events, the vicissitudes of his own destiny, his travels in both hemispheres, had taught him to recognize the errors which to such salutary results had added such a mass of disappointment, mistake, and crime. But while enlightening himself on the Revolution, the spirit of King Louis-Philippe had not completely shaken off its influence. He had seen it at the outset so brilliant and always so strong, both in word and act, in anarchy and despotism, that it appeared to him an almost irresistible and fatal power. At the same time he felt the necessity and difficulty of contending against its passions and demands; and being convinced

that they were incompatible with free and regular government, he was by no means satisfied that such a government could resist them with success. Surrounded thus by favourable, although by discordant parties, and sometimes disturbed by the doubts of his own mind, his inclination led him, from the beginning, to shrink from a strong, decided policy, and alternately to succumb to or resist the Revolution; in the hope, by thus beating about, of gaining the tone and strength he required, to surmount the obstacles that beset the difficult Government he was called on to establish.

These complications of his position, and this uncertainty in his ideas, were perceptible in the attitude and demeanour of the King towards the very opposite councillors by whom he was surrounded. His attention above all was directed to the partisans of the popular policy. He treated M. Laffitte, who was still suffering from a sprained foot, a hurt received in the midst of the barricades, with friendly and almost anxious familiarity. His language with M. Dupont de l'Eure was full of frankness and gaiety, as if to conciliate the peasant of the Danube. Towards M. Casimir Périer he evinced strong respect, mingled however with some disquietude as to his suspicious pride. With the Duke de Broglie, M. Molé, and myself, his manners were simple and open, bearing the impress of esteem and cordiality, without caresses. His real confidence and outward deportment were not always in perfect harmony; hence, enemies and shallow observers accused him of premeditated duplicity; but this was simply the natural result of a complicated position, still undefined, and the working of a spirit as

yet inexperienced in government, and seeking with hesitation its course and its friends.

I find in the letters which, from that time, King Louis-Philippe addressed to me every day on passing affairs, evident traces of these internal fluctuations, which made him sometimes hesitate, either from not having formed his resolution or from want of confidence in its success, to adopt the measures which appeared to him sound or even necessary. On the 14th of August, 1830, in sending me a police report on the disorders by which Paris was troubled, and which no public force had repressed, he added:—"It is necessary to form a body for this express service, but the matter is difficult and delicate." Towards the middle of September, I was preparing for the Chamber a statement of the condition of the kingdom, and the changes already introduced into the administration. The King wrote thus to me on the 13th:—"Would it not be possible to indicate in your statement, that while the Government so extensively participates in the dismissals demanded by the public wish, yet no persecution takes place; individual liberty is enjoyed by all in its fullest extent; also the free passage of travellers of every class and party; that the dark closets* no longer exist; that the privacy of letters is scrupulously and conscientiously respected; that no one is molested for his opinions, whatever they may have been or may become? I do not covet the incense of compliment; but nevertheless I think it might be said to those who misconstrue my conduct and its motives—Would you have done as much for me and for us? But perhaps it will be better to reserve this for articles

in the journals. It is quite possible that the public would put a wrong construction on it; and I always say, *when in doubt, abstain*. Besides, there might be a difficulty in arranging the matter with your colleagues, and it could not be done without their consent."

The King's position, on this occasion, assuredly sprang from modesty, and I do not think it would have been difficult to have adopted this language, in concert with my colleagues. But, at that time, he was generally disposed to shrink from taking the initiative when not absolutely necessary, to avoid the slightest collision, and to confine himself within a restricted and somewhat fluctuating policy, which the divisions amongst his partisans and the doubts of his own mind induced him to look upon as alone prudent and practicable.

But this line of policy, open to the King, was close to his ministers. A system of liberty and free public discussion absolutely compels the responsible depositaries of power to make the first step; to be decided, prompt and effective in action. It is essential that at every instant, and under any circumstances, they should clearly and openly take their part between the opposite solutions of questions, the different ideas and pretensions of men. As minister of the Interior, I was more frequently called upon than any other, and on the most important and delicate occasions, to act in this manner. The department at that time included the most varied and extensive duties; not only the general administration of the departments and townships, the establishments in support of public order and charity, the police of the kingdom and the national guards, but the public work

of every kind,—agriculture, industrial labour, commerce, science, literature, the arts, and nearly all the great material and intellectual interests of the country,—were under the control of the minister of the Interior. Neither in the organization of the central power itself, nor in its relations with the local authorities, was the labour fairly divided, or the functions suitably defined. Of all the ministerial departments, that of the interior was the most overloaded and confused. I had to bear this weight, with the pressure of all the unreasonable demands, hopes, rancours, proposals, complaints, and dreaming schemes which from all points of France carried in thousands to Paris, and to my ministerial bureau, the petitioners, the accusers, the curious, the scheming projectors, the busy, and the idle. I surrendered myself entirely to this rough mission. I allowed myself only four or five hours of repose. I gave inconvenient audiences at early dawn, that I might devote the entire day to the Council, the Chambers, the public correspondence, and current affairs. My strength sufficed for the work, but gradually diminished like the waters of a spring, all the canals of which are opened without caring not to exhaust them. My fatigue became visible, and I remember that one day, at Council, M. Casimir Périer, who felt a friendship for me, said to the King, “Sire, you will want M. Guizot for a long time; tell him not to kill himself all at once in your service.”

Nevertheless loud complaints rose against the Cabinet, and against my department in particular. If they were to be believed, no change whatever had taken place in the administration. The functionaries of the fallen

dynasty everywhere retained their posts. I had done nothing to inculcate in the agents of the new system a new spirit and new maxims: men and things, all followed the old beaten track of the Restoration. It is not easy to comprehend how false and ridiculous these clamours were, without having been compelled to hear and seriously discuss them. It was the tumult of personal pretensions, of local animosities, of assumed, conceited consequence, and of blind impatience, unable to obtain satisfaction. In public places, at popular meetings, in the newspapers, and even in the Chambers, the revolutionary advocates seized upon these ebullitions of dissatisfied egotism to raise round the nascent power a storm of ill-humour and general mistrust. The Cabinet resolved not to remain silent under such attacks, and I was therefore instructed to draw up an Exposition of the state of the kingdom, the object of which was to show how much had already been done to place the actual administration in harmony with the spirit of the government. Presented, in effect, to the Chambers on the 18th of September,¹ this Exposition confounded for a time the malcontents, and dissipated some credulous prejudices. It evidently proved that, while refusing, as Mirabeau had said in 1790, "to place everywhere, below, what had been above, and above, what had been below," the Cabinet of 1830 had with more boldness than hesitation, greatly changed the agents of authority in every branch of the public service and in all districts of the kingdom. For my own share, I had, in a single month, changed 76 prefects out of 86, 196 sub-prefects out of

¹ See Historic Documents, No. III.

277, 56 secretaries-general out of 86, and 127 councillors of prefecture out of 315. And "in anticipation of the law for regenerating municipal administration," my Exposition stated that "398 changes had already taken place, and a circular letter instructed the prefects to make as many more, without delay, as they might deem necessary."

I do not pretend to say that in this rapid revisal of such a long list of names, in so many places and in a few days, I may not have fallen into some mistakes. Even after experience had pointed out to me more than one, I should say of the imperfection of my work, as M. Royer-Collard once said under different circumstances, "I do not know this, but I affirm it." In a note from the King, I find an instance of the errors to which, in such cases, power is liable. On the 17th of August he wrote thus to me :—"I am sorry to inform you that two of our newly-appointed sub-prefects came yesterday to the Palais-Royal completely drunk, and that they were jeered at by the national guard. My aides-de-camp will tell you their names, which I have forgotten, and which you will conceal out of respect to their patrons. We shall not boast of these selections, but replace them immediately." In a general view, notwithstanding, and after a trial of eighteen years, I am confident that the changes accomplished at that period in personal administrators, soon threw off the yoke of revolutionary tendencies, and that I called into the public service a vast number of moderate, impartial, and able men, who at once set to work in support of established authority. On the 6th of October, 1830, I wrote

as follows to the new prefect of Morbihan, M. Lorois, an officer as intelligent as he was energetic:—"The national party must thoroughly understand that its situation is not changed, and that it has a Government to consolidate. It rests with us to prove that we are capable of wielding power, and of maintaining order while developing liberty. It is for us to falsify those never-ceasing imputations of our adversaries, who have so long accused us of being capable of nothing but loud complaints, and bent only on destruction." I sought everywhere to place in trust, and without caring for appearances, men who, since 1814, whether in office or in opposition, had given proofs of sincere attachment to constitutional monarchy, and well understood the nature of its legal strength. The greater number of those I selected, on the grounds named, vindicated my prepossessions in their favour; for while that monarchy lasted, successive Cabinets, notwithstanding the variations of general policy, considered them eligible to serve the State well, and introduced but few changes into the local administration organized in 1830.

In calling to the direction of affairs so many new men, on the day succeeding a revolution, I was anxious to watch over and guide them effectively in their duties. I am convinced that the minister of the Interior, by personal intimacy and private correspondence, independent of official communications, can exercise a powerful influence over his representatives in the departments, and can impress on their public acts that self-confidence and character of firm consistency which can alone give them moral force and credit with the popular masses. I had not time for such an undertaking: scarcely enough

was allowed me to indicate to a few prefects, with whom I had been long acquainted, the spirit with which I was animated myself and desirous of imparting to them. On the 14th of September, 1830, I wrote to M. Amédée Thierry, prefect of the Higher Saône, as follows :—"Do not hesitate to replace the mayors who are repudiated by the people, and by whom you are impeded rather than strengthened. All that assumes the character of servile and blind re-action tends to produce a bad effect. Every thing that attests a firm resolve to be well served and to serve the public well, brings strength and reputation. Seek out men who think and act by themselves. The first necessity of this country is to establish, on all questions, independent opinions and influences. The centralization of minds is worse than the centralization of business." And again, on the 16th October, to M. Chaper, prefect of Tarn-et-Garonne :—"I wish to tell you how much I am satisfied with your conduct and correspondence. You are not sunk in the old routine of administration. You do not act in obedience to a circular. You do not write for the sake of writing. You go straight to the fact on your own suggestion, and with the assurance of success. I am tempted to thank you as for a personal obligation. Between ourselves, the empire of forms and customs suffocates me. I have a great turn for order, for regular and systematic activity ; but this factitious and conventional order, this unconcerned activity, this rhetorical and mechanical administration, which neither emanates from an original thought or an energetic will, are my sovereign antipathies. Do not fall into this, I entreat you ; do not become what

so many people call *an excellent prefect*, which means a man who never leaves a petition or a letter without a written answer, but who never troubles himself to ascertain whether his answers really advance business, or his letters become realities."

About the same time, the crosses erected during the Restoration outside the churches, had, in many places, been objects of popular attack; and a report was spread that the Government, to evade the difficulty of protecting them, had given orders for their removal. Several public functionaries wrote to me to inquire if this were the fact. I answered on the instant:—"The Government has issued no order whatever to remove these crosses. In some places they have excited an active popular demonstration; violent efforts have been made to throw them down. The authorities, according to my instructions and those of the minister of Public Worship, have opposed all attempts of the kind. In some places, the clergy have been recommended to transport these symbols of their faith into the interior of the churches, to secure them from profanation. The clergy in general have seconded this suggestion, and the removal has taken place respectfully, without disorder or outrage. Elsewhere, the crosses remain erect, and will continue where they are until they become the objects of tumultuous and sudden attack. The liberty of worship must be unrestrained; and the first condition is, that no form should be insulted. Let us not leave our enemies any pretext for taxing us with indecency or tyranny. I could never allow my administration to supply grounds for such a reproach, and I thank you for enabling me on the in-

stant to contradict a report which is already falsified by orders given throughout the two last months, on similar occasions."

In the midst of the incidental excitement of the time, and often without public support, I failed sometimes in thoroughly protecting either order or liberty; but when my efforts were futile, I was ever ready to acknowledge my impotence, and to declare the principles which condemned the aggressors.

Within the Government, and even in my own exclusive department, I encountered embarrassments less apparent but equally pressing. The national guards, whether in Paris or in the departments, their organization and management, even their employment when necessary, fell under my duties and official responsibility; but I had no real power over them. Not only on the 29th of July, during the height of the contest, had their own spontaneous impulse conferred the command on General La Fayette; but four days later, on the 2nd of August, before the Chambers had assembled, and the Duke of Orleans, as Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, could preside at the opening of their session, M. de La Fayette had announced, in an order of the day addressed to the national guard at Paris, that "in compliance with the desire of the Prince, he accepted the post of commandant-in-general of the national guards of France." Would he retain this post under the re-established constitutional monarchy? And if so, how would the exceptional and singular power be regulated? What would be its relations with the Sovereign, with the responsible ministers, and more particularly with the

Minister of the Interior? The apprehension was serious. But supposing this doubt removed, the question of organization which remained to be settled was practically, as well as constitutionally, both delicate and difficult. There was danger of its becoming not only a question of self-love with individuals, but of passion with parties. It occasioned much anxiety to the Government, and excited many popular rumours.

M. de La Fayette took warm interest in it himself, and adopted measures for its solution according to his own views. I received, not from himself, but from his staff, a note without signature, thus expressed:—

“In the condition under which our last happy Revolution has placed us, while millions of citizens are in active movement and enrolling themselves provisionally as national guards; while a definitive organization is in preparation according to a new law, which will require consistency and confidence; and while the declared or secret but undoubted malevolence of foreign Powers requires that we should show them a nation in arms, throbbing with patriotism, and not only rallied round liberty, but round the form of government we have chosen,—is it or is it not desirable to place at the head of this great impulse a man who enjoys public confidence?

“The population of Paris and of France have adopted this opinion. It was also the first thought of the Lieutenant-General of the kingdom. It is still the wish of the King. General La Fayette himself accords with it, since, after having obstinately refused, in 1790, this ardent desire of three millions of national guards, he has consented to assume the title, and consequently the

positions, of commandant-in-general, of the national guards of France.

"If the King's Government thinks differently, the matter is very simple. All the national guards of the departments, towns, and villages run to La Fayette. He has only to reply to letters, deputations, and the general feeling, that he has no longer any interest in the affair, and to refer them to the minister of the Interior. It is unnecessary to say that he would do so in terms the best calculated to diminish the real effects of this answer. By this course he would not only personally gain repose, but a position more suited to his taste, to the particular nature of his patriotic life; and it has been already seen in the critical moment that he lost nothing by standing alone. But he believes, and we all concur in this belief, that such a state of things would injure the great national movement, the interior and exterior situation of the country, and the Government of the King itself.

"Nevertheless, as long as General La Fayette consents to hold this great command, it must not be a title without duties, which, without giving him useful influence, would be prejudicial to that which is exclusively personal and dependent on himself alone.

"The post of commandant-in-general of the national guards of France has its inconveniences and dangers. La Fayette has demonstrated this more than any other person. Are there no longer inconveniences and dangers, that his services may be dispensed with? This is the question, less for himself than for the public interest and the Government.

"Undoubtedly it would be more convenient to the

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administration of the interior to settle everything by clerks; but the state of things will not permit this, and military habits have taken such deep root for thirty years, that La Fayette is the only man in France who can replace civil and municipal authorities.

"We have an example that simplifies the whole matter. Marshal Moncey commanded the gendarmes of France. He had a chief of the staff who transmitted his orders. He was called inspector-general; he had offices, and reports were transmitted to him. But this in no way prevented the corps, the companies, and brigades of gendarmes from communicating with the minister of the Interior and the civil authorities, even to the mayors of the towns and villages to whom the gendarmes were obedient.

"It would be necessary, therefore, to appoint an inspector-general, executing the duties of head of the staff under the orders of the General-in-chief, with sub-inspector-general, officers, etc."

In this language there was something more of personal vanity than became so strong a position and so much legitimate pride. The pride, however, was not without address. The authors of the note had taken care to exclude the King from the case, by affirming that his opinion as monarch agreed with that he had held as lieutenant-general of the kingdom. The question was thus concentrated entirely between M. de La Fayette and the minister of the Interior,—I might rather say, the offices of the ministry, for it was to the offices only, *to the clerks*, that the objections of the note applied. The contest would have been neither possible nor profitable for the authority

of the true principles of the constitutional system. There are situations in which silence speaks more forcibly than argument. I abstained therefore from all discussion, and on the 16th of August a royal decree, prepared and countersigned by myself, appointed M. de La Fayette General-commandant of the national guards of France, "until the promulgation of the law for their organization." This reserve for the future, which M. de La Fayette did not contest, was the only sign of opposition. The decree appeared on the 18th of August in the 'Moniteur,' and on the day following I received this letter from M. de La Fayette:—"It happened by mere chance, my dear friend, that I had not read the 'Moniteur' of yesterday; and only this morning have I received your official letter; thus I have omitted two duties,—to present my respects to the King and to wait upon you, both of which I shall fulfil today. I have also to request of the King and his minister, permission to recommend to them General Dumas as major-general of the national guards of France. It rests with the General-in-chief to name the head of the staff. But this time the army is so numerous and the career so vast, that a presentation to the King and the ministers appears most desirable. Besides, it was settled beforehand, as you are aware. Dumas is the man we require for the staff of this great command, and for mutual understanding. I perceive with great satisfaction that you are urging on the definitive organization, and I am delighted with your good idea for the choice of secretary to the commission. A thousand regards."

While this situation continued, taken upon both sides

with equal accord and candour, no difficulties whatever occurred between M. de La Fayette and myself. He required, frankly my co-operation when the official interference of a responsible minister was evidently necessary; and, on my part; I was careful not to interfere with the exercise of the authority of which he bore the name, neither wishing to trammel it by paltry discussions, nor to sanction it by official association. On the 29th of August, the King, surrounded by the royal family and a brilliant assembly, held a solemn review in the Champs de Mars of the entire national guard, commanded by M. de La Fayette, and distributed their colours to the different battalions. I was not present at this ceremony.

In the midst of the difficulties and tediousness of these questions of organization and individual politics, I found in other duties of my department a more congenial interest and labour. When I turned to the relations of Government with science, literature, and the arts, I felt impressed with a conviction that we ought to emerge from the old official routine, and act through other channels than those of clerks and orders. To deal suitably with men of letters and artists, a general sympathy or patronage is not sufficient. They require to be impressed and treated with confidence, void of pretension and without parade. Genius is a free and haughty power, which reciprocates no cordiality when not respected in its dignity and liberty. It is also a power which desires to be understood and loved. It expects from its patrons something more than mere favours; it is not satisfied or grateful unless when treated with

intellectual and warm appreciation. My natural taste led me to give this character to my intercourse with men of letters. To assure myself that I should never lose sight of it in the details of business, I called near me as leaders,—one, from the section of science and literature, and the other, from that of the fine arts,—two young men, M. Hippolyte Royer-Collard and M. Charles Lenormant, both accustomed to the most accomplished society, trained up from early life in the administration, practice, and love of intellectual labours, and both endowed with dispositions as independent as their abilities were distinguished. I felt confident that in the discharge of their delicate functions they would never sink into routine clerks, and they soon proved themselves useful and attached coadjutors. They assisted me most effectively in repelling the spirit of reaction which was struggling to penetrate the learned world, equally careless of rights or reputation. We should have banished it still more completely, if, from customary habit rather than conviction, the Government had not opened a door for its entry by requiring from men attached to certain establishments exclusively scientific or literary, such as the Board of Longitude, the Garden of Plants, the National College, the Public Libraries, etc., the political oath from which the great learned bodies, the Institute for example, had always been exempted. This condition cost those establishments two eminent men, M. Augustus Cauchy and Doctor Récamier. With regard to the oath, I do not consider it in the careless light under which it has sometimes been regarded. In the political scheme it forms a moral tie, which may naturally be

imposed upon all who take part in public affairs, nothing proves its importance more than the general desire to be liberated from it on the part of those men by whom it has been scandalously abused. But to take the salary paid by the State, and not the nature of the duties attached to it, as the principle of obligation in the political oath, and on this construction to impose it on astronomers, archæologists, botanists, orientalists, and artists, is unquestionably one of the most ignorant ideas and absurd chimeras ever conceived by the fanatical converts or servile worshipers of power.

In the intellectual movement which reflected honour on the Restoration, the revival of a taste for the old historic monuments of France and the study of foreign literature, had occupied a prominent position. Some measures had been adopted to arrest the destruction of the masterpieces of French art, and to introduce into modern France a knowledge of the highest class of European literature. But both attempts were wanting in a fixed centre and in defined means of action. If it is desirable that the noble aspirations of human intelligence should not be mere sterile impulses and passing flashes of light, they should at once receive the support of permanent institutions; and that those institutions themselves should not become vain, they require from the beginning to be placed under the control of men capable of rendering them effectual and productive. I had the good fortune to discover, amongst my personal intimates, the two fittest persons that could be selected,—the one, to prosecute and render popular the restoration of the ancient monuments of France, the other, to

disseminate an acquaintance with, and to set for, the great literary productions of European genius.

Still young, M. Vitet had already become distinguished by the most difficult judges for that quick perception of the beautiful,—for that correct and diversified knowledge of the history of art,—that critical and sympathetic delicacy in the appreciation of its works which had elevated him in the estimate of artists themselves far beyond the position of a mere scholar or amateur.

M. Fauriel, having reached the extreme limit of mature age, and after having enthusiastically dedicated himself to many studies and pursuits, with a refined and expansive mind—a severe and erudite critic, although occasionally somewhat fantastical—a hellenist, orientalist, philologist, philosopher, and historian—at last confined himself to the literary and comparative history of Europe. The King, on my report, sanctioned the appointment of M. Vitet as Inspector-General of Historical Monuments; and the Duke de Broglie, on my recommendation, created in the Faculty of Letters at Paris a professorship of foreign literature for M. Fauriel. M. Vitet has ceased to be Inspector-General, and M. Fauriel is dead. But each established the work to which they were the first to lend assistance.¹

My assistants being thus selected,—when I desired to act externally and to exercise with dignity and discretion some influence over the labours of literature and art, multiplied obstacles presented themselves. Means were wanting to support, in the midst of the general confusion

¹ See Historic Documents, No. IV.

of affairs, the great scientific undertakings which required encouragement. I had much difficulty in enabling M. Didot, by a strong subscription, to commence his new edition of the 'Thesaurus of the Greek Language,' by Henry Étienne, the materials for which he had collected. I was anxious to establish a serious and honourable dramatic censorship, intended to protect public decency against the cynical avidity of the contractors for corruption. Literary assumption, declamatory promises, and interested speculation, seconded by the thoughtlessness and weakness of our manners, placed themselves in opposition with so much eagerness, that I had no time to conquer them and carry out my design. Politics penetrated even into the domain of art; there, as elsewhere, popular passions sought to make the law, and the democratic spirit looked for gratification. Men of no note expected to be treated as eminent professors, and pupils as masters. Things and individuals became equally confounded. It was necessary to finish the monuments commenced, discontinued, and resumed under various governments, and the destination of which had been more than once changed. The greater number of these problems of prudence or convenience gave me little trouble in their solution. While I caused the works of the triumphal arch at the Étoile to be completed, I urged the sculptor Lemaire to commence without delay the pediment of the church of the Madeleine, which the friends of the imperial system wished once more to transform into a Temple of Glory, but which I was desirous of preserving for religion. The palace of Versailles was threatened; the democrats, who detested

the splendours of Louis XIV., and the economists, who dreaded the expenses of keeping it in order, spoke of throwing it down, or of converting it into vast barracks for the relief of Paris. I proposed to the King to establish there a grand ethnographic museum, in which would be collected the monuments and remains of the manners, customs, military and civil life of France in the first instance, and subsequently of all the nations of the world. But the King had already his own ideas with regard to Versailles, more influential than mine, and the execution of which he commenced at once, by deciding that the equestrian statue of Louis XIV. should be placed in the principal court of the château.

We had to settle the internal decorations of the assembly-room of the Chamber of Deputies. It was decided that they should consist of three grand paintings and of two statues, placed above and on each side of the table. In the centre, the *King's Oath*, at the sitting of the 9th of August, when the Chambers offered him the crown. On the right, the *Constituent Assembly*, after the Royal Session of the 23rd of June, 1789, with Mirabeau replying to M. de Brézé:—"Return, and say to those who sent you, that we are here by the might of the people, and that we shall only be driven out by the force of bayonets." On the left, the *National Convention*, in the midst of the tumult on the 1st of Prairial, year III. (the 20th of May, 1795), with the President Boissy-d'Anglas respectfully saluting the head of the representative Féraud, which the insurgents brought to him on a pike. Two great memorials,—one, of resistance to power, the other, of resistance to anarchy. The

statues were to be two allegorical figures,—Order and Liberty. The execution of these was entrusted to the sculptor Pradier. I wished also to assign the paintings to the three masters of the school, Messrs. Ingres, Bérard, and Paul Delaroche; but the democratic influence opposed this decision, and imperatively demanded competition,—an excellent ordeal on the commencement of different careers by which to estimate young and yet unknown talent, but most objectionable when a first-rate work is required, for established ability will not submit to it. I hoped to supply some remedy for the inconveniences of the competitors, by calling in the most eminent artists to decide on the results with their personal independence and authority; but the jury was not to be selected until the sketches were ready. When the time came, I had ceased to be in office; and by an excess of democratic caprice, the candidates were allowed to choose their own judges. A vast number of sketches were presented. The prize for the *King's Oath on the 9th of August* was awarded to that of M. Court, whose painting occupied the place assigned to the subject until the revolution of the 24th of February, 1848, when it disappeared, perforated with musket-balls. This mutilated canvas, it is said, has found a refuge in the repositories, where the work of M. Hesse representing the *Constituent Assembly and Mirabeau at the Session of June the 3rd, 1789*, has gone to rejoin it. The *Boissy-d'Anglas presiding at the National Convention*, by M. Vinchon, has been sent as a gift to the town of Annonay, the birthplace of the courageous President; and I preserve in my own cabinet an extremely faithful sketch of the *King's Oath*, which M.

MY MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.

sent for trial. The statues have been dispersed like the actors.

Amongst the monuments then resumed, one alone, the Pantheon, was an error on my part which nearly led to serious consequences. That a nation should publicly honour the great men who have upheld its credit, is a just act and a generous sentiment; but the dead are inappropriately distinguished, when religion is not present to receive and consecrate the homage bestowed on them. It belongs to religion to perpetuate memories and to protect tombs. The most illustrious dead require to repose in temples where immortality is daily proclaimed, and any veneration paid to them is cold and precarious indeed when separated from the worship of the Creator. It was a false and an unhappy idea to take the church of Sainte-Geneviève from Christians, to dedicate it to heroes; and the pagan title of *Pantheon*, with which was soon coupled the odious name of Marat, mournfully declared the character of this transformation. It was abolished in 1800; the vast mind of the Emperor Napoleon perceived the vice of it, and, while leaving the great men in the church of Sainte-Geneviève, he decided that it should be restored to Christian worship. King Louis XVIII. followed up this idea of intellectual and moral atonement.¹ But the work, although determined in principle, was but imperfectly accomplished in fact. We returned into the evil path. The Pantheon was given up to the great men alone. This, in the midst of our general resistance to revolutionary pretences, was an act of complaisance to the revival of inflated and declamatory

¹ See Historic Documents, No. V.

caprice, which mistook the conditions of the end to which it aspired. In committing this error, I had an internal feeling of dissatisfaction; and to extenuate the evil effects, the decree declared "that a Commission should be appointed to prepare a bill, to settle the terms and forms under which this testimony of national gratitude should be decreed in the name of the country." This Commission, instituted to gain time, was composed in such a manner as to lead the partisans of the measure to hope for a prompt gratification of their wishes. M. de La Fayette and M. Béranger were included amongst the members. But popular impatience refused to wait the decision of even the most popular men. A numerous assembly paraded through Paris the busts of General Foy and M. Manuel, declaring their intention of carrying them to the Pantheon, of forcing the gates, and of installing them there on the instant. M. Odilon-Barrot, at that time Prefect of the Seine, had great difficulty in persuading the leaders of this crowd to forgo their design, and to deposit the two busts at the Hôtel de Ville, in expectation of the legal homage destined for them. A few days after this clamorous and empty tumult, M. Béranger, with his accustomed prudence and calculating dread of ridicule, retired from the Commission, in which he was immediately replaced by M. Casimir Delavigne, who undertook with little eagerness the preparation of the bill committed to his charge.

When, after the lapse of long years, we collect our reminiscences, we are astonished at the associations which operate in the memory, and which we took no note of while facts were in progress of accomplishment. At the

same period, perhaps on the self-same day, when these disorderly riots occurred in the streets of Paris relative to the Pantheon, and of which I retain such a disagreeable impression, M. Lenormant brought M. Rossini to breakfast with me. He had sustained some annoyances from the Revolution of 1830, which I wished to make him forget. King Charles X. had treated him with great favour. He was Inspector-General of singing, receiving, beside his rights of authorship, a salary of 7000 francs; and a few months before the brilliant success of 'William Tell,' the Civil List had signed an agreement with him by which he engaged to compose for the French stage two great works. I was anxious that the new Government should exercise towards him the same consideration, and that in return he should supply us with these masterpieces. We conversed together without reserve. I was struck by his active, varied disposition, open to every subject, gay without vulgarity, and disposed to jest without bitterness. He left me after half an hour of pleasant intercourse, which however led to nothing, for I soon after ceased to hold office. I remained alone with my wife, who had been interested by M. Rossini and his conversation. My daughter Henriette was brought into the room, a little child who had just began to walk and prattle. My wife went to the piano and played some passages from the composer who had just left us,—from 'Tancredi' amongst others. We were alone. I remained thus for I know not how long, forgetting all external associations, gazing on my daughter, who attempted to run, perfectly tranquil, and absorbed in the presence of these objects of my affec-

tions. Thirty years have since passed over, and yet it seems like yesterday. I do not agree with Dante, when he says:—

“Nessun maggior dolore

• Che ricordarsi del tempo felice
Nella miseria.”

“There is no grief more bitter than the memory of happy times when we are in misfortune.”

I think, on the contrary, that the reflection of a light upon the places it no longer illuminates is a precious enjoyment, and when Heaven and time have allayed the ardent rising of the soul against misfortune, it pauses and gratifies itself in the contemplation through the past, of the blessings and advantages it has lost.

As Home Minister, the re-establishment of order and regular administration were the chief points, but not the only ones, of my office and occupation;—external affairs filling an immense place in the government of the Interior. The spirit of war marched side by side with the spirit of revolution. The policy of resistance to anarchy was impracticable and futile without the policy of peace.

People and kings throughout Europe, with the exception of the dreamers and abettors of revolution, presented in 1830 and the years immediately following—I may say from 1830 to 1848—a rare and imposing spectacle. They were all inspired with the passion of peace. Never had more pretexts for war burst forth in so short a time. In France, a great revolution with its prolonged disquietude. Other revolutions on all our frontiers,—in Belgium, in Switzerland, in Spain. Attempted revolutions in the centre and at the extremities of Europe,—

in Germany, in Poland, in Italy; with all the questions and international complications inevitably belonging to such movements. Other questions not absolutely revolutionary, but in a political sense important, and difficult: the Ottoman Empire becoming weaker and weaker; Asia, more and more divided and contested between England and Russia; France, predominant in Africa; in the new world, France and England, England and the United States, the United States and France, engaged in animated disputes on points of territory, money, influence, and national honour. Formerly war would have frequently and interminably sprung up from these questions. In our days, they scarcely lead to a little partial and transient excitement. On every side we hasten to arrest impending events. The world has remained immovable in the midst of storms; peace has resisted and survived a host of dangers.

And does this proceed from the increased wisdom and virtue of men? Are the questions of peace and war, in our days, more scrupulously weighed than formerly, and deliberately settled upon principles of right or by considerations of justice and humanity?

I am not one of those who build their pride (and a foolish pride it is) on denying the empire of moral ideas. I feel convinced that this empire is really progressing at present in the mutual dealings of nations; and that considerations of right and public welfare exercise now, upon all questions of peace and war, much more influence than they formerly possessed. But they do not entirely control. We have passed a portion of our lives in seeing these questions governed by totally different means;

and if the passions or interests which incite to war were to be effectually revived in Europe, I much doubt whether the principles of justice and humanity are in a condition to meet them with a strong repelling obstacle.

Or, can it be that revolutions in the midst of a dazzling and delightful civilization have enervated the nations who have been exposed to them, and that the prevailing love of peace has its source in the effeminacy of manners, and the necessity for those physical indulgences which peace alone permits and supplies?

Glorious examples refute this apprehension. Not less since 1814 than before that great epoch, warlike vigour has never been found wanting when required. The French in Algeria and in the Crimea, and the English in the Crimea and in India, have splendidly proved that civilization produces no degeneracy, and that the enjoyments of polished society are not incompatible with the aspirations of military ardour and the rude trials of life in the camp. But facts even more conclusive, in a political sense, decide this question.

Two States especially, which had undergone no revolution, and are not suffering from the consequent lassitude and embarrassments—England and Russia—might, from 1830 to 1848, through ambitious motives have disturbed the peace of Europe. But these were precisely the nations who, during that period, had been consistently governed by the spirit of peace.

In England, the people at large, from 1830 to 1853, were peaceably disposed; from a sensible and clear understanding of their real interests, from inclination for the productive activity which peace engenders, and from

a true Christian principle. Religious convictions are not with them mere rules for private conduct or simply intellectual indulgences; they enter into political life, and influence the actions of public men as conscience weighs upon simple individuals. The dissenting sects are generally the first who stir themselves energetically for some object, which in their eyes religion commands them to pursue. The movement soon extends through the entire Christian church of the country, then into the different classes of civil society, and finally reaches the Government itself, which either coincides from approbation or resigns itself to follow. Thus, the traffic in slaves has been abolished; thus, the spirit of peace, until the last few years, has predominated in England, gathering power at once from the wisdom of material interests and the force of religious convictions; and imposed by the nation upon the Government, which on its part, during the progress of this interval, has not repulsed the public feeling, but has voluntarily adopted it as the rule of state policy.

Russia, in her international affairs, is very far from playing a part similar to that of England, and if influenced by it, it is probably in a different sense. Russia has reached that exact degree of civilization in which a rough, bold, and devoted people, little given to reflection or foresight, and profoundly ignorant of distant and complicated facts, are excellent implements of war and conquest, and follow blindly the leaders who conduct them. But, notwithstanding the profound vexation which the Revolution of July caused him to feel; and the ill-will he bore to King Louis-Philippe, the Emperor Nicholas

was desirous of peace. To rule his own dominions with a strong hand, to weigh upon Europe in the interests of order and monarchy, to carry on in his foreign relations the traditional policy of Russia, without urging its march or results by any great enterprise,—such were the dominant ideas of this vigilant and active sovereign, much occupied with the power of his name and empire; but, after all, not violently ambitious, neither greedy nor capable of military fame, and more haughty than daring in the exercise of absolute power. He might, perhaps, have been tempted to take advantage, by war, of the troubles of Europe; but he preferred the grand air of controlling the world in the bosom of peace.

In presence of England and Russia thus determined on a pacific policy, Austria and Prussia adopted the same cause, from a much stronger necessity. Austria is strictly occupied in preserving and holding together her heterogeneous States. Prussia, a nation still uncertain of its future, and probably the only Power at present in Europe which really encourages an uneasy desire for aggrandisement, can never expect to raise, by herself, any European question whatever. Her Government also, beset internally by liberal exactions, is little inclined to encounter the risk of great enterprises, and makes no external movement beyond what it considers indispensable to satisfy the national pride.

Peace, therefore, though purchased by painful sacrifices, was, in 1830, the desire and will of the great European States. The revolutionary faction in France completely misunderstood this position. Governed by habit at least as much as by passion, they looked upon war

as inevitable for the country, and essential for themselves; and blindly assuming the character of heirs to the Convention and the Empire, unfurled the double standard of the spirit of propagandism and the spirit of conquest; expecting nevertheless, when strife commenced, to find allies in Europe.

This was, perhaps, the most unaccountable of all their chimeras. The revolutionary spirit of our days admits no regular or fixed system of society or government. It means universal destruction and enduring anarchy. It may excite conspiracies and insurrections; it may by a momentary triumph achieve momentary conquests; it has everywhere, amongst the popular masses, practised agents, accomplices, and dupes; but it can never have any government for ally, for with no government whatever can it act in concert. It was impossible in 1830 and 1831, to listen, without a smile, to the orators of that party,—M. Mauguin amongst others, disposing today of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and tomorrow of that of Berlin, to bring Europe into accordance with their own views; and, in their fits of idle diplomacy, contracting, according to their own wild notions, alliances with the very governments they were incessantly insulting, threatening, and endeavouring to undermine.

Not only were the revolutionists of 1830 and 1831 shut out from alliance with any government, but it was *against them exclusively that all governments combined*. The facts so entirely unprecedented which had commenced in 1815, and confirmed themselves in 1831; the permanent accord between Powers hitherto so divided; the suspension of ambitious desires, of regal and

national rivalries; the passion of united Europe for peace; —all these feelings arose from the dread of that spirit of propagandism and revolutionary conquest which had excited and maintained them. Experience, although actual, had less to do in the matter than anticipation. All nations felt that every great war might merge into a war of revolution, and none were disposed to incur that risk. Europe remained motionless, to withhold from the revolutionary spirit any opportunity of once more attempting a universal overthrow.

This disposition of Europe, which the revolutionists of 1830 either knew not or refused to acknowledge, was at once comprehended by Louis-Philippe. No sooner was he declared King, than he saw clearly that the cause of order within, and that of peace without, were closely united; and the more resolutely he adopted the policy of resistance, the more he devoted himself to the policy of peace.

This boldness on his part was judicious and necessary, but difficult and meritorious; for in thus promoting the true interests of France, he sacrificed his own personal prejudices and habitual predilections. By rejecting the idea of all aggressive war, he had imposed on himself the task of combating revolutionary propagandism and of maintaining the treaties of 1815.

France, with no desire for more domestic revolutions even while suffering them to take place, is pleased to see them elsewhere. This movement, excited by her example, gratifies her, and she persuades herself that she finds friends in all her imitators. Besides which, notions of justice, reform, liberty, and social progress have been so

senselessly mixed up by us with the idea of revolution, that whenever a revolution breaks out, our first instinct is to believe that progress has commenced, that justice and liberty are on the point of establishing themselves; and we look upon it as an honour and almost a duty to become, from a distance, their patrons. In the sequel, when revolutions, by excess or failure, have deceived our hopes, their proscribed fugitives flock to us for shelter; a lively interest attaches to their sufferings, their devotion, and their courage. The reactions which succeed, produce in their severities a lamentable confusion of honest men and rogues, of noble spirits and inveterate mischief-makers, of merited and unmerited calamities. The legitimate commiseration inspired by some extends without discernment to others. The day, perhaps, arrives when it grows cool and becomes extinguished to all; but meanwhile a blind sympathy injures the principles of the rights of the people, and compromises national policy beyond what is due to the claims of misfortune.

Let the friends of peace and honest policy think seriously of this. It comprises a grave question, respecting which the public rights of Europe and the interior legislation of civilized countries are really in their infancy. The right of asylum is, in the estimation of all independent States, a noble and indispensable prerogative. Free nations take just credit in assuring to strangers as well as to natives, the protection of their laws. While they thus alleviate heavy misfortunes, they assist their neighbours by facilitating those voluntary banishments, which after political troubles blunt the edge of reactions, and afford to dangers and antipathies time

for abatement. But if this great privilege degenerates into a principle of national disloyalty and a source of internal and external embarrassments, perpetually recurring, it will sooner or later succumb to its own abuses. Our weak and incoherent ideas on this point, not only increased materially the difficulties of preserving peace for several years succeeding 1830, but they vitiated peace itself and destroyed some of its most important fruits.

I must say the same with regard to public opinion and feeling as to the treaties of 1815. No one wished to disavow or infringe those treaties, because peace was the general wish; but there was an inclination, at the same time, to respect and condemn them, and to menace without positive action:—an unworthy and unskilful attitude, which inspired external mistrust, by words, at the moment when endeavours were making to dissipate it by conduct, and which, while calling upon the government to maintain peace, imposed on it demonstrations and language which rendered peace more difficult, and always precarious.

While Europe anxiously desired peace, she was determined and prepared—if the maintenance of amicable relations became difficult—to wage against us once more the war of coalition by which Napoleon had been dethroned. Between the four great Powers, this coalition still subsisted; and they were resolved to maintain, equally against the spirit of revolutionary propagandism as in arrest of Imperial conquest, the territorial position and established order of Europe. The leading nations themselves, the English, the Germans, the Spaniards, and

the Russians, would again have enthusiastically seconded their governments in this struggle; for the spirit of independence, of dignity, and of national rancour was more powerful within them than the spirit of revolution. France, on her side, notwithstanding the ardour of popular impulses and demonstrations, was neither disposed nor able to brave such dangers, for she no longer lay under the control of the young ambitious passions which had once already involved her in them. The revolutionary spirit still declaimed, and appealed to the masses, but it was unable to incite them to a burning and devoted fever, and had no longer any great moral or physical prey to hold out as an inducement. Any aggressive enterprise, more noisy than rational, would have ended in deplorable reverses, and perhaps in ridiculous mistakes. And why engage in them? Where lay the necessity? What duty was at stake? France had just achieved one of the most brilliant acts of political independence that could possibly be imagined, and this act was acknowledged in every quarter. The nation modified its institutions without the interposition of the slightest obstacle on the part of any person in Europe. All that could be demanded in the name of right was already secured; the people were in possession of the two benefits which have ever been their chief objects of desire,—liberty and peace. If they had thrown those advantages to the winds, to bring back to Europe and to inflict upon themselves the two heaviest scourges that can desolate human society,—anarchy and war,—France would have committed the most absurd and guilty act of insanity that has ever been recorded in the pages of history.

Despite the variety of opinions and tendencies comprised in the Cabinets of 1830, on this single point they were unanimously and entirely in accordance with the King, whose conviction and resolution would, if required, have assured that of his advisers. In the somewhat precipitate fluency of his conversation, King Louis-Philippe did not always convey his ideas under the most persuasive form. He was generally so absorbed in his subject, that he thought little of his exact words, and disregarded their effect upon his auditors. But he held to the main point of his ideas and plans with untiring perseverance; and resumed, without being disheartened, his efforts to win men whose co-operation was necessary to him to ensure success. His first diplomatic selection, that of sending M. de Talleyrand as ambassador to London, at once satisfied intelligent minds, how much his views as to foreign policy were decided, just, and sagacious.

It has been said that the King alone determined on this appointment, and forced it on his Ministers. There is no truth in this. Never did he take more pains to ensure their concurrence. He began by discussing with the greater number of them, beforehand and in private, his motives and their objections. I know not what those who disapproved, or wished to avoid the appearance of approving of this appointment, may have said to him, in these confidential interviews, nor what they may have subsequently said to others besides the King; but when it was proposed in Council, some hinted a few doubts, more, as I believe, from personal precaution than to oppose the measure; no one raised any serious objec-

tions. For myself, I felt convinced that the choice was appropriate.

M. de Talleyrand, as a negotiator, possessed two rare and valuable qualities. He knew, with surprising tact, how to distinguish the leading object in the interest of the government he served, the essential point to hold in view; and to this he exclusively devoted himself, despising and sacrificing, with a carelessness at the same time natural and calculated, every other question, even of the most important nature, which might weaken him in the position he wished to assume, or detach him from the end he was determined to reach. He excelled in the art of pleasing, without degrading familiarity; he was singularly attentive and considerate to all persons whose assistance he required, great or small, and at the same time preserved in his intercourse with them the habitual airs of patronage and superiority, which gave an additional charm and value to his compliments and favours. Although the circumstances were very different, there was a certain analogy between what he had accomplished at Vienna in 1814, and what he had now to effect at London in 1830. In 1830 also,—and the task was more difficult,—it was necessary to replace the French Government in confidential relations, and, if required, in common action with the great States of Europe. It was not enough that there should be peace between them. It was important that they should acknowledge with the existence of our new dynasty, its influence; and with its influence, the changes it was likely to produce in the European system. The revolutionary party in France is imbued with an ardent and patriotic sentiment of

national greatness ; but they indulge this feeling without justice or limit, and can only satisfy themselves by violence. With them, violence is not only war between States, but war carrying revolution into the bosoms of States, or rather force employed not alone to conquer but to destroy. At this price, the greatness of a country can neither be legitimate nor of long continuance. Real and permanent success demands sounder reason and superior morality. The government of King Louis-Philippe imposed on itself, from the commencement, a more salutary as well as a purer task. Its object was to maintain peace ; and through peace to preserve the position of France in Europe. In lending its aid to the European system, it undertook to conciliate for French policy the tacit approbation, and sometimes even the active concurrence of foreign Powers. Intimate and confiding relations with England were indispensable for this object ; for while England, with us, was strongly disposed for the continuance of peace, she alone, in the perplexing questions which the Revolution of July had raised, had the power and inclination of uniting her policy with ours in direct sympathy. Such was the mission of the Prince de Talleyrand to London ; and in the midst of so many representatives of old Europe, jealous, uneasy, or perhaps decidedly hostile, he was the most likely man to succeed ; for the position required what he eminently possessed, a mixture of liberal intelligence and aristocratic manners, of immobility and boldness, of calm patience and quick tact, joined to the art of suggesting or listening with a certain degree of pride. Eight days after this nomination, the King wrote to me

as follows¹:—"I have just read the English papers, which are all, of every shade, in approbation of the choice of Talleyrand. They consider the opposition of our journals on this point as the result of the exaggeration of what they call *ultra-liberalism*, and the *plain good sense of John Bull* appreciates the appointment as being the wisest and most fortunate for the two countries. It is also this conviction which has determined me; it is the dictate of my duty as head of my nation. I have only deceived myself, in the hope that our public would be more judicious than I have yet found them. They will end by doing me justice on this point, as on many others, in which I have been misconstrued."

I cannot discover, that the soundest judgments have yet rendered adequate justice to the policy of France and Europe at the epoch of which I am now speaking. Foreign Cabinets gave proofs of a moderation, and the French Government of a loyalty of purpose undoubtedly well understood and most opportune, but extremely rare as historical facts. On the part of the first, there was no false pride, no mean jealousy; they acknowledged without hesitation the necessities which displeased them, and accepted those which they did not feel called upon to combat openly; thus subjecting passion to reason, and personal prejudices to public rights and the general good. The French Government, in its turn, played no double game, and acted with no weak or treacherous reserve. No attempt was made to vibrate between order and anarchy, between the spirit of conservatism and revolution; or to obtain alternately, from opposite parties,

¹ On the 18th of September, 1830.

contrary favours. It selected resolutely and definitively its position and flag. On both sides the policy was rational, consistent, and sincere. The nations are deeply interested in according to it the esteem and rank to which it is entitled.

From the commencement of the debates in Council, I had signified my entire concurrence. I looked upon this line of action as alone suited to establish a free government within, and to extend French influence without,—to the advantage of European civilization. As minister of the Interior, I was soon called upon to support it, under delicate circumstances.

Three States amongst our neighbours, Belgium, Piedmont, and Spain, were already invaded, or threatened, by the revolutionary movement. Belgium had boldly struck the first blow, and broken her ties with Holland. The refugees who had been driven into France by the political shocks in Piedmont and Spain, were stirring themselves to return to their country, to renew their attacks upon the prevailing systems.

These different foreign enterprises found varied supporters in France. As regarded Belgium, it was not to sustain her in her aspirations towards independence, but to reconquer that country, that our active leaders interested themselves. The imperial and revolutionary spirit combined for this object. Emissaries were despatched to Brussels, to open communications with the partisans of union with France. The Society of the "Friends of the People" recruited a battalion of volunteers, to be despatched to the Belgian capital to second a French movement. M. Mauguin and General La

marque were at the head of this enterprise, to which the pure Liberals, M. de La Fayette amongst others, were strangers. Satisfied with the independence of Belgium, and ready to support it, if required, they were more anxious to lend their aid to the Spanish and Piedmontese exiles. With these latter the question was not to make conquests, but to restrain or overthrow governments for the advantage of liberty.

On these different questions King Louis-Philippe and his Ministers, in 1830, were also much divided.

As to Belgium, our policy was simple and decisive. We were resolved to support her in her independence, but to attempt nothing further. There was no idea of territorial reunion, or of a French prince on the Belgic throne. France in that quarter had a great and pressing interest of dignity and security to accomplish,—the substitution of a neutral and inoffensive state for that kingdom of the Netherlands, which in 1814 had been established against her. Our renunciation of all other ambitious views rested on these conditions; and with this understanding we secured the concurrence and united action of England in almost all the affairs of Europe. It would have indicated little intelligence and courage had we hesitated to assume this position. King Louis-Philippe, in conversation with me one day on the subject, pointed out another advantage of even a more elevated order, as being more general and permanent:—"The Low Countries," said he, "have always been the stumbling-block of peace in Europe. None of the great Powers can see them in the hands of another without uneasiness and jealousy. Let them form, by general consent, an inde-

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pendent, neutral State, and that State will become the keystone of European order." This was perhaps to expect too much from the future. Pride and chimerical fancy mingle in the wisest of human calculations. This at least proceeded from a grand idea founded on a prudent policy. In concert with M. Molé, I took measures to baffle opposing schemes. I propagated in every quarter that they were disavowed by the French Government. Some Belgians of importance, who came to Paris to ascertain correctly our intentions, received a formal assurance that they were not to reckon on the reunion of their country with France, nor on a son of the King for their throne. The volunteers destined to excite a movement in Belgium, had been promised that they should be supplied with fire-arms by a merchant of Valenciennes: he was forbade to deliver them. There is no policy more compromising and disloyal than that which, to escape from the difficulties of the moment, encourages nations or partisans to enter on a path in which it has predetermined not to follow them. No effort was wanting on our part, both in Belgium and France, to escape the obloquy of this reproach.

At this early period we had no serious misunderstanding with Piedmont. The Italian refugees were not in strong bodies, either popular or military, in the direction of that frontier. I had at Lyons and Grenoble two able and trustworthy prefects, M. Paulze d'Yvoi and M. de Gasparin, who were watchful of the slightest symptoms. They gave me notice that at Bourgoing, at a meeting of national guards, some fiery spirits, who were in exciting communication with Turin and Chamberry, had declared

their intention of proposing an Address to the King, to demand the dismissal of a Ministry incapable of protecting liberty, even in the countries most disposed to welcome it; but the announcement was so ill received that it was quashed on the outset. No assemblies, no movement on this frontier, afterwards so much agitated, at that epoch disturbed the Court of Turin; and our relations with Sardinia remained, if not mutually confiding, at least regular and undisturbed.

With Spain our position was more complicated and difficult. The Spanish exiles abounded in France, including political and military leaders of much importance in the different shades of the Liberal party;—Martinez de la Rosa, Isturiz, Torcno, Calatrava, Mendizabal, Mina, Valdez, etc. They kept up an active correspondence with their own country, and had numerous adherents there. Some came expressly from Spain to concert and mature a movement long in preparation. They found patrons in Paris as zealous as they were influential. M. de La Fayette, without absolutely forgetting the exigencies of his official situation, continued to conspire for them and with them. “Up to the moment of our last revolution,” he wrote,¹ “I was free in all my actions. At present I am differently situated. I am intimately connected with the new government of France, which adopts the system of non-intervention, neither interfering itself nor suffering the interference of foreigners in the affairs of our neighbours. It is an honest government, and the King will not lend himself

¹ On the 4th and 12th of October, 1830. See ‘Memoirs of General La Fayette,’ vol. vi. pp. 441, 446.

in an underhand manner to what he has openly disavowed. Our common wishes are in favour of universal liberty, but he has no wish to contribute to that cause by a diplomatic falsehood. Such has been the resolution of the King and his Council. My own has not coincided with theirs. Whatever may be my ties with the new government, it can neither dispose of my anticipations nor my sympathies; and our intercourse, long anterior to the great week, remains unchanged in character and object. Nevertheless, I must observe certain cautions, for, in consistency with my necessary duties to the King of the French, and the command he has entrusted to me, I should incur the reproaches of my own country if I permitted too much pretext for those of foreign Powers." As regarded Spain, reproaches on the part of France were little to be apprehended; for the French people had no esteem or consideration for Ferdinand VII. He had shown himself void of courage in the struggle, and without dignity in reverses and with his conquerors; without faith or pity in victory and towards the vanquished. He was even looked upon as more incapable and more detested by his own subjects than actually proved to be the fact. General opinion considered revolt against him as quite natural, and cared little for the man or the European order he tended to disturb. Of all points in public feeling, the heaviest against sovereigns is that which touches their personal character; and in our days, notwithstanding the weakness of moral ties, this is a consideration with which they cannot dispense.

Toward France and King Louis-Philippe, Ferdinand

He had placed himself in a false and disloyal position. Without formally refusing to acknowledge the Government of July, he delayed the official act of recognition,¹ and during the interval continued to treat the envoy of Charles X., the Viscount de Saint-Priest, as the actual French ambassador. The Legitimists assembled on the Spanish frontier, and openly prepared their plans for a rising in the departments of the south. Marshal Bourmont, it was said, was to assume the command. The immediate arrival of the Duchess de Berry in Spain was announced; and the favourite minister of Ferdinand VII., M. Calomarde, gave authority to these reports and importance to the alleged schemes, by addressing to the magistrates and bishops of the Peninsula a circular letter, couched in terms of bitter hostility to France and her newly established government.

In the face of these facts, and to compel the Court of Madrid to put an end to them by making it feel the danger incurred, we, on our side, determined to oppose no obstacle to the preparations of the Spanish refugees. We offered them no encouragement, we entered into no treaties with them. The King expressly rejected their overtures for the marriage of his son, the Duke de Nemours, with the young Queen of Portugal, Donna Maria, and for the union of the Peninsula under the same sceptre. But we allowed a free course to their hopes, their meetings, their efforts to negotiate a loan, to their magazines of arms and ammunition; and we gave

¹ The letters of the King of Spain, accrediting the Count d'Orfila as his ambassador to King Louis-Philippe, bear date the 25th of September, 1830, and were not presented by M. d'Orfila until the 23rd of October following.

them passports for the Spanish frontiers, adding for the most destitute the usual expenses accorded to indigent travellers. We neither wished to deceive them by promises and acts which might have bound us to their cause, nor to shut them out from success, by preventing what they could do for themselves or through their friends, and which the Spanish government within its own territories was actively permitting against us. This defensive menace produced its full effect. The Spanish government took the alarm, and while it prepared to repulse the invasion of the refugees, hastened to assure to us on its frontier all those international rights which are usual between friendly states, provided we gave them the same security. It was our desire, as well as our duty, to continue or to establish settled and conscientious relations with foreign countries and sovereigns. The unsuccessful issue of the armed attempts of the Spanish refugees to excite a Liberal insurrection in their country, soon furnished a suitable opportunity. Defeated and pursued by the royal forces, Mina, Valdez, and their companions had no resource but to retreat back upon our territory, their constant refuge. They were received on terms which I may call equally honourable to the power which proposed them and the unfortunate exiles to whom they were addressed. I wrote as follows to our prefects on the frontiers of Spain:—"I entirely approve your conduct towards the Spanish fugitives who have re-entered our territory. You have persuaded them to remove to a distance from the frontier, and you have taken care to avoid all coercion and harsh measures towards them. This is precisely what was due,—on the one side to the

rights of nations, and on the other to the respect which misfortune may justly claim. France is and desires to remain in profound peace with her neighbours, particularly with Spain. A scrupulous and sincere neutrality is the only condition on which such a peace can exist. You have punctiliously observed it. But, at the same time, it is both just and natural to evince towards the unhappy exiles the esteem inspired by their courage, and the sympathy demanded by their calamities. I have brought under the King's notice in Council the letter they have addressed to him, and which you have transmitted. His Majesty has determined to adopt the measures necessary to secure to them, in the interior of France, a tranquil hospitality, and the succour of which they stand in need. The departments in which they are to dwell will be pointed out, and there they and their families will receive what the royal bounty has assigned to them, subject only to the condition of not removing without the consent of the local authorities. Acquaint them with this resolution, which will be immediately carried into effect. The King is anxious not only that *his protection should relieve*, but *console them as much as lies in his power*, and I esteem myself happy in being commissioned to transmit to them this assurance."

"I do not admire," says Pascal, "the excess of any particular virtue, such, for example, as valour, unless I see it accompanied in an equal degree by the opposite virtue; as in Epaminondas, who to extreme courage joined extreme benignity." It would be to ask too much from governments, to expect that they should unite contrary merits in the same degree with Epami-

nondas ; but now, more than ever, it falls within their mission and their bounden duty to be at the same time decided and liberal, firm and gentle, in their acts as in their views, and to feel sympathy with, while they deal justly towards, the opposing interests and sentiments which dispute empire in society and in the human heart.

I have hitherto only alluded to the least important of the difficulties to which the new government, and I especially, as minister of the Interior, were at that time exposed. It was neither in the administration of domestic nor foreign affairs that they were chiefly to be found. It was in the Chambers that they all broke out, for it was there that the lawful partisans of the new dynasty engaged in their intestine struggles, and that the revolutionists without sought and found an echo and a support.

Neither of the two Chambers possessed at that time their natural and necessary strength. Both had issued from the Revolution, mutilated and enfeebled. In the Chamber of Deputies, out of 406 members, 52 Legitimists had tendered their resignation, and 18 elections had been annulled from irregularity or violence. The Chamber of Peers, in which, on the eve of the Revolution, 364 members took their seats, on the day following counted only 189 : 175 were excluded,—some through the elimination pronounced, under the revision of the Charter, against all the Peers created under the reign of Charles X. ; and others, by their voluntary withdrawal or refusal to take the oath to the new system. It was by the aid of powers thus shaken themselves that we undertook to establish a government.

In the hope of prolonging and taking advantage of this unsettled state of affairs, the abettors of revolution demanded the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, and a general election on some new electoral principle, either revolutionary in character or of popular origin. We rejected this policy of indefinite and illegal experiments. The new King was on his throne. The two Chambers, who had arranged the treaty, were seated round him. It rested with them, in concert with the monarch, to bring into immediate exercise the legalized system which formed their contract. The laws of nature are sound models. To those who have created belongs the right of bringing up. Of the many important political errors committed in our time, the greatest of all was that of the Constituent Assembly, in surrendering to other hands the work they had scarcely sketched out. We took care not to repeat it. The Chamber of Deputies still occupied their place at the Palais-Bourbon, to sustain and direct in its first steps the dawning government it had just consecrated. But while preserving the Chamber, we applied ourselves to complete and strengthen it. Three bills were immediately proposed; two, to fill up, by new elections, all the vacant seats; the third, to submit to the chances of re-election the Deputies promoted to official posts. The two first, bearing in view the loud complaints which the existing electoral systems had given rise to, introduced into that system certain provisional modifications, which settled the definitive law under which the completed Chamber would be established. The third, while instituted to assure the influence of the country in its government, a guarantee that

had been long required, subjected to the ordeal of public opinion, in thirty-nine electoral colleges, forty-one of the leading agents of the new power.

The introduction, discussion, and passing of these bills, fell under my superintendence. They encountered but little opposition in the Chamber. In convoking the colleges for the one hundred and thirteen expected elections, I took great pains to mark the attitude the Government wished to assume;¹ and the Chamber of Deputies was completed, with an indication of public favour, which, while sanctioning what it had already done, promised to its future operations the strength it required.

We were unable to accomplish a similar result in the Chamber of Peers. Already mutilated in composition, it saw in the future a prospect of even more serious dismemberment. The question of hereditary peerage was to be debated in the ensuing session; and on this question, such was the dominant feeling, that on the 19th of August, 1830, when the form of oath to be taken by both Chambers was discussed in the lower house, no one thought of making, at the first moment, any distinction between the Peers and the Deputies; and they were on the point of declaring the Peers who refused the oaths, voluntary seceders, both for their descendants and themselves, and their peerages absolutely extinct. M. Berryer and M. de Martignac demanded this. M. Dupin argued that a perpetual right of heritage existed, which no act of a temporary usufructuary could abolish. I proposed, that since it was decided that the hereditary peerage was to be brought hereafter under discussion,

¹ See Historic Documents, No. VI.

until then it was no less the constitutional enactment of the country than the legal rights of families; and an amendment, founded on my proposition, decided that the Peer who refused to take the oaths should be personally deprived of his seat, without prejudice to the claims of his successors.

The Chamber of Peers owed one point also to the Cabinet of 1830—the choice of its President. Revolutions bring individual names into strange contact. It was M. Dupont de l'Eure who, as Chancellor, countersigned the nomination of M. Pasquier to this high office. Like the appointment of M. de Talleyrand to the English embassy, it was an act of clear and sound policy, which conviction and urgency carried during the first moments of a great crisis, against the prejudices and passions of party feeling. In spite of some old disagreements, to which we attached less importance with every succeeding day, my friends and I looked upon M. Pasquier as the fittest man to direct, through the complicated struggles that awaited them, the important and compromised body at the head of which he was about to be placed.

Throughout eighteen years he reflected as much honour on the Chamber and Court of Peers as they conferred on him, by the ability, the dignity, the justice, the prudent firmness and imperturbable tact he invariably displayed in discharging the duties of their President.

The two Chambers being thus constituted, legislative labours pressed rapidly in on them. Besides the three bills I have named, I presented six more to the Chamber of Deputies; some incidental, such as the national rewards to be assigned to the wounded and

families of the slain during the struggle of July ; on the importation of grain, on urgent public works, etc. ; and others of regulations with respect to the national guard, whether stationary or movable. I had instructed a general Commission, under the presidency of M. de La Fayette, to prepare the two last, which were vehemently demanded from all quarters. It constitutes, at once, the merit and the danger of the institution of national guards, that they excite the most opposite hopes, and lead themselves to the most contrasted views. Their prompt organization satisfied all those quick spirits who were eager for the independence and external dignity of the country. The friends of order expected to find in them strength to maintain peace, in default of the army physically and morally weakened. The Liberals flattered themselves that, thanks to this force, always disposable, a large standing-army would cease to be required. The democrats saw with delight the people armed, and thus placed in a condition to interfere in public affairs.

The ministers of War, of Justice, and of Finance, presented, at the same time, upon questions applicable to their departments, nine bills,—some indispensable to the public service, and others, which had long been the objects of parliamentary or popular remonstrance. By the side of these government bills, prepared and presented in less than three months, twenty-two propositions, emanating from the Chambers themselves, involved reforms in the municipal administration, in the penal laws, the press, the taxes, etc., which gave rise to the most important discussions.

At the outset, however, whether proceeding from the

Government or the Chambers, these propositions failed to excite the long and animated debates that might have been expected. Some amongst them, long called for, such as the abolition of the law of sacrilege, and the re-establishment of a jury to try offences of the press, were received without opposition. Others, on the contrary, seemed, on the part of their proposers, to be merely promises acquitted, or hopes held forth to their friends without, and in no pressing expectation of the result. M. Benjamin Constant and M. Bavoux, for examples, demanded,—one, the complete enfranchisement of the business of printing; the other, a considerable abatement in the security and stamp-duty imposed on the newspapers; but they neither of them called for an immediate inquiry. Many propositions were thus adjourned. There was not yet any declared opposition in the Chambers; organized and irritated by long combats, we were all disposed to agree in one common object; whether in sincerity or from convenience, we worked in concert. There were occasional glimmerings of differences of opinion and misunderstandings, but, except M. Mauguin and a few declaimers of inferior rank, the malcontents and dissentients were more disposed to restrain than to declare themselves.

The Government, on the other hand, was little disposed to promote a contest. I was its principal organ in the Chambers, and although, at a subsequent period, I have been sometimes taunted with the ardour of provocation, I cannot recollect that the reproach was ever cast upon me at that time, and I am confident also that it was not deserved. My temper in debate was then self-

possessed and reserved, as much from the precautionary habit of an orator, as from the official prudence of a minister. To speak the truth, I began at the tribune as in the Government; I was, for the first time, in the front rank of the field of battle, and entrusted with the responsibility of power. I was not a novice in the practice of public speaking, which I had acquired at the Sorbonne; but at the Palais-Bourbon a quick instinctiveness told me that I was in another theatre, with a very different audience. Like the preacher in church, the professor speaks from the elevation of his pulpit to modest and docile listeners, assembled around him by duty or necessity, who have no thought of contradiction; who admit beforehand his moral authority, and are disposed, however little his discourse may please them, to treat him with confidence and respect. It is, in fact, a monologue delivered in presence of a favourable auditory. The political speaker, on the contrary, has before him adversaries who are thirsting for combat, and allies who only render him their support when he can assure them of victory. He is in a continual altercation, on one side with impassioned enemies, and on the other with exacting friends, who sit there as judges. He has not alone to deal with his avowed opposers and rivals in eloquence. While speaking, he is, as it were, in action with the entire assembly who are listening to him, and whose silence he must read and understand. If he cannot unravel the rapid and conflicting emotions which take rise amongst them; if he is unable to see on their faces the impression of their minds; if he fails to anticipate, in order to prepare his answer, the objections and doubts

they are ready to urge, his most laboured oratory will produce no effect. His arguments will be cold and futile, mistaken, misconceived, and turned against himself. An undefined but actual interchange of sentiments and ideas, a sympathetic conversation sudden and continued, between the orator and the assembly, form the leading condition as well as the greatest difficulty of political eloquence. Its power depends on the possession of this faculty. In 1830 I did not estimate the dangers and exigences of this position as fully as I was enabled to do at a later period; but I had a strong presentiment of them, and, far from being led away by the warmth of my convictions or the freedom of my thoughts, I advanced cautiously in this difficult arena, prepared to endure the inevitable impediments of the struggle, and without seeking to extend or inflame them.

Thus, the Chamber, left to itself, was and probably would have long remained, comparatively tranquil; but the approaching storm was incessantly murmuring from without. While we discussed quietly—I might even say coldly—the different questions in the order of the day, popular movements, tumultuous gatherings, whims and unexpected attempts of an excitable and unemployed multitude were constantly increasing in the streets. Labouring men assembled in masses to drive away foreign competitors, and to destroy the machines which they said deprived them of their work. Several factories were destroyed, and on the 3rd of September the 'Journal des Débats' was unable to appear. Meetings, analogous to those which had sought to carry the busts of General Foy and M. Manuel to the Pantheon,

were formed to bestow the same honour on the bust of Marshal Ney. Another assembly, strongly bent on their object, and solemnly advertised for the 24th of September, met at the Place de Grève, on the same spot, where, eight years before, the four sergeants implicated in the conspiracy of Rochelle—Bories and his three companions—had been executed. A platform was raised, a discourse pronounced in homage to their memory; and the Pantheon was promised, if not to their images, at least to their names. Besides these grave solemnities, excited by political schemes or real feeling, promenadings without object or restraint, songs, and cries of bravado or mere amusement, were incessantly agitating the most populous quarters, especially the environs of the Palais-Royal, the abode of the King, and the gallery of the people. In the crossways, and at the corners of the most frequented streets, placards continually renewed covered the walls, couched in terms of lamentation or menace, of licentiousness or insult. Curious idlers gathered round with anxiety to read them, and gossiped on the spot, carrying away to their districts and abodes the impressions they received.

Although mischievous to society (the return and repose of which they delayed,) and troublesome to the authority which as yet wanted the power to repress them, these palpable irregularities would have signified little, if beyond and above street demonstrations, other causes of disorder, older and more deeply rooted, had not taken possession of many minds. The Revolution of July had not confined itself to the overthrow of a dynasty, and the modification of a Charter: it had given rise to pre-

tensions and hopes, not alone in the political party who desired for France a form of government opposed to monarchy, but in all the schools, and in every sect, through all the varied divisions of life, whether prominent or obscure, who were dreaming of another state of social organization quite distinct from that which France had received from her origin, her Christian faith, and her fourteen ages of political existence. Besides the Republicans,—and divided between a desire to join and to separate from them,—the St. Simonians, the Fourierists, the Socialists, and the Communists, much opposed to each other in principle and unequal in strength, as in intellectual power, were all in a state of ambitious effervescence. The fundamental ideas of these schools were not more novel than rational. The world, from its earliest dawn, in every great crisis, has witnessed the explosion of the same chimæras, the same rebellion of human pride against the arrangements of Providence, the same false calculations on human nature, and on man's proper share in human legislation. In a state of society firmly organized, and under a well-established government, these reveries, which always brood indistinctly, are of little importance. They never acquire more than a very restricted number of recruits or dupes, and they may be allowed to vegetate within a narrow sphere of action without regard to their progress. But in the heart of a democratic, remonstrating, and determined nation, given over for fifty years to innumerable experiments and ambitious hopes, all these small political and philosophic sections, some of them even affecting semi-religious airs, became so many small rotatory powers, possessing little

physical strength, but capable of disseminating much moral venom. The reformers scarcely pretended to assume full control over French society, or to reconstruct it at their pleasure; but they aspired to exercise over its laws, ideas, and motives, a predominating influence, and they all supplied a contingent aid to the revolutionary ferment which boiled round the Government it had so recently introduced. By a strange combination between the traditions of contrasted ages, these fermentations found the most appropriate centres for reunion, increase, and expansion. The secret societies of the Restoration had transferred themselves into revolutionary clubs, thus combining the remains of silent discipline with the extravagant enthusiasm of unbridled speech. There, at daily and public meetings, all events and questions, whether of principle or incidental occurrence, were warmly discussed. All designs, hopes, and dreams, were boldly investigated. The entire government, the monarchy, the chambers, the magistracy, the administration, were attacked with undissembled violence. Their total overthrow was unreservedly proposed. Working-people and youths, casual passers-by, entered into these places of assembly as to a public spectacle, enjoying their audacious license; and round the leaders of these old republican, Bonapartist, socialist, or other associations, advocates of the popular party were grouped, ready to declare against the existing authorities, which from day to day they were in the habit of hearing insulted and denounced as enemies.

The clubs, in their subversive ardour, forgot that they were engaged, not only with a power as yet unsettled and

disturb public tranquillity and interfere with the progress of trade. M. Laffitte has assured us that the Government would effectually attend to the desire expressed so strongly by all good citizens. I think it would be well that you should communicate this to MM. de Broglie and Guizot."

I had not waited for this information to act according to the mode which appeared suitable to the state of facts and feelings. I had previously spoken in Council of certain legislative arrangements, which had rather the object of entertaining than of settling the question, when several deputies, friends of my own, and amongst others M. Benjamin Morel, the great merchant of Dunkirk, informed me that they felt called upon conscientiously to declare in the Chamber the extensive mischief which the clubs were producing and fermenting, and to press the ministry for an immediate remedy. Far from dissuading, I encouraged them in this design, with an assurance that the government would do its duty, as they were anxious to discharge theirs.

Two days later, assuming for pretext the industrial distress in his department, M. Benjamin Morel attacked the clubs without reserve, and imputed to them the continued agitation which compromised at the same time the credit of the new dynasty and the prosperity of the country. The Chamber listened to him in silence, embarrassed but favourably disposed. Some voices were raised against the exaggeration of his complaints, and in favour of the principles of liberty which these political associations might appeal to in common with insulated individuals. I took up the question at once, not

without embarrassment in my turn, whether arising from the disposition of the Chamber, or from some personal doubts of my own. I had to deal with wavering minds, uneasy at the proceedings of the clubs, but still remembering their ardent struggles for freedom under the Restoration; and I felt unwilling to abolish in advance and on principle, privileges which the future might bestow on my country, or to concede to existing liberty the right of causing and promoting anarchy. I believe that I adopted the most convincing as well as the sincerest arguments. I proposed no absolute or irrevocable maxim. I admitted the perplexities, and pointed out the various considerations, the distant perspectives which appeared to me connected with the subject. "France," I said, "has accomplished a revolution, but with no desire to place herself permanently in a revolutionary state. The leading features of such a state are, that everything is incessantly questioned, that pretensions are undefined, and appeals continually made to violence and force. These features exist in all popular associations, in the action they produce, and in the impulse they compel themselves to convey to France. This is not progress, but disorder. It is agitation without object, but not improvement. We have conquered more liberty within the last fifteen years than any other nation has won in a century. Why? Because reform was stern and laborious; because we have been compelled to use prudence, patience, and perseverance in proportion to our advance. Let us not depart from this path. I hasten to declare that the 291st Article of the Penal Code ought not to hold a lasting or even a long place in the legislation of

a free people. The time will come when, not being justified by the state of society, it will disappear entirely from that Code. But it is there at present. It is the existing law of France. Since power is thus armed with a legal remedy against the danger of popular associations, it is called upon to exert it. It has already done so, and has determined to do so again, as long as may be necessary for the maintenance of order in the country, and for the regular progress of her liberties." The vote of the Chamber evinced their full accordance with the tone of this language.

On the same day when this debate took place, the Chamber of Accusation of the Royal Court of Paris sent the leaders of the "Society of Friends of the People," and the owner of the house in which they assembled, before the police-court; and in the evening, the society itself, in full meeting, saw the hall surrounded by a vast number of the inhabitants of the district, the greater portion of them National Guards, who hissed the orators, put an end to their deliberations, and assailed the members with hootings to such an extent that they hastened out, as much terrified as incensed at their sudden unpopularity. They tried, on the day after the morrow, to meet again; but the hall was closed up, and a platoon of the National Guard, posted at the doors, interdicted all admission. Four days later, the police-court sentenced the accused to three months' imprisonment, and declared the dissolution of the club, which was constrained to undergo a second metamorphosis, and to become once more a secret society.

The Chamber, the courts of Justice, the National

Guard, and the Cabinet, by suppressing these centres of subordinate anarchy, concurred in an act of evident sound sense and easy boldness. But through the irritation cherished by the vanquished party and the disagreements which less palpably and immediately began to spring up in the heart of the government, this act led to more serious consequences than it deserved, and became the starting-point of the contest that speedily commenced. In the Chamber, M. Dupin had seconded me in the debate; but Messrs. de Tracy, Salverte, Benjamin Constant, and M. Mauguin opposed me, some from respect for absolute principles, and others as a concession to violent and clamorous allies. In the Council MM. De Broglie, Casimir Périer, Molé, Louis, and Sebastiani voted with me warmly; but M. Dupont de l'Eure was melancholy and dissatisfied, and M. Laffitte would have been embarrassed but for his constitutional carelessness. I had undertaken a commission in which all my colleagues were not decided in following me. None of them liked the clubs; but while some were eager, others hesitated to break with them irrevocably. It was no longer, as in the constitution of the peerage and the revisal of the Charter, really opposite ideas and intentions that entered into contest; but unequal resolutions, not able to keep the same pace on the same road. The question, from day to day, resolved itself more distinctly into a contest between the policy of resistance and the policy of forbearance, between the active exercise of constitutional power, and patience, not exactly abetting but tolerant towards the intemperance of popular enthusiasm. It was evident that, on the first

critical conjuncture, although the definite objects of all were nearly similar, the varieties of character and tendency would lead to a separation.

From the first days of the Revolution, this event was in preparation. In the Government, in the Chamber, in the public mind, the trial of the Ministers of Charles X. was the subject of extremely opposite but general and anxious solicitude. On my own part, I was resolved to strain every nerve to prevent the victory being stained by blood when the contest had ceased. I had struggled hard, under the Restoration, to pull down the political scaffold, and I held myself bound in honour to oppose its re-erection. There are solemn occasions when a thinking man owes it to himself to seek to put in practice the truths he has advocated ; for in such cases inconsistency would be disgraceful, and would betray as much weakness of mind as depravity of heart. The more I reflected in 1830, the more I became fixed in the conviction which, in 1822, had induced me to oppose vehemently the penalty of death for political offences. In the case of the ministers who had countersigned the decrees of Charles X., as in that of the conspirators who sought to dethrone Louis XVIII., I felt convinced that their minds were not imbued with that moral perverseness, in the absence of which capital punishment is a detestable iniquity ; and that their condemnation was not called for by the social necessity, which, joined to the offence of the accused, can alone legitimize the extreme severity of the law. The argument set forth in their favour by the advocates of the ministers, and founded on the overthrow of constitutional order and

the expulsion of the King himself, had no decidedly legal value; but as a moral consideration it carried much weight. There can be no doubt that the most rigorous punishment would have been more necessary and just towards the ministers of a King remaining on the throne, than towards those of a banished monarch. And with regard to purely practical consequences, it required but little sagacity to perceive that, far from enhancing the security of the new Government, blood shed on the scaffold would have augmented its difficulties and dangers, by affording to revolutionary passions those feverish and poisonous gratifications which irritate instead of appeasing them.

The entire Council, with King Louis-Philippe at their head, and nearly all the men of note who surrounded him, agreed in this opinion; but we were confronted by an opposite sentiment, very ardently and extensively disseminated. Amongst the population which took part in the resistance that became the Revolution, and in the National Guards, whose ranks were filled from that class, hearts were still trembling with the rage excited by the decrees of July; with remembrance of the perils by which the struggle had been accomplished, and of the painful sacrifices that victory had cost. Should rights violated and blood sacrificed remain without expiation? In human nature there is at the bottom a grain of barbarism, which looks upon the law of retaliation as sound justice, and exhibits a blind thirst in the desire for sanguinary punishments. The revolutionary leaders and promoters of disturbance at any price, took advantage of this popular inclination, and tried all means in their

power to animate it, with the hope of raising or encouraging sentiments even more violent, by which to compromise the people through irritating reminiscences, and thus to produce a chance of once more seizing the power that had escaped them. Even in the higher ranks and amongst conscientious men of the prevailing party, some narrow, impracticable minds were not wanting, who adopting a mode of reasoning at once revolutionary and juridical, supported capital punishment as the just and necessary consequence of the great violation of national rights which had rendered the Revolution itself just and necessary.

As soon as the question sprang up, these opposing sentiments and objects displayed themselves simultaneously. On the same day when M. Eusèbe Salverte brought forward in the Chamber of Deputies his proposition for the impeachment of the ministers, M. de Tracy placed on the table his motion for the abolition of the penalty of death. Both were disinterested and sincere. The one a philosophic puritan, hard without passion, and coldly fanatical; the other a warm and generous heart, ever ready to stand forward for what he believed to be just or beneficial to humanity, and astonished at the difficulties he encountered in bringing others to his own ideas, and in inducing them to adopt his views.

The same reporter, M. Béranger de la Drome, was ordered to draw up both propositions for the Chamber, and acquitted himself with equal propriety, as a moderate and impartial legislator, more careful of expressing justly the opinions of others, than of strongly indicating his own. His report on the abolition of the

punishment of death was not read in the Chamber until thirteen days after that, the object of which was the impeachment of the Ministers; and during this interval, two unexpected incidents materially aided the proposition of M. de Tracy. On the 21st of September, at the Place de Grève, in the midst of a solemnity celebrated in memory of the four sergeants of Rochelle, and as if under the dictation of their shadows, a petition was signed in favour of the abolition of capital punishment; and two days later, the wounded of the three days of July, still disabled in the hospitals, addressed an expression of the same desire to the Chamber of Deputies. The public, with justice, ascribed to M. de La Fayette the honour of these generous manifestations. It was a fortunate chance for him, and which he hastened to avail himself of, that he was thus enabled to give to the great instincts of his own lofty nature a popular force and utterance. When the proposition of M. de Tracy began to be seriously debated, the impossibility of its rapid or complete adoption became evident. The magistracy and military indicated the danger of altering or enfeebling the Penal Code to this extent, and the Chamber gladly adopted an amendment of M. de Kératry, who proposed to change the proposition into an Address to the King, praying him to introduce a bill tending to abolish the penalty of death in certain specific cases, exclusively political. M. Dupont de l'Eure seconded the amendment. "During the approaching prorogation of the Chamber," said he, "government will have the opportunity of examining this important question, and of proposing to you, when the Chamber resumes its labours,

a bill to reconcile all interests. I promise that, as chancellor, I will give my entire solicitude to carry out the wish contained in the Address to the King." On the same day, at eight o'clock in the evening, and at a special sitting, the committee which had been directed to prepare the form of address, presented it to the Chamber, who adopted it almost unanimously, although after a long debate; and on the day following, the 9th of October, the King, surrounded by his ministers, with the Duke of Orléans on his right-hand, standing on the steps of the throne, received the deputation appointed to present the Address, and who were accompanied by a great number of the members. "The wish you now express," said the King, "has long been the desire of my own heart. A witness, during my early youth, of the terrible extent to which the penalty of capital punishment for political offences has been abused, and of all the evils thereby inflicted on France and on humanity, I have ever most ardently longed for the abolition of this law. The remembrance of that disastrous time, and the painful feelings which overwhelm me when my thoughts recur to it, will secure to you a safe guarantee for the readiness with which I shall lay before you a bill in accordance with your wishes."

On all sides, between the King, the Chambers, and the Ministry, the engagement was strong and reciprocal, and reduced to conditions that appeared reasonably practicable. No one mistook its origin and object. The immediate end was to save the heads of the ministers of Charles X. from the scaffold, to which revolutionary passions and resentments were determined to consign

them. When the glove was thus thrown down, many began to say that a fault had been committed; that it was wrong to engage in the struggle publicly and beforehand; that the proposition of M. de Tracy was inopportune; that it tended to drive those who opposed it to extreme violence; that it would have been wiser to have remained silent, and to have allowed the impeachment to proceed without clamour before the Chamber of Peers, who would undoubtedly consider it with independent moderation. In holding this language, a question was cut short much more general and important than the conduct to be held in the prosecution of the ministers. Strength was given to the policy of forbearance or expediency, in opposition to the policy of resistance, and the latter was destined before long to succumb to its adversaries. But sound policy has this virtue—that even in submitting it preserves much of its effectual power. If we had not resolutely opposed the passions and calculations which demanded blood to nourish the Revolution,—if we had not raised against the infliction of the supreme penalty under similar circumstances a strong and determined clamour, the revolutionary spirit would have developed itself at its ease, and in all probability have accomplished its object. But so many and such powerful manifestations against this design, excited a public feeling which rendered it impotent in its triumph; and even though it might succeed in overthrowing the ministers by whom it was vehemently opposed, it found none amongst their colleagues, who, even in entertaining the question, sincerely desired to promote its success.

No sooner had the Address of the Chamber of Deputies been presented and received with so much promptitude, than hostile plots and demonstrations began hastily to exhibit themselves in their turn. Already, for several days, some disgraceful symptoms indicated this inauspicious explosion. Pamphlets, articles in the newspapers, and placards were disseminated against the fallen King, his family, and his recognized friends, including the grossest insults and the most infamous calumnies. A work appeared, entitled 'The Scandalous, Political, Anecdotal, and Sanctimonious History of Charles X. ;' and another, called 'The Secret Amours of the Bourbons.' It was affirmed that poniards and barrels of gunpowder had been discovered in the palace of the Archbishop of Paris, and that the commission entrusted with repairing the disasters caused by the contests of July had granted to the prelate an indemnity of 200,000 francs. Revolutionists excel in the art of vilifying their adversaries, to irritate their own instruments. Before long, the fire of these attacks concentrated itself upon the accused ministers and the parties who advocated the abolition of capital punishment. The words "Death to the Ministers!" were written on all the streets, and even on the walls of the prison of the Luxembourg. The same menaces were addressed to the judges and the accused. "The enemies of our Revolution," it was said, "have believed that on this point it was ready to yield. It will not yield a single point. A great example is required, and will be exacted. . . . Banishment for these guilty Ministers! Gorged with gold, full of insolence and contempt for the people, they think only of reaching some despotic courts,

where they will be received with all the honours due to tyrants, and where they can prepare new plots for the overthrow of liberty. But a river of blood surrounds them, and a nation in arms watches its banks,—they shall never pass it in safety.”

On the 17th of October, the manifestations were no longer confined to pamphlets and placards. Two bands of men, women, and children, belonging nearly all to that idle, corrupt, and turbulent population which swarms in the heart of Paris, ever on the alert for an opportunity to carry their excesses to the surface, paraded the streets, and assailed the Palais-Royal with cries of “Death to the Ministers!—the head of Polignac!” mingling with these shouts insulting exclamations against the King and the Chambers. The guard dispersed these gatherings without difficulty, but without effect. They reappeared on the following day, the 18th, towards noon, in still greater numbers, and bearing a flag with this inscription, “Desire of the people; death to the Ministers!” Some of the most conspicuous were arrested; but the remainder spread themselves through the suburbs, where they obtained large accessions to their number; and during the evening a dense crowd tumultuously invaded the courts, the galleries, and the garden of the Palais-Royal, uttering louder insults than before against King Louis-Philippe, the Ministers of Charles X., the Chamber of Deputies, and the Chamber of Peers: a lawless mob, with a determined object, ready to attempt anything against any authority which might venture to oppose their ferocious demands. After repeated efforts, the guard succeeded in driving them

from the courts of the palace, and in securing the iron gates; but immediately a cry arose in the middle of the square, "To Vincennes!—to Vincennes!" Thousands of voices repeated this shout as an indication of victory, and the waves of the crowd immediately flowed towards the direction to which the name invited them.

After having, during the day, held council in the King's palace, we were all, at that moment, assembled at the house of the chancellor, uneasy as to the state of Paris, and still more dissatisfied with each other. M. Dupont de l'Eure and his friends bore with impatience the weight of our unpopularity, while we were equally restive under the pressure of their want of firmness. We held one of those vain consultations in which the time is lost which no one knows how to employ; when General Fabvier entered and informed us, that the insurrectionary crowd expelled from the Palais-Royal had taken the route to Vincennes with the most menacing demonstrations and intents. It was absolutely necessary to adopt a course, and we decided on two. I proposed an immediate repression; but by others it was considered necessary to yield something to popular feeling. I wrote on the instant, at the Council table, to General Pajol, commander of the military division:—

"General,—The Council has just received intelligence, through General Fabvier, that a certain number of riotous persons have resolved this evening to march on Vincennes tomorrow, under the pretext of ascertaining that the state prisoners are still there; but in all probability with the intention of pursuing violent measures against them. I am instructed to call upon you to take

every necessary precaution to place the Castle of Vincennes in security, and to drive away any crowd that may take that direction. It is equally important to concoct measures for dispersing, by the presence of the National Guard, the assemblages that have been formed in Paris for several days. The Council places the fullest confidence in the wisdom of the arrangements that you may deem necessary to establish order in the capital, and to watch over the tranquillity of the citizens, so seriously compromised."

The letter being despatched, before the sitting terminated, I drew up for the 'Moniteur' an article which appeared on the following morning, containing, amongst strong denunciations against the fomenters of disturbances, this sentence:—"The circumstance which has given rise to this has no justifiable pretext whatever. The government, which is of opinion that the universal and immediate abolition of capital punishment is impracticable, thinks also, after a most careful examination, that to confine it in our Code to the only cases in which necessity may render it legitimate, requires time and long preparation." This was to adjourn indefinitely, or at least far beyond the trial of the Ministers, the Bill which the Chamber of Deputies had earnestly demanded in their Address, and which M. Dupont de l'Eure, in the King's name, had promised to bring in immediately. These two measures being adopted,—one to repress, and the other to conciliate the insurrection,—the Council broke up.

Two hours had scarcely elapsed when General Fabvier, commandant of Paris, received from General Daumésnil,

the governor of Vincennes, this laconic note :—" General, —a considerable mob has presented itself before the fortress I command, but dispersed on my approach. I request you to send immediately one or two battalions of the National Guard." Towards eleven in the evening, in fact, the seditionists arrived in front of Vincennes. Roused by their shouts, the prisoners, of whom they were in search, saw through their narrow windows and by the light of the torches that the crowd had gathered before the castle, and demanded admittance. General Daumesnil ordered the gate to be opened, and presented himself alone. "What do you want?" said he. "We demand the ministers." "You shall not have them; they belong to the law alone, and I will blow up the powder-magazine rather than surrender them to you." After some minutes of hesitation and parley, the mob, impressed with respect, and intimidated, resumed the route to Paris, crying aloud, "Long live the Wooden Leg!"—and Vincennes resumed its tranquillity.

But three hours later, still in the dead of night, the same crowd once more appeared round the Palais-Royal, echoing the former demands and insults. A single guard was posted there, weak in number and ill informed as to passing events. The rioters shouted aloud, "The King! we want to see the King!" Some had already penetrated into the interior and were ascending the grand staircase, finding the royal palace more easy of invasion than the prison of the ministers of Charles X., when a few companies of the National Guard, hastily assembled, arrived upon the spot, arrested the most audacious of the insurgents, and finally dispersed the gathering.

Two days after, on the 20th of October, the 'Moniteur' was filled with congratulations mingled with regrets, and with royal and popular exhortations. On the 19th, at nine in the morning, the King, accompanied by the Duke of Orleans, M. de La Fayette, and Marshal Gérard, descended into the court of the Palais-Royal, and addressed to the National Guards and troops of the line who had suppressed the tumult, affectionate thanks and resolute counsel. M. de La Fayette, in an order of the day issued to the National Guard, had expressed himself on the troubles of the eve, with an overflowing of the heart ever confident and fond toward the people, although a little tinged with melancholy, conjuring them, "not to fall from the lofty rank in which the late Revolution had placed them, and to spare that mortification to an old servant of the popular cause, who rejoiced that he had lived long enough to witness at last its pure and glorious triumph." The official journal hastened to publish these instances of a return to order, and these calls to future subordination, in which sage and patriotic integrity were more apparent than the strong hand of power. One article alone was wanting in the 'Moniteur' of that day,—the proclamation addressed to his fellow-citizens by M. Odilon-Barrot, as Prefect of the Seine. More explicit and energetic than any other, against the violence which had threatened at the same time the safety of the accused and the independence of the judges, and impressed with a sincere moral sentiment, the proclamation contained also the following passage: "An unseasonable step has led to the supposition that there was an understanding to interrupt the

ordinary course of justice in the case of the ex-ministers." This was openly casting blame on the Chamber which had voted the Address on the punishment of death; on the Cabinet and the King, who had not only seconded and received it, but had pledged themselves to a prompt acquiescence. A government which had thus spoken and acted could not, without a complete sacrifice of consistency and dignity, appear to give the slightest countenance to this language of one of its principal agents. The question of system and cabinet which had been for some time fomenting approached a crisis. In expectation of the result, I insisted that the proclamation of the Prefect of the Seine should not appear in the 'Moniteur,' from whence it was in consequence excluded.

Amongst the men to whom it has been my lot to be often opposed, M. Odilon-Barrot is, perhaps, of all others the one of whom I find it most easy to speak without embarrassment. I retain with respect to him a double conviction, which has survived all our contests, and rises above all our disagreements. I am convinced that, at the bottom, our political views were the same, and that he always desired, with me, a constitutional monarchy for our common country,—neither more nor less. I think also that in the idea he had formed of the conditions and policy under which that monarchy should be founded, he has ever been sincere, and influenced by objects of public advantage and not by personal interests. We may express our opinions freely when they are accompanied by esteem. With an excellent mutual understanding under the Restoration, M. Odilon-Barrot and I differed materially at the epoch of 1830. He belongs

to the school of confiding politicians, who for the accomplishment of the good they desire place much reliance on the spontaneous and enlightened concurrence of the people; a generous school, which has more than once done good service to humanity by giving itself up to elevated hopes, but at the same time short-sighted and hazardous, forgetting within what limits and by what restraining checks human nature requires to be held back, that its good instincts may prevail over its evil tendencies. What the disciples of the school chiefly want, is to become sound and serious moralists: they are ill acquainted with man, and cannot love without flattering him. M. Odilon-Barrot persuaded himself that constitutional government was more easy, and men more wise than they actually are. He expected too much from the faculty of free institutions to enlighten the nation, and from the intelligence of the nation in the exercise of free institutions. This was the sentiment which in 1830 prevailed in his conduct and words, and herein lay the true cause of our separation and first contests. He had made no application for the important post confided to him. On the 12th and 15th of August, while accompanying Charles X. to Cherbourg, he wrote to me as follows: "I read in the papers my appointment to the Prefecture of the Seine. Every one compliments me on it, but I have received no official or even private communications from you to that effect. I attach myself with extreme cordiality to the existing government, and I ask nothing better than to devote myself entirely to its support, because I see in it the maintenance of all my principles, and the alliance I have ever so anxiously

desired between power and liberty. But still men ought to be employed according to their fitness, and an administrative career is to me entirely new. I am terrified at the difficulties of the post you offer me." M. Odilon-Barrot was not sufficiently terrified, not only for himself but for us all, for the government and for France. I never had to complain, as minister of the Interior, that he treated me with any want of frankness. He not only invariably acquainted me with his opinions and bias, but he often tried to induce me to accord with his own views; and when our disagreement became evident, he at once tendered his resignation. He considered me too uneasy, too exacting with the Revolution, the country, my colleagues, and himself. According to his notion my friends and I required too much unity, regularity, consistency, and inherent strength in the government. He would have wished us to be more accommodating to the desires and impressions of the public, more disposed to give them latitude, and to trust to a favourable issue from their unrestrained development. I repeat the words I have already used, as they are the only ones that reflect my thoughts correctly;—he preferred, on the day after a Revolution, the policy of leaving things to their natural course, in preference to the policy of resistance.

Whatever might be thought of their respective advantages, the two lines of policy could not act in concert. They mutually condemned each other to inconsistency and contemptible impotence. A government so conducted lost all power as well as dignity. In the Chambers, instead of progress towards the organization and discipline of

parties, confusion increased from day to day. No one applied himself either to exercise authority systematically, or to seek for it in rational and legitimate opposition. Beyond the Chambers, the public felt surprised and alarmed at seeing affairs in the hands of an administration, ill-combined and incapable from its internal disunion, of effectually struggling against public anarchy. My personal friends and those of M. Dupont de l'Eure equally manifested their impatience and discontent. It was the general opinion of the Cabinet, and in this the King agreed with his ministers, that such a state of things called for an immediate termination. The Duke de Broglie and myself had firmly resolved no longer to sustain the responsibility. The trial of the ministers of Charles X. supplied the opportunity of a division not only favourable but opportune; for a division reduced rather than augmented the danger of this crisis, which was looked forward to with general anxiety.

We knew that Messrs. Laffitte, Dupont de l'Eure, and La Fayette agreed in the matter entirely with our views, and would use their utmost endeavours to insure its successful termination. Unallied with us, they were more called upon as well as more capable of effecting this end. On their part, opposition was not expected. The prospect of this difficulty determined Messrs. Casimir Périer, Molé, Louis, and Dupin to retire with the Duke de Broglie and myself. Messrs. Laffitte and Dupont de l'Eure—the one as Minister of Finance and President of the Council, the other in his former post of Chancellor—became the standard-bearers of the new cabinet. Of the partisans of the policy of resistance, General Sébas-

tiani alone retained his seat there, as indifferent and variable in his relations with individuals as decided and persevering in his line of conduct. He cared little for alliances and appearances. He wished to remain the confidential adviser of the King, and in a position to serve him according to the necessities and fluctuations of the times.

We retired from office, the Duke de Broglie and myself, with a feeling of deliverance almost joyful, of which I still retain a vivid recollection. We escaped the mortification of fruitless efforts, and the responsibility of errors which we opposed without being able to prevent them. With the public of Paris, and even in the Chambers, our resignation created no surprise and little uneasiness. We had struggled rather than succeeded. We had acquired some credit in defending order and regular government; but our endeavours had not been attended with a triumph sufficiently declared to win for us the character and influence of its sole and indispensable representatives. We were reckoned upon for the future; but for the present, even in the estimation of a portion of our friends, we were considered as more compromising than effective.

At a distance from Paris, the public in the departments, governed by more simple and more fixed ideas, looked upon the change of ministry as an important event. Amongst the evidences of opinion that I received at the time, I shall quote but one, displaying the true feeling of a man more clear-sighted than the majority of the lookers-on. M. Augustin Thierry wrote thus to me from Hyères on the 9th of November, 1830:—"Under

the sufferings of an intermittent fever, which returns in spite of all remedies, I have felt the full anxiety produced by the change which the papers of this day announce. They are real anxieties, for you may readily believe that I have suffered equally as a friend and as a patriot. Your entry into a ministry which, immediately following a revolution, had so many claims to contend with, so many ambitious aspirations to satisfy or extinguish, was indeed a painful task. This will soon be discovered. In the meanwhile what you have effected in three months can never be lost, and the administration of the country, let what may happen, will remain in the mould in which you have cast it. It will be a great gratification to your friends to see the little actually accomplished by those who have opposed and calumniated you with so much bitterness and bad faith. The press of Paris, which saved everything during the late crisis, seems now to have no other object than universal destruction. I cannot understand what has happened, and was far indeed from expecting it. But, thanks to you and your political friends, order is re-established in France! We are acknowledged by foreign Powers, and at peace at home. A few blundering writers will be unable to upset all this, and the good sense of the provinces will learn to appreciate as it deserves the turbulence of Paris."

We had no occasion to wait until the good sense of the provinces rendered us justice. As soon as he was appointed, M. Laffitte, the President of the Council, assumed that office to himself.

CHAPTER III.

TRIAL OF THE MINISTERS OF CHARLES X., AND SACK
OF SAINT-GERMAIN L'AUXERROIS.

DISAGREEMENTS IN THE CABINET OF M. LAFFITTE.—DEATH AND FUNERAL OF M. BENJAMIN CONSTANT.—TRIAL OF THE MINISTERS OF CHARLES X.—MY SPEECH AGAINST THE APPLICATION OF THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH.—ATTITUDE OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS.—M. SAUZET AND M. DE MONTALIVET.—EMBARRASSMENT OF M. DE LA FAYETTE AFTER THE TRIAL OF THE MINISTERS.—PRETENSIONS AND HOPES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY.—THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ABOLISHES THE COMMAND-IN-GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL GUARDS OF THE KINGDOM.—NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE KING AND M. DE LA FAYETTE ON THIS SUBJECT.—DEMANDS AND RESIGNATION OF M. DE LA FAYETTE.—THE COUNT DE LOBAU IS APPOINTED TO THE CHIEF COMMAND OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF PARIS.—CONVERSATIONS OF M. LAFFITTE WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF FRANCE AT * * * *.—M. THIERS, UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE FINANCES.—STATE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.—M. DE TALLEYRAND AND THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON.—SACK OF THE CHURCH OF SAINT-GERMAIN L'AUXERROIS AND OF THE ARCHIEPISCOPAL PALACE AT PARIS.—SCENES OF ANARCHY IN VARIOUS PLACES.—SUPPRESSION OF THE FLEUR DE LIS IN THE ARMS OF FRANCE.—EFFECT OF THESE SCENES IN EUROPE.—ON THE STATE OF PARTIES IN FRANCE AND IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.—WEAKNESS AND INCAPACITY OF THE CABINET.—MY OPPOSITION.—FALL OF THE CABINET.—INTERNAL STRUGGLE FOR ITS REPLACEMENT.—M. CASIMIR PÉRIER FORMS A NEW MINISTRY.

(From NOVEMBER 3, 1830, to MARCH 13, 1831.)

ON the 9th and 10th of November, 1830, on the occasion of a proposal by M. Bavoux, which called for a considerable reduction in the amount of securities, stamp-duty, and postal expenses imposed on the newspapers, a debate, or rather a conversation, arose on the

causes which had led to the dismemberment of the old cabinet and the formation of the new one, and also upon their different politics. M. L. fitte opened the discussion:—"As members of the former and present administration," said he, "we feel called upon to explain our intentions and conduct. We shall be brief and exact. Disagreements have arisen; not, as you might be inclined to believe, tending on the one hand to anarchy, and on the other to conservatism. No, Gentlemen, there was nothing of the kind. Every member of the Council knew and felt convinced that liberty should be accompanied by order, and that the continued execution of the laws until they are reformed is indispensable, under the penalty of confusion. Every one was fully imbued with the experiences which the Revolution of 1789 has bequeathed to the world; every one knew that the Revolution of 1830 ought to be maintained to a certain extent, and that it was necessary to conciliate Europe to that event, by combining sustained moderation with dignity. Upon these points we were agreed, for in the Council there were none but men of sense and prudence. But there were misunderstandings as to the manner of appreciating and directing the Revolution of 1830. All were not equally convinced that it was destined so soon to degenerate into anarchy; that we should so rapidly be compelled to take defensive precautions against it, and assume an attitude of mistrust and hostility. But except this general impression, no fundamental disagreement on any point of a system separated the members of the late cabinet. . . . Unanimous upon leading principles, the difference con-

sisted entirely in the more or less confiding temperament of the different parties. Either could possess itself of power. It has been said and repeated to us, until we are compelled to believe it, that confidence in this Revolution would establish a better condition for its direction. Perhaps this view may be correct; perhaps it may be better, to understand completely and to govern this Revolution, that it should neither be doubted nor feared. Perhaps the ideas of order, the true maxims of legislation, may more readily become popular with certain names than with others. We have not the vanity to believe that such influence rests with ours; but we have been forced to think so, since power has been left in our hands. While deeply regretting the course of events, we have remained near the King's person as faithful and devoted subjects." Thus M. Laffitte, on his very entrance into power, felt the necessity of extenuating, in the eyes of the public, the misunderstandings which had agitated the preceding cabinet, and of enrolling under the same standard the ministers who had resigned and their colleagues who had become their successors. In truth, he scarcely compromised himself by taking up this position in the terms I have related; there are general ideas so true that they become from that cause insignificant, and may be attributed to all the world without individual objection, although at the same time common adhesion by no means indicates actual unity. Besides, as regarded M. Laffitte, it was not pure political tactics and dexterity of language. His open, flexible, light, and superficial mind, on almost every occasion thought in common with

his associates, and readily persuaded himself that they equally thought with him. But amongst his colleagues or allies were dispositions more consistent and characters less pliable. At the precise moment when he was endeavouring to represent the former and the present cabinet as animated by the same views, M. Odilon-Barrot, in justification of his own conduct, undertook to elucidate the profound difference of their principles, and the practical consequences resulting therefrom. While M. Laffitte, in his financial solicitude, defended the stamp-duty on newspapers, M. Odilon-Barrot opposed it in the name of the general line of policy which alone, according to him, was suitable to the revolution:—"I have thought," said he, "that the securities, the stamp-duties, and all the shackles on the liberty of the press could only be necessary at a time when power was reduced to oppose the national interests, in support of which the press contributed its full influence; but that under the system which prevails at present, a system of government which finds its strength and principle in the national interests, there could be no occasion to protect ourselves against the freedom of the press. That, on the contrary, such a government should appeal to the unfettered press to augment its energy, and to carry into every class of society that prevailing voice of reason which such complete liberty can alone proclaim." And when the question came to a vote, by the side of M. Laffitte, who affirmed that the cabinet were unanimous in maintaining the stamp-duty, M. Dupont de l'Eure, practically applying the principle laid down by M. Odilon-Barrot, openly declared for the reduction of the

impost. Thus, eight days after its formation, disagreement and incoherence betrayed themselves in the new cabinet, even more glaringly than in the old one: the policy of resistance and the policy of leaving things to their course were still at issue. It was only that the first, weakened and intimidated, endeavoured to conceal its true position while struggling to maintain itself; the second spoke with loud confidence, and sought to govern by impeding government.

Beyond the precincts of the Chambers and of official life, in private societies and conversations, the internal discords of the ministerial party were more freely discussed. An ambassador, recently appointed by the King, and about to depart for his post, thought it necessary before he left Paris to take the instructions, or at least to ascertain the views, of the new president of the Council. Not finding M. Laffitte at the ministry of finance, he encountered him seated on the boulevards and placed himself by his side. M. Laffitte held a long conversation with him, not on the subject of his mission, but relative to the cabinet which he, M. Laffitte, had lately formed, and to the difficulties of a situation under which, however, he appeared to be neither uneasy nor embarrassed. He belonged, he said, to the moderate party, the same who had desired that a ministry should be formed under the premiership of M. Casimir Périer; he held similar opinions and intentions to theirs; he also desired peace and a cordial understanding with foreign powers, and was fully resolved to maintain that policy. He spoke contemptuously of the influence which M. de La Fayette pretended to exercise, of his mania

for popularity, of the hair-brained persons with whom he surrounded himself, and of the propagandism he was continually fomenting to produce revolutions throughout Europe. "I shall put a stop to all this work," said he; "I pledge myself to bring back to reason my own republican friends and these chimerical liberals. In fact, we are all of the same opinion."

My friends and I sought to take no advantage of the dissensions between our successors, to render their maintenance of power more difficult, and to resume it ourselves. Nothing can be more lawful than to oppose a policy which we believe to be injurious, always provided that we are ready to substitute another essentially different, and that we feel ourselves in a condition to put it into practice. All ambition that does not impose these two conditions on itself becomes an act of evil personality, which injures government, and is derogatory to those who indulge in it. We left office, convinced, on the one hand, that M. Laffitte and his partisans were better suited than us to encounter the perilous dilemma of the trial of the ministers; on the other, that it had become necessary that the policy of non-resistance should be brought to the test of facts, and condemned, not only on our arguments, but on its own experience. I abstained scrupulously from all opposition, from every ambitious pretence. I re-enter into that old scene of contest, now covered with ruins, to retrace my own steps; I have examined the monuments of my combats with MM. Odilon-Barrot, Benjamin Constant, Mauguin, and Salverte; they are numerous and animated; but they bear, unless I deceive myself, an evident impression

of sincere disinterestedness. My heartfelt desire was to bring to light my opinion on the true character and mission of the revolution of 1830; I maintained with ardour, in the common interest of liberty and public prosperity, the necessity and legitimacy of resistance to the old examples and the new revolutionary tendencies; but in that course I sought no destructive weapon, no instrument of war against the cabinet. I was entirely occupied with the position of the country, not with my own personal prospects, and thought much more of the future than of the present. I engaged in general and remote politics, rather than in personal and impatient controversy.

I was thus in perfect harmony with the Chambers and the King. Neither at the Palais-Royal, at the Palais-Bourbon, nor at the Luxembourg, had they any confidence in the "laissez aller" policy, or in its chiefs; but there was no thought, while there would have been a fear of displacing them. They were looked upon as a weak but solitary dike against the waves of the popular ocean. No better successors presented themselves. Every opportunity was seized to obtain some additional guarantees against their prepossessions and weaknesses. The Chamber of Deputies, by choosing M. Casimir Périer for president, and M. Dupin for one of the vice-presidents, loudly manifested its disposition in favour of the policy of resistance. When Marshal Maison resigned the portfolio of foreign affairs for the embassy to Vienna, the King immediately replaced him by General Sébastiani; and on the appointment of Marshal Soult of the ministry of war, and of the Count d'Argout to that

of the marine, he assigned to Messrs. Laffitte and Dupont de l'Eure inspectors rather than colleagues in the Council. These were, in fact, so many securities against a party who were feared and caressed at the same time. They held possession of the citadel; the attempt was to keep them within bounds there, and not to expel them.

At this epoch, the party lost, not its most powerful, but its cleverest organ. M. Benjamin Constant died on the 8th of December, 1830. A man whose mind was gifted with infinite variety; ready, expanded, clear, and keen; great in conversation and in a pamphlet, but a sceptical and deriding sophist, without conviction or reflection, giving himself up from sheer weariness to extinct passions, and solely intent on still finding some amusement and interest for a blunted spirit and a worn-out existence. He had received from the new Government employments, distinctions, and favours. On the recommendation of the Duke de Broglie, he had been appointed president of the committee of legislation of the state council, with a considerable salary. King Louis-Philippe made him a present from his privy purse of the sum of two hundred thousand francs, thinking by that gift to put an end to his personal distress. M. Benjamin Constant nevertheless continued to engage more and more in the opposition, and in the least worthy of all oppositions,—in the subtle flattering and feeding of revolutionary and popular passions. He paid the most assiduous court to the press, under all its forms and degrees; he undertook as an incessant task to charge back upon the conquered of 1830, all the alarms and indignations of the country, to relieve the

conquerors from responsibility. He declared himself opposed to all legal securities and demands, to the extent of not wishing to require from elementary teachers a certificate of morality. He had failed in recovering either his fortune or the tone of his mind. Under the ministry of M. Laffitte, as under that which preceded it, he was ruined and melancholy; and he carried his gloom to the tribune, exclaiming with an air of patriotic despondency, "This sadness, gentlemen, will be understood and shared by many; I shall not permit myself to explain it to you."

On the day before he held this language he received a check which affected him sensibly. He had long entertained an ardent desire to become a member of the French Academy, to which his brilliant wit, and talent as a writer at once elegant and popular, gave him an indisputable title. Sick and impatient, he wished, under the pretext of repairing an act of violence committed, in 1816, by M. de Vaublanc, then minister of the Interior, who had cut off eleven academicians, that I should create in the Academy, by an analogous proceeding, many vacancies and nominations which would assure to him an immediate election. I peremptorily refused this reaction, and firmly resolved not to introduce into any academy expulsions or appointments by decree. On the 24th of October, 1830, M. Benjamin Constant addressed a letter to me, in which his ill-humour was ill disguised under amicable appearances. "The course you have taken," said he, "banishes Cousin and myself from the Academy for years. Nearly the whole Academy laments it. I except that mischievous

and silly Arnault. It also injures yourself; for you belong essentially and at no distant future to that very Academy which you wound today. Under the system which only admits the remaining seven who have been excluded to a partial re-election after the vacancies, you close the door for a long time upon yourself and your friends, as well as upon us. Could you not revise this arrangement? I should owe my nomination to you, and I should delight to be so indebted."

I made no change in my decision, and M. Benjamin Constant, reduced to the chances of an ordinary election, offered himself to the Academy for the seat vacated by M. de Ségur. But the Academy, aware of the violent measures suggested by M. Benjamin Constant, felt little disposed to open their doors to him voluntarily, and on the 18th of November, 1830, M. Viennet, his competitor, was elected in preference.

Three weeks afterwards, when it became known that M. Benjamin Constant was dead, the popular party began to stir, and evinced a desire to pay him high honours. A civic wreath was laid upon the seat in the Chamber which he usually occupied. A demand was made that the entire Chamber, in costume, should attend his funeral, and that a mourning crape should be attached for several days to the flag placed in the hall of session, above the president's chair. A bill was required from the minister of the Interior, and which was in fact introduced shortly after, to enrol the deceased at once amongst the great men of the Pantheon. The greater part of these wild aspirations of a false enthusiasm evaporated without result. The assembly which

accompanied the obsequies of M. Benjamin Constant was numerous and pompous, but cold and dry, even as the image of the dead man himself. Nothing can be more beautiful than homage to the memory of men who have reflected credit on their age; but it should be justly meted out, and combined with sincere respect and emotion. These sentiments were wanting at the demonstration exhibited in honour of M. Benjamin Constant. A merited check for the memory of the individual, and a depressing symptom for the party who glorified him. I felt uncomfortable and shocked during my presence on this occasion.

A more weighty event, the trial of the Ministers, was approaching. Scarcely retired from office, I hastened to take a very decided position on this question. During the sitting of the 9th of November, 1830, certain expressions of M. Odilon-Barrot on the address of the Chamber of Deputies against the punishment of death for political offences, supplied me with a suitable opportunity. While on my way to the tribune, as I passed M. Casimir Périer, "Your efforts will be futile," whispered he to me in a low voice; "you will not save the head of M. de Polignac." I expected better from the public feeling, and I expressed my own in a few words. "I take no personal interest," I said, "in the fallen ministers; I have no ties with any of them; but I feel profoundly convinced that it belongs to the honour of the nation, and to its historic credit, not to shed their blood. After having changed the government and renewed the face of the country, it is truly miserable to prosecute a paltry justice by the side of that immense justice

which has struck, not four men, but an entire government, a total dynasty. On the question of blood, France desires nothing that shall be profitless. All revolutions have shed blood through inflamed passions, and not from necessity. Three months, six months after,—that blood has recoiled back upon themselves. Let us not today re-enter on the old track, which we avoided even during the combat." The Chamber was visibly moved to sympathy. As I was returning to my place, M. Royer-Collard stopped me, and warmly pressing my hand, said, "You may make greater speeches, but you will never do yourself more honour." M. de Martignac came to place himself by my side, and thanked me with sincere emotion. "It is a sad pity," said he, "that this cause is not to be decided here and at this moment. It would be gained."

As regards the speaker, and even the listeners, the impressions of the tribune are so vivid, that we are apt to look upon them as decisive. Facts are not slow to dissipate this illusion. When great questions of government are in debate, eloquence is at once powerful and insufficient. It prepares, but achieves nothing, and should be employed without too much confidence. Our debates in the Chamber of Deputies had certainly elucidated true political justice, and impressed many minds with a favourable sentiment. But when the trial actually commenced, the difficulty and danger continued to be enormous; and during eight days, the Cabinet with all its power, M. de La Fayette with all his popularity, King Louis-Philippe with his well-timed, able, and humane dexterity, the House of Peers with its courageous

wisdom, exhausted themselves in efforts, ever on the verge of failure, to restrain the underhand revolutionary practices and improvident fury which sought respectively, in the death of the accused parties, their gratification and success. During this period of action, the Chamber of Deputies, which could take no part, abstained from speaking.

Once only, on the very point of the crisis, the day before the House of Peers was to pronounce sentence, the cabinet judged it essential to obtain the explicit support of the Chamber. On an earnest address from M. de Kératry, M. Laffitte exposed in strong terms the dangers of the situation and the public uneasiness, pointed out and distinguished without reserve the different enemies of order, and promised that the government would do its duty, its whole duty, while confidently expecting that all around him would follow the example. M. Odilon-Barrot held the same language, qualified by a few unhappy expressions, borrowed from the practice of the old parties rather than from his own sentiments, and which very soon after he hastened to disavow. M. Dupin and I responded to this appeal by a frank concurrence. Every argument and criticism, every injurious remark and unseasonable suggestion was laid aside. We declared ourselves committed with the cabinet to one common responsibility, and determined to support to the utmost of our power the struggle thus maintained for the honour of all.

It formed the peculiar characteristic of this struggle, that the embarrassments and perils of power came much more from its instruments than its enemies. The active

promoters of disorder, the members of the clubs, the secret societies, the populace, idle and turbulent, were in fact little to be dreaded. But it was necessary to restrain them by the aid of a national guard, doubtful, unsettled, and as full of discontent against the men they were called on to protect, as against those with whom they were placed in conflict. And this national guard was under the orders of a chief, animated on the special question of the trial of the ministers by the frankest intentions, but dissatisfied with the general policy of the government, and aspiring to contest it for the purpose of a change. M. de La Fayette, besides, scarcely knew how to exercise his command, except by compliments, entreaties, and affectionate exhortations,—means of influence not deficient in moral dignity, and which have their value in a specific moment; but can only produce incomplete results, and are speedily exhausted when men are called on to act against their natural inclinations.

Fortunately, and above all, through the able firmness of the president of the House of Peers, and of the house itself, the trial was short, and divested of all that might have aggravated it. The liberty of the defence was complete, without for a moment exposing the tribunal to the charge of weakness. The same events, the same acts, hardly yet cooled down, which, beyond the precincts of the hall, in the court of the palace, and in the streets of the city, still made so many spirits boil, and excited even the battalions charged with the defence of public order, were at the same moment, within the confines of the Chamber, recalled, commented on, and discussed with uniform and appropriate boldness. The judges, the

accused, and their defenders, preserved throughout an equal dignity, a reciprocal impression of their duties and their rights. Nothing passed within the walls that could increase the external anxiety and ferment; nothing that occurred without interrupted the regular course of the trial. I do not believe that the judicial annals of the civilized world offer a more lofty example of justice rendered with independence and imperturbable serenity, *in the midst of the most violent political storms.* It is *the glory of the House of Peers* to have presented constantly this noble spectacle under different dynasties and systems; in its hands the balance of justice has never given way, whatever might be the surrounding license of public passions, or the tottering condition of the State.

Two men, previously unknown, but destined soon to take an active part in public affairs, appeared then for the first time upon the scene. Amongst the advocates engaged on the part of the accused Ministers, and by the side of M. de Martignac, M. Sauzet, defender of M. de Chantelauze, astonished the Court and the public by a display of fervid, rich eloquence, overflowing with ideas, emotions, and images, and which revealed in the orator ample stores of political equity and intelligence, in the midst of the somewhat exuberant flow of his thoughts and language.

M. de Montalivet, who had joined the cabinet on the 2nd of November, as minister of the Interior, at first hesitated to accept such a rapid elevation, under the plea that he considered himself too young, and dreaded to fall prematurely under the burden. "You refuse then to assist me in saving the life of the ministers,"

said King Louis-Philippe to him, somewhat brusquely. M. de Montalivet yielded on the instant, and responding to the King's appeal, undertook as his appointed mission the personal security of the accused, throughout the entire course of the trial. It was he who, on the 24th of December, some hours before the moment when the sentence was to be pronounced, assumed the responsibility of all the difficulties it was impossible to foresee, took MM. de Polignac, de Chantelauze, de Peyronnet, and de Guernonville from the prison of the Luxembourg, and on horseback by the side of their carriage, surrounded by an escort of national guards and chasseurs, conducted them rapidly to Vincennes, whence the cannon announced that they had returned to the well-tried custody of General Daumesnil.

The defile was cleared. At the first moment, when the sentence was made public, the ferment redoubled instead of subsiding. Honest anger and factious hopes were equally deceived. During two days, measures for preserving order were doubled. The entire government lent themselves to this with ardour. The princes of the blood royal set the example. The Duke de Nemours, scarcely sixteen, went the nightly rounds with the mounted national guard. But the excitement soon ceased. All the leading authorities, M. de La Fayette, the ministers of War and the Interior, the prefect of the Seine, and the prefect of Police issued orders of the day and proclamations congratulating the national guard, the troops of the line, and the population in general on their conduct and success. The King traversed all the different quarters of Paris on horseback, displaying

everywhere his grateful joy. The satisfaction soon became general; the danger was over, and self-love satisfied; there was nothing now to fear, and all assumed their own share of credit. The question which for six weeks had filled all hearts with irritation or inquietude, and condemned so many citizens to so much fatigue and weariness, was at length brought to a decision; the public sentiment was one of deliverance.

M. de La Fayette alone and his friends were not delivered. They had acted loyally and effectively. A considerable portion of the success and honour rested with them, but they were about to be exposed to a fresh trial. To restrain the ardent spirits and impatient youth which pressed around them; to obtain even their aid against the violences in the streets, they had excited many hopes, and had dealt largely in promises; vague and empty on both sides, the consequences of the Revolution of July, the programme of the Hôtel de Ville, republican institutions environing a popular throne,—all these confused aspirations towards the Constitution of *the United States of America* in place of the Charter, and nevertheless under the name and form of monarchy. The moment had arrived for paying these debts. During the last days of the trial of the ministers, a certain number of youths belonging to the Polytechnic, and the schools of law and medicine, occupied themselves in repressing all physical disturbance; at the same time they publicly announced the price they expected for their zeal. Announcements posted in their different quarters declared that “Without the prompt re-establishment of order liberty is lost. With the re-establishment

of order, we obtain the assurance of public prosperity. The King we have chosen ourselves, La Fayette, Dupont de l'Eure, Odilon-Barrot, our friends and yours, are pledged on their honour to the complete organization of the liberty for which they are bargaining with us, and which in July we purchased with ready money. . . . Order first, and then let us demand a more republican basis for our institutions." This new basis was now called for with loud cries. In vain the 'Moniteur,' speaking in the name of the government, declared that no promise whatever had been made; in vain M. Laffitte confirmed in the tribune of the Chamber of Deputies the assertion of the 'Moniteur,' and endeavoured to satisfy the youths of the schools by voting to them, in the Chamber, the same thanks which had been already given to the national guard and the army. The young men rejected with arrogant disdain the thanks of the Chamber, which was precisely one of the existing powers they intended to reform. It was to M. de La Fayette and his political friends that they looked for their real satisfaction and the fulfilment of the promises made to them when calling for their co-operation in support of legal justice and the maintenance of public order.

At the moment when these new tumults burst forth, the Chamber of Deputies was busily engaged in discussing the bill for the organization of the National Guards. This bill naturally brought into question the position of M. de La Fayette. As I have already stated, the decree of the 16th of August, 1830, had merely appointed him General-Commandant of the National Guards of the kingdom "until the promulgation of the

law respecting their organization." An article proposed by the commission had even interdicted for a single department or division all central command of this nature and had restored to the national guards their municipal character, by replacing them under the authority and responsibility of the minister of the Interior. After a long debate, and despite the efforts of some members that a temporary exception might place M. de La Fayette beyond the reach of this arrangement, the Chamber adopted the article, and the functions of Commandant-in-general of the National Guards of the kingdom were thenceforth legally suppressed.

With simple manners, M. de La Fayette was shrewd and proud. Being thus dismissed by the Chamber of Deputies, in the name of the principles of the constitutional system, and undoubtedly with the consent of the King and the cabinet, for M. Laffitte had rested on the article of the commission,—he saw clearly that he had but one weapon with which to defend himself with any prospect of success. Without further delay, he sent in his resignation to the King, not only as commandant-in-general of the National Guards of the kingdom, but as special commandant of the National Guard of Paris. If his importance, his popularity, and the service he had so lately rendered in the capital should intimidate the King and induce him to hesitate before this sudden retirement; if some animated manifestation of public opinion should step in to increase this hesitation, then M. de La Fayette would find himself in a position to make his own terms, and to obtain for his political friends all that he had promised or allowed them to

expect. If, on the other hand, the King accepted his resignation without fear, and the public continued passive, the dignity of M. de La Fayette remained intact, and he would be looked upon by the popular party as a great citizen, ill-treated and dissatisfied.

The King, I believe, felt but little surprise at the resignation of M. de La Fayette, and resolved to accept it. But he dreaded the appearance of wrong towards a man of consideration, persevering in his devotion to his principles, and who had just rendered him an important service. Although capable of spontaneous and sudden resolutions, King Louis-Philippe had a repugnance to them. His exclusive object, in his personal acts, was to assume the part of responsibility, and to appear on all occasions influenced by necessity. He replied to M. de La Fayette in vague terms, and expressed a hope that in an approaching interview he should induce him to reconsider his intention of retiring. The interview took place at the Palais-Royal, on the same evening, and ended by leaving nothing settled. Neither the King nor M. de La Fayette wished to assume the air of having formed a decisive opinion, or to enforce it on each other. The day after, the King commissioned M. Laffitte and M. de Montalivet to call on M. de La Fayette on his part, and to request him to retain the title of honorary commandant-in-general of the National Guards of the kingdom, with the effective command of those of Paris. After a long conversation, reserved on the part of M. de La Fayette, desultory and prolix on that of M. Laffitte, the parties separated without any certain or clear result. M. de La Fayette adhered to his resignation with

some commentaries that seemed to render it conditional, and M. Laffitte declared himself convinced that in the end M. de La Fayette would accept the King's proposal. M. de Montalivet, on leaving him, expressed doubts, and urged on M. Laffitte the necessity of a peremptory assurance before arriving at a positive conclusion. "Bah!" replied M. Laffitte, "lay aside your incurable mistrusts and mathematical exactions; the matter will be arranged." The King, who thought differently, again despatched M. de Montalivet alone on the same evening to the office of the staff of the National Guard to bring the question to a settlement. This time, the questions and answers were concise and explicit. "Although the law respecting the National Guard has not yet received the sanction of the third legislative power," said M. de La Fayette, "for myself, it has decided. There is no longer a general commandant of the National Guards of the kingdom. As to the command of the National Guard of Paris, if I accepted it now, I should include myself in the responsibility of the non-execution of the programme of the Hôtel de Ville. I cannot consent to this. The only line of policy that can obtain my co-operation resolves itself into these three points:—A Chamber of Peers, chosen by the King from amongst the candidates named by the people; a Chamber of Deputies, elected under the control of a new electoral law, with a large extension of the right of suffrage; and a ministry, taken entirely from the left-hand party." The position now became clear, and M. de Montalivet retired. M. de La Fayette wrote to the King, saying, "that he looked upon himself as having

sent in his resignation." The King replied at once, "that while sincerely regretting this, he was about to take measures for supplying the vacancy he had wished to prevent." It was then past midnight. M. de Montalivet summoned the colonels of the different legions of the National Guard to the Palais-Royal, explained to them the urgency of the case, with the definitive resignation of M. de La Fayette, and being assured of their adhesion, repaired at once to the residence of one of the bravest and most honoured of the chiefs of the army, General Count de Lobau, to announce the King's intention of confiding to his care the supreme command of the National Guard of Paris. "Disturb me not," replied the old soldier, as modest as brave; "I understand nothing about national guards." "How! You understand nothing, when perhaps this very morning there is a question of battle and danger?" "Ah! If that's the case, I am with you. Let what will happen, I accept the offer." The general rose from his bed, hastened to the Palais-Royal, and within one hour assumed his new command.

We now witnessed an exhibition of one of those innumerable examples of the obstinate and eager credulity which so readily takes possession of parties,—sometimes even of their distinguished leaders; and induces them to credit the most absurd and extreme imputations against their adversaries, shutting their eyes to the natural and true explanation of facts which have excited either their active alarm, heavy defeat of hopes, or bitter displeasure. Throughout two years, in the tribune, in the journals, in pamphlets, and correspond-

ence, M. de La Fayette had been accused of an attempt to coerce the King, and to constrain him, by factious combinations or popular movements, to bestow on France those republican institutions promised by the programme of the Hôtel de Ville, and which were still expected. In their turn, the friends of M. de La Fayette accused the King of having woven against him, in the Chamber of Deputies, a perfidious plot, and of laying every description of snare in an underhand negotiation, to deprive him of the command-in-general of the National Guards of the kingdom, without absolutely taking it from him; and to drive him from the command of the National Guard of Paris, under the semblance of wishing to retain him in that post. It was in vain that the King and M. de La Fayette either gave themselves, or caused to be given by others, the most explicit denials to these imputations. Both sides continued to ascribe this colouring to their intentions and acts; and it has remained recorded in many minds and written documents that, in December, 1830, after the trial of the Ministers of Charles X., M. de La Fayette was a factious conspirator, and King Louis-Philippe an ungrateful trickster.

Neither the one nor the other was revolutionary or Machiavellian to this extent. M. de La Fayette had pushed to their utmost limit his means of influence, to force on the government a very pernicious line of policy, equally rejected by the desire of France and the sound judgment of the King; but the most unbecoming manifestations, even of his friends, had never reached sedition; and as regarded himself, he was at all times able

to find, in the perspective of his resignation, a chance of success, and to retire, rather than lend to a policy he disapproved the semblance of support. In acting thus, he had freely exercised, but without exceeding them, the privileges of his importance and liberty. And it could not have been said that any factious combination accompanied his resolve ; for if one of his two principal political friends, M. Dupont de l'Eure, also resigned with him, the other, M. Odilon-Barrot, differed from their views, and continued to hold his post, declaring without reserve the reason why. King Louis-Philippe, on his part, was perfectly justified in availing himself of the support voluntarily tendered to him by the Chambers, to escape from conditions which he justly considered perilous, and to establish in his government some small degree of harmony and method, in place of the agitation and trouble which M. de La Fayette and his friends were perpetually fomenting. There was neither violence on the one side nor perfidy on the other. Simply, King Louis-Philippe, in his oral or written demonstrations, treated the comedy which is ever to a certain extent going on amongst political actors, with more consideration than his part required ; and M. de La Fayette, in the midst of his republican chimeras, was rash in idea rather than bold in action, and allowed himself to be urged to undertake much more than he either had the power or daring to execute. The crisis terminated without noise. The command of the National Guard of Paris passed quietly from the hands of M. de La Fayette to those of the Count de Lobau. Neither the public nor the National Guard itself appeared to care much for

the change. The Chambers congratulated themselves on having got rid of a turbulent influence, and of having re-established constitutional order in this branch of the administration. M. de La Fayette had deceived himself as to his personal importance, as he also committed a mistake in his plans of general policy. King Louis-Philippe alone rose under this trial; he had proved himself skilful and resolute, patient and ready. He had no longer by his side an ally, often compromising and always troublesome; nor in his Council a crabbéd chancellor devoted to the policy of the opposition. M. Mérimé had replaced M. Dupont de l'Eure in the ministry of Justice, and M. Barthe had succeeded M. Mérimé in the department of Public Instruction. Both, belonging to the popular party, had been opposing conspirators under the Restoration; both were disposed to consider their public and personal object as achieved by the foundation of the new government, and resolved to support it against all enemies. The cabinet thus became more homogeneous, while the personal influence of the King increased. He had gained much in public opinion, and for the exercise of his own power.

M. Laffitte was almost as well satisfied as the King. He had aided and concurred in all that had taken place, and remained president of the Council, without any additional contest. The same ambassador who in the month of November had conversed with him on the boulevards, as I have already stated, held a second conversation during the first days of January, the particulars of which he has preserved; and I now give them literally, for the slightest alteration would make them lose something of

their remarkable truth:—"I had returned to Paris," says he, "to attend the trial of the ministers, and on repairing again to my post, I requested M. Laffitte to name the day and hour when I could take leave of him and receive his instructions." He was much occupied, and appointed our meeting, not in the ministry of Finance, where he had no official residence, but at his own house, at eight o'clock in the evening, desiring me to be punctual. He was still at table, and had company to dinner. I requested he might be told that I was waiting in the drawing-room. He left his guests, and came to chat with me. I had little to tell him. What I desired to know was the feeling of the government, the opinion formed on the present state of affairs, and the course it was intended to follow. M. Laffitte gave me full information. He was even more satisfied and confident than at our interview in the month of November. The trial of the ministers had just concluded, during which he had conducted himself as an honest man, and had given proofs of judgment and courage. His party seemed to have renounced traditions and revolutionary extravagancies. M. Laffitte at that time was indulging in unqualified optimism. All circumstances appeared to him favourable. He congratulated himself on the cordial understanding which France appeared to be continually augmenting with foreign powers; he hoped they would not be disturbed by the revolutions which his republican friends so imprudently desired. He resolutely disavowed all interference, on the part of the French government, with the Italian revolutionists and their secret societies. While he was

thus speaking, the guests, dinner being concluded, came into the drawing-room; he took no notice of them, and continued to converse with me on internal and external policy, without perceiving the somewhat astonished physiognomy of his friends. He added much to their surprise when he came to the chapter of England. He was not well informed, and judged very erroneously of the ministry of Lord Grey, who within the last few weeks had succeeded the Duke of Wellington. He did not believe that the new cabinet could succeed in obtaining a majority, and in passing the bill for parliamentary reform. This anticipation seemed to give him little uneasiness. He said that the Duke of Wellington was perfectly reasonable, that he had recognized without hesitation, and in all sincerity, the accession of King Louis-Philippe, and that undoubtedly we should have a most friendly understanding with him. Perhaps it might become necessary to acknowledge Don Miguel as King of Portugal; but that would produce no inconvenience to France. This language, held so openly in presence of such hearers, appeared the more strange, as at that moment public opinion ran justly against Don Miguel: the French flag had been insulted at Lisbon; several Frenchmen had been arbitrarily imprisoned, ill-treated, or transported to Africa; and the King's government was preparing to send a squadron to the Tagus, to exact satisfaction for this affront. As soon as M. Laffitte had finished our conversation, I took my leave, and have never known whether his friends demanded from him an explanation of what they had heard. I suspect not, for they seemed to me more bewildered than vexed."

The illusions of M. Laffitte differed from those of M. de La Fayette, but quite equalled them. Although for a moment he had separated himself from M. Dupont de l'Eure and the amateurs of republican monarchy, he had neither won over in the Chamber, nor with the public, the friends of the policy of resistance. Parties do not seriously afford their adhesion, except on two conditions,—fixed principles and brilliant talents. They wished to be sure and proud of their leaders. M. Laffitte failed to present to the adversaries of the revolutionary movement either of these points of satisfaction. A clever and agreeable speaker in conversation, in the tribune he was deficient in originality, fluency, and power. Although his ideas on questions of finance and administration were in general healthy and practical, even considered in this light he inspired no solid confidence. In his special department, whether for internal details or for the parliamentary debates which related to them, he trusted entirely to M. Thiers, who had accepted the duties of under-secretary in this office, in which he displayed talent and activity that soon made him the actual minister. Several bills on the most important administrative questions of the time,—on the system of direct contributions, on the sinking fund, on the budget, on extraordinary expenses, and on the civil list and dotation of the Crown,—were prepared under his care, presented and discussed in the Chambers, with that minute study of facts, and that intelligent, fertile, and sparkling as well as natural eloquence, which rendered his oratory at the same time so agreeable and convincing. On all these matters he assiduously consulted

with Baron Louis, whose general views and experience he justly held in the highest esteem. M. Thiers often worked directly with the King, at which M. Laffitte took not the slightest umbrage, being thus spared the exertion and weariness of toil.

But irrespective of these special questions of administration, M. Thiers at that time, with a reserve evidently premeditated, kept himself entirely aloof. Still young and new in the Chamber, and too clear-sighted not to perceive the weak points in the position and conduct of the cabinet, he had no wish to engage himself exclusively in the train of M. Laffitte, nor to compromise his future on the outset, by avowedly giving his adhesion and support to such a tottering policy. Thus, in the Chambers, and when all great questions of general government were brought forward, M. Laffitte stood without the concurrence of any influential party or great orator, and remained almost alone under the responsibility of government, with all his natural thoughtlessness, improvidence, inconsistency, complaisance, indecision, and presumption. •

The state of external affairs rendered his task from day to day more complicated and difficult. The agitation impressed on Europe by the Revolution of July spread rapidly in many places: in Germany, in Switzerland, in Italy, in Poland, as also in Belgium; and everywhere, with each succeeding shock, the eyes of governments and nations were directed towards France. Belgium offered her throne; Italy and Poland demanded the assistance of our armies, or at least of our generals. In all quarters, questions of intervention or

non-intervention, of moral or material protection, of the maintenance or rejection of the treaties of 1815, sprang up anew; and at the end of all these, the supreme subject of European war or peace;—a formidable alternative incessantly paraded before the government of France. And as often as, owing to some new event, these different questions were revived, animated debates sprang up again in the Chamber of Deputies, forcing parties into collision, and compelling the government not only to decide explicitly on its course of policy, but to be continually announcing and defending it publicly, under the assault of unexpected complications. And while the cabinet of King Louis-Philippe was thus reduced to constant explanations and an incessant struggle within, to render its measures intelligible and acceptable to France, it sat in conference in London with the great European powers, also assembled there to comprehend and accept the necessities of its situation, and always on the eve of expecting this general and pacific deliberation,—the only resource through which France and Europe could be rescued from the perils of war in the chaos,—to be broken up by some internal or external crisis.

One day, in fact, the Conference of London was in danger of coming to an end. M. de Talleyrand, whose position and influence there had rapidly become great, ascertained that an idea had struck some individuals in the Chambers, and even in the French Cabinet, requiring that it should be removed to Paris. He immediately instructed one of the most intelligent of his secretaries to repair thither and explain in his name, to

the King and his ministers, the inconvenience of such an attempt, with the improbability of success; and to add moreover, from himself, that if the Conference ceased to be held in London, he could not remain there as ambassador, for his functions would be ended. The envoy acquitted himself faithfully of his commission, and this thoughtless scheme was abandoned. While he was in conversation with the King on the subject, a tumultuous gathering of people took place in the square of the Palais-Royal, demanding some inadmissible concession. "Do you believe, Sire," said he, "that the Conference could maintain itself long in the midst of such scenes as these?"

M. Laffitte and his Cabinet continued to sink from day to day under the weight of their position. It was in vain that, as regarded foreign affairs, the influence of the King definitively prevailed in the Council; it mattered nothing that General Sébastiani and M. de Montalivet struggled to exercise the policy of order and resistance; it was always in the ranks of the partisans of movement, or non-interference, that M. Laffitte had his associations and friends. Through indecision, want of judgment, fickleness, or weakness, he surrendered himself up to them, even when acting contrary to their opinions and wishes. In addition to this, union, the spirit of coherence, authority, and strength were absolutely wanting in the cabinet. The Chambers, in a state of uneasiness, alternatively treated it with that outward consideration and contemptuous discontent inspired by power unequal to its mission, and which there is no desire to support, although there may be hesitation to overthrow. The

public too had not more confidence in the administration of M. Laffitte than the Chambers had, and men in business as little as diplomatists. Private interests were as much injured by this state of affairs as the interests of the country; commerce and industrial trade were in prey to perturbation and languor; disorder reigned in the provinces as in the streets, and security for the future was as far removed from the simple citizens as from the State.

The incident is well remembered which led to the fall of this cabinet, by bringing into broad daylight the radical vice of its origin and policy. The scenes of unbridled popular violence which followed the religious ceremony celebrated on the 14th of February, 1831, in the church of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois, in honour of the Duke de Berry, assassinated eleven years before by Louvel, are present to my memory as vividly as if still passing before my eyes. I saw, in common with all the world, emblems of worship, ecclesiastical vestments, the furniture, pictures, and books of the episcopal library floating upon the river and trailed through the streets; I beheld crosses overthrown; I visited the archbishop's palace, or rather the square of the palace, the house of the resident priest of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois, and the church itself, that ancient parish of kings, after their devastation. These sudden ruins, this desolate nakedness of holy places, presented a revolting spectacle; less hideous, however, than that of the brutal exultation of the destroyers, and the mocking indifference of a crowd of spectators. Of all orgies, those of popular impiety are the worst, for in them are exhibited the

revolt of souls against their true sovereign ; and in truth it is difficult to decide which are the most insane, those who deliver themselves up frantically to this excess, or the passive lookers-on, who smile while they behold it.

In the works written since that epoch, as also in the Chambers and the journals of the time, there has been much argument on the question of deciding as to what point the legitimist manifestations which occurred on the occasion of the service given in the church of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois, had caused and almost justified the violence of the people and the attitude of the cabinet. I look upon this discussion as unworthy of rational men. It was never pretended that the legitimist party had abdicated and quitted France with Charles X., nor that, being still in existence, they should not seize obvious opportunities of manifesting their vitality and sentiments. They had done so a few days before, on the 21st of January, by services celebrated in several churches in honour of Louis XVI., and no one had ventured opposition or exhibited offence. To have the legitimist party still on the soil of France, and to see them persevering in their principles and enjoying all the privileges secured by the Charter to every Frenchman, was the innate and inevitable condition of the government of July. It was quite right to put in force against this party, if they incurred their application, the laws intended to protect the safety of the State and the public authorities ; and if those laws proved insufficient, it would be equally just to frame new ones. Nothing could be more simple or more clearly sanctioned by sound policy. But the attempt to suppress

every evidence, every outward manifestation of the existence and sentiments of the legitimists, would have been senseless, for it would have required the most odious and impracticable tyranny. There are enemies and dangers with which free governments are forced to live in peace, or to pass them over in silence, as long as no absolute necessity exists to bring down upon them the rigour of the laws. And of all the demonstrations with which hostility can be associated, those which pertain to religion are the worthiest of being dealt with respectfully, for with them are mixed up the most venerated of human sentiments, the most expanded amongst honest men, and the most sacred of public liberties. The legitimist manifestations of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois were, beyond all question, less dangerous to the country and the constituted authorities, than the processions and republican demands of the Pantheon, which M. Laffitte and his friends treated with so much consideration.

The Cabinet knew beforehand that a religious service was arranged for the 14th of February, in memory of the Duke de Berry. Under this expectation there were but two courses to adopt. If it was believed that public peace was seriously threatened by this ceremony, the celebration should have been decidedly prohibited, either by an arrangement with the ecclesiastical authorities, or by an act of government, publicly justified. If the danger was considered too trifling to require such a measure of exception, power should have taken into its own hands the cause of religious liberty, and have allowed the ceremony to be carried through under its protection, always reserving to itself the right of prosecuting

before the regular tribunals any seditious acts which might incidentally have been committed.

Under the first hypothesis there is reason to believe that the government, with a little foresight and resolution, might have succeeded in preventing everything. The service was first appointed to take place in the church of Saint-Roch. Upon the representations of the ministers of the Interior and of Public Worship, the Archbishop of Paris and the curate of Saint-Roch refused to authorize it. Why was not the same measure adopted in the case of the church of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois? The ecclesiastical authorities assuredly could not have been more blind and intractable in one parish than in another. And again, if the government had decided to place an obstacle in the way of the ceremony, I cannot believe but that the public force was in a state to protect religious liberty effectually, while watching the ebullitions of political passion with the avowed intent of suppressing them according to law.

Instead of adopting heartily one or the other of these resolutions, the powers in office did nothing. They allowed free scope, at first to the legitimists, and afterwards to the anarchists. The causes of tumult were not forestalled; the rights of liberty were left unprotected. The different parties alone were the actors; the government looked on as silent spectators.

No contagion propagates so rapidly as that of anarchy. Within the eight days which followed the sack of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois and of the archiepiscopal palace of Paris,—at Lille, Dijon, Perpignan, Arles, Nismes, and Angoulême, similar scenes took place, with the same

mixture of political antipathies and impious passions. Here, the statue of the Duke de Berry was thrown down and broken in pieces by the mob. There, the bust of Louis XVIII. was extracted from the magazine in which it had been buried, and dragged with insults through the streets; in some places the schools for the clergy were pillaged and set on fire; again, in others, the bishop believed himself compelled by tumultuous crowds to submit to the revocation of a minister. In the heart even of the large towns, amongst the municipal authorities charged with the repression of disorder, many were found sufficiently given up to popular passions to write thus to the minister of the Interior:—"Scarcely established, the government which owes everything to the people has seemed to deny its origin. The retirement of La Fayette and Dupont de l'Eure has confirmed what was but too strongly indicated by the law respecting the national guard, and the continued withholding of the electoral bill. By relying on a Chamber without power, and the object of general animadversion, the government will not fail to reflect back upon itself the hatred and contempt with which that Chamber is surrounded."

In the midst of these anarchical transports, and in spite of the efforts of the King and his most trusty advisers to arrest their course, the government itself became tainted with the contagion. Its own language and attitude carried some impressions of the evil traditions and dangerous tendencies with which it was at issue; and the aspect of power was sometimes revolutionary when, in point of fact, in direct conflict with the

fomentors of revolution. Two days after the pillage of Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois, an official act brought this evil into light. In one of his fits of deference for popular passions, M. Laffitte requested of the King to change the arms of France, and to expunge the fleur-de-lis, the insignia of his own house. The King complied, not considering himself in a position to resist. At these early periods of his reign, and under the dominion of the memories of his youth, the temperament of King Louis-Philippe led him to believe that the spirit of revolution prevailed more than it actually did, and that his personal force in resistance was less than he really possessed. He had besides, in unforeseen emergencies, extremely rapid impulses, prompting him to sudden resolutions far beyond the necessity. In later days I more than once took the liberty of saying to him, "Never let the King trust to his first impressions; whether in hope or apprehension they are almost always in extremes; to see things exactly as they are, and to measure them by their correct standard, the mind of the King requires to examine them twice." I believe that in this lamentable instance he deceived himself, and that to check a tyrannical pretension of the revolutionary spirit he might have said *No*,—undoubtedly with some degree of danger, but without incurring imminent peril. Such was at that precise moment the opinion of many men of honour and ability, sincere friends of the King; and on the 19th of February, in the tribune of the Chamber of Deputies, M. de Keratry reflected credit on himself by openly avowing this sentiment.

Without dwelling on their deplorable echo through Europe, these scenes and evidences of imbecility produced a most grievous effect in France on the rising party of order; loyal and honest minds were thereby impressed with feelings of mistrust and estrangement towards the new government. They had welcomed it as the only rampart against anarchy, and they saw anarchy ready to burst forth again, while the existing authorities appeared to treat its precursors and abettors with weak complaisance. These latter resumed their malevolent feelings toward the monarchy born of the revolution, and returned to them the more readily that they no longer succumbed under the unmeasured terror with which the revolution had at first overwhelmed them. In effect, they were saved. They knew well that the government defended, and would continue to defend them against serious dangers; they were still disturbed, but no longer really menaced, and they complained freely of their prolonged uneasiness without feeling indebted to power for their safety. Thus, amongst the well-disposed classes, that unanimity of sentiment disappeared which had been produced at the commencement by the pressing nature of the danger and a clear view of the necessity; and thus the old parties, with their enmities and their hopes, sprang again rapidly into life.

But while the disturbances of the 14th of February, 1831, divided and weakened the party of order beyond the walls of the Chambers and in the country,—they produced within the Chamber of Deputies a contrary effect. The party rallied there strongly, and resolved

to take the initiative in raising and securing established authority. The patience of the Chamber was exhausted. While the trial of the ministers of Charles X. was in progress, it had vigorously supported the cabinet under the conviction that it was well adapted to surmount that difficulty. The trial over, all attack on M. Laffitte and his colleagues was abstained from, in the inherent spirit of monarchy, and from reluctance to exhibit a display of strength by making or unmaking ministers. But when it saw the government ever disunited within, powerless without, floating with the breath of the popular breeze, and sinking from fluctuation to fluctuation, the Chamber felt that its honour and responsibility were compromised equally with the security of the State; and being thus decided by honest judgment, openly declared war against anarchy. On the 17th of February, M. Benjamin Délessert demanded explanations from the cabinet as to the recent disturbances in Paris, the unrestrained violence of factions, the devastated churches, the overthrown crosses, the deplorable condition of public affairs, and the improvidence and weakness of the authorities. A Deputy in opposition towards the close of the Restoration, and associated with all the acts of the Chamber during the days of July, M. Délessert could not be suspected of malevolence or even of indifference towards the new dynasty. A Protestant, he gracefully defended the crosses and the bishops. A man of importance and respect in the bank, in commerce, and in trade, he was justly entitled to speak of the sufferings and misgivings of these influential sections. His

step was as fully authorized as it was significant and opportune.

The debate at first merged into arguments and personal retorts. When MM. Mauguin, Dupin, and Salverte had succeeded in bringing it back to the general system of policy, and I saw that it approached a close, I took up the word in my turn, carefully premising that it was my first act of opposition to the ministry. Necessity alone, an imperious necessity, decided me. What we had promised ourselves from the revolution of July, and what France expected from that event, was a solid, constitutional government, capable at the same time of conciliating and protecting order and liberty. Such a government was absolutely wanting to us. Facts proclaimed loudly that neither order nor liberty were sufficiently protected. Why? Because the essential conditions of authority were forgotten and absent. There was no unity in the bosom of the cabinet, nor between the cabinet and its agents; no serious and sustained understanding between the ministers and the majority of the Chambers. No efficacy in power. It governed not, because it allowed itself to be governed; courting popular favour, and not relying on the steady exercise of legal authority. "If this course is persisted in," I said; "if government is to depend on the popular cry, we shall speedily have no government;—not more, but even less than we have at present. Order will lose its strength, liberty its prospects for the future, men will forfeit their influence, and we shall return to what we were. I do not consider it possible to remain in our present condition."

Even if I and my friends had been destined to replace the cabinet, I should not have hesitated to use the same language. Under a free system, the desire of participating in government is the privilege of sincere conviction, and honour is comprised in acting up to this ambition and no other. But in 1831, the vulgar embarrassment of such a situation was spared to me. My friends and I had no wish to assume, and no chance of attaining power. It was not we who at that time pressed forward the reaction against anarchy. We served in the army of order without aspiring to the command. M. Laffitte had a successor clearly and naturally designated. M. Casimir Périer, president of the Chamber of Deputies, was the obvious and necessary president of the impending Cabinet. Devoted to the policy of resistance, and a first-rate man of business, constantly in the opposition up to 1830, and as decided in action during the days of July, as moderate in his plans; at the same time impetuous and prudent, warm and discreet, aspiring, but not impatient of grasping power, he was admirably adapted by temperament and position, both to encounter the future struggles the new cabinet would have to sustain, and the immediate combat incidental to its formation.

The construction of this cabinet was, in truth, a contest. Despite his exposed weakness, M. Laffitte was unwilling to relinquish power, and M. Casimir Périer had no desire to assume office except with the full strength and securities he required. The one foresaw that his fall would be his ruin, and resolved not to give way. The other hesitated to encounter a check,

and required much before he consented to ascend. Round M. Laffitte, great efforts were made to retain office, if not in his own person, at least for the party that ruled in his name. M. Dupont de l'Eure was again introduced on the scene. With him were associated M. Odilon-Barrot, M. Eusebius Salverte, General Lamarque, M. de Tracy, and even General Demarçay. To these attempts to form a cabinet entirely from the left-hand party, the partisans of resistance in the still existing ministry opposed acts which attested their efforts and progress towards a contrary end. M. de Montalivet resigned to procure the substitution of M. de Bondy for M. Odilon-Barrot in the Prefecture of the Seine; and M. Odilon-Barrot became, in effect, banished from the State Council. The chancellor, M. Mérilhou, refused to sanction the removal of his friend M. Charles Comte, the King's attorney in Paris; a bold conscientious man in opposition, but embarrassed and talentless in office. M. Comte was nevertheless ejected, and M. Mérilhou himself quitted the ministry of Justice, which in the interim was entrusted to M. d'Argout. Still the King hesitated on the one hand, and M. Casimir Périer on the other. It was no slight sacrifice for the King to break with M. Laffitte, an accommodating, and, until lately, a valuable minister. The policy of avowed resistance, besides, appeared to him almost as dangerous as necessary. Would it not be possible to wait a little longer, until the necessity, becoming more and more urgent, should outweigh the peril? The haughty and susceptible temperament of M. Casimir Périer also impressed him with some anxiety as to their mutual understanding.

M. Casimir Périer, on his side, insisted every day more peremptorily on the conditions of his acceptance of office. To the inquisitive who came to question him, to his friends, and above all, to the King, he laid open with strong and desponding emotion the difficulties of the undertaking, and the absolute necessity of the probably inadequate means on which he depended. He wished to govern in the council as in the country. He demanded Baron Louis in the ministry of Finance, and in every other department safe colleagues, resolved to march implicitly on his track. He would have neither dissenters nor rivals. On the evening of the 12th of March, in one of their last conferences, Marshal Soult evinced some hesitation at receiving M. Casimir Périer as President of the Council. "Marshal," said M. Casimir Périer to him, "have the goodness to make up your mind. I must write this evening to Marshal Jourdain, whose promise I hold." Marshal Soult decided at once. Baron Louis took the Financial department; his nephew, Admiral Rigny, became minister of Marine; M. de Montalivet yielded the ministry of the Interior to M. Périer, and passed to the department of Public Instruction. The repeated instances of the Chambers, the continually ascending waves of anarchy, the dangerous names which the popular party placed in their van, had at length terminated all uncertainty in the King's mind. "I must tell you," said he at a subsequent period to M. d'Haubersaert,—at that time head of the cabinet of the Interior,—"that if I had not found M. Périer on the 13th of March, I should have been reduced to swallow Salverte and Dupont entirely

raw!" He accepted, without further hesitation, the dangers, the difficulties, and perhaps the weary burden of the policy of resistance, and of its chief; and on the 18th of March, M. Casimir Périer was officially announced as—what he soon became in effect—Prime Minister.

CHAPTER IV.

M. CASIMIR PÉRIER AND ANARCHY.

RELATIONS OF M. CASIMIR PÉRIER WITH HIS COLLEAGUES; — WITH KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE; — WITH THE CHAMBERS; — WITH HIS AGENTS.—PERSONAL ACTION OF THE KING IN THE GOVERNMENT.—PRETENDED SCENES BETWEEN THE KING AND M. CASIMIR PÉRIER.—ANARCHY IN PARIS AND IN THE DEPARTMENTS.—EFFORTS OF POLITICAL PARTIES TO PROMOTE ANARCHY.—THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.—THE LEGITIMIST PARTY.—THE BONAPARTISTS.—THEIR PLOTS.—WEAKNESS OF JUDICIAL REPRESSION.—ANARCHICAL SCHOOLS AND SECTS.—THE SAINT-SIMONIANS.—THE FOURIERISTS.—INSURRECTION OF THE WORKING CLASSES AT LYONS.—SEDITION AT GRENOBLE.—DISORDERS IN VARIOUS OTHER PLACES.—GREAT COMMOTION IN PARIS ON THE NEWS OF THE FALL OF WARSAW.—M. CASIMIR PÉRIER AND GENERAL SÉBASTIANI IN THE PLACE VENDÔME.—M. CASIMIR PÉRIER RE-ORGANIZES THE POLICE.—M. GISQUET, PREFECT OF POLICE.—KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE GOES TO RESIDE AT THE TUILERIES.—WORKS IN THE GARDEN OF THE TUILERIES AND THEIR OBJECT.—M. CASIMIR PÉRIER EQUALLY MODERATE AND ENERGETIC IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER.—HE REJECTS ALL EXCEPTIONAL LAWS.—QUEEN HORTENSE IN PARIS.—CONDUCT OF KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE AND HIS GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE MEMORY OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—LEGISLATIVE DEBATES.—CIVIL LIST.—ABOLITION OF THE HEREDITARY PEERAGE.—PROPOSITION TO ANNUL THE LAW OF THE 19TH OF JANUARY, 1815, AND THE OFFICIAL MOURNING FOR THE DEATH OF LOUIS XVI.—SPEECH OF THE DUKE DE BROGLIE ON THIS PROPOSAL.—MY ATTITUDE AND LANGUAGE IN THE CHAMBERS.—OPINION OF KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE THEREUPON; —OF M. CASIMIR PÉRIER, AND OF THE CHAMBERS THEMSELVES.—DEBATE UPON THE USE OF THE WORD 'SUBJECTS.'—STATE OF SOCIETY IN PARIS.—POLITICS DESTROY THE OLD SOCIAL HABITS.—DECLINE OF THE SALOONS.—WHAT REMAINS OF THEM AND MY PERSONAL CONNECTIONS.—M. BERTIN DE VEAUX AND THE 'JOURNAL DES DÉBATS.'

(From May 12, 1831, to May 16, 1832.)

As soon as the cabinet was formed, and M. Casimir Périer

had commenced habitual intercourse with his colleagues, the Prime Minister began to make himself felt. At first he evinced an intention of assuming only the presidency of the Council, without any special department, not wishing that the cares of particular administration should distract his attention from the general government; but on reflection, he readily convinced himself that to govern in fact, it was necessary to hold under his own hand the leading springs of power. Satisfied, also, that in spite of our European complications, it was internally that the fate of France must be decided, he assumed the ministry of the Interior, confining it to exalted and truly political duties. Affairs purely administrative were arranged into a separate department, under the title of ministry of Commerce and Public Works; and confided to Count d'Argout, a laborious, intelligent, brave, and docile agent. In the daily labour, M. Casimir Périer found him an indefatigable under-secretary of state; and in the Chambers he sent him to the tribune, or called him from thence, according to his own personal convenience, caring little to exhaust him by too much employment, or to offend him by an unceremonious display of his authority. I once heard him exclaim with impatience, when he saw M. d'Argout preparing, as he thought unadvisedly, to speak, "Come here, d'Argout;" and M. d'Argout came, not without mortification, although he abstained from showing it.

The first time that M. Casimir Périer ascended the tribune of the Chamber of Deputies to explain in firm and clear terms his ideas and general plan, he directed the ministers of War; of Finance, and Justice, to follow

him in immediate succession, that they might expressly declare their adhesion to the line of policy which the head of the cabinet had laid down.

Some days after, having addressed a circular to the different prefects on the occasion of an extensive association, under the title of *National*, which the opposition was endeavouring to form in defiance of the cabinet, M. Casimir Périer wound up with these words:—"The King has decreed, with the advice of his Council, that his censure of all participation in this Society by civil or military functionaries be officially declared;" and he ordered other circulars to be written by his colleagues, while transmitting his own to their different agents, prescribing the most strict compliance.

But above all other considerations he had it most at heart to bind and publicly compromise Marshal Soult to his policy. He had not forgotten that the Marshal had evinced some repugnance to his appointment as President of the Council, and while saying with the King, "We must have this powerful sword," he felt some doubts as to the entire co-operation he was so anxious to obtain. The Marshal, on his part, while yielding to the ascendancy of M. Périer, fully estimated his own importance, and abstained from surrendering himself without reserve, even while he served without objection. Although both felt that each was necessary to the other, between the two there was little confidence and no mutual sympathy.

Baron Louis and General Sébastiani were the allies and confidential intimates of M. Périer in the Council. An old and familiar friendship united him with the

first. In the ranks of the opposition before 1830, he had learned to know the second, and since he had associated him in the government, he held him daily in higher esteem. General Sébastiani advanced greatly under this trial. His mind was slow and lightly stored; he spoke without ease or brilliancy, and his deportment was often formal and pretentious. But he carried into important affairs a free and firm judgment, a cool sagacity, a resolute prudence, and a collected courage, which made him a highly valuable and safe co-operator. He knew how to deal in a word and without stir with the interests or weaknesses of men, and he excelled in foreseeing the possible and remote consequences of an event, a particular step, or a speech. In the Chambers, while defending with more firmness than ability of language the policy of the cabinet, he sometimes seriously compromised himself. Everybody recollects the indignation excited against him by the celebrated and unfortunate phrase he uttered when speaking of the disasters of Poland: "According to the last intelligence, tranquillity reigns in Warsaw." On this occasion, as on others, M. Périer energetically supported General Sébastiani against all attacks, not only to prevent a breach in the ministry, but from a just and unalterable appreciation of his rare qualities. Like the true head of a government, M. Périer at the very moment of an error or misfortune, remembered the value of an honest man, and never, with the view of diminishing by a few minutes his own annoyance, consented to yield up a brave and trusty ally in prey to the enemy. He was also not slow in placing confidence in M. de Montalivet,

who seconded and served him loyally, both in his general policy and in his communications with the King. Predominating, and on just grounds, in his cabinet, M. Périer dreaded lest the King should wish to predominate also; and he firmly determined to assert and place in full light, as minister, and first responsible minister, his independence and authority. Then commenced silently the question which afterwards excited so much clamour,—the question of the active interference of the King himself in government, and of the jealousies of power between the Crown and its advisers.

In 1846, at a moment when this question excited amongst us dissensions as puerile and falsely based in themselves as they were weighty in their consequences, being called upon to state with precision the relative parts which, under a constitutional monarchy, I understood to belong to the King on the one hand, and to his advisers on the other, I explained myself in these terms:—"A throne is not an empty arm-chair, which has been locked up to prevent any one from being tempted to sit on it. An intelligent, free individual, who has his ideas, feelings, desires, and will, in common with all other living beings, sits in that arm-chair. The duty of that person,—for there are duties for all, and equally sacred to all,—his duty and the necessity imposed on his situation, is to govern exclusively in accord with the great public powers instituted by the Charter; with their consent, adhesion, and support. In their turn, the duty of the advisers of the royal personage is to establish in his mind the same ideas, measures, and policy which they believe themselves called upon to propose, and

capable of sustaining in the Chambers. I look upon myself, under the title of an adviser of the Crown, as commissioned to establish unity between the great public offices, and not to promote the preponderance of any one specific authority over another. No, it is not the duty of a royal councillor to give the Crown the ascendancy over the Chambers, or to place the Chambers above the Crown. To bring these various powers to one common thought and conduct, to unity of action through harmony;—such is the mission of the King's ministers in a free country; such is constitutional government;—not alone the only true, legal, and constitutional form, but the only government that can be respectable; for we are all bound to remember with due consideration that the Crown reposes on the head of an intellectual, free being, with whom we are treating; and that it is not a simple and inert machine, merely destined to occupy a place which the ambitious would greedily seize if it were vacant."

I feel convinced that if, in 1831, King Louis-Philippe and M. Casimir Périer had been asked what they thought of this summary of their position and constitutional relations, they would both have assented to it sincerely and without reserve. M. Casimir Périer was too essentially monarchical and too rational to lay down in principle as a basis for constitutional monarchy that the King should reign and not govern; and King Louis-Philippe, on his part, had too much intelligence and political moderation to pretend to govern contrary to the counsel of the advisers who were provided to sustain his power by the concurrence of the Chambers and the

country. One day he said to me, on this subject, "The mischief is that all the world wishes to be leader of the orchestra, while in our constitution it is necessary that every one should play his own instrument and be content. I play my part of King; let my ministers keep to theirs as ministers; if we know how to act, we shall surely agree." In fact, M. Casimir Périer desired no more; and if he could have convinced himself that the King had no wish to interfere with the independence and importance of his minister, he would have remained satisfied. But the wisest men do not apply the full measure of their wisdom to their own conduct. Preconceived notions, passions hidden at the bottom of the heart, susceptibilities, mistrusts, and fantasies of the moment often exercise over their actions and relations, an influence contrary to their true and habitual convictions. A man intended to govern by nature, but reaching power after a long career of opposition and through the wind of a revolution, M. Casimir Périer occasionally carried into his official acts, prejudices and impulses of impatience, less monarchical than his sentiments and designs. Penetrated with the ideas and recollections of 1789, King Louis-Philippe had nevertheless passed the greater part of his life, at first in the habits of the old system, and afterwards under the shock of revolutionary subversion. He retained certain aspirations and anxieties little in accord with his constitutional intentions. It was difficult for two men, born and matured under atmospheres so opposed, to ascertain in their first intercourse the exact part of each in the government, new to both, which they had the task of directing in common.

On entering into office, M. Casimir Périer took great pains to establish, and make public the fact, that the ministers should meet habitually at his house, without the presence of the King. For some time, these meetings were regularly announced in the 'Moniteur.' He had reason for attaching importance to them, for in the eyes of the public they afforded a startling declaration of his independent will and authority. The King made no objection; he knew how to accommodate himself to characters when he recognized the importance of services. Nevertheless, the proceeding was offensive to him, and sometimes he allowed his displeasure to become evident; too much so perhaps, even for the vindication of his authority. Nothing is more serviceable to kings than to accept without remark and with a good grace the necessities they are constrained to endure.

At the same time, M. Périer demanded another sacrifice. He required that the Duke of Orleans, who, until then had attended the councils held in the palace of the King his father, should cease thenceforward to be present at them.

In the work of forming the cabinet of the 13th of March, the prince had not promoted the accession of M. Périer, and had declared himself more favourable to M. Laffitte and his friends. He was generally believed to be imbued and to sympathize with the views of the popular party. His presence in the Council might affect their unity or discretion. M. Casimir Périer was not disposed to permit the heir to the throne to raise up obstacles in his way, or to allow it to be thought that he exercised any influence in ministerial affairs. The King

estimated highly the interest which the future monarchy and the present ministry both had in the fact that the Duke of Orleans should prepare himself for government, should live in the midst of its defenders, and by his constant attendance become more and more attached to sound policy, even though he might not approve of every measure adopted. M. Périer insisted on his point, and the King yielded. I incline to think, that at that time the Duke of Orleans but slightly regretted the decision.

In the daily exercise of business, M. Périer was not less exacting and susceptible. He took charge of all the telegraphic despatches before they were transmitted to the King, and the editor of the 'Moniteur' had orders to insert no article or note emanating from the King's cabinet, without previously communicating them to the president of the Council and being assured of his sanction.

It has been currently repeated, that the demands and offensive tone of M. Casimir Périer had produced between the King and his minister not only important difficulties, but violent dissensions. Scenes have been described of obstinate dispute and extraordinary passion. Mere vulgar exaggerations, in which the true characters of the parties are disfigured and history transformed into a coarse melodrama. Neither King Louis-Philippe, despite the vivacity of his displeasure, nor M. Casimir Périer, notwithstanding the ardour of his temperament, allowed themselves to indulge in such extremes. They had both too much judgment, and too just a sense of necessity or convenience not to restrain their misunder-

M. CASIMIR PÉRIER AND ANARCHY

standings within bounds; and at the moment *when they* appeared to have reached a dangerous climax, they knew how to make mutual concessions privately, which restored harmony between them. A trifling fact, with the details of which I am thoroughly acquainted, will furnish a correct view on this particular point of their dispositions and intercourse.

Towards the end of 1831, General Sébastiani happened to be ill, and M. Casimir Périer in the interim superintended the foreign affairs. He directed the correspondence of this department principally under the advice and care of the Count de Rayneval, and promised him, in acquittal of the obligation, the Spanish embassy, at that time filled by the Count Eugène d'Harcourt. One day he determined to fulfil the promise forthwith, and instructed M. d'Haubersaert, the head of his personal staff, to prepare the draught of a decree for this appointment, to carry it in his name to the King for his signature, and to send it then to the 'Moniteur,' with instructions to publish it on the following morning. M. d'Haubersaert, who merited and possessed, through his intelligence, courage, and firmness of character, the entire confidence of M. Périer, was accustomed to such missions; being the usual intermediary between the King and his minister, and was ever sedulous to soften, as much as lay in his power, the asperities of their communications. On arriving at the Tuileries, he found the King in his dressing-gown, preparing for rest. Having no doubt that the appointment of M. de Rayneval was a settled affair, he presented the decree and requested his Majesty's signature. "No," replied the King, "nothing

that each was necessary to the other, to carry it through with success. They combined, therefore, without personal attachment, and mutually supported each other, under the conviction of one feeling and one common necessity. In this singular compound of acquiescence and resistance, it was the King who generally gave way, while at the same time he gradually gained ground, by superior calmness and patience. He acquired, at length, a solid influence over his powerful minister, for which he, at a later period, assumed credit, saying, "Périer gave me much trouble, but in the end I well balanced the account ;" an expression more pointed than prudent, and which the King acted wisely in not using until after the death of M. Casimir Périer, who would have been deeply hurt if it had reached his ears, as in all probability would have occurred.

With the Chambers, M. Casimir Périer was not less haughty and exacting than with the King. Before consenting to assume the premiership, he had caused a minute statement to be laid before them of the bad administration and impoverished state of the Treasury. He had scarcely entered on office, when he demanded, by three bills, all the financial resources of which he might stand in need. An addition of fifty-five centimes to the land taxes, and of fifty centimes on the patents for the year 1831 ; an eventual credit of 100,000,000 in the interval between the sessions of the same year, realizable either by an extraordinary assessment, or by a loan on the revenue ; and also an extraordinary credit of 1,500,000 francs for secret service expenses. He not only wished to be in a condition to meet events which

foreshadowed themselves, but by showing himself well prepared, to restore at once public confidence and credit. He introduced at the same time another bill for the effectual repression of riotous meetings. These various propositions he treated explicitly as cabinet questions, without declamation or display of alarm, evincing as much patriotic hope as political solicitude; but desirous that the friends of order should thoroughly understand the evil they called upon him to cure, and invariably laying down the principle that he only accepted the responsibility of government on the condition of receiving the necessary powers, and that he should retire as soon as he discovered that the great public authorities withheld their firm and adequate support.

It was soon perceived that, on his part, this was no theatrical flourish. By the end of July, 1831, the heaviest dangers appeared to be dissipated, and the most pressing difficulties surmounted. The Chamber of Deputies which had accomplished the revolution of 1830, had been dissolved. In virtue of a new electoral law, which enlarged the circle of political capabilities, as well for the deputies as for the voters, a fresh Chamber had recently been chosen and assembled. They had now to elect their president. M. Casimir Périer, anxious to ascertain how far he could trust their feeling on this point, reduced the election to a ministerial question, and his candidate, M. Girod de l'Ain, having only obtained an advantage of four voices over M. Laffitte, the competitor in opposition, he declared this an insufficient majority for the government and tendered his resignation. The alarm was general; the King, the Chambers, and the

Council, scarcely emerged from anarchy, felt themselves on the point of falling back into the abyss. Vain efforts were exhausted to induce M. Casimir Périer to retain power. He replied to all these entreaties, that he would not renew the spectacle of a pretended government ever trying to hold itself erect and ever on the point of falling. News suddenly arrived that the King of Holland, violating the armistice, had marched his army into Belgium with the intention of reconquest. The honour and safety of France were implicated in saving Belgium, even at the hazard of a European war. Danger often brings strength. M. Périer accepted the alternative, and resumed office, despatching immediately a French army to the relief of Belgium. And no one suspected him of acting, in this emergency, under a pretext. Friends and adversaries, all knew that whether in speech or action, he was always seriously in earnest.

His physiognomy, his gait, his attitude, his look, his accents, everything in his personal attributes impressed this conviction. His gravity proceeded neither from moral austereness, nor intellectual meditation ; but arose from a sound and resolute mind, penetrated with strong thought and passions, and ever intent on an object which he looked upon as equally difficult and indispensable of attainment. Ardent and restless, he had the air of defying his adversaries, and of telling his friends that they might desert him if they pleased. One day he received certain deputies, members of the majority, who came to present objections against a particular measure, and to prepare him on this point for the defection of some of his allies. He replied only by exclaiming,

while fixing on them an eye of fire, "I hold my friends cheap when I know I am in the right ; it is when I am in the wrong that they are bound to support me ;" and so saying he re-entered his closet. In private conversation, he listened coldly, argued little, and nearly always evinced himself determined beforehand. In the tribune, he was not often either eloquent or dexterous, but ironically effective and powerful. He inspired confidence in his partisans in spite of their doubts, and enforced it on his adversaries in the height of their irritation. Herein he evinced the personal influence of the man, far above that of the orator.

With his agents and in the entire administration, he established, from the outset, unity of views and action as a political maxim and an honest duty. Many circulars, some on general principles, others called for by particular incidents, strongly inculcated this doctrine on functionaries of every class, cautioning them that the cabinet would tolerate no relaxation ; and, in fact, when men of considerable note persisted, notwithstanding their public positions, in remaining members of the 'National Association,' which the ministry had expressly denounced, they were all removed. M. Odilon-Barrot left the State Council, M. Alexandre de Laborde ceased to be aide-de-camp to the King, and General Lamarque was ordered to hold himself ready for service. It appeared evident that the cabinet had firmly resolved to carry out its declared views, and possessed in all quarters the necessary powers.

There was severity in requiring from public functionaries such a strict observance of their duties, particu-

larly when no special or pressing interest appeared to be in question. The 'Moniteur' of the 30th of March, 1831, contained the following article:—"A prefect, having yesterday presented himself at the office of the minister of the Interior, without previously requesting permission to come to Paris, was unable to obtain an audience. The minister takes this opportunity of announcing that every prefect who absents himself from his department without leave, incurs the penalty of dismissal. All these functionaries will therefore understand, that in the actual state of affairs, it is their paramount duty to remain at their posts."

To this close superintendence of his agents, this energetic management of all the implements of power placed in his hands, M. Casimir Périer added another important care. He bestowed much attention on the state of the public mind, and frequently employed the 'Moniteur' as an organ of communication to render his system of government thoroughly known and comprehended. In those columns he also spoke with authority, denying false reports, correcting mistaken ideas, and explaining in their clear light the acts of the cabinet. This was not polemical discussion, but the assiduous monologue of firm, sensible power, speaking openly before the whole country. And when the blind or intractable hostility of adverse parties and their journals plunged M. Périer into a depressing doubt as to the efficacy of his official commentaries, he said to his friends, "After all, what does it signify to me? I have the 'Moniteur' to record my acts, the tribune of the Chambers to explain them, and the future for my judge."

There was much in so determined a will, master of such concentrated and acknowledged powers from its earliest steps. But this was not enough in the actual state of France, and with the work in hand to accomplish. Of all diseases, the worst is to remain ignorant of the full extent of your malady. M. Casimir Périer undertook, with admirable good sense and courage, to struggle against anarchy; but anarchy was more generally diffused and more deeply rooted than either the party ranged by his side to put it down, or the country he undertook to snatch from it, could be made to understand.

In the streets of Paris, at the moment when he entered on office, commotion was flagrant and continued. From the month of March, 1831, to July, the place Vendôme, the place du Châtelet, the Pantheon, the suburbs of Saint-Denis, Saint-Martin, Saint-Antoine, and Saint-Marceau, the street of Saint-Honoré, and all the great thoroughfares of the boulevards and quays, were the theatres of popular assemblies, sometimes idle and noisy, but more frequently inflamed and seditious. The most opposite motives, serious or frivolous, the anniversary of a revolution, a newspaper report, a tree of liberty to be planted, a pretence set up by popular tradespeople, a quarrel before the door of a coffee-house;—either of these causes sufficed to collect and excite the crowd. In all directions they found points of re-union, centres of irritation, or sources of amusement. More than twenty thousand stall-keepers, collected from every part of France, obstructed the quays, the bridges, the squares, the boulevards, the populous quarters, and the most

frequented crossings. "We are free," exclaimed they; "the open streets belong to the public; we choose to establish ourselves where we can buy and sell at our pleasure." The most factious manifestations and the most menacing intents prevailed in these premeditated or accidental gatherings. Cries of "*Long live the Poles! Death to tyrants! Down with the Russians!*" echoed round the walls of the Russian embassy. At a celebrated banquet held on the 9th of May at the *Vintages of Burgundy*, one of the guests rose up, and, brandishing a poniard, exclaimed, "*To Louis-Philippe.*" Gangs of rioters promenaded the city night and day, shouting aloud, "*Long live the Republic!*" When the repression of these disorders commenced, it was almost invariably met by a resistance in which the municipal authority and the national guard were scarcely treated with more respect than the agents of police and the soldiers; and if today the tumult was put down on any given point, tomorrow it burst forth again in a fresh quarter.

How could these seditions recognize their error or defeat? They were incessantly provoked, encouraged, and re-animated by fearless supporters. The popular societies, legally interdicted as clubs, were still in full activity and influence; whether by concerted arrangement or instinct, they were divided and multiplied so as not to incur simultaneously the same danger; but under their distinct names, the *Friends of the People*, the *Friends of the Country*, the *Claimants of July*, the *Regenerated Franks*, the *Society of Condemned Politicians*, the *Society of the Rights of Man*, the *Gaulish Society*, the *Society of Liberty, of Order, and of Progress*;—all

were in reality but one and the same army, animated by a similar spirit, and marching under a common impulse to a common end. Two modes of action gratify men and take possession of them with equal control—secrecy and publicity, silence and noise. Popular associations exercised upon their members and constituents this double seduction. Sometimes they surrounded themselves with precaution and mystery, acting through obscure agents, nocturnal meetings, and arranged signals; at others, they boldly presented themselves in petitions, incidental assemblies, public promenades, and pamphlets circulated in every quarter. In the periodical press they found either organs devoted to their special object, or allies engaged in the same general cause. The accession of M. Casimir Périer to power brought into the greater portion of the opposition papers an increased measure of fury and insult, which would excite our astonishment had we not been taught by experience how rapidly, in this species of warfare, insult merges into routine, and fury becomes habit. I knew, while he was still young, Armand Carrel, a man of rare mind and noble inclinations, notwithstanding certain habits and propensities inferior to his nature; and I find it difficult to believe that he would not himself smile with contempt if he could read again today those articles in the 'National' and 'Tribune' of 1831, which compared M. Casimir Périer to M. de Polignac, and spoke of the rising ministry of the new Cabinet of the 18th of August, as preparing again the decrees of July, calling upon France to watch the opportunity of taking arms in opposition, to preserve her liberties.

The tumults and popular societies of 1831 comprised even more than anarchy; they covered and prepared civil war. Under that revolutionary effervescence three great political parties—the Republicans, the Legitimists, and the Bonapartists—were all in action, burning to overthrow the lately established authority, and to elevate or restore their own form of government on its ruins.

I say three great parties, and I hold them all as great in fact, though unequal in influence. It is ever a mania of existing power to aggrandise or depreciate its rivals alternately and without measure, yielding from time to time to the necessity of alarming or re-assuring their own partisans. In 1831, there was no disposition to conceal the importance of the Republican party; it was the chief source of inquietude to the tranquilly disposed public, and the party themselves proclaimed it with considerable emphasis;—speaking of monarchy as the sole remaining shadow of the past, and appropriating a near future as their own exclusive domain. Nevertheless, it was frequently said, “The republic is a chimera, the dream of some honest madmen or avowed disturbers.” And with regard to the Legitimist and Bonapartist parties, they were looked upon, if not as extinct, at least as powerless; one, in the light of the decimated army of an old system suspected by the country at large; and the other, as the inheritor of a great reminiscence, but having nothing to offer to contented France as a security for national interests, and bringing to her only the perspective of a European war.

In 1831 as now, and now as in 1831, in spite of all

their faults and reverses, and neither believing in their rights nor success, I held and still hold the republicans to be a great party. A republic, in our days, possesses this strength, that it promises all the people can desire; and this weakness, that it cannot bestow what it promises. It is a government of exaggerated hopes and mistakes. Liberty, equality, the ascendancy of personal merit, progress, economy, the gratification of good and evil passions, disinterested desires, and egotistical instincts;—all these attractions are contained within the republican system, and all are placed under the guarantee of an assumed principle, very seductive in itself,—namely, the equal right of all to take part in the administration of the country. Judged by severe reason and practical sense, the republican principle will not stand the test of serious examination, and its absolute worth, as that of all forms of government, depends upon places, periods, social organization, the state of minds, and a multitude of accidental and variable circumstances. But, as regards the truths, the sentiments, and the interests with which it connects itself, this principle is of a nature to inspire profound and enthusiastic convictions. The republican party has a faith,—a faith which philosophy disavows, and which with us experience has cruelly falsified, but which is not the less fervently implanted in its adepts, and which may for the moment become controlling over the popular masses. France would be blind indeed if she again permitted the republicans to dispose of her destinies; but every government would be blind in its turn if it ignored the importance of this party, and was not

always prepared to reckon seriously with it, either for enlightenment or resistance.

The Legitimists have also a faith,—a principle,—the origin and bearing of which they have often superstitiously perverted, but in which they believe resolutely and sincerely. They have, moreover, an affectionate and devoted attachment to a particular name, to actual and living individuals. And in addition to this, an important social position, which constitutes them the natural confederates and supporters of order and authority. Herein is comprised indisputable and respectable strength. Numbers may be wanting to this party, as also wisdom and public favour; they may become, by their pretensions or errors, useless to their country and injurious to themselves. Nevertheless, there still remains an influential section, who, whether they stir actively or rest supine, make themselves felt, either as a great weight or an important void in society and government.

Experience has revealed the strength of the Bonapartist party, or, to speak more truly, of the name of Napoleon. It is much to be at the same time a national glory, a guarantee against revolution, and a principle of authority. There is in this combination enough to survive great mistakes and long reverses.

The anarchy of 1831 offered to the conspiracies of these three parties means of action and chances of success. They seized them eagerly, and within the space of a year, without speaking of insignificant attempts, four republican, two legitimist, and one Bonapartist plot assailed the government of King Louis-Philippe. I

have delivered without reserve my opinion on the plots against the Restoration; I shall speak of these with the same freedom. They were utterly unjustifiable. They aimed to overthrow a government welcomed and adopted by the overwhelming majority of France; a moderate and liberal government, which had extricated the country from an imminent danger, and, far from restraining, had extended public liberty, and scrupulously confined itself within the limits of the common law. Again, at the end of these subversive attempts, supposing they achieved a momentary success, there was no clear, obvious, or assured result; nothing but an increase of civil disorder, with added perplexities and obscurity to the destinies of France. I admit that generous sentiments, and ideas of duty towards the past or the future, may have had part in these conspiracies; but they were not the less destitute of justice and true patriotism, as of political intelligence and sound sense.

I am not one of those who—when misfortunes or crimes ensue as the natural and easily anticipated consequences of men's jarring passions and interests,—re-sign themselves as to an earthquake or a tempest, and neither care to describe nor explain them. I cannot thus renounce human intelligence and morality, and have resolved not to consider souls as the rough elements of nature. Men, whether they stir for their country, their party, or their own interests, have a share of resolution and free action in the destinies with which they interfere, and are responsible to history, while waiting their responsibility to God. If the republicans, the legitimists, and the Bonapartists, condemning the origin, and having

no trust in the duration of King Louis-Philippe's government, held back from serving or supporting it; if they stood aloof as mistrustful and critical spectators,—this line of conduct I can perfectly understand. I admit, under these circumstances, total abstention and legal opposition; but neither political honesty nor patriotism justify on such grounds conspiracy or insurrection. I know the little account that may be taken of reasons drawn from morality and wisdom to restrain human passions within the limits of justice; but this is an additional motive why, in dealing with them, complaisance should be cast aside; if we cannot flatter ourselves that we are able to restrain, let us at least have the satisfaction of thinking that we can judge them.

Under a system of legality and liberty, judicial repression is the only effectual weapon to employ against conspiracies. It is necessary that plotters should fear the law and its interpreters. In 1831, this judicial repression was weak, uncertain, and insufficient. From the 5th of April to the 15th of June, in five prosecutions before the Court of Assize at Paris, for conspiracy, insurrection, or tumult, the accused, who far from disputing the facts, justified them by the intent, and even boasted of them openly, were all acquitted by the intimidated or partial jury. The magistrates, rendered powerless by the verdict of the court, or perhaps confounded by the extent of the disorder they were commissioned to repress, sometimes betrayed an uneasy hesitation. When they attempted to vindicate, against flagrant outrages, the dignity of justice, their ears were assailed by unheard-of ebullitions, and the accused left

the court, exclaiming aloud, "We have still balls in our cartridges."

Beyond the arena in which these tumultuous scenes were acted, and independent of the political parties who disputed for the present the government of France, other struggles and reformers were already engaged in claiming the empire of the future. It was in 1831 that Saint-Simonism and Fourierism, a long time in preparation, burst into noisy activity. The journal called 'The Globe,' for some time emancipated from the hands of the doctrinarians, then transformed itself into a pulpit of the Saint-Simonian school, which was struggling to become a Church; and a clever officer of engineers, M. Victor Considérant, commenced about the same period at Metz his public meetings, to expand and bring into practice the ideas of Fourier. If I had not been personally acquainted with several of the most distinguished disciples of these two schools, and if I had not observed by their example, after many others, what an infinitely small dose of truth suffices to conquer enlightened minds, and to induce them to receive the most monstrous fallacies, I should find it difficult to speak of these dreams, and probably should not name them at all. In reality, Saint-Simonism and Fourierism were but natural phases of the great moral, social, and political crisis which, since the last century, ferments the world with meteoric courses in this prolonged tempest. Impressed by some of the errors of our time, especially in political institutions, and comprehending better than the radical school the importance of principles of authority, of discipline, and hierarchy, Saint-Simon

and Fourier believed themselves called on together to rectify the French Revolution, and carry it to its last and definitive limits. But with pretensions to the spirit of organization they were possessed by the spirit of revolution; and under the mantle of some ideas rather more rational in political order, they introduced into moral and social order the most false as well as the most pernicious doctrines. At the same time that they defended authority, they unchained man, and subverted human society in its foundations. As it usually happens in such cases, it was by their revolutionary bias that they acquired a degree of power; their most able disciples made profession of contempt for anarchical maxims in government; but their doctrines and general tendencies aggravated unlicensed perturbation amongst the popular masses, by fomenting the instincts which surrender man up to the jealous thirst of material advantages and the egotism of the passions.

A sad event soon displayed the tenour and effect of their influence. In November, 1831, the stagnation of trade, the wants of the operatives, and the false measures of a local administration without firmness or intelligence, although by no means deficient in spirit and courage, brought on, at Lyons, a formidable insurrection of the working population, demanding that the public authorities should regulate the agreements between them and the manufacturers, and secure to them fixed salaries at a higher rate. After two days of sanguinary contest, the troops were compelled to evacuate the city, which remained for the ensuing ten days at the mercy of an astonished, embarrassed multitude, terrified at their

own triumph, and who sought of themselves to return to order, not knowing how to deal with the anarchy in which they ruled. Every political party, every social innovator, every revolutionary passion, idea, and dream, appeared in this outbreak. Some leaders of the Saint-Simonians and Fourierists a short time before this had presented themselves as missionaries at Lyons to preach their doctrines, in the name of which several popular associations had already formed themselves in that great industrial focus. Republican plotters, legitimist agents, secret societies, and professional conspirators, all endeavoured to reap profit from this formidable movement. The greater portion of the labourers drew back from this factious attempt, and wished to restrain their insurrection within the limits of its immediate and local object. They wrote thus to the principal newspaper of Lyons, the 'Precursor':—"Mr. Editor, we feel called upon to explain, that in the events which have so recently taken place at Lyons, political and seditious insinuations have no influence. We are entirely devoted to Louis-Philippe, King of the French, and to the constitutional Charter; we are animated by the purest and most fervent sentiments for public liberty and the prosperity of France, and we abhor all factions that seek to assail either." But on both sides the efforts were vain. The labourers were unable to prevent the political conspirators from impressing on the tumult the features of revolutionary revolt, and the conspirators failed to impel the labourers towards revolution; anarchy, with its various principles and promoters, reigned at Lyons in impotent predominance.

Three months later, under extremely frivolous pretexts connected with the carnival, Grenoble became the theatre of violent disorders. The administrative authorities were disavowed and insulted. The intervention of armed force aggravated instead of suppressing the evil. The republican party, which mustered strong at Grenoble, hastened to take the field. Sanguinary encounters took place between the soldiers and the citizens; and under orders from the officers in command, shaken by the popular exasperation, the thirty-fifth regiment of infantry of the line, which had been engaged in the struggle, was removed from the city, humiliated without being vanquished.

In many other places, and chiefly from trifling causes, at Strasbourg, Tours, Montpellier, Carcassonne, Nismes, and Marseilles, similar disturbances broke out. The spirit of disorder was not exclusively confined to the people, but infected the army itself. At Tarascon, the soldiers refused to obey the municipal authorities who wished to prevent the tumultuous planting of a tree of liberty, and one of their officers declared that, notwithstanding the order of the magistrate, he would not allow some prisoners, who were to be examined, to be taken from the gaol. When the appointed time arrived to distribute the decoration instituted by the King, according to the law of the 13th of December, 1830, under the title of *Cross of July*, in commemoration of the contest of the three days, the greater number of persons to whom it had been decreed by the commission of Paris, refused to receive it with the inscription, *Given by the King of the French*; and on the condition of taking the oath of

fidelity. At the cavalry school of Saumur, a sub-lieutenant received the decoration without the previous sanction of his superiors, saying, at the same time, that he had no occasion for their consent. Others took it while evading the oath. One of these parties was prosecuted on this charge and acquitted by the jury. The authorities then gave up any similar proceedings. Thus, while the victors of July so arrogantly defied the rights and orders of the government born of their triumph, the vanquished were preparing, in the south and west, a grand legitimist insurrection, which waited but the arrival of the Duchess de Berry to spring into life.

I have here recapitulated and brought together all the elements of anarchy with which M. Casimir Périer had to grapple. They were not opposed to him in one mass, or with their combined dangers. Nevertheless, he thoroughly understood and felt the magnitude of the struggle, and encountered it with more determination than confidence. There is no courage more rare and imposing than that which continues to resist without calculating on success. Bold, but misgiving of the result, and inclining to be depressed, it was the disposition of M. Casimir Périer to expect little while undertaking much. He supplied the deficiency of hope by earnestness, and an immovable conviction of the absolute necessity of the contest. To re-establish order in the streets, in the state, in the government, in the finances, internally and externally,—in this was comprised the single and fixed idea which he pushed to its accomplishment with ardent and unflinching perseverance, as people labour to check an inundation or a fire. Insurrection perpetually rising,

excited his indignation, but failed to tire him out. He employed, to put it down, all the permanent or incidental power, all the organized or spontaneous forces furnished to him by the unsettled state of society ;—the troops of the line, the municipal and national guards, the agents of police, and the well-disposed section of the labouring population who were irritated by the street disorders which interfered with their work. And when he had brought into the van these varied auxiliaries, he supported them energetically against hostile anger or complaint, well knowing that zeal commits errors in loyal service, and at once assuming to himself the individual responsibility.

It happened once, that during one of the most violent of the popular eruptions of the day, excited by the intelligence of the fall of Warsaw, he found himself unexpectedly in personal presence of the rioters. He had just left the Hotel of Foreign Affairs, in company with General Sébastiani. The mob surrounded his carriage, and assailed him with menacing cries. M. Périer put his head out of the window, addressed a few words to the nearest persons, and ordered the coachman to drive on. The carriage advanced with some difficulty to the place Vendôme, near the Hotel of the Chancery. There, it was impossible to proceed further ; the crowd had stopped the horses. The two ministers opened the door of the carriage, came forth, and advanced on foot towards the mass, which drew back a little as they appeared. General Sébastiani, with calm and collected demeanour, pointed out with his hand to the rioters the neighbouring station of the staff of the garrison, and the

soldiers on guard, who were getting under arms. M. Casimir Périer advanced towards the most furious of the crowd. "What do you want?" said he. "Long live Poland!" they shouted in reply; "we want our liberties!" "You have them, and what use do you make of them? You come here to insult and threaten me; me, the representative of the law which protects you all!" His proud demeanour and resolute words suspended for a moment their cries; the guard arrived, and the two ministers entered the Hotel of the Chancery, leaving the multitude confused in their irritation.

It is little to repress these disorders when they occur. It is much more important to forestal them. On this condition alone society can regain confidence in repose. M. Périer doubted the sufficiency of his resources and agents. He had on his commercial staff a singularly bold and clear-headed person, who had been a long time employed and afterwards associated in a banking-house, and lately concerned in administrative affairs, although a stranger to politics. He summoned M. Gisquet to his presence. "I am badly seconded," said he; "my intentions are misconstrued, my orders are not executed with the promptitude and precision without which orders go for nothing. All the world make themselves police. They do so at the Palace, in the ministries, and in the offices of the staff; this is intolerable. It is necessary that all these different police should be abolished and that mine alone shall remain in efficacy. M. Vivien has good qualities, but I require a prefect who will act with more thorough conviction and attachment in carrying out my policy. M. Vivien must retire to the State

Council. I have replaced him by M. Saulnier. I wish you to assume the duties of secretary-general. I have apprised M. Saulnier that I reckon on you for political matters; you are my man; name the powers you require to second me well, and I give them to you at once." M. Gisquet accepted the office. Three months after he was prefect of police in title as in fact, and served M. Casimir Périer with energetic devotion.

From the first days of his ministry, M. Casimir Périer intently occupied himself with another measure, which he judged indispensable to the external and daily dignity of power. On the 20th of March, the 'Moniteur' announced that the King was going to reside at the Tuileries. As long as the palace of the kings remained unoccupied, it seemed to belong to its old masters, or to the Revolution which had driven them from it. It was essential that the new royalty should take the place of these two reminiscences. The Palais-Royal, moreover, was the general rendezvous of crowds and commotion; safety was often wanting to that abode of royalty, and convenience always. M. Casimir formally required that the King should establish himself at the Tuileries. It was said that the King evinced resistance, or at least hesitation. I do not credit this. Different sentiments were undoubtedly mixed up with this resolution. King Louis-Philippe, extremely sensible of domestic habits and affections, set considerable value on the remembrances of his youth and of his ancestors. It cost him something to leave their residence; at the same time, he felt an emotion of sadness in entering the palace where the elder branches had so long reigned and whence they had been

so miserably expelled. His heart was readily moved, and ever accessible to the confused impressions naturally excited by the vicissitudes of his destiny. But he had too rational and too firm a mind not to admit the necessity of the step which his minister demanded. M. Casimir Périer took the initiative, and King Louis-Philippe was unable to oppose serious resistance.

This event soon led to an embarrassment which occasioned some noise. Scarcely settled at the Tuileries, the King perceived that, if not commotion, insult at least followed him to his new abode. While traversing the garden, and chiefly in the evening, under the cover of darkness, coarse passengers uttered injurious exclamations and sang ribald songs under the windows of the apartments occupied by the King, the Queen, and the princesses. To check this practice effectually, it would have been necessary for the sentinels to patrol the entire front of the palace, and to make arrests under the very walls. The King ordered, that while leaving open the passage from the Pont-Royal to the rue de Rivoli, a strip of ground should be reserved, encircled by a ditch planted with lilac, to remove the passers-by from the actual windows of the Château. The hostile journals immediately overflowed with clamours proceeding from accumulated malcontents. They were fortifying the Tuileries and taking the garden from the public. The public, ever credulous, seemed disposed to fire up. M. Périer expressed to me some uneasiness on this point. One evening, when I went to pay my respects to the Queen, the King named the subject with animation. "I take nothing from the public," said he; "all the world

traverses the Tuileries as before ; I neither disfigure the palace nor the garden ; I have no idle fantasy in the matter ; but I cannot suffer banditti to come under my windows and outrage my wife and daughters with their disgusting expressions ; I have a right to remove these insults from my own family." M. Périer had no occasion to think twice before according with the King ; he boldly seconded his determination, and the harmless work, commenced along the extent of the Tuileries, was completed without obstacle ; leaving however some discontent amongst the idlers, and an unpleasant recollection on the King's mind.

In the departments, M. Casimir Périer exhibited the same firm resolve as at Paris, not only to suppress everywhere sedition and disorder, but effectually to protect the public or private interests which disorder injured. When on the first news of the great insurrection of the labourers in December, 1831, he despatched the Duke of Orleans and Marshal Soult to Lyons, he charged them not only to retake possession of the city, and of the authority invaded by the insurgents, but to re-establish between the manufacturers, the foremen, and the operatives, entire liberty of dealing, an absolute condition for labour as well as capital, for security and property, according to the measure permitted by the natural wants of life and the exigences of society. In March, 1832, when the weakness of the military authorities had consented, in the midst of a sedition, to withdraw from Grenoble the regiment that had combated against the rioters, M. Périer, after removing the inefficient commanders, insisted that this same regiment should re-

enter the city, with their band playing and colours displayed; and a proclamation from the minister of war rendered ample justice to the troops, while restoring the ascendancy of public power.

No administrator, no civil or military chief can exhibit want of firmness or discipline with impunity. The active presence and serious disposition of power must impress itself on its agents, and through its agents on the millions. The 'Moniteur' hastened to express the opinion and explain the conduct of the cabinet under the different emergencies which had called for action; and when these incidents led to important discussions in the Chambers, M. Casimir Périer supported his acts and agents with indomitable energy, rejecting all equivocal assent on the part of his friends, all disguised censure from his enemies, and exclaiming with painful anger, when the opposition spoke of indulgence, "I accept no indulgence; I demand nothing but justice and the esteem of my country."

With rare and striking contrast, M. Périer, while he threw this ardent passion into his exercise of power, mingled with it extreme moderation and prudence. This minister, so impatient and haughty, confined himself rigorously within the limits of the law. He even went beyond this; he employed the laws themselves with reserve, and had no desire to exercise their extreme force. When in the month of May, 1831, he despatched Lieutenant-General Bonnet to the departments of the West, where troubles had broken out, with the title of commissioner-extraordinary, he took especial care not to confer on him any provisional power; and in his *Report to*

the King, he minutely explained that this mission had no object beyond concentrating in a single hand the command of the public forces, to assure the unity and promptitude of their action. Some months later, new disorders again developed themselves in these departments; the country became excited and the towns alarmed. The deputies from the disturbed districts, while detailing these agitations and apprehensions to the Chamber, required provisional laws and measures of rigour. M. Casimir Périer peremptorily refused. "I oppose these demands," said he, "convinced as I am that, under the existing system, the ordinary law suffices for everything. Paris also has seen its tranquillity disturbed by commotions, but who for that reason would have thought of declaring the city in a state of siege? There is no greater necessity for such measures in these provinces. Order in La Vendée by the maintenance of the laws, peace in Europe from respect to sworn faith;—such is the answer to silence all these reproaches, to calm so many anxieties, and to reconcile such a host of convictions."

In April 1831, a few weeks after the accession of M. Casimir Périer to power, and while commotion rolled and grumbled in the streets like thunder in a protracted storm, Queen Hortense suddenly arrived in Paris with her son, Louis Bonaparte. She was flying from Italy, where she had just lost the eldest of her children; and whence with great difficulty she had brought the second, enfeebled by illness. Immediately on her arrival, she addressed herself to Count d'Houdetot, aide-de-camp to the King, with whom she had long been acquainted, praying him to make his Majesty acquainted with her

situation, and the circumstances that had brought her to Paris. The King, after a conversation with M. Casimir Périer on the subject, and with him alone amongst the ministers, received Queen Hortense secretly at the Palais-Royal, in the small chamber occupied by Count d'Houdetot,—the Queen and Madame Adelaide being also present. All three evinced towards her the deepest interest. She desired permission to remain, for some time at least, in France, and to bring certain pecuniary claims before the government. The King, on both points, promised her all the assistance in his power, and sent M. Casimir Périer to her, as being necessarily acquainted with what had taken place. "I know, sir," said she to the minister, as she saw him enter, "that I have violated a law; you have a right to arrest me, which would be only just." "Legal, yes, madam; just, no!" replied M. Casimir Périer; and, after conversing with her for some minutes, proffered services of which she might stand in need, but these she declined. Meanwhile the disturbances continued, and approached the rue de la Paix, in which the fugitive Queen resided. On the 5th of May, the column in the place Vendôme became their central point; cries of "*Long live the Emperor!*" resounded on all sides; a report flew abroad that Prince Louis had been seen in the square. M. Casimir Périer announced to Queen Hortense that her visit to Paris must terminate. She departed with her son for England, unrecognized by the public, and protected by the King whom her friends were seeking to dethrone. At a later period, she received in London, through the intervention of M. de Talleyrand, passports

allowing her to traverse France, and thus to reach Switzerland, where she had determined to reside.

Some days before this incident, on the 5th of April, 1831, the King, at the suggestion of M. Casimir Périer, ordered the statue of the Emperor Napoleon to be replaced on the column of the place Vendôme; and a few months afterwards, on the 13th of September, the Chamber of Deputies presented petitions to the President of the Council, praying that the remains of the Emperor might be demanded from England, and placed under the column. A young and ardent oppositionist under the Restoration, M. Charles Comte, and an ancient liberal of the Constituent Assembly, M. Charles de Lameth, objected almost alone to the order of the day, which proposed the commission. "It is true," said M. de Lameth, "that Napoleon stifled anarchy; but I see no necessity for bringing back his ashes to revive it today." The cabinet took no part in the debate, and accepted the reference in silence.

In this manner commenced, under the ministry of M. Casimir Périer, that series of acts by which King Louis-Philippe and his government, during eighteen years, and in spite of conspiracies, testified such continual regard for the name, the memory, and the family of the Emperor Napoleon. Many sound-judging persons have considered this a serious error on their part, or at least a marked instance of imprudence. I myself incline to think that such signal complaisance on the part of the constitutional government of 1830 for a national reminiscence and a popular sentiment little in harmony with its liberal and pacific policy, exceeded necessity, and perhaps even

propriety; and if I thought that this line of policy exercised any important influence on the fortunes of the new dynasty, I should not hesitate even now to express my condemnation and regret. But I cannot persuade myself that either the statue of Napoleon in the place Vendôme, or his remains at the Invalides, produced the fall of King Louis-Philippe and the Charter. Very different causes, some more direct, and others more profound, determined the events of 1848. Today, I feel pleasure in retracing in the acts of the government of 1830, that generosity of feeling and expansion of views which satisfied the existing power that it could, without danger, render homage to our entire history, whether ancient or contemporaneous; and revive indiscriminately in our streets, in our public squares, in the Invalides, as at Versailles, all the glories of France, while at the same time laying the foundation of her liberties. There is also honour attached to these acts which King Louis-Philippe and his government have nobly won, and of which subsequent reverses cannot deprive them.

To the violent debates arising from these accidental causes, discussions were added more anticipated and tranquil, emanating either from questions originated in the Chambers, or from bills presented by the government. Out of seventy-eight ministerial propositions, introduced during its limited term of office by the cabinet of the 13th of March, 1831, sixteen had for object the completion of some of the engagements of the Charter, or important political and administrative reforms. M. Casimir Périer in general took less part in the preparation and discussion of these bills than in

the debates on incidental events and policy. Exclusively a man of action, formed more by conflict than study, his mind was little exercised in the examination of fundamental principles and in the toil of legislation. He could foresee with powerful instinct the practical value of a general idea for the advantage of social order and government; but when it became necessary to connect this idea with its originating cause, and to follow it out to historical or logical developments, he resigned that task to others, not finding it particularly suited to his own attributes. This happened particularly in two of the most important questions which the cabinet of the 13th of March had to decide,—the civil list and the hereditary peerage. The act of government,—or rather, the resolution adopted in both these cases by the ministry—was in truth the act of M. Casimir Périer, and the result of his judgment, as to what he considered practically convenient and possible; but he sought to take no important personal share, and, in fact, appeared but little in the debate.

On the question of the civil list, the debate was of an ordinary character, far below the importance of the subject, and the situation in which it was proposed. Independence and political acuteness were equally deficient. I have never encountered in history falsehoods to be compared to the suppositions and imputations, serious or frivolous, clever or commonplace, of which on this occasion King Louis-Philippe was made the object, beyond the walls of the Chambers. Neither as regarded money nor power had this prince any excessive pretensions or irregular wants. Accustomed to orderly

and calculating habits, he felt no surprise at the homely manners of his time, and had no desire to shock them by personal luxury or prodigality. "I have neither," said he to me one day, "mistress nor favourite; I have no passion for war, play, or the chase; they say I am too fond of building, but the public Treasury and morals are not sufferers by that." His only fault (if after the Revolution of the 24th of February, 1848, and the decrees of the 23rd of January, that could be called a fault) was an overwrought uneasiness as to the future destiny of his family, and too animated a display of that feeling. He also disturbed himself beyond measure with all the exigencies which besieged royalty, and his own incapability of meeting them, at the same time that he firmly resolved to discharge his obligations. But these anxieties, manifested without reserve in his familiar intercourse, by no means regulated the standard of his pretensions. The civil list, presented on the 4th of October, 1831, by his ministry, was modest rather than ambitious. The Crown thereby renounced several domains it had until then possessed; the figure of the annual sum to be allowed was left blank, evidently intended to fall below that proposed by M. Laffitte some months before. Nothing could be more natural than that these new propositions should be discussed, although the most moderate that had ever been brought forward in a similar matter; but assuredly they contained nothing to call for exclamation. On their part, an immense majority of the Chamber of Deputies had no hostile feeling towards King Louis-Philippe and his monarchical establishment; on the contrary, they

wished sincerely to support, strengthen, and secure it. They wished royalty to be hospitable, generous, and surrounded with appropriate splendour. Yet, at the same time, they disputed and bargained with it as with a greedy and cunning contractor, whose charges are suspected and whose profits are to be jealously reduced. This was not alone the attitude of the opposition, but also that of the greater portion of the friends of government, of the very men who declared and believed themselves firmly resolved to accord to royalty all that its mission required. Unconsciously to themselves, they were disturbed by the assertions and intimidated by the attacks from without. They were in dread of being accused of prodigality or weakness. Even the cabinet itself exhibited sometimes an embarrassed air, as if demanding more than it had a right to expect, or any prospect of obtaining.

In fact, throughout the entire progress of this debate, the great question—I shall not say simply of principle, but of circumstance,—the political argument was forgotten and disappeared under the minor consideration of economy with which all minds were prepossessed. The idea of cheap government was the dominating, sovereign idea. People spoke and acted as if in presence of an ancient royalty, powerful and rich, which it had been found necessary and difficult to bring back into the paths of order and economy ; or rather as if they had only to provide for the transient position of the first magistrate of a republic, emerging yesterday from ordinary life, and destined to return to it tomorrow. There was a different problem to solve. A monarchy was

desired because it was considered necessary, as well for the liberties as for the repose of the country. It erected itself in the midst of ruins. The pressing and paramount object was to establish this monarchy; and for that purpose, at the outset, it required all the available resources and pledges of stability. The perpetuity of the entailed dotation of the Crown, the clear and settled constitution of the royal family, the strong manifestation of public confidence in its own work, and of a determination to bequeath that work to future generations;—such were the ideas and intentions which ought to have governed the legislators, and regulated their acts and language. But they thought little of them; and at the very moment when they pretended to found a monarchy, they contested its inherent elements because they gave signs of solid and permanent duration. The entailed dotation of the Crown was reduced to a life annuity, like the civil list, properly so called. Appanages were abolished; endowments were only promised to the princes of the Royal family eventually, in case it should be proved that the private estate of the King was inadequate to their support. Two speeches, one by M. Casimir Périer, the other by M. de Montalivet, produced no effect in modifying the state of minds and the character of the discussion. The bill on the civil list was scrutinized and passed as if we were merely disputing and settling the price of a machine destined to become, for a certain time, the government. I believe that this bill provided sufficiently for the material necessities of royalty; but it is not the less certain that royalty was humiliated by the debate.

The hereditary peerage was a question lost before discussion. Democratic clamour absolutely rejected it; and amongst the new conservatives themselves, the majority agreed with that decision either from conviction, from being led away by the torrent, or from absolute weakness. The party of citizen-monarchists, so recently triumphant in 1830, had here a brilliant opportunity of elevating their victory by a decisive rupture with revolutionary traditions, and by pacifying the superior classes of the country. That under constitutional monarchy, an hereditary Chamber may be at once a guarantee of stability and liberty, a school of legal government and of temperate opposition, is a truth which reason suggests and experience proves; which, before 1830, nearly all the enlightened friends of constitutional monarchy admitted, and which the partisans of a democratic republic alone have a right to throw aside, since they reject monarchy altogether. The great political powers can only spring from two sources, election or inheritance. Beyond these, there are only the magistracies. Representative monarchy can combine and bring into joint action these two principles. It is thus, and on these conditions, that it constitutes an excellent form of government, which gives to all social, civil, and political interests,—to the private family as to the State, to liberty as to power,—the best pledges of strength and security.

Aversion to the principle of heirship is one of the prevailing sentiments of the sincere or factious promoters of revolution. A natural antipathy for change and levelling being the two enduring passions of the revolutionary spirit, heirship whenever encountered is the first obstacle

it seeks to overthrow. But to gratify itself at this price, the revolutionary spirit falsifies and isolates the fundamental rule of all sound political organization, which consists in preserving harmony between the laws emanating from man, and those providential laws which God has established over all human society; and to assure to each of the great principles that contest the world, its just share in the government of nations. Now, heirship is evidently one of these principles; it plays such an important part in the social life of humanity, that every State which refuses to recognize it under some specific form or institution, remains incompletely constituted, and carries within its bosom the seeds of disorder and fragility, which never fail to expand themselves.

Apart from all general considerations of political arrangement, France has in this question an imperative and pressing circumstantial interest. Everywhere, and especially in the classes naturally called to political activity, our social system of today requires pacification and unity. As long as the old French nobility and the citizens are determined to remain mutually jealous and at variance, instead of resolving to be reciprocally influential, we shall be exposed to recurring revolution, or rather to alternate anarchy and despotism, instead of combined stability and liberty. Now this pacification of classes so long in rivalry, can only be effected in ordinary public life, and in the heart of the government. They should meet there every day, to exercise the same rights and defend the same interests, under the weight of the same common responsibility to the country. Let the old and new social influences, the nobility and the

citizens mix together in the hereditary as in the elective Chamber;—sooner or later peace will be declared between them, and such a peace announces the end of revolution. In 1814, the Charter began this work; in 1830, the new monarchy, victorious in the struggle, could have accomplished it. With perfect dignity and without danger, it might have offered to the old monarchical party, in the hereditary peerage, a position which with equal dignity might have been accepted. Both would have gained strength in this practical and progressive reconciliation, entered into without conditions or dispute.

The revolutionary and democratic spirit combined to set aside this promising result. They stifled in the bosom of the victorious middle classes of 1830, those expanded instincts of order and government, which under great political emergencies constitute practical sense; and at the moment when a co-operation of the two elements of the monarchical party might have led to a decisive step, division and anger were aggravated between them.

One fact perhaps deserves to be recorded. M. Royer-Collard, M. Thiers, and myself, sat in the Chamber of Deputies, all three representing under different degrees and principles the system of constitutional monarchy; and all three, citizens of the middle class. Yet we supported simultaneously the hereditary peerage, equally convinced of its importance to the government we were endeavouring to found.

Could the question have been carried? I am doubtful on this point. Not that the democratic current was

insurmountable ; it had less strength in reality than in appearance ; but our means of resistance were extremely weak. The debate was favourable to the right of inheritance. At the moment of the vote on the amendment which proposed to maintain it, General Bugeaud said to me, " It is a pity that this discussion ends so quickly ; you had not twenty voices at the commencement ; you will have more now." The principle of heirship had eighty-six votes against two hundred and six ; that of General Bugeaud being included in the former number.

During this debate, M. Casimir Périer was placed in a galling position. He was in favour of the hereditary peerage, he expressed this bias openly, and yet he proposed its abolition. No one had a right to reproach him, for no one dared to suggest a different course. My friends and I were at full liberty to vote as we did in the debate ; the solution of the question was not placed in our hands, but none amongst us ventured to deny the necessity to which M. Casimir Périer consented to submit. In the midst of his triumphs over anarchy, it was the evil fortune of this great citizen that, carried away by the pressure of physical resistance, he suffered himself at the same time to be led into fatal concessions in affairs of political law and institution. He felt deep vexation at this, for his mind, which rose daily above his position, was strongly impressed with the necessity of a consistent policy, which should restore order by permanent enactments of State, as well as by the daily exercise of power. Not being as equal to the one task as to the other, he sometimes complained to his friends of his destiny, as sad, he thought, as if he had not suc-

ceeded in stemming the tide of anarchy, his true mission, and glorious object. The regret was worthy of a lofty soul.

Nothing demonstrated more evidently the painful situation of M. Casimir Périer in this affair, than the measure to which he was compelled to have recourse, to secure in the Chamber of Peers the abolition he so much deplored. A royal decree sent up to that Chamber thirty-six new members, called and prepared to mutilate with their own hands the body into which they were introduced. And to add still more to the strange inconsistency of this step, the power of the principle and sentiment of heirship was solemnly recognized and accepted. Two youths, still in their minority, sons of Marshal Ney and General Foy, were included amongst these new peers; a noble and just homage to the memory of their fathers, to the military glory of the one, and the united military and political reputation of the other; and at the same time, a strong avowal in favour of that natural inheritance which was thus sanctioned in the very act destined to effect its abolition.

In another circumstance, less serious but still of some weight, M. Casimir Périer had the vexation not only of acting against, but of suppressing his own sentiments. A deputy whose opinions accorded ill with his name, M. Augustus Portalis, proposed the total abolition of the law of the 19th of January, 1816, which had instituted for the anniversary of the 21st of January, a national and authorized mourning, as well as the erection of a monument in expiation of the death of Louis XVI. This proposition gave rise to an obstinate conflict be-

tween the two Chambers. In abrogating several provisions of the law of January, the Chamber of Peers desired that the 21st of that month should remain a day of mourning and sacred observance. The Chamber of Deputies persisted in voting the complete annulment of the act. During this long debate, and in both Chambers, the cabinet maintained absolute silence. To the Duke de Broglie belonged the honour of manifesting in their difficult harmony the opposite sentiments inspired by such a question. He accomplished this with that scrupulous and delicate firmness by which his talents and his merit are characterized. "What does the interest of peace," said he, "require here? What is demanded by that spirit of wisdom, of moderation, and of prudence, which should preside in every regular government? that spirit of conciliation which terminates revolutions, and which ought to be the good genius of the revolution of July.

"Let us not array every year, on a given day, at all points of France, parties in presence of each other, around a solemn funeral canopy. Let us not excite our citizens annually, and at a fixed date, to point the finger at each other, as they obey or resist the injunction to clothe themselves in a prescribed colour. Let us rather anticipate all chance of disorder by forestalling, in the non-interruption of the ordinary avocations of civil life, the dangerous idleness of a political holyday.

"But having thus given full consideration to the reasonable, honest, and legitimate notions which, without doubt, have inspired the other Chamber with the resolution now before us, and have obtained a majority of

votes, there remain, nevertheless, in the law of the 19th of January, thus purified, some excellent provisions.

“In the first place, there is the public authority and solemn declaration that the 21st of January is a day of mourning for France; not of that external display which quickly degenerates into a puerile mockery, but of that moral sorrow which dwells in the recesses of the heart;—one of those days which the ancients denominated unpropitious, a day of self-examination and thought, replete with melancholy instruction.

“In the next place, there is the obligation imposed on justice unworthily outraged, detestably profaned, and horribly parodied for forty years, to veil her face on such a day and to close her sanctuary.

“Who requires from you the sacrifice of these enactments?

“Is it the national honour which calls upon us to declare that the 21st of January is a day like any other,—a day in no way distinguished from the ordinary series—recommended by nothing peculiar to the remembrance of the expiring or rising generations, or of those that must succeed them in the order of time?

“Is it the national honour which calls upon us to declare that the trial of Louis XVI. was a prosecution like any other, one of those so-called *celebrated cases* which occupy the curiosity of idlers for eight days, and are then buried in legal folios?

“I know not why, gentlemen, but all that I have of French blood in my heart swells up at this thought. . . . The more I reflect, the more I feel convinced that if we make this sacrifice, we offer it up neither to national

honour, public tranquillity, nor the interest of our government; we shall yield it to an undue parliamentary influence which endeavours, but I trust vainly, to impose itself on public authority. . . . Let us have a clear understanding on the word *oblivion*. It is one thing to forget persons, votes, opinions, and errors; but it is another to lose remembrance of the great events of history, and the all-important lessons they include. The Gospel—which is the law of laws, and the charter of the human race—prescribes to us indulgence and even loving-kindness for the weak and erring; but at the same time it commands us to abhor evil in itself. This precept applies to policy as to everything else. For those who took part in the event we are now discussing, let there be peace, charity, and even respect. Some amongst them were thoroughly sincere. Besides, the times were horrible, and minds in a bewildered state. Which of us, always excepting those who have gloriously passed the ordeal, could take upon himself to say that he would have escaped from that trial with honour? But as regards the 21st of January itself, let us have no weak complaisance, no sophistry, and no oblivion. In the times under which we now live, with the hurricane of revolution whistling round the heads of nations and kings, it imports much to France and to the world, to preserve the memory of that day.”

It gives me much satisfaction to repeat here these noble and judicious expressions, which reflect equal honour on the person who uttered them, the assembly of which he was the interpreter, and that epoch of liberty in which truth ever appeared pure and brilliant in some

corner of the horizon charged with clouds and storms. "The Duke de Broglie is very fortunate," said M. Casimir Périer, with a sincere feeling of admiration, although a little tempered with sorrow; "he has been able to avow what all honest men think."

My friends and I had no misunderstandings with M. Casimir Périer beyond those shades of conduct or language which spring from difference of situation rather than of opinions. Throughout the duration of his ministry, and the more freely that I was in no office whatever, I gave him my active co-operation, not only to support in the parliamentary debates the acts of his policy when vehemently attacked, but to connect them with rational principles, and to conquer minds for him as well as votes. It is (I will not say it was) a distinctive feature of the greatness of our country, that purely material and actual success does not suffice for it, and that minds require to be satisfied as well as interests. It was not enough in 1831 to resist in fact; it was also necessary to resist in principle; for moral order was equally in question with political order, and there was as much anarchy to oppose in people's heads as in the streets. A revolution had just taken place; different forces had concurred in its accomplishment,—just rights and evil passions, the spirit of legality and the spirit of insurrection. It was essential to extricate this great event from the revolutionary elements mixed up with it, and in which many persons struggled hard to retain or even to plunge it still more deeply. The people—or, to speak more correctly, that chaos of human beings called the people—invested with the sovereign

and permanent right of framing and overthrowing its government in the name of its single will; and the popular election accorded in the name of that same sovereignty as the only lawful basis of the new monarchy: these were the two ideas with which, in 1831, the general mind was infected; ideas as false as they were vain, which pervert to the promotion of evil the small degree of truth they contain, and weaken until they overthrow the government they pretend to found. What can be more revolting to reason than to reduce the authorities called to preside over the destinies of a nation to the condition of servants, to be discharged at pleasure? And what greater fallacy than the pretension of electing a king at the moment when monarchy is appealed to as an anchor of safety! I was always tempted to smile when I heard King Louis-Philippe called *the King of our choice*; as if, in 1830, we should have had any choice, if the Duke of Orleans had not happened to be the only and necessary person. I attacked loudly those illusions of idle vanity, and those sophisms of material force which seeks to satisfy itself, but shrinks from avowal. I denied the sovereignty of the people—that is, of mere numbers, and the permanent right of insurrection. I showed, in the Duke of Orleans, what he was in effect,—a prince of the blood royal, happily discovered near the broken throne, and by necessity elevated into a king. France had treated with him, as we treat for safety with the only power that can rescue us. In presence of impending anarchy such a contract may become a solid basis of government, and of free government, because it stands between forces

really distinct from each other, and it admits the mutual rights without which it cannot suppose the sovereignty to rest with or be conferred on either of the contracting parties. It cannot be too often repeated, to bring down human pride to its just level, that God is the only sovereign, and nobody on earth is God, neither people nor kings. And the will of the people is not enough to create kings; it is indispensable that he who becomes a monarch should bear within himself, and bring as a dowry to the country he espouses, some of the natural and independent characteristics of royalty.

It was not this ground that M. Casimir Périer took up when he defended himself, little accustomed to philosophic meditation, and of a mind more resolved than fertile; but he comprehended to a point the practical value of these ideas, and he felt deeply indebted to me for expounding them to his advantage and under his standard. "I am," said he to me, "a man of circumstance and contest; parliamentary discussion is not my element; you will one day occupy my place here, when either the Duke de Broglie or the Duke de Mortemart takes the portfolio of foreign affairs."

King Louis-Philippe had no greater inclination for political philosophy than had M. Casimir Périer, and during his youth he had been much more deeply imbued than his minister with the doctrines of the revolution. But he was gifted with a keen spirit of observation, and singularly prompt in seizing the lessons of experience; if not to extract from them the general truths they inculcate, at least to recognize on all occasions what is

practicable, useful, and wise. During the course of his eventful career, he had suffered from the false nature, and endured the yoke of many of the prejudices of his time, and every succeeding day of his reign raised his mind above the standard of his past life. He perceived at once that my method of comprehending and explaining the revolution which had placed him on the throne was the fittest and most monarchical on which to establish a government. He did not, however, adopt it openly or entirely; he had too many different minds to deal with, to act in this manner; but he testified his esteem, and made it clear to me that we were in a mutual understanding. At a later period, and when I had lived a long time in close intercourse with him, he repeated to me incessantly, "You are a thousand times in the right; it is in the recesses of the mind that we must combat the spirit of revolution, for it is there that it reigns; but to exorcise demons we require a prophet."

In the bosom of the Chambers, and with the public supporters of the government, my systematic defence of the policy of resistance met with warm approbation; but an approbation often restrained from utterance, and more honourable to myself than advantageous to our cause. When the day of some difficult question arrived, I was found to be too absolute or too rash; and whether from instability of mind, or feebleness of heart, my advocates and approvers yielded to the tendencies they dreaded, while praising me for contending with them. Of this I shall cite but a single example.

In January, 1832, during the debate on the bill re-

specting the civil list, M. de Montalivet spoke of the King's *subjects*. A violent tempest arose on the word. "It is we who have made the King! There are no longer subjects. The sovereign people cannot be composed of subjects! Here is a counter-revolution attempted." M. de Montalivet explained himself with caution. The chancellor, M. Barthe, said that the King was the living image and at the same time the first subject of the law. The most conciliating interpretations were vainly attempted. The uproar was as absurd in foundation as unbecoming in form. The word *subjects* had absolutely nothing to do with the feudal system or with despotic power. In republics, as in monarchies, in the internal regulations of free commercial cities, as well as in the castles of great landed proprietors, the word expressed simply the relation of the citizen or inhabitants with the ruling power of the State. Henry Dandolo at Venice, John de Witt at Amsterdam, Lord Chatham in the parliament of England, were in fact, and called themselves subjects of the government, popular or regal, of their country, as much as Sully was the subject of Henry IV. and the Duke de Saint-Simon of Louis XIV. And it is absolutely necessary that, independent of the various forms of government and different degrees of liberty, there should be a word which marks the obedience, deference, and respect due by all the members of society to the power which represents and rules it. It would be very offensive if this power were only treated by its subordinates with the simple politeness evinced by equals towards each other; truth and good order require a contrary practice, and neither the pride

nor liberty of honest men can suffer from its indulgence. One hundred and sixty-five deputies thought differently, and protested against an expression, "irreconcilable," as they said, "with the principle of national sovereignty, and which tended to alter the newly established public rights of Frenchmen." I was of an opinion so thoroughly opposed to this, that I should have believed myself wanting in political duty and moral consistency if I had ceased to evince my respect for the King of my country, in the form consecrated by the law and usage of all States, constitutional or not. I continued therefore publicly, in my official as in my private communications with the King, to sign myself, his faithful subject. The Chamber of Deputies, if I am not deceived, always approved of this act, and in reality accorded with my view, for on the 5th of January, 1832, they terminated the debate on the subject by a clear and simple order of the day. But here their monarchical energy paused; they yielded in fact after having refused to submit in principle, and the word *subject* disappeared almost entirely from the language of the monarchy.

While we were absorbed in these debates, the world in which I had long lived—the amiable, polished, and educated society which had rallied under the Empire, and brilliantly developed itself with the Restoration—disappeared from day to day. Its most eminent characteristics, the taste for enjoyments of the mind and social sympathy, liberal toleration for diversity of origin, position, and ideas, yielded to the dominion of political passions and interests. Discord penetrated into the drawing-rooms; between the cultivated and influential classes

who mingled there, bitter rivalries and dividing animosities began to re-appear. The prolonged tumults, the troubled state of public affairs, the uncertainties of the future ;—all these noisy and threatening revivals of the revolutionary times assorted badly with assemblies where people met to seek the interchange of gentle relations and intellectual enjoyment. Several distinguished men, who had formerly constituted the life and brilliancy of these meetings, had thrown themselves body and soul into public life. Amongst the superior and attractive women who had formed their centre and tie, some—Madame de Staël, Madame de Rémusat, and the Duchess de Duras—were no longer in existence ; others had quitted Paris in the suite of their husbands or relations, called by diplomatic functions to foreign lands. M. de Talleyrand, and his niece the Duchess de Dino, were in London ; M. and Madame de Sainte-Aulaire, at Rome ; M. and Madame de Barante, at Turin. Repulsed by material disorders or political uncertainties, the great European world no longer came to seek relaxation in Paris. French society beheld its most brilliant elements disappear or disperse, at the same time that the violence of passing events deprived its tastes and manners of their ancient and gentle supremacy.

When I retrace my reminiscences of 1831, I find only three persons round whom society still congregated with no other end than recreation. Imperturbable in her habits as in her sentiments through so many revolutions, Madame de Rumford always assembled in her drawing-rooms Frenchmen and foreigners, men of science, literature, and fashion, invariably assuring

them at her hospitable table the pleasure of enlightened conversation, and in her more numerous assemblies the gratification of superior music.¹ With less worldly display, and by the charm of her understanding at once refined and sensible, the Countess de Boigne at that time attracted round her a small circle of chosen and faithful visitors. Educated in the midst of the best company in France and Europe, she had for many years kept the house of her father, the Marquis D'Osmond, successively ambassador at Turin and London. Without being in the slightest degree what is understood by a woman of politics, she joined in political conversation with intelligent and discreet interest. All subjects were discussed at her parties without reserve or display. Madame Récamier, who had the gift of drawing round and retaining in her circle the most distinguished men of her time, fully expressing their opinions without dissension, continued to enjoy her many intimacies with equal deference to the most unassuming and illustrious of her guests, and as steady in her own sentiments as charming in the habitual intercourse of her life. She possessed the rare privilege of never losing a friend except by death. Of these three persons so justly esteemed and courted, Madame de Rumford was in 1831 the only one at whose house I was a constant visitor; at that time I was but slightly acquainted with Madame de Boigne, and the violence of M. de Châteaubriand against the government of 1830 excluded me from the intimate society of Madame Récamier, although my affectionate relations with her

¹ See Historic Documents, No. VII.

niece, Mādamē Lenormant, furnished me with the motive and opportunity. I therefore mixed little with the world, and the world no longer offered its former attractions. The drawing-rooms had ceased to be the homes of social life; there were no longer to be found there that variety and affability of demeanour, that animated and at the same time restrained movement, those conversations generally interesting without any particular object, and animated without contest, which had so long marked the congenial character and formed the charm of French society. Now, parties displayed themselves with all their animosities, and social circles were restrained within the narrowest limits. Political liberty, especially when the democratic spirit is in the ascendant, entails hard conditions and severe ties. I know nothing but the privacy of the domestic hearth which can bring true relaxation and happiness in repose, after the violence and fatigue of public life.

Nevertheless, my friends and I possessed at that time an exclusive privilege. We enjoyed in our own intimate circle, the social charm of which the Parisian world was deprived. Our meetings were chiefly held at the residence of the Duke de Broglie. Even if the Duchess had wanted the attraction of all the reminiscences attached to her name, she sufficed in herself to command the most select and punctilious society. A noble and fascinating nature, in which was united, by the happiest association, virtue and grace, dignity and affability, the elegant richness of the mind and the perfect simplicity of the heart, the most valuable gifts of God received and enjoyed with as much modest restraint as if she always

felt herself on the point of being called on to render an account of her actions. When I left my own house, it was in her society that I sought the indulgence at once animated and serene of that free exercise of ideas and moral sympathy which relaxes the mind from the labours and calamities of life, without weakness or injurious distraction. I have hesitated to permit myself the indulgence of some expressions of tender regret to her memory; but to remain silent respecting a person of such rare qualities, and who held so high a place in the hearts and lives of her friends, would make me feel guilty of falsehood, although well aware that I cannot satisfy myself with what I say.

Until the time of which I am now writing I had only known the 'Journal des Débats,' and its proprietors, the Messieurs Bertin, at a distance, and through unfavourable reports. When I entered the Chamber of Deputies in 1830, I found there one of the two brothers, M. Bertin de Veaux, and we thought and voted together. After the Revolution of July he maintained with the most rational firmness the policy of resistance, and during my ministry of the Interior afforded me his zealous support. M. Casimir Périer also found in him a steady and effectual ally. From that period I established with him a close intimacy. His mind was singularly just, sagacious, prompt, well stored, diversified, full of imagination and accomplishment in ordinary conversation; of bold originality and cleverness when it became necessary to act, and at the same time eminently sociable, and gentle, though commanding; free from all jealousy, ever ready to listen to and serve, without the

slightest alloy of self-love, all who were engaged with him in the same cause, and for whom he acknowledged friendship. He had a natural love for political life, but more as an epicurean than an ambitionist, desiring free influence rather than responsible power, and determined never to compromise, for any external gratification, the importance he derived from his newspaper. Once only, but without success, he endeavoured to take a place amongst the orators of the Chamber of Deputies. "Before I ascended the tribune," said he to me, when relating this check, "I had a store of excellent things to say, and not the slightest fear of those to whom I was going to address them. But I no sooner found myself there, than my throat became closed up, and my sight confused. I uttered very little of what I had prepared, and returned to my seat, fully resolved never to repeat the attempt."

After the Revolution of July, towards the end of September, 1830, he accepted the mission of the King's minister in Holland; but soon becoming weary of the trifling duties of his post, and, above all, of his absence from Paris, he renounced diplomacy as he had given up the tribune, and returned to his seat in the Chamber of Deputies, and to the cabinet from whence he superintended his journal. It was there that of an evening, and often very late in the night, he received his friends, and while running over the proof-sheets of the paper to appear on the morrow, he discoursed on all points, questioning, informing, criticizing, advising, and conjecturing, always with an unembarrassed and even mind, sincerely anxious for the success of the policy

advocated in the 'Journal des Débats.' Occasionally, M. Casimir Périer, the Count de Saint-Cricq, one of his particular friends, and myself, made up with him a party at whist. This was our moment of free conversation on the state of affairs, questions of conduct, and the prospects of the future. We broke up,—M. Périer, satisfied to find himself well supported in the press as in the tribune; M. Bertin du Veaux, content with his own importance and that of his paper; M. de Saint-Cricq, delighted at having passed a familiar evening with the President of the Council; and I, entirely occupied with the debates of the following day, but without feeling impatient to resume my place either in power, or in contest; and always eager to return to my own home, expecting to find there the happiness I hoped to preserve, whatever might be the vicissitudes or trials of my public life. Improvident confidence! The happiness of man is even more uncertain than the destiny of States.

CHAPTER V.

M. CASIMIR PÉRIER AND PEACE.

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE EXTERNAL POLICY OF FRANCE FROM 1792 TO 1814; AND FROM 1814 TO 1830.—THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.—THE HOLY ALLIANCE.—GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF 1830.—OF THE OPPOSITION AFTER 1830.—THE ENGLISH ALLIANCE.—THE BELGIAN QUESTION.—KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE, KING LEOPOLD, AND M. DE TALLEYRAND, ON THE BELGIAN QUESTION.—RELATIONS OF M. CASIMIR PÉRIER AND M. DE TALLEYRAND.—THE POLISH QUESTION.—VITALITY OF POLAND.—THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THAT KINGDOM HAS NEVER BEEN SERIOUSLY ATTEMPTED.—WHAT THE POLES MIGHT HAVE DONE IN 1830.—GENERAL CHLOPICKI AND HIS LETTER TO THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.—THE GOVERNMENT OF KING LOUIS-PHILIPPE NEVER GAVE FALSE HOPES TO THE POLES.—HOW AND BY WHOM THEY WERE DELUDED.—ITALIAN QUESTION.—PIEDMONT AND NAPLES FROM 1830 TO 1832.—INSURRECTION IN THE SMALL ITALIAN STATES GOVERNED BY PRINCES OF THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA, AND IN THE ROMAN TERRITORY.—FIRST OCCUPATION OF THE LEGATIONS BY THE AUSTRIANS.—THEY EVACUATE THEM.—THE PRINCE DE METTERNICH AND M. CASIMIR PÉRIER ON THE AFFAIRS OF ITALY.—THE COUNT DE SAINTE-AULAIRE, AMBASSADOR FROM FRANCE TO ROME.—MEASURES OF THE GREAT POWERS WITH REGARD TO THE POPE, TO INDUCE HIM TO ADOPT REFORMS.—PAPAL EDICTS.—FRESH INSURRECTION.—SECOND OCCUPATION BY THE AUSTRIANS.—EXPEDITION TO ANCONA.—ADMIRAL ROUSSIN BEFORE LISBON.—EXALTED POSITION OF M. CASIMIR PÉRIER IN EUROPE.—NEVERTHELESS HIS SUCCESS IS INCOMPLETE AND PRECARIOUS.—HIS OWN CONVICTION ON THIS SUBJECT.—OUTBURST OF THE CHOLERA IN PARIS.—MY OPINION ON THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF PARIS DURING THE CHOLERA.—VISIT OF THE DUKE OF ORLEANS AND OF M. CASIMIR PÉRIER TO THE HÔTEL-DIEU.—DEATH OF M. CUVIER.—ILLNESS, DEATH, AND FUNERAL OF M. CASIMIR PÉRIER.

(From MARCH 13, 1831, to MAY 16, 1832.)

ALL moralists, religious preachers, or observant philoso-

phers agree in saying that nothing is more difficult to man, than to emerge from an evil path in which he has long walked. And Christian moralists, who are the profoundest of all, affirm that human will alone is insufficient for such a task, and that a superhuman aid, the action of God upon the soul, is necessary to give repentance the power of bringing back man to regeneration.

Politicians, whether Christians or not, might apply the same language to the conduct of nations. It is much more difficult for them to practise self-reform than they imagine. When they have lived long under the empire of a particular passion, and either from natural impulse or the influence of their leaders, have adopted a certain line of conduct, it requires much time and many great efforts to enable even interest and necessity to surmount routine, and to draw them back decidedly and honestly into new roads.

It is perhaps in matters of external policy, and when justice and good sense are required to be introduced into the mutual relations of people, that the work of reform is most laborious and slow. "Such," says Adam Smith, "is the natural insolence of man's heart, that to attain the object of his desires, he never consents to employ good means until he has exhausted the bad ones." Even more naturally than insulated individuals, nations commence in their external relations, by arrogant violence. I am neither surprised nor do I complain, that power, advancement, grandeur, or glory should be their prevailing passion. The absence of either would indicate that they are sinking into the worst of all

egotisms—apathy. Nations, like individuals, are formed to live in society; and society means movement, emulation, and the developement of ideas, interests, and strength, either in concert or in contest. It is thus that during nineteen centuries Christianity has been founded and progressively established,—the most extensive as well as the most beautiful example of association amongst different states and people. But when I call this a beautiful example, I adopt a general definition, and think only of the established fact of the great Christian community, without considering the relative and reciprocal conduct of particular governments and nations. Although morally superior to all other historical associations, the policy of Christian states towards each other has hitherto closely bordered on barbarism; barbarism on the part of the spectators and actors, of the governors and the governed. Above all, it is beyond their frontiers, and through the splendour of war and the skill of negotiations, that the gross and ignorant passions of princes and nations have been displayed. The imperfection of government, always enormous, is more conspicuously evinced in the management of foreign than of domestic affairs. External policy has ever been the favourite theatre of brutal or injurious violence, of fraud, of improvident selfishness, and emphatic credulity. In none of their other functions have governments been so indifferent to good or evil,—so trifling, so obstinate, or chimerical. On no other subject have nations shown themselves so ignorant of their true rights and interests,—so ready to subside into mere instruments or dupes.

The French Revolution promised itself and the world the reform of this as of all other evils. When it declared, "No more wars, no more conquests,"—when it laid down as a principle that justice and morality ought to govern the relations of states with each other, as of citizens with every state,—it spoke sincerely, and really believed that it was advancing towards the end it proclaimed. But it was its destiny to bring into action at the same time the noblest aspirations and the worst passions of humanity, and to expiate its pride in falsehood and crime. It excited the most aggressive and unjust foreign policy that the world has ever known,—the policy of armed propagandism and indefinite conquest,—the overthrow, by war, of all European establishments, to raise upon their fall a general republic today, and tomorrow a universal monarchy. In this path, and in defiance of common sense and justice, the foreign policy of France continued to march from 1792 to 1814.

How and through whom did this struggle commence? Whence arose the provocation? What were, at the commencement, the mutual wrongs of France and Europe? What real or imaginary necessities justified, on either side, or at least accounted for, aggression or resistance? I do not pause to debate these questions, but confine myself to the dominant fact,—the essential character of the relations between France and Europe from 1792 to 1814; they were comprised in war, the war of revolution and conquest; an incessant attack upon the existence of governments and the independence of nations:

In 1814 France and Europe emerged from this de-

testable path; other maxims prevailed in the external policy of states. There was no longer question of a single sovereignty in Europe, or of the propagandism of ideas and institutions by arms. States very differently constituted and governed, absolute or constitutional monarchies, and small republics, tranquilly retained or resumed their places in the European association. War ceased to be the systematic vocation of governments and nations. We no longer saw territories and people change their names and rulers every two or three years. With peace and respect for traditionary rights, justice began once more to assume some empire over the foreign policy of Europe.

Much has been said against the two leading forces which from 1814 to 1830 exercised the greatest influence in carrying out this policy,—the Congress of Vienna at first, and afterwards the Holy Alliance. The organization which the first gave to Europe, and the sovereignty which the second pretended to maintain, have been severely criticized. I pass over these conflicting arguments. It is true that the Congress of Vienna, on more than one occasion, disposed arbitrarily of territories and their inhabitants, without much regard to their rights, their interests, or desires. The egotism of the great powers, flushed with recent victory, held a more prominent place in their deliberations than a free and lofty view of the necessities of European order. Their geographical and diplomatic combinations were not always just or fortunate. The Holy Alliance had an intense dread of the progress of political life and liberty in Europe. It exhibited a great abuse, and even a

greater display of the right of intervention in the affairs of foreign states, laying down as a general and permanent principle what was in fact nothing more than a momentary exception; an accident justified by some important, direct, and palpable interest. I do not assume the character of apologist, either of the Holy Alliance or of the Congress of Vienna: I merely notice two facts, misrepresented or passed over in silence by their enemies. All the reproaches heaped upon them were more deserved by the governments that had prevailed in Europe from 1792 to 1814. Much more violently and repeatedly than the Congress of Vienna, the Convention and the Emperor Napoleon I. had disposed of and partitioned states, countries, and people: at one moment, dethroning their kings; at another, imposing on them new sovereigns, and changing their laws or alliances as well as their political fortunes. Did not the Emperor Napoleon I. carry his right of intervention to the extent of wishing to curtail the entire commercial legislation of the European continent, and of finding in the shackles he imposed on the food and clothing of every family in every nation, arms and means for carrying on his struggle with England? I am aware of all that can be urged to defend, or at least to explain, the errors and outrages of that stormy epoch; I know also the benefits which, in the midst of so many sacrifices, it has conferred on France, and the good which has remained even after such heavy reverses. But the facts I bring forward are not the less certain. Good sense and justice require for all times equal indulgence or security; and in a general estimate, there was in Europe, after the

labours of the Congress of Vienna, and under the control of the Holy Alliance, more liberty and respect for public rights than during the rule of the Convention or of that of the Emperor Napoleon I.

In 1830, after the Revolution of July, the movement which exploded was, in respect to foreign policy, a direct return towards the practices of the earlier revolutionary and imperial epoch, a relapse into the war of propagandism and conquest ; a relapse still more inopportune and dangerous, that it was divested of every imposing and specious motive. France, as regarded foreign powers, had accomplished an act of the most complete and haughty independence ; and this act, so far from exposing her to any aggression or menace, was recognized and accepted by every state in Europe, with a readiness which marked, if not their goodwill, at least their prudence and desire of avoiding any important collision. Never was any line of policy less original, more founded on ancient impressions, and more destitute of the intelligence of the times, than that into which M. Mauguin, Général Lamarque, and their friends endeavoured to draw the new government. There was nothing in her position or general relations with Europe which could possibly entice France into such a course, and those who suggested it were prompted, either by the reminiscences of old-age or the apprehensions of childhood. A single idea, a solitary sentiment in the midst of the declamations of that period, retained some shadow of greatness. This was the vow which, independently of all direct or actual interest, France, in the fulfilment of a mission of civilization and liberty, imposed on herself throughout Europe.

of redressor of wrongs, protector of the oppressed, and patron of all just causes too weak to triumph by themselves. I am not amongst those who smile contemptuously at this pretension, and look upon it as pure folly. There is at present a state of associated feeling in the world, and, beyond the boundaries of national territory, many intimate ties, with rapid and continued relations, between different states. This desire for distant action, exercised with a view to advance the rights and interests of the various components of the great human family, has in it a certain degree of truth and power which demands serious consideration. The great politicians of the sixteenth century understood the mission of religious sentiments, and accorded to them much respect and influence. In our days, the sympathetic and liberal feelings of nations towards each other are entitled to receive from enlightened policy the same indulgence and circumspection.

But the advocates of this general apostleship of France in the service of humanity lose sight of a great duty, and a leading fact, which sound and moral policy should never forget. The duty is, that the first obligations of a government are towards its own particular nation, which has a right to expect from it good interior arrangements, impartial justice, prosperity, respect for privileges, wishes, and the ties of blood, before taking into the account external relations. The fact is, that armed intervention in the affairs of a foreign state scarcely ever turns to the profit of justice or liberty. Sometimes, this interference affords to a particular party a factitious and transient predominance, dividing a single people into

victors and vanquished ; at others, it revives national susceptibilities, elevates them above domestic quarrels, and rallies in one common cause the conquerors and conquered against the stranger who has thus divided them. In conclusion, the interposing power nearly always finds itself compelled, either to retreat in impotence before the obstinacy of the evil it desired to check, or to become itself the oppressor of the people it professed to succour.

National independence is a feeling so natural, powerful, and active, that the greatest care should be taken not to wound it, even when the appearances of the moment seem to court foreign interference, and to hold forth an easy success. M. Dupin interpreted this sentiment after an extreme fashion, when he said, " Every one at home ; every one for himself." Nations cannot practise this isolation and mutual indifference. But notwithstanding the coarseness of the expression, there is a great foundation of truth in the idea. When a nation has existed throughout ages, it personifies an individual whose historical egotism is legitimate and respectable ; a family which must be suffered to regulate its own affairs according to its own notions ; a house into which no stranger has a right to enter by force, even though he comes as the bearer of justice or liberty.

Force and war, moreover, are bad mediums for the establishment or propagation of right and freedom. Such advances can only be made effectually and safely by moral influences and the co-operation of time. The aspect and example of a well-ruled country have greater power than armies to disseminate the ideas and aspirations of good government. These are seeds which must

be sown and trusted to the wind, leaving to the soil on which they fall, and to its proprietors, the care of managing and cultivating them, according to their means and convenience.

The French Revolution and the Emperor Napoleon I. plunged a certain number of minds, and some of very superior qualities, into a feverish excitement, which soon becomes a moral, or, I was on the point of saying, a mental malady. They require stupendous, sudden, and strange events. They are incessantly employed in undoing and remodelling governments, nations, religions, society, Europe, and the world. They care little at what price; the grandeur of their design intoxicates them, and renders them indifferent to the means of action, blind to the chances of success. To listen to them, we should say they dispose of elements and ages; and as, according to the aspect of their ardent labour, we are struck with terror or inspired by hope, we are tempted to think ourselves verging on the last days of the world, or returning back to the bright dawn of creation.

I have said elsewhere, and I repeat it here, in the midst of this revolutionary resuscitation and these chimerical outflowings, it will ever be the glory of King Louis-Philippe to have comprehended and adopted a rational, regulated, patient, consistent, and pacific policy. The entire merit of this has been often attributed to his prudence and a skilful calculation of personal interest. This is a mistake. When prudence and interest are allowed an ample share, all is neither said nor explained. The idea of peace, in its full moral grandeur, had long before penetrated deeply into the heart and mind of the

King. The iniquity and misery which war inflicts on men, often from the most trifling motives and vain combinations, were revolting to his humanity and clear judgment. Amidst the grand social expectations—I will not call them the beautiful chimeras—in which the age and early education had cradled his youth, the idea of peace had impressed him more than any other, and continued predominant in his soul. In his eyes, peace was the true conquest of civilization, a duty equally imposed on him as man and king. In fulfilling this obligation he sought for self-satisfaction and honour, even more than he looked for security.

In the practice of moderation and prudence he by no means confined himself within a narrow or inactive sphere. At the same time that he maintained peace for France, and refused thrones for his family, he carried his action beyond our frontiers and maintained abroad the legitimate interests of French policy. Side by side with the principle of respect for treaties, he laid down and carried out another equally important,—respect for the independence of the states immediately contiguous to France, and which form her girdle,—Belgium, Switzerland, Piedmont, and Spain. M. Molé announced to Baron de Werther, that if Prussian soldiers entered Belgium, French troops would enter at the same time. M. de Rumigny, in Switzerland, and M. de Barante, at Turin, held the same language. Belgium, in fact, assumed laboriously, but without foreign opposition, its place amongst the European states. Switzerland accomplished freely in her domestic constitution the reforms which, right or wrong, she considered necessary.

Piedmont, far removed at that period from political innovations, closed up her strength against Austria, but without falling under her yoke, and negotiated carefully with France, whose hostility she dreaded, and whose support she might one day desire. The future epoch began already to show itself, in which Spain would require France to acknowledge and sustain its new political system. In every direction round our territory the government of King Louis-Philippe exercised its action, thrusting aside foreign intervention, and proving itself an effectual but unambitious protector of the independence of its neighbours, and of the security of France within her natural orbit. "We must," he often said, "balance causes and calculate distances: afar off, nothing calls upon us to implicate France; we may act or not, according to prudence and our national interests. Near us, at our gates, we are committed beforehand. We cannot allow the affairs of our immediate neighbours to be regulated by strangers, and without our interference."

To carry out this honest and judicious, but at the same time difficult policy, it was necessary to find a European resting-point. But even with the powers that ostensibly approved of it, there arose misunderstandings and doubts ever ready to mature into dangers. Sincere and active adhesion was indispensable. This was discovered in England; not at the price of any exclusive concession to British interests, or in virtue of any special or formal engagement, but by the most natural and binding of all ties,—conformity of political views. To secure peace and the undisturbed development of her liberties, France accepted, in its actual state, the

European system. To preserve order in Europe, and to avoid war, England acknowledged, not only the new French system, but its leading consequences in Europe: the fall of the kingdom of the Netherlands, the independence of Belgium, and the approaching dismemberment of the continental coalition, until then on guard against France. Both governments adopted the same general and predominant interest for the rule of their conduct. Both ranged themselves under the flag of constitutional government. Notwithstanding the ancient rivalry and recent combats of the two countries, this mutual understanding became easy, and almost indispensable, from their new relative position. The Tory cabinet, the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen, by their prompt acknowledgment of King Louis-Philippe, had opened the path, and would undoubtedly have continued to follow it. The Whig ministry, under Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston, pursued it with becoming eagerness. England, sympathizing warmly with France, prompted her minister; France, though a little surprised, followed her King.

Thus, in 1830, was formed, and such at that time was its character, the English alliance: an ill-chosen word, which expresses imperfectly the actual relations between the two governments. At a later period, indeed, they entered into a specific connection, at certain moments and for particular questions: in 1832, for the affairs of Belgium; and in 1834, for those of Portugal. But they had no general and permanent alliance; they were not bound to each other by solemn treaty; they acted frequently in concert, but with perfect liberty, and from the

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sole motive that they agreed in opinion. In our days, such a line of policy has proved itself not only natural, but in conformity with the public interests of France, for it has survived many revolutions and the most opposing obstacles. It was the policy of the ephemeral republic of 1848; it is now that of the new empire. Both these governments, in conformity with that of King Louis-Philippe, were desirous of peace, and accepted European order; and both, following the same example, have sought, in a friendly understanding with England, the pledge of tranquillity, and a secure basis from which to act efficaciously in European questions.

Before M. Casimir Périer entered on office, from August, 1830, to March, 1831 all these principles of the foreign policy of the new system had been pre-calculated and exercised. They had dictated decisive resolutions and acts. Within the cabinet, King Louis-Philippe employed all his influence and persevering address to cause them to be adopted and followed by the ministers most divided in opinion. In the Chambers, they were defended against the revolutionary or warlike declamations of M. Mauguin and General Lamarque, and the exuberant liberalism of M. de La Fayette; nevertheless, they were still rather confused, obscure, and fluctuating. They had only been superficially debated. The public had no clear intelligence of their full conditions and consequences. Above all, they had not yet undergone the trial of the great European struggles and explosions. It was under the ministry of M. Casimir Périer, in 1831 and 1832, that the peace policy was fairly confronted with that of war, and compelled to sur-

mount all the incidental temptations. It was thus that the Belgian, the Polish, and the Italian questions, each having reached its crisis, brought out the principles which had governed the foreign policy of the government of 1830, and exhibited them in brilliant light with all their inherent virtue.

With respect to the Belgian question, M. Casimir Périer was singularly fortunate. He acted in perfect concert with the three persons who exercised the leading influence in that matter,—King Louis-Philippe at Paris, King Leopold at Brussels, and M. de Talleyrand at London; and these three, by the natural turn of their characters and minds, agreed cordially with the policy which M. Casimir Périer had undertaken to render successful. It is the tendency of our age, even amongst enlightened spirits, to think slightly of personal actions, and to see in great events nothing beyond the general causes which regulate their course, without looking upon the individuals whose names are mixed up with them as more than swimmers carried away by the torrent, whether they resign themselves to its force or attempt resistance. It might be said that we are spectators of a drama entirely composed beforehand, and that we feed our vanity by treating the actors with contempt, as mere reciters of a prescribed part. Intelligent experience contradicts this false estimate of the powers which regulate the destinies of nations. The influence of individuals, of their personal thoughts and unbiassed desires, is much greater than the impertinent philosophy of some of their critics may be disposed to allow. History is not a drama arranged from its opening, and

the actors who appear in it, for the most part, create the characters they play, and the denouement to which they lead.

I happened to be at the Palais-Royal on the 17th of February, 1831, when the deputies from the Belgium Congress presented to King Louis-Philippe the decision of that assembly, which had elected his son, the Duke de Nemours, King of the Belgians. I was present at the audience accorded to them by the King, and heard him deliver his answer.¹ I shall not allude to the hesitation, for he had none, but to the suppressed wishes and sentiments which agitated his mind and revealed themselves in this reply. The gratified self-esteem of the sovereign to whom the desire of a nation offered another crown; the restrained regret of the father, who refused that crown for his son; the judicious appreciation of the true interests of France, sustained by the secret pleasure of comparing his refusal with the efforts of his most illustrious predecessors, Louis XIV. and Napoleon, to conquer the provinces which now voluntarily offered themselves to him; with an extensive feeling of goodwill towards Belgium, whose independence he promised to guarantee, after having declined her throne. And above all these varied thoughts and inward agitations, there was also the sincere and profound conviction that duty and prudence, patriotism as well as paternal affection, prescribed the line of conduct he had chosen and solemnly avowed. From that time forward, this language of the King, so strongly impressed with his personal ideas and sentiments, characterized even more

powerfully than the act itself the tone of his policy, and convinced his own ministers and the Belgian deputies, France and Europe, that he was determined to persevere in its practice.

The Prince who, through this refusal, ascended the throne of Belgium, was admirably suited to the difficult post he accepted. Consenting, rather than anxious to become a king, and mingling with ambition itself a degree of patient moderation, which seemed to approach indifference; a sagacious observer of national character, and perfectly acquainted with Europe, her sovereigns and their advisers, with the dispositions of men and the relations of states; he excelled in the art of conciliating different or opposing interests, and knew as well how to wait for the favoured moment, as to seize it when presented. Scarcely elected King, and while the limits of his dominions were yet under discussion, he immediately secured their basis. A German by descent, and English by adoption, he became French by alliance, through his marriage with the Princess Louise, eldest daughter of King Louis-Philippe. By this step, he found himself, on the outset, in close, natural, and legitimate connection with all his most powerful neighbours, and armed with serious or specious motives for refusing or acceding, according to circumstances, to the different exactions which each, in their respective interests, might be inclined to propose. Superficial minds affect to despise these family bonds between sovereigns, and to hold them as nothing in the destiny of states. A strange indication of ignorance! Such ties are undoubtedly neither infallibly decisive nor invariably salutary. But all history,

ancient and modern, and our own in particular, is ready in evidence to demonstrate their importance, and the advantage which able policy may derive from them.

M. de Talleyrand, in London, maintained by his personal co-operation, and with a sincere desire of success, the policy he had been commissioned to negotiate. It suited his position and his tastes, being at once French and European. However devoted he might be to his personal ambition and fortune, he had never been indifferent to the interests, the security, or the greatness of France. In his character, patriotism and selfishness marched side by side; he willingly looked for his personal advancement in the success of the national policy. With equal satisfaction and zeal, he laboured to dismember, during the Conference of London, that same kingdom of the Netherlands, which, in 1814, the European coalition had created in opposition to France. He enjoyed at the same time the satisfaction of promoting, by this work, the cause of European order, and of acting in it, with the concurrence, sad and reluctant, it is true, but seriously resigned of the same powers who, at Vienna in 1815, had consecrated the very organization of Europe, which now it became necessary to overthrow. Professional diplomatists constitute in Europe a distinct society, which has its peculiar maxims, lights, manners, and desires, and maintains in the midst of the disagreements or positive conflicts of the states it represents, a tranquil and permanent unity. The interests of nations are ever in presence there, but not their prejudices or passions of the moment; and it is quite possible that the general desire of the great European association

to overcome difficulties, and to advance the success of a uniform policy, may be as clearly acknowledged and as strongly felt in this little diplomatic world, by men who for a long time have maintained different views, but have never disagreed amongst themselves, and have always lived together in the same atmosphere, and at a similar elevation of the horizon.

Such was, in 1830 and 1831, the Conference of London, and M. de Talleyrand assumed his post there with great freedom of action and language, almost as much from his natural temperament as for the interest of his sovereign, and with the same ease as that with which we enter our own houses in familiar society. Such a disposition of the minds, and such cold but real intimacy of the selected European diplomatists, was quite essential to the pacific solution of the Belgian question, and to dissipate the clouds which, from the most opposite points, threatened at every moment to darken into war. It was alternately the outbreaks in Paris, the menacing ebullitions of the opposition in our Chambers, the pretensions and ill-timed bravadoes of the Belgians, joined to the intractable obstinacy of the King of Holland, that conveyed not only anxiety unto the bosom of the Conference, but impressed doubt and hesitation on the work it had in hand. One of the most judicious of my own friends, attached to our embassy in London, wrote to me thus:—
 “ We are personally well situated here, and shall continue to be equally so in our official capacities, if good order maintains itself in France. There is an excellent disposition towards the King and his government; but we cannot efface from the public mind that the revolu-

tionary propagandism which threatens everybody, has become permanent with us, and is not sufficiently repressed. . . . We do all that zeal and experience can effect to simplify the external question ; in general, it is little known and understood in France. Our journals speak in utter ignorance of the possible and impossible, and too often confound them. They have not appreciated, as regards Belgium, either the difficulties or the advantages at first of the armistice, and afterwards of the independence. We shall speedily see what they will say of the neutrality so laboriously obtained, and so contested by Prussia. Statesmen here, to whatever party they may belong, look upon it as quite sufficient to satisfy reasonable France. This neutrality levels thirteen opposing fortresses, renders it more difficult to commence war against us, and takes from us, on our part, all pretext for declaring hostilities ourselves. Our bullies of the boulevards will take it in ill part ; but all well-disposed spirits will be perfectly content. The latter, unfortunately, are weak in numbers. But in the great game of politics we should work for history alone."

I know not whether M. de Talleyrand thought exclusively of history while negotiating the Belgian question at London ; but he displayed in that matter firm and judicious ability. It was, as I have already said, his natural bent, in all public affairs in which he was employed, to disentangle and arrange the essential end in view, and to attach himself to it exclusively, disdaining and sacrificing all other considerations, even the most serious, which might weaken him in the position he assumed, or turn him from the point he desired to reach.

From 1830 to 1832 he adopted this method at London, in an extended sense. As representative of a country and government on which, at that period, a crowd of important considerations pressed heavily, he saw in the affairs of France nothing but the Belgian question; and in that a single interest,—the independence and neutrality of Belgium. He treated lightly the other problems and events of the day,—Poland, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland; sometimes preserving on these subjects total silence; at others, freely delivering his opinion, and always without entering on useless controversy with the other diplomatists his colleagues. For the true interest of France, he acted wisely. Belgium was at that moment the leading and most profitable affair in our foreign relations; the point, on which a certain, immediate, and moderately purchased result could be obtained, important in its own strength, and in its bearing on the security of Europe. In concentrating all his efforts on the Belgian question, M. de Talleyrand formed a correct estimate of the general state of politics, and advantageously served his own country.

By re-establishing order and strengthening power in internal government, M. Casimir Périer seconded external policy in the most effectual manner. He was moreover, both on the importance of the English alliance and the Belgian question in particular, as well as on the general affairs of Europe, not only in accord, but in full confidence with M. de Talleyrand, and both were sedulous to continue and increase that mutual understanding by reciprocal and brilliant proofs. M. Périer, who wrote very few letters, highly extolled in conversation the ser-

vices of M. de Talleyrand, and employed his eldest son, at that time secretary to the embassy at London, when he had occasion to explain to the ambassador the exigencies of his internal government and to arrange measures in concert. M. de Talleyrand, on his part, elevated to a high degree in the estimation of the representatives of Europe, the energy, political wisdom, and other merits of M. Casimir Périer, omitting no opportunity of conveying to himself with his consummate mastery in the art of pleasing, the great esteem he entertained for him.

When the French army suddenly entered Belgium in August, 1831, to drive out the victorious Hollanders, a lively emotion was excited amongst the diplomatists in London, and M. de Talleyrand had some trouble in calming down mistrust and restraining discontent. When informing M. Casimir Périer of his success, he concluded his despatch with these words:—"I hope, Sir, you will be satisfied with my conduct." I remember well the slight emotion of gratified pride with which the minister showed that letter to me, and doubtless to others at the same time.

In other respects, in his indirect relations with M. de Talleyrand, he maintained considerable reserve, from a desire of not wounding the feelings of General Sébastiani, on whom he relied, and who seconded him loyally.

By the close of April, 1832, after eighteen months of discussion in the London Conference, and of negotiations between the seven Powers who were represented there or took an interest in the proceedings; after patient delays and repeated attempts to effect a voluntary conciliation between the demands of the Belgians and the

obstinacy of the King of Holland, the question was at length determined as far as Europe in general was concerned. The cabinet of Brussels accepted the twenty-four articles agreed on by the Conference on the 15th of October, 1831, to regulate the separation of Belgium from Holland. The cabinets of Paris and London, acting more and more in concert, had ratified these articles on their own account, without waiting for the final adhesion of the three Northern Powers. Count Orloff, despatched to the Hague by the Emperor Nicholas to induce the King of Holland to yield, had failed in his efforts, and had departed on his return to St. Petersburg, assuring King William that the Emperor, his brother-in-law, would in future leave Holland to bear alone the consequences of her obstinacy, and oppose no obstacle whatever to the measures which the Conference of London might adopt to constrain the Dutch sovereign's compliance. This was, on the part of the Emperor Nicholas, a remarkable sacrifice of family ties, and of his own personal feelings, to the peace of Europe.

Following this declaration, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, with a few reservations of simple convenience, ratified the treaty of the twenty-four articles. But it could scarcely be said still that the work was accomplished, for the King of Holland persisted in rejecting the treaty, and everything indicated that force alone would extort his consent. But the success of France was secured; her government, that is to say, King Louis-Philippe and M. Casimir Périer, thinking and acting in concert, whatever might be their domestic differences, had caused the independence and new institutions of Belgium to be

acknowledged and accepted by Europe, equally with that of their own country. It was without general commotion, without war, and by the sole empire of justice and sound sense universally admitted, that this important change in the order of Europe had been accomplished. An example and spectacle even more imposing than the result itself which was thus obtained.

It would have been a great happiness and honour for Europe if the Polish question could have been treated and settled in 1831, after the same mode. There has ever been, and there is still, in the destiny of Poland, a remarkable and exclusive characteristic. Conquests and dismemberments of states have abounded in Europe; provinces and kingdoms have repeatedly changed masters and names; treaties have succeeded wars; time has hallowed treaties; territorial and national changes, in spite of original bitterness, have been consecrated by peace and the lapse of years, and accepted, not only by indifferent spectators, but by the very people that have been compelled to undergo their yoke. Nothing like this has happened to Poland. Before long, a century will have rolled over since the first partition of that unhappy country. I know not how many diplomatic acts have acknowledged its new masters. Events of immense importance have changed the destiny and absorbed the interest of Europe. In the midst of so many iniquities and fresh misfortunes, the fate of Poland has never ceased to be acknowledged and felt as a European crime and calamity. It was the murder of a whole nation, as her friends have said, with terrible truth. In vain have their adversaries replied that Poland herself, her detestable in-

stitutions, her blind quarrels, her execrable anarchy, led to her overthrow, and that national suicide provoked foreign assassination. The explanations of history are not judicial sentences, and argument avails nothing against the strong sentiment of public conviction. For more than sixty years Poland has ceased to figure amongst nations, and as often as the nations of Europe rise in agitation, Poland also begins to stir. Is it a phantom, or a people? I cannot say. Poland may be dead, but she is not forgotten.

By the side of this arresting fact, I have remarked another no less extraordinary :—Since the conscience of Europe has been disturbed by the fate of Poland, important changes have been accomplished. Many powerful and different authorities have disposed of nations. Monarchy or republic, conqueror or congress, none have ever seriously attempted to call back Poland from her grave, or to heal this European wound. At the moment when this murder was committed, neither old France nor old England raised an arm to prevent it; new France and new England have not acted with more efficacy. The re-establishment of Poland never entered into the real or sincere designs of the French Revolution or the Emperor. Words have been uttered, perspectives have been opened, devotion has been called into brilliant display by exciting hopes, but nothing more. Extreme misfortune alone has infused some transitory illusions into all these falsehoods. The whole world has made use of Poland, but no one has ever assisted her.

The course of history, so replete with the calamities of nations, presents no example of a similar conquest, or

of a similar position when conquest has been achieved. It is not simply a defeated opponent in presence of his conqueror; in Poland there is one vanquished and three victors. Three victors included amongst the most powerful states of Europe, and ever united by one enduring interest, in defence of their conquest, still common, though divided. The beaten party is situated at the extremity of Europe, unable to find sympathy or support, except from an immense distance, and through the possessions of its subduers. As regards the most formidable of the three conquerors, Russia, the preservation of her part of Poland is not only a question of government, an interest of the sovereign, but a national passion. The Russian people are even more resolved than the Emperor that Poland shall not escape from their dominion. Amongst ill-fated nations, Poland labours under the peculiar misfortune of having been too extensive, and even at this day, in her ruin, her destiny continues too important. When the defeated Goths in the mountains of the Asturias, and the small Greek colonies in Epirus, Peloponnesus, and Thessaly, struggled for ages against the Arabs and Turks, their resistance, though sad and glorious, was simple and restricted. These broken fragments of a nation aspired only to maintain, in some remote corners of their land, a vestige of nationality and local independence. Providence rewarded their courage by finally elevating their destiny. But these unassuming heroes fought and suffered long without pretension, solely for their faith and their obscure homes. The Poles, on the contrary, whenever they rise up in insurrection, must excite, and cannot do otherwise than call

into action a great national and European struggle. The Polish question throws into the balance the peace and organization of collected Europe.

I am not surprised that all the governments which have deplored the fate of Poland, and have expressed towards her their warmest sympathy, have not the less looked upon her re-establishment as impossible, and have never seriously attempted that enterprise. They would have found, on their own responsibility, and at the cost of their individual nation, too much strength to engage, and too many interests to compromise, in such an undertaking.

In 1830 the Poles obtained a chance from which they might have drawn an important advantage if they had better estimated their position, and more sensibly regulated their ambition and strength. During and after the Congress of Vienna, the Emperor Alexander, with that mixture of moral greatness, Russian ambition, and visionary fancy which marked his character, secured to them a national existence, institutions, liberties, and rights: rights acknowledged, not only in their own country and by their sovereign, but in Europe, and by the powers that guaranteed the maintenance of the European system. That these institutions and liberties, confined exclusively to Russian Poland, were insufficient to satisfy national patriotism; that even where they were proclaimed in 1815, they had since been repeatedly forgotten or violated by the Russian government; that Poland had constitutional grievances to set forward, at the same time that she had national regrets to endure, are questions I shall neither dispute nor examine. I

confine myself to a single fact. A great portion of the Polish nation had a charter, a point of departure and base in their career of free, public life. If they had attached themselves to that as their sheet-anchor; if they had paraded or defended it as their inherited field; if they had manifested, to preserve, exercise, resume, or extend their legal rights, the energy and devotion they exhibited in attempting, under the most unpromising conditions, revolutionary success;—I know not what efforts they might have been condemned to make, what sufferings to undergo, or to how many years of struggle and expectation they must have resigned themselves; but, beyond all doubt, they would have effected more with their own sovereign, and would have excited sympathies in Europe, perhaps even assistance, more beneficial than the disturbances in the streets of Paris; and would have established an infinitely better chance of resuming their rank amongst nations.

This is not the empty dream of a foreigner, after the event. In November, 1830, when the Polish insurrection broke out, it was not only the opinion but the conduct of the first chief they elected themselves, and who, three months after, was unanimously chosen dictator, with the exception of a single voice, by the Polish Diet. Still young, Joseph Chlopicki had fought before for the independence of his country, and the patriot-hero of Poland, Kosciusko, moved by his bravery, had enthusiastically embraced him in front of the army. When Poland ceased to exist, Chlopicki, with a determination not to serve his new masters, sought military employment in France, and rose from rank to rank until he became a

highly distinguished general-officer in the Grand Army of Napoleon. Returning to his own country after the peace of 1814, he was treated with marked favour by the Emperor Alexander; but too proud to bend to the government of the Viceroy of Poland, the Grand Duke Constantine, he tendered his resignation from the service, and lived in retirement, until, first, the desire of the army and the revolted patriots, and afterwards the National Diet, conferred on him the supreme command. He accepted the post without hesitation, and immediately employed his power to repress the popular movement, while ardently sustaining the national aspirations. He shut up the clubs at Warsaw, maintaining order in the city and discipline in the army, and addressed a letter to the Emperor Nicholas, laying before him with candid firmness the desires and grievances of Russian Poland, and demanding for his country justice and hope. "In my character of an old soldier and a true Pole," said he, "I venture, Sire, to declare the truth. By an unprecedented concurrence of circumstances, the nation, finding itself in a position perhaps too daring, is not the less prepared to make every sacrifice for the first of all causes,—national independence and moderate liberty. May our destiny be accomplished! And may you, Sire, fulfilling the promises of your predecessor, prove to us that your reign is but an uninterrupted continuance of the reign of him who restored life to a part of ancient Poland. Sire, you hold at your disposal the destinies of an entire nation. By a single word you can raise us to the summit of happiness, or precipitate us into an abyss of misery."¹

¹ See *Historic Documents*, No. IX.

I have nothing to say on the events that followed this letter. I am not writing the history of the time ; I merely review the part I took in it, and what I thought and felt while these occurrences were passing round me. Nine months later, when revolutionary intemperance had gained the ascendancy in Poland ; when the dictator Chlopicki, too wise to be controlled by the clubs of Warsaw, resigned his power ; when General Skrzynecki, less judicious in policy, but his worthy successor in the command of the Polish army, had yielded in a hopeless struggle, after the massacres perpetrated in Warsaw, on the eve of its destruction, by the unchained license of popular fury ; when Warsaw and Poland had fallen again under the power of Russia ; while Chlopicki, severely wounded at the battle of Grochow, where he had fought in the ranks as a private soldier, was living unnoticed at Cracow, whither he had retired ;—M. Mauguin, during one of our debates in the Chamber on foreign affairs, spoke of Generals Chlopicki and Skrzynecki as chiefs of a timid and wavering party, who had opposed the national sentiment, and would willingly have accepted the pure restoration of Russian despotism. I protested against this language. “ It is,” I said, “ an insult to apply such terms to these two brave generals. The struggle was not between them and the national party, but with the clubs of Warsaw. They had no desire for the return of Russian autocracy ; but they had the good sense to understand that the contest between Poland and Russia was unequal, and that under this enormous disadvantage, it might have been useful to their country to preserve a chance, and some grounds for negotiation.”

I have never held any personal intercourse whatever with these two valiant Polish leaders; but their cause and sentiments received my anxious sympathy, and it gratifies me to remember now that I had an opportunity of expressing it.

It has been said that the French government deceived the Poles by leading them to expect support, which was never given or intended. Facts utterly disprove this charge. During the first days of the insurrection, the consul of France at Warsaw, M. Raymond Durand, declared to several members of the diet that they were not to expect from his government either help or encouragement. Six weeks later, towards the end of January, 1831, the Duke de Mortemart, appointed ambassador extraordinary at St. Petersburg, repaired to his post. "At Berlin," says M. de Nouvion,¹ "he learned that the Diet of Poland had adopted a proposition for the dethronement of the Emperor Nicholas and the family of Romanoff. At some distance beyond that capital, he encountered, in the midst of a forest, the agents of the new government of Warsaw, who had interrupted his route, to question him on the dispositions of France. It was during the night, and under a piercing cold. The conference, which began in the snow, ended in the carriage of the ambassador, while still in progress, and the lanterns of which alone gave light to this strange scene. "My instructions," said M. de Mortemart, "do not au-

¹ 'History of the Reign of Louis-Philippe I.,' by Victor de Nouvion, vol. ii., pp. 189, 192; a work as much to be recommended for the truth of its historical sketches as for the honesty of its political sentiments. The Duke de Mortemart has assured me that the details contained in the recital of M. de Nouvion are perfectly correct.

thorize me to act in favour of the kingdom of Poland, except as constituted by the Congress of Vienna. If the Poles exceed that, they will have nothing to expect from the assistance of France." He pointed out to them how France, in contempt of the principles proclaimed by herself, could not, by supporting the pretensions of Poland, provoke Europe to a bitter and hopeless war, and urged the Polish negotiators to return with all speed to Warsaw, and prevent violent measures. But far from yielding to his advice, these envoys exhibited the utmost confidence in the co-operation they expected from France."

"The French democracy," said they, "will control events, and sustain Poland. Your King and your Chambers will be compelled by public opinion to come to our aid;" and they then named M. de La Fayette as the pivot on which their hopes were founded. M. de Mortemart endeavoured in vain to undeceive them by representing that M. de La Fayette did not dispose of France, and that the French government, even if it had the desire, would find it impossible to send them an army. While he still continued to impress on them the necessity of restraining their countrymen within moderate limits, he could only obtain this answer, "The lot is cast; it will be all or nothing." "Well, then," replied M. de Mortemart, "I tell you with sorrow, but with a profound conviction, it will be nothing."

Some months later, in July, 1831, when Poland, after heroic efforts, was on the point of falling under the contest which she had herself made a struggle for life or death, the French cabinet, to stop the effusion of blood, and to afford an evidence of sympathy to the Poles, as

well as to gratify in some degree the feeling in France, made an effort at mediation with the court of St. Petersburg, informing the government of Warsaw at the same time, and requiring it to attach some importance to this step, in its language, as also in the conduct of the war. At the official instance of M. Casimir Périer, M. de Talleyrand also attempted in London, probably without much hope of success, to induce the English cabinet to co-operate with that of France. But in speaking of these measures in the Chamber of Deputies, M. Casimir Périer took care to explain their bearing, and to prevent any idea that the King's government intended to commit itself further. "Before the 13th of March," said he, "no mediation whatever had been proposed for Poland. We recommended the King to offer his as the first. The allies have been urged to join in arresting the contest, and in securing for Poland conditions of nationality under better guarantees. These negotiations are still in progress; we watch them with anxiety, for blood flows, danger presses, and victory is not always faithful. To what other means, gentlemen, could we have recourse? Were we called upon, as we have heard it said, to acknowledge Poland? Even supposing that the faith of treaties, and respect for our foreign relations, had left us the right of this recognition, it would have been illusory, unless followed up by decisive measures, and these would have led to inevitable war. I appeal to the reason of this Chamber, for here it is not emotion or enthusiasm, but reason that must decide. Would France have been justified in seeking war? Ought she to recommence that gigantic campaign in which Napoleon lost his fortune? Have those

who call for this war reflected on its consequences? It will be a war throughout the whole extent of the European continent; a universal contest, the object of so many insane ambitions and chimerical passions. At least we might expect that this heroic crusade would save Poland! But, gentlemen, this would not be the consequence. If France were to lay aside her neutrality, other powers would follow the example, and four days' march alone separate their armies from that capital which defends itself at a distance of four hundred leagues from us. In the face of such facts, who then will venture to call for war,—not to save, but to destroy Poland?"

These words had scarcely been pronounced when the English cabinet, asserting with unceremonious candour the advantage of peace, the general policy of England, and the fruitlessness of any official interference at St. Petersburg, refused to join in the proposed mediation of the French ministry. Eight days after, Warsaw fell into the hands of its demagogues, and in three weeks more succumbed to the power of Russia. Events travelled more rapidly than despatches. The Poles had no ground for complaining that they were not supported by the government of King Louis-Philippe; he never gave them any right to rely on his assistance.

Nevertheless, I can understand that they were deceived, and that the most formal declarations of the French cabinet and their agents failed to disabuse them. The journals and disturbances of Paris; the conversation and correspondence of the greater part of the leaders of the opposition plunged them into serious delusions. Even

when convinced that King Louis-Philippe and his ministers could not assist them by declaring war, they persisted in believing, as they said to the Duke de Mortemart, that the existing cabinet would be overthrown, and the opposition, succeeding to power, would act effectively in their behalf. Appearances and superficial probabilities were well calculated to inflame their passions and hopes. People who cry aloud in the Chambers and in the streets, care little for the consequences of the tumult they raise, and the consternation they lead to on the part of suffering people at the other extremity of Europe. There was also in the public demonstrations in France, in behalf of Poland, something more than mere appearances and clamour. The national feeling was sincerely and vehemently excited. A friend of mine, a man of rare intelligence, and a zealous supporter of M. Casimir Périer, wrote to me from the interior of his department on the 29th of June, 1831, at the precise moment when, after the deaths of Marshal Diebitsch and the Grand Duke Constantine, Marshal Paskiewitch assumed the command of the Russian army, and prepared for the assault of Warsaw. His letter ran thus:—"The state of the public mind engages my attention. I have seen it rapidly changed for the worse within a month. I no longer recognize this country as compared with what it was at the commencement of May. There was then improvement, not from what it had been in October last, but from February to April. At present, there is a mixture of irritation and despondency,—of fear and the necessity of action. It is a disease of the imagination which can neither justify nor explain itself, but appears to me

of a very serious character. Minds seem entirely in a revolutionary state, looking forward to a change or a crisis, which they expect and call for, without any one being able to say for what. It is essential, on your own account, that you should endeavour to find and repeat to the government the necessity of discovering some remedy for this evil. Paris appears to have rallied into an energetic sentiment of resistance; but the departments are not in accordance with that feeling. I cannot too strongly entreat you to reflect that we are not at present under the dominion of reason, when the rational means of the representative system are sufficiently efficacious. Do not rely too much on the authority of the Chamber, even if it were sound, but seek elsewhere. I am convinced that a war would be advantageous, always understood that we could limit its extent. I should be disposed to risk this by demanding much for Poland, which is infinitely more popular than Belgium. Why? Because it is more dramatic. For the moment, France is disposed to indulge in the sentimental, rather than in the rational style."

This letter treated of a real evil, and marked its distinct character; but so far from a cure, the proposed remedy would have operated as an aggravation. In this unsettled condition of public feeling, this necessity for movement war,—and, above all, a war in support of Poland—would have led to a state of active, positive revolution, with all its demands and consequences. War, at certain moments, may be a profitable vent for the agitated humour of a nation; but it is a resource always dearly purchased, and not invariably applicable.

On any European question raised by the revolution of 1830, France could not, in 1831, have entered on an ordinary and limited war. And a contest that must assume revolutionary features would have been the more dangerous, as France could not have long carried it on with ardour and confidence. She was not impelled to this course by any just and evident necessity, by any national or permanent advantage. The impression of the moment, and the pleasure of theatrical display, would speedily have disappeared before the injury of many interests and the light of sound judgment. Nations that wish to be well managed, must cease to make their impulses and dramatic tastes the rule of their government. They are sometimes afflicted, as are individuals, by what medical art denominates a complaint of the nerves, and vapours. Under free institutions these tendencies exhibit themselves boisterously, and intelligent policy deals considerably with them, but according to their true symptoms, well knowing that they are unsuited for long and energetic action. In almost all cases, whether of nations or single persons, this malady ought to be met by the only convenient remedies,—time and a consistent regimen. M. Casimir Périer had the merit of resisting these passing fantasies, which were not true passions, and of persisting to govern France according to public rights and acknowledged interests, as a man of serious thought conducts the affairs of a reflecting people.

Although he authorized the boldest act of French foreign policy since 1830, the Italian question was, in 1831, far less dangerous for the ministry than that of

Belgium or Poland, and created inferior excitement in the public mind. The two ideas which at the present day control and inflame this subject—the expulsion of Austria and the union of Italy—had not then declared themselves. They existed in the recesses of many hearts, and were made manifest in the language and secret efforts of the Italian conspirators, who as yet suppressed all public declaration of this as their end. I postpone what I have to say on the general state of Italy, and the feeling of Europe on that subject, until it displayed itself in full strength during my personal administration from 1846 to 1848. In this place I propose to speak only of the position of Italian affairs in 1831 and 1832, of the opinion entertained of them by the French cabinet, of how our government acted, and of the part I took myself in the incidental debates.

At that time, at the opposite extremities of Italy, and in the two States the most closely connected with France, whether by contiguity of territory or relationship of their sovereigns,—in Piedmont and Naples,—there were no symptoms of flagrant revolt or of evidently approaching explosion. The King of Naples, Ferdinand II., who had ascended the throne since the revolution of July, and was in affectionate communication with King Louis-Philippe and Queen Marie-Amélie, his uncle and aunt, seemed disposed to adopt their advice, and to introduce reforms into his government. The King of Sardinia, Charles Felix, had beheld the events of 1830 in France with great inquietude, but without any hostile feeling towards the new king. The two sovereigns were personally acquainted. Queen Marie-Amélie was in con-

stant correspondence with Queen Maria-Christina, her sister. When the new ambassador of France, M. de Barante, arrived at Turin, he found there an extensive dread of revolutionary movements, but no mistrust of the French government. It was not believed that the latter had any disposition to excite or support commotions in Italy. While relying upon Austria, the Piedmontese cabinet maintained towards that power her attitude and sentiment of independence and reserve. It had received coldly, without absolute rejection, the offers of assistance which Prince Metternich had hastened to propose against revolutions, and was resolved to live on good terms with the France of 1830 and her government.

On their side, the Piedmontese liberals, even the *Carbonari*, accustomed, since their check in 1821, to precaution and silence, attempted no movement. They approached M. de Barante rather from curiosity than in the hope, or even in the design of leading him to their views. The outline of a proclamation was printed in a proof-sheet and shown to him, much more with the object of learning what he would say, than officiously to give him information. He and I were in intimate correspondence. On the 8th of February, 1831, he wrote to me as follows, with a sagacity vindicated by subsequent events:—"This country is calm. The government is uneasy, but not under the necessity of taking any decided step. The chances of a Jacobin and Carbonaro movement appear to recede. The probabilities of a rapid progress gain more ground in general opinion. All eyes are fixed on us. The absolutists, who wish to engage at

once in contest, and are made up of chimeras, may be reckoned by individuals. The men in high employment, the elder nobility who have passed the age of fifty, and the King himself, desire no more than the *status quo*, administered wisely, and with consideration for all classes. The younger aristocracy say that the revolution ought to come from the higher powers, to forestal the movement of the lower orders; they dream of great reforms. Others of this class go much further, and almost wish to march at an equal pace with us. They do not as yet set much value here on the opinion of the Third Estate, which has, nevertheless, nearly as much influence as in France. It is used more and more from day to day, without being acknowledged or understood. Herein lies, in my opinion, the most likely pledge of a revolution. A social reform has to be made, and this is rarely effected by royal decrees."

The death of King Charles Felix, which occurred on the 27th of April, 1831, and the accession of Charles Albert, his successor, led to no change in Piedmont, either in the government or the country. From 1830 to 1832, the portion of Italy under the sway of sovereigns of the house of Bourbon remained tranquil, and in friendly relations with France of 1830 and her new sovereign.

It was in the smaller states possessed by princes of the house of Austria, and in the Papal territories,—at Modena, Parma, Bologna, and Ancona,—that the insurrection burst forth. Prince Metternich openly proclaimed the conduct that Austria would adopt under these circumstances. To place her own Italian possessions be-

yond the influence of the revolutionary flame, by extinguishing it in those of her neighbours ; to protect the princes of the house of Austria,* and the Italian potentates who demanded her aid against the revolutions attempted in their own lands ;—such was his doctrine and firm resolution, publicly announced. M. de Metternich was at the same time a practical politician with defined views, and a theorist upon wise maxims. With too elevated a mind not to understand the wants and dispositions of human nature, he was ever solicitous to array his acts under a grand intellectual standard. He advanced without hesitation towards his practical object, but allowed his adversaries and allies the gratification or embarrassment of arguing philosophically on the road. On the right of intervention in certain cases, and with specific limitations, he laid down principles which the French government was unable to recognize ; for it had recently expressed, in regard to Belgium, opinions apparently opposite, but without being quite prepared to defend them ; having also resolved to interpose in the proceedings of her neighbours, if they evidently and seriously affected the interests of France. General principles have almost invariably the defect of not being sufficient to embrace all facts, or capable of application to all cases ; thus they usually supply arms for discussion rather than rules of conduct. Prince Metternich despatched Austrian troops to Modena and Bologna, in the name of the right of interference according to his definition ; but promptly withdrew them as soon as the insurrections were quelled, which required but little time and slight exertion. M. Casimir Périer maintained the

principle of non-intervention, disavowing at the same time "that any reciprocal contract resulted from thence with the insurrections of other countries, and that the support afforded by France to her neighbours of Belgium established between her and more distant nations no mutual obligation whatever of a similar nature." The two ministers were anxious to protect the interests of their own countries, and to maintain the peace of Europe; while discussing these points, they mutually tolerated or aided each other in working out their double end.

But it was evident that as long as the Italian states in which the insurrection had exploded, and above all the Papal dominions, remained in the same internal condition, revolt would incessantly recur, leading to the necessity of intervention, and compromising the peace of Europe. There is an extent of bad government which nations, whether great or small, educated or ignorant, will not, in these days, endure. In the midst of much immoderate and undefined ambition continually fermenting, it constitutes their honour and the security of advancing civilization, that they demand from the ruling powers, a measure of justice, sound judgment, enlightened views, and care for the common interest far beyond that which formerly sufficed to maintain the existing state of society. The authorities who cannot comprehend this actual condition of their vitality, and are incapable of meeting it, will pass alternately from fever to atony, trembling ever on the verge of ruin. Struck by this necessity of the age, and strongly urged by France, the great powers of Europe endeavoured also to impress their conviction on the court of Rome; recommending the

necessary reforms in administration, if not to satisfy the desires of the Italian liberals, at least to remove their strongest causes of complaint, and diminish their credit with the popular masses. The representatives of France, Austria, England, Prussia, and Russia, at Rome, adopted a defined and concerted measure on the 21st of May, 1831, indicating clearly to the Pope the principal reforms, the necessity of which Europe recognized and counselled him to adopt.¹

The French ambassador at Rome, at that time, happened to be one of my intimate friends, the Count de Sainte-Aulaire; a man singularly adapted by his disposition and personal sentiments to the mission with which he was charged. He was not only highly honourable and accomplished, but a sincere Catholic and liberal, equally moderate and determined. In the advice he suggested to the court of Rome in the name of France, there was as much respect and goodwill for the Pope, as zeal in favour of the Roman people, and anxiety for the amelioration of their government. If there was a rock against which he required to be on his guard, it was excess of frankness in the successive expression of the feelings by which he was animated, and in the alternate defence of the different interests he was called on to conciliate. By supporting in turn, and according to the exigency of the moment, sometimes the Papal government against immoderate pretences and hostile practices; at others, the wishes of the Roman people, and the reforms he required for them in opposition to the prejudices or obstinacy of their rulers,—he sometimes gave way to exuberant

¹ See Historic Documents, No. X.

enthusiasm in the cause he advocated at the moment, without reflecting sufficiently on that which he might have to defend on the following day, or on the effect his different speeches might produce on the public, either of France or Italy, to whom they were reported. He was ever thoroughly sensible and loyal, but not always sufficiently provident and cautious. A noble error, which would have led to no difficulty if the greater part of the other political actors, Italians or Frenchmen, had been as free from after-thoughts as M. de Sainte-Aulaire; and if the policy of all the European powers on the Italian question had evinced the same decisive tone as that of the French cabinet and its ambassador at Rome in 1831.

But it was not so. The popular leaders in France sought in the affairs of Italy anything but the reform of the Roman government; and in the estimation of many of the Italian liberals, that reform possessed no value except as it prepared instead of forestalling, a revolution and a national war. On their side, the European powers were far from unanimous accord in their views. Prince Metternich, as I think, scarcely believed in the success of the intended reforms, and the Emperor Nicholas was opposed to them. In the eyes of the one they were mere dreams; in the estimation of the other, direct attacks on the rights and authority of a sovereign. They had acceded to the proposals made to the Pope, from prudence, at a threatening moment; and principally through respect for France and England, whose liberal tendency they dreaded and hoped to restrain by apparent concurrence. But in their hearts they had neither confidence in, nor predilection for the cause they adopted.

Nothing is more imprudent or more productive of embarrassment in great affairs than acts not seriously meant, and the success of which the originators neither desire nor expect. Good appearances without effect are fatal to sound policy, and futile remedies aggravate the disease they appear intended to cure. To escape from internal difficulties and diplomatic misunderstandings through complaisance rather than conviction, reforms had been demanded from the court of Rome. There was little anxiety evinced at first to ascertain whether they were practicable or sufficient, and afterwards whether they were carried into effect. A demonstration was required, rather than a result. The demonstration weakened the Pope, and the result dissatisfied the people. If the European powers had really agreed upon the end in view, if they had all felt the same interest, and had brought a sustained and unanimous purpose to bear upon the court of Rome, they might have made an important step towards a true and permanent solution of the Italian difficulty; as it was, they merely instilled into it additional venom. The people, already indisposed to be satisfied with even effectual reforms, hastened to abandon themselves to the irritation of disappointed hopes. A few months only after the promulgation of the three Papal edicts, bearing date the 5th of July, the 5th of October, and the 8th of November, 1831, for the reform of municipal administration, and of civil and criminal justice in the Legations,¹ confusion and dis-

¹ See Historic Documents, No. XI. I add to these edicts a letter written to me by M. Rossi, from Geneva, on the 10th of April, 1832, some months after they had been promulgated; showing how, either through their insignificance or non-execution, they had produced little

obedience at first, and afterwards open insurrection recommenced. The civic guards rose in arms. Cardinal Bernetti addressed a note to the representatives of the foreign courts, announcing to them the necessity to which the Pope felt himself driven of adopting means of energetic repression. All reform of criminal justice was, in fact, suspended; civil war burst forth; the Papal troops defeated the insurgents without subduing them, and their excesses after victory renewed the strife, under the form of local sedition, private revenges, accidental encounters, and assassinations. At the request of the court of Rome, and almost to the joy of the inhabitants, the Austrians re-occupied the towns they had recently evacuated.

The Italian question then presented itself under a new form. The concurrent action of the powers had failed. France, whose policy, at the same time liberal and anti-revolutionary, appeared to be adopted by Europe, had not been able to render it triumphant in Italy, or to re-establish, through that channel, harmony between the Pope and his subjects. It was Austria and the policy of physical repression that prevailed. If we had paused there, if the French government had not shown itself sensible of this check and ready to repair it, it would no longer have possessed either consideration or influence in Italy. At home, it could only reply to the attacks and insults of the opposition, who had already evinced indignation and demanded answers, declaiming on the sufferings of the Italians, the excesses of the Papal sol-

effect, the extent to which the public mind was still agitated, and what was the amount of even the most moderate desires.

diers, and the re-entry of the Austrians into the Legations as rulers, and almost as deliverers, as much for the protection of the people as to support the authority of the sovereign. On that specific point France had no direct or material interest; but it involved a question of national dignity and importance, perhaps also of internal tranquillity. The peace policy was humbled and compromised. M. Casimir Périer was not the man to submit coldly and inactively to this position. The King agreed with his opinion, and the expedition to Ancona was decided on.

It is well known with what rapidity and vigour that measure was executed. Leaving Toulon on the 7th of February, 1832, under the orders of Post-Captain Gallois, with the 66th regiment of the line on board, commanded by Colonel Combes, the small French squadron arrived in sight of Ancona on the 22nd. During the night, at two o'clock, the frigate 'Victory' entered the harbour under full sail. The troops disembarked in silence, the gates of the city were forced; and on the following morning, without shedding a single drop of blood, the town and citadel were occupied by French soldiers, assuming the duties of the different posts in conjunction with the troops of the Pope, and the French and Roman flags floated side by side on the walls.

In France, as in Italy, and throughout all Europe, the surprise was great. The idea of such an act on the part of the French government was not entirely new, and had already been canvassed by cabinets and diplomatists. From the first entry of the Austrians into the Legations, M. de Saint-Aulaire had himself induced Gene-

ral Sébastiani to send French ships of war to the coasts of Italy, to be ready for an effective demonstration in case such a necessity should arise; and Captain (now Admiral) Parseval-Deschênes had in consequence cruised about with his frigates,—first, before Civita Vecchia, and subsequently in the Adriatic, keeping the open sea, but inclining towards the ports on the Italian coast, amongst others, Rimini and Ancona, as soon as the Austrian troops appeared to be approaching them. When the second occupation of the Legations became imminent, M. Casimir Périer expressly instructed M. de Sainte-Aulaire to demand from the Pope that if the Austrians re-entered those territories, the troops of some Italian power, especially those of Piedmont, should be admitted on another point of the Roman States, and a French garrison received into the citadel of Ancona. M. de Sainte-Aulaire acquitted himself faithfully of his mission, and in several interviews held with Cardinal Bernetti and afterwards with the Pope himself, announced the requisition of our government. At the first moment, he had reason to think that it would not be peremptorily rejected; but soon the idea of the presence of French soldiers and the French flag, on any Italian ground whatever, inspired the court of Rome, the Sacred College, and the ministers of the foreign powers, with animated alarm. In their eyes such a movement would probably lead to a revolution, and, under any circumstances, to the predominance of French influence in Italy. This combined opposition easily prevailed, and when, on the 31st of January, 1832, the Count de Sainte-Aulaire addressed the official demand of the French cabinet to

Cardinal Bernetti, that minister replied on the following morning by a formal refusal. Eight days later, on the 9th of February, M. Casimir Périer informed the French ambassador at Rome that a small squadron, destined for Ancona, had sailed from Toulon.¹

During several previous weeks the preparations for this armament were freely talked of in Italy, and all inquired with deep anxiety what could be its object. At Rome, Naples, and Florence, neither the French agents nor the Italian politicians believed in this sudden landing,—this unlooked-for and armed invasion of a Roman city. The act seemed too much opposed to public rights, and too rash to have been committed during perfect peace, and without the consent either of the Pope or of the allies of France. At Turin alone, M. de Barante, being informed by M. Edmond de Bussière, at that time first secretary to the French embassy at Naples, of the departure of the expedition and its probable object, wrote to me on the 28th of February, 1832, before he was acquainted with the result. He said, “I expect, in the course of the day, the courier with news from Ancona. We imagine here that in spite of the profound displeasure which this occupation must give to Austria and the Holy See, their consent has been obtained. Under existing circumstances it is the best step that could have been taken. Such an occupation by Sardinian troops would have been very difficult to accomplish. The cabinet of Turin would not have consented to it unless positively assured that Austria evinced no repugnance. Besides which, in a political

¹ See *Historic Documents*, No. XII.

sense, a Sardinian or an Austrian garrison is in fact the same thing. Such an arrangement would establish what we desire to prevent, the sovereignty of Austria over Italy. In this, the whole question is contained. At Vienna and at Milan, they have no desire to conquer the Legations, but they wish to carry a high hand in the Peninsula; and this has become a much more easy matter, since the Italian governments, who rejected their interference a short time before our revolution, at present desire nothing better, and look to it as to a safeguard. If, then, we occupy Ancona (which I shall know before I close my letter), we shall have displeased Austria, but without inducing her to quarrel with us; an excellent result. We shall have shown the Italian governments that we do not intend to let them sink into vassals to avoid yielding anything to their subjects. We shall have committed an act of force, to the great delight of the French and liberal party, who will derive encouragement and strength from the presence of our flag in Italy. The *Carbonari* themselves will begin to think a little more of our ministry than of M. de La Fayette. Everything is therefore for the best, if there is only success." A few hours later, M. de Barante finished his letter thus:—"The question is decided: we have entered Ancona by force, and the Pope has issued a protest. If Austria, as appears likely, takes the matter patiently, we are in an excellent position. The effect will be great throughout Italy, as I already perceive."

At Rome, during the first moments, the irritation of the government was as strong as it was natural. In a note from Cardinal Bernetti to M. de Sainte-Aulaire, the

Pope protested solemnly against the occupation of Ancona. He withdrew from the city his representatives, his garrison, and his flag, transferring to Osimo the administration of the province. The cabinet of Vienna made a great display of surprise, declaring that it was a European affair, and that all the cabinets ought to take it up. In the English parliament, Lords Grey and Palmerston were accused of having surrendered Italy to the ambition of France. M. de Sainte-Aulaire could not avoid being somewhat troubled and uneasy. After the failure of his negotiation to obtain the same end, through a legitimate course, he was unprepared for such a sudden and decisive act. It was he who had to bear the weight of a position not emanating from himself, and he also had to pacify the anger and dissipate the suspicions of the Pope and his advisers. He applied himself to the task with his accustomed fidelity and devotion to the instructions of his government, and the interests of his country. Six weeks after the occupation of Ancona, he succeeded in obtaining its acknowledgment by the court of Rome, as a temporary fact, tending in no way to disturb the peace of Europe, or the friendly relations between France and the Holy See. The conditions and arrangements were settled by a convention drawn up on the 16th of April, 1832.

Independently of his own constant exertions and the personal confidence he had inspired at Rome, it was to the attitude and language maintained by M. Casimir Périer, in the Chambers as well as in his diplomatic communications, that M. de Sainte-Aulaire was indebted for the credit and power without which he could never

have accomplished this difficult result. As soon as it was known that the French troops had entered Ancona by open violence, the representatives of the great powers at Paris, either from serious vexation at this event, or through a desire to shield themselves from official responsibility, waited on M. Casimir Périer to demand explanations. They found him in great suffering. A few hours before leeches had been applied to him. He received them with excited haughtiness, and on a question from the Prussian minister, the Baron de Werther, who asked if there was still such a thing as public European right, M. Périer started abruptly from his sofa, and approaching him, exclaimed, "It is I, Sir, who defend the public rights of Europe. Do you think it an easy matter to maintain treaties and peace? It is also necessary that the honour of France should be supported, which called for what I have done. I have a right to expect the confidence of Europe, and on this I have relied." Count Pozzo di Borgo, who related this interview to me, added, "I still see that lofty, pallid figure standing before me in a loose dressing-gown, his head enveloped in a red Madras handkerchief, and advancing towards us with a fierce expression." The first emotions having subsided, the conversation assumed a more friendly tone. No one was anxious to embitter it, and the foreign ambassadors retired, expressing their concurrence with the step that had been taken. M. Périer felt the necessity of healing the wound, which he did with the frank resolution of a man sure of his intentions as of his power, who disavows nothing because he has nothing to conceal, and in proceeding towards his object

knows how to stop and when to press forward. On the 7th of March, 1832, the Chamber of Deputies discussed the budget for the department of foreign affairs. M. Casimir Périer opened the debate, and entered into all the leading points of our external policy. When he touched on the affairs of Italy, and the occupation of Ancona, the news of which had only been heard in Paris for four days, he said, "This is not yet an event completed, and consequently subject to unlimited investigation. But we hasten to declare that there is nothing in a measure maturely considered, and all the consequences of which have been weighed, that ought to occasion the slightest uneasiness to the friends of peace as to the continuance of harmony between the powers who agree in this question, as in all others, for one common object. As in the case of our Belgian interference, the expedition to Ancona, conceived in the general interest of peace, and for the advancement of French policy, will act as an additional guarantee against all collision in that quarter of Europe, by assuring to the Holy See, and to the inhabitants of Italy, real and certain advantages; and by putting an end to periodical interventions, irksome to the powers by whom they are exercised, and furnishing a continual subject of anxiety for the repose of Europe."

In my turn, I ascended the tribune on the following day, and, less fettered than M. Périer, entered more fully into an explanation of the motives for the expedition to Ancona, of our proceedings in Italy, and of their connection with our general policy in Europe. "We cannot deny," I said, "that there exists a party, a faction,

anxious for war, and without hope or chance but in a universal collision. That collision was expected from Belgium; the expectation has failed. It was then looked for from Poland; another failure. It is now sought for in Italy. Many have said with eagerness that Austria was planning in that country a gigantic intrigue, and that her interference in the Legations was merely a pretext to obtain possession of those provinces, and to add them to her Italian dominions. These parties flattered themselves that from that cause a rupture would ensue between France and Austria, which Poland and Belgium were unable to produce, and from whence incalculable revolutions would inundate Europe. I feel confident that they will deceive themselves in Italy as in the two other countries. The Austrian government is too clear-sighted not to feel that even the possession of the Legations is not worth the risk of a general war. What Austria covets is that Italy should belong to her through influential means; and this is precisely what France is bound to oppose. Each country must assume its own position; Austria has taken hers, as we have taken and must maintain ours. We shall support the independence of the Italian States, and the development of Italian liberties. We cannot suffer Italy to fall decidedly and completely under Austrian preponderance; but at the same time let us avoid all general collision. Fomented and exploded insurrections, wars of invasion and conquest, are the policy of revolution, into which there is a desire to inveigle us. Measures of denunciation, strong precautions, limited expeditions, and patient negotiations, constitute the policy of civilized order. We have adopted

the last, and are decided to persevere in it. The difficulties we have to encounter are serious, but they are not incompatible with the state of European peace; they are not questions of life and death. They will solve themselves gradually through the judicious conduct of the government, through its respect for universal rights, under every form; and through the determination of the Chambers to support the government firmly in the course it has adopted."

I feel much pleasure in recalling our contests of that epoch; I engaged in them ardently, but as a volunteer at perfect liberty. No function or engagement bound me to M. Casimir Périer. I promoted my own wishes and developed my own personal views while supporting his administration. Neither did I go alone to the combat. Not including the cabinet, I was seconded by skilful and effective allies. M. Dupin and M. Thiers supported with me the policy of the ministry; both holding public situations,—the one as attorney-general of the Court of Appeal, the other as a councillor of State,—they were not the less independent champions in the Chambers, actuated much more by their individual convictions than by the obligations of office. We had no concert between us, no pre-arranged understanding or settled tactics; we entered the arena by the gate we selected and under the colours of our own choice. In general we considered the questions in debate from opposite points of view, and through very different courses. M. Dupin, when treating of foreign policy, considered it less in itself, than as regarded its influence on the domestic and internal interests of the country, its prosperity, and repose.

M. Thiers embraced every hypothesis, discussing the conduct of all parties, of the opposition as well as of the government, extracting at every step the practical impossibilities, inevitable contradictions, and unlimited dangers of the policy which MM. Mauguin, Bignon, Lamarque, and also M. de La Fayette, (with more dignity and politeness, though even with additional hardihood), were inclined to impose on the country and the government. I chiefly endeavoured to characterize the general policy of the cabinet and its supporters, to establish forcibly the justness of their views, to show how they ought to persevere and control in all special questions; while, at the same time, I directly attacked the evil traditions and false principles from which the policy of the opposition was derived, and the fatal predominance they would have recalled. Far from injuring the cause we advocated in common, these varieties of position and language added to its support, for they indicated the number of different but convinced and zealous defenders, who combined to ensure its triumph.

The expedition to Ancona was not the first proof that M. Casimir Périer had given of his energetic determination to protect externally the honour and interest of France. Some months before, he had occasion to address just remonstrances against the brutal injustice with which the King Don Miguel had treated, both in respect to their persons and property, the French subjects resident in Portugal, but without obtaining the desired redress. The English government, which had also some of their countrymen to protect from similar outrages, succeeded in recovering satisfaction. M. Casimir Périer,

tired of waiting longer, resolved to enforce his demands. Admiral Roussin, at the head of a formidable squadron, with equal skill and boldness forced the entrance to the Tagus, captured the Portuguese fleet in their own waters, silenced the fire of the forts by which it was protected, and before the quays of Lisbon compelled the ministers of Don Miguel to sign a convention on board his flagship, which allowed to France, and her subjects established in Portugal, all the reparation, both in dignity and interest, to which they were entitled. The brilliant execution of this rapid enterprise was not its only merit in the eyes of the French public. They saw in it a proof of the independence which the cabinet of M. Casimir Périer pursued in its relations with England. In London, the opposition endeavoured to cast a reproach upon the government for the humiliation endured by Portugal. The Duke of Wellington himself on this occasion departed from his usual reserve. "I have felt," he said, "as an English subject, the blood rise to my cheeks at the sight of an old ally thus treated, and England remaining passive." The English cabinet had no right to oppose the justice demanded by France; and, if the Duke had been then in power, I am almost convinced he would have adopted the conduct of Lord Grey. When there is no infringement of right, and a claim clearly established is firmly maintained, the English government, even when dissatisfied, never engages precipitately, or upon secondary questions, in a serious quarrel with its neighbours.

This sound and sustained course, this combination of prudence and vigour, this firm resolve not to depart,

even in the most delicate private questions, from the general and pacific policy professed by the cabinet, produced throughout Europe, even more than in France itself, a profound impression. M. Casimir Périer became everywhere the object of interest and hope, not only of men in power, but of all honest and enlightened citizens. The English ministry evinced from day to day their increasing confidence in him. The most suspicious and mistrustful governments began to rely on his word, and to believe that he could be safely treated with for the future. All the cabinets were anxious for a general and concurrent disarming. At Vienna, in particular, Prince Metternich attached himself to this purpose, giving M. Périer the compliment of having originated it, and speaking openly of the brilliant token of respect which the sovereigns would be eager to render him, if he could accomplish, for the benefit of Europe, this great measure, calculated to save such heavy expenditure to nations, and so much embarrassment to governments. "The hope we adopt ourselves internally," M. de Barante wrote to me, "is eagerly embraced by foreigners. The cabinets have no inclination to risk all for the chance of all. Whatever may be their antipathy to the revolution of July, they would rather see it arrange and consolidate itself than fall into confusion. After all, revolutionary France seems to them less formidable in permanence than France under sound regulation. At times they imagine that it would want even the force of disorder. Nevertheless, a great peril is therein comprised,—positive, unknown, impossible to estimate, and which all are unwilling to encounter. But the entire

position would change if M. Périer no longer remained in power. Already, when at the opening of your session he evinced a wish to retire, everything was supposed to be lost. The Belgian affair also was looked upon as a fortunate stroke."

But neither the energy nor reputation of one man is sufficient to restore to order, in a few months, a state of society profoundly shaken. M. Casimir had undertaken the most laborious and noblest of all tasks,—that of subduing anarchy in the name of a government born of a revolution, and in presence of liberty. In the midst of his efforts, his success, and the confidence he inspired in all honest minds, whether in France or Europe, the evil was ever there, abated, but not cured; anarchy struggled under his grasp, intimidated, but not vanquished. During the first months of 1832, two conspiracies exploded in Paris; and in other portions of the kingdom, as at Grenoble, the authority of the government was disavowed and the public peace violently disturbed. Mischievous passions were still inflamed by revolutionary hopes. The republican party had not given in; the legitimists once more appeared on the stage. The periodical press had never been more hostile or audacious. In the Chamber of Deputies the opposition incessantly assailed the cabinet; and the display of this declamatory combat, alternately violent and confident in temerity, afforded an indirect aid to the mortal war which, beyond the Chambers, existing authorities had to sustain. Foreign nations, both princes and people, watched with uneasy astonishment this state of prolonged revolution under a government so promptly and easily

established. "Our consideration and influence," said M. de Barante to me in one of his letters, "are placed in quarantine; we present the aspect of a country in which honest men endure the most powerful and dangerous struggle with the perverse or insane portion of the people. The arresting point is not yet discovered. All appears to be still in question or in peril. The victories of the reasonable party seem to exhaust them, without weakening their opponents. The mania for changing the state of society, and for reducing to the condition of pariahs all who fill high places, becomes daily more palpable. M. Périer is admired, but pitied. Your name is often pronounced as that of the clearest and most fearless opponent of the spirit of anarchy; but even when a favourable result is hoped, such a social state offers little temptation to liberals who are not revolutionists. If we were in a better train, if we presented a secure and honourable aspect, the progress of ideas and improvement would be rapid. Instead of that, Italy floats between sedition and the repressive measures of Austria."

No one was less deceived as to the state of the country and the incompleteness of his own success than M. Périer himself. I have already said that he was not sanguine, but mistrustful of men and fortune. Experience, instead of diminishing, augmented this disposition. As he grew familiar with power, he became more difficult to please, more dissatisfied with his own work, more exacting towards his assistants, allies, and friends. "No one does his whole duty," he said; "no one comes forward to support the government in moments of diffi-

culty. I cannot do everything. I cannot emerge from the beaten track alone. Nevertheless, I am a good working horse. I shall kill myself, if it must be so, in harness. But let others exert themselves too, and give a strong pull with me, or France is lost." He foresaw the moment approaching, when even under success he either would not or could not endure longer the burden with which he was loaded, and his thoughts reverted with noble solicitude to the future destiny of his country. A young friend of mine, at that time attached to his cabinet, and soon after his nephew, M. Vitet, towards the middle of March, 1832, a few days before the cholera broke out in Paris, held a conversation with him, by which he was so impressed that he has retained a recollection of the particulars. I give them here as he repeated them to me, and without feeling that the honour conferred by the esteem of M. Casimir Périer should either involve me in embarrassment or impose reserve. "I had accompanied him alone," said M. Vitet, "from Paris to his house in the Bois de Boulogne, whither his physicians had sent him for fresh air, for he was already weak and suffering. For more than two hours we walked round the gardens, under a heavy, misty sky, which I still see. He spoke to me with more freedom and connection than he had ever done before, of his projects, plans, and hopes. He read to me the latest despatches he had just received from London and Vienna, explained to me that in less time than was supposed, the Continental Powers would disarm on an extended scale, to remove all idea of double-dealing or after-thought on their part." "From that moment,"

added he, "all this accumulated mass of war will fall to pieces, and I shall retire. My task will be accomplished. The burden is already heavy; it would become insupportable when the danger is dissipated. My best friends, who are not now very amenable, would play me hanging tricks at every moment. I shall make room for them. But I shall not go without appointing successors who comprehend and complete what I have begun." He then entered into long details respecting some of his allies, criticizing them with the hand of a master. "It is not with such men," continued he, "that a government can be formed. I know that the doctrinaires have great defects, and are deficient in the art of attaching the public; but they alone honourably agree with me. I shall only be satisfied with Guizot. He has gained ground enough to enable him to assume power. 'This will be the condition of my retirement.'"

Another example of the vanity of human confidence. At the moment when M. C. Périer thus occupied his mind with the arrangement of the future, the cholera, which was destined to strike him, suddenly invaded Paris. It has been said that from the first outbreak of this scourge, the imagination of M. Périer was possessed by it to the injury of his health; and, above all, that the reports of poisonings, and the popular murders thereby excited, had disturbed his mind with the effect of a personal outrage. He was, in truth, profoundly indignant at these deplorable scenes of savage credulity. "This," said he, "is not the idea of a civilized people; it is the howl of a tribe of savages." But I do not believe that his impression went further. "I was present," said M. d'Hau-

bersaert to me, "when the prefect of police came to report to him what had occurred; M. Périer was touched, vexed, and saddened, but not disordered." His imagination was warm, and his temperament irritable; but his mind was strong and his spirit resolved. He saw things in their true light, without either exaggeration or illusion, even when they moved him profoundly.

- I cannot find that the writers who have treated of this period, have described with truth and justice the state of Paris, government, and people, during that melancholy crisis. Equally absurd and detestable, the popular extravagancies were few in number, limited to certain streets encumbered with a poor and ignorant population, and ceased almost immediately. The general aspect of the city was mournful, but not disturbed. In no quarter was there exhibited that disorderly agitation or stupid immobility which characterizes fear. The people traversed the streets in silence, with a hurried step, and with countenances somewhat stiffened and shrunk, under the influence of the cold and withering air they inhaled. The Chambers, the tribunals, the functionaries of every class, continued to prosecute their regular labours. The clergy, the public officers, the physicians, the members of pious and charitable institutions, did their duty, many with ardour, and nearly all without hesitation. The King and his family, the ministers, and all the heads of departments, set the example of courage and devotion. Count d'Argout, within whose province the sanitary police were included, traversed the most infected quarters, assisting with his own hands to place the dead in the vehicles which received them from house to house, for

conveyance to the cemeteries. Christian charity, liberal sympathy, and administrative zeal, united their efforts to struggle with the disease or to diminish its results. The public anxiety was evident, the sadness universal; but we had no displays of that disgraceful terror, attended by social and moral disorganization, which in other times and places have accompanied similar trials. On the contrary, we felt ourselves in the midst of a population in which the sentiment of duty or honour predominated, and under the control of a regular, vigilant, determined government, capable of accomplishing, within the limits of science and human ability, all that was required for the perilous service of the society committed to its care.

It was not through indirect and distant observations, but by close personal evidence, that I saw and estimated the moral condition of Paris at that epoch. I lived in the midst of the public calamity, and of the labour assiduously persevered in to provide a remedy. Why should I not render to a beloved memory the tribute so justly due? Affection may command reserve without interdicting truth. A constant visitor of the poor in the quarter where we dwelt, my wife, as soon as the scourge appeared, devoted herself to protect the families committed to her charge, and many others also whose destitution was increased by this new misfortune. She employed several hours every day in visiting them, in furnishing precautions to those who were well, in providing attendance for, and often in attending herself, on such as were infected, in promptly removing those who had fallen, and in sustaining and consoling the survivors. Her youth, activity, calmness, and unaffected courage,

her kindness, at once sympathetic and encouraging, soon acquired for her the confidence of the terrified, the sick, the physicians, the public officers, and of all who in the district were either the allies or objects of her labours. They were incessantly coming to request her visits, assistance, and advice, some to acquaint her with their misfortunes and necessities; others to put her in possession of the measures adopted by the authorities, and the remedies employed by science. From my study I heard the constant inquiry, "Is Madame Guizot within?" I saw her with uneasiness that she readily divined,—but of which we never spoke to each other,—go out, return, and leave the house again, several times during the day, in prosecution of her task. Her health sustained no injury, but she was soon compelled to confine her attention to her own home. I was myself seized with cholera, not very acutely, but enough for my physician, Dr. Lerminier, to say, "If M. Guizot were nervous, he would be extremely ill." I had no occasion to arm myself against such an impression. During a single day only my indisposition was excessive. I felt a sensation of great uneasiness and internal disorganization. The remedies adopted, especially a constant supply of ice, arrested the disease. I became rapidly convalescent, and my wife resumed her external duties.¹ This atmosphere of charity in which I lived, and my own attack, rendered me quite familiar with the history of the cholera in

¹ I indulge my own feelings without scruple, by including here, amongst the *Historic Documents* (No. XIII.), an essay, entitled, 'On Charity, and its Place in Woman's Life,' by Madame Eliza Guizot, written in 1828, and which has hitherto only been printed in an unpublished *Collection*, of which only sixty copies were struck off.

1832. I heard it continually spoken of; I was made acquainted with all the incidental occurrences, the feelings and exertions connected with them. That sad epoch left me deeply penetrated with esteem for the benevolence, courage, devotion, intelligent zeal, and affectionate sympathy, and for all the domestic endearments which abound in every class of French society, and were then displayed with captivating enthusiasm, as soon as the great trials called for their exercise. There is enough in this to atone for many weaknesses, and a powerful foundation for inspiring the hope that this society will also acquire with time the public virtue of which it stands in need to accomplish its destiny and satisfy its own honour.

During the worst period of the disease, to diminish the dread of contagion, and to encourage the despondent, the government thought it necessary to adopt a startling measure. The King proposed to visit the general hospital (Hôtel-Dieu) in person, accompanied by the President of the Council. The cabinet overruled the intention, but the Duke of Orleans, with generous eagerness, offered to assume his father's place, and the proposal was accepted. The Duke, M. Casimir Périer, and M. de Marbois, at that time president of the council-general of the hospitals, and eighty-seven years of age, traversed the cholera-wards of the Hôtel-Dieu, stopping by the bedsides of the patients, taking them by the hand, conversing with and encouraging them by kind and hopeful words. The visit was long. Several of the diseased—ten or twelve, according to the report of an attendant—died during the time. M. Lanyer, a young physician of eminence,

attached to the ministry of the interior, and director of the civil affairs of Algeria, had accompanied M. Casimir Périer. He urged him, as well as the Duke of Orleans, to limit their stay, saying that to remain longer in such an atmosphere might be dangerous, and completely useless. Neither the Duke nor M. Périer listened to this advice. The Prince discussed with an unembarrassed mind the question of ascertaining whether or not cholera was contagious; and M. Périer, silent and serious, evidently felt and restrained deep emotion in presence of such multiplied suffering. At length they retired, and M. Périer having re-entered the Ministry of the Interior, related with glowing satisfaction the courage of the young prince and the old magistrate, the one upon the steps of the throne, the other on the brink of the grave, both perfectly collected and calm by the side of the expiring sufferers, whose breath might probably spread death around them. While he spoke of this sight, his eyes were inflamed, his countenance pale, his expression changed, so that his friends, while they looked on him, were struck with apprehension.

Three days after this mournful visit, M. Casimir Périer was dangerously ill. One of his colleagues, M. de Montalivet, called to see him on the evening of the 5th of April. "I found him alone," said he, "extended on a sofa; the murder perpetrated the evening before, by an infuriated and senseless crowd, had left on his spirit a heart-rending impression. He uttered melancholy predictions as regarded France and himself. 'I have already told you,' he repeated, 'I shall leave this ministry with my feet foremost.' These were, in fact, the very

words he had used in conversation with me on the day when he installed himself in the official residence, on the 14th of March, 1831. He afterwards talked with composure and sadness of the article to be inserted in the 'Moniteur' on the following day.¹ The prefect of police was announced, and I left him with an adieu destined to be the last. I never saw him again.*

While the cholera, by carrying off M. Casimir Périer, imperilled the tranquillity of France, it deprived the country, in M. Cuvier, of one of her proudest ornaments.³ In the midst of her perturbation, France severely felt this loss. She has ever loved intellectual greatness, and at the present day it is perhaps the only superiority she delights to honour. The concourse of people at the funeral of M. Cuvier was enormous; a genuine feeling of sympathy and regret inspired that crowd, eager to disperse again, to withdraw themselves from the danger of the plague by which he had been smitten. This mixture of generous respect and personal apprehension presented at the juncture an imposing and melancholy spectacle.

¹ See Historic Documents. No. XIV.

² Extract from a letter addressed to me on the 18th of September, 1858, by M. de Montalivet, to whom I am indebted for several important particulars with reference to that time.

³ The causes which led to the death of M. Cuvier have been much disputed. To attain the opinion of a perfectly competent judge on this subject, I applied to my learned associate and friend, M. Flourens, his worthy successor in the French Academy as in the Academy of Sciences. He answered me thus:—"The causes of M. Cuvier's death remain in doubt. It has been attributed to cholera, and it is very probable that disease may have acted, but only by latent operation. The palpable symptoms of his disease were those of paralysis, which, from the right arm, successively affected the larynx and the organs of respiration."

The malady displayed itself in the house of M. Casimir with terrific violence:—"Nervous spasms raised his large frame in bed by a kind of mechanical motion, the irresistible power of which was appalling. It was a miserable sight to look on such intelligence and so much energetic determination struggling in vain with physical disease."¹ Some of the physicians called in, doubted whether it was the cholera; the greater number, and the most eminent, affirmed that it was, and everything seems to indicate that they were right. By the side of M. Périer, in the ministerial residence, eleven persons were attacked at the same time, and his colleague, M. D'Argout, who had accompanied him in the visit to the Hôtel-Dieu, was seized in the same manner, and almost in equal danger. At the expiration of several days, a sensible improvement excited hopes; there was an interval of doubts, discussions, and various experiments amongst the physicians. During six weeks they struggled, with all the resources of science, and the patient, with the utmost vigour of his spirit, against the disease perpetually returning with incessant violence. But every effort proved vain. The fever raged incessantly from day to day; the extreme nervous susceptibility of M. Casimir Périer amounted almost to distraction. In the midst of his sufferings, the future of his country, and her political condition, principally occupied his thoughts. He spoke on these subjects to those around him, and to himself, under the delirium of the fever. His eldest son arrived

¹ Extract of a letter addressed to me on the 27th of September, 1858, respecting the illness and last days of M. Casimir Périer, by M. Lanyer, who had accompanied him to the Hôtel-Dieu, and from that time had remained constantly near him.

from England. M. Périer conversed with him for more than an hour exclusively on the Conference of London and the settlement of the affairs of Belgium. In spite of the affection he bore to that son, he *surrendered himself to no emotion, and gave way to no paternal weakness. The peace of Europe appeared to be his only care.* When his mind reverted to the internal affairs of France, he expressed strong alarm for the continuance of social tranquillity, and, above all, for respect for property, the chief foundation of order,—not deceiving himself as to the extent of his triumph over anarchy, and being well convinced that though he had arrested the ruin of public peace, he had won no decisive victory. “My wings are clipped,” he said; “I am in extremity, but the country is even in a worse condition.”

The country watched with anxiety the progress of the disease which threatened to plunge it back again into all its old difficulties. When it became known, on the morning of the 16th of May, that M. Casimir Périer was dead, a general sentiment of regret, of gratitude, and apprehension, spread throughout France, amongst the proprietors, merchants, manufacturers, magistrates, public officers, and all the friends of order in that vast population whose interests he had understood and maintained better than themselves. They hastened in crowds to his obsequies; they poured in subscriptions for the erection of a public monument to his memory. The details of this burst of public estimation are universally known. I joined the funeral procession at its departure, but having scarcely recovered from my own attack of cholera, I was unable to accompany it to the cemetery. Of

the discourses delivered there, that of M. Royer-Collard, —and amongst the writings consecrated to the memory of M. Casimir Périer, the notice which M. de Rémusat has prefixed to the collection of his speeches,—alone possess historic value. In the first, the public, and in the second, the private character of M. Casimir Périer is drawn with equal ability and truth. Both are worthy of surviving the moment that inspired them.¹ They offer beautiful examples of profound admiration and clear-sighted sympathy. A single year of government, without complete or assured results, had sufficed to win for M. Casimir Périer this flattering eulogium from the most fastidious judges, confirmed by the public opinion of France and Europe.

¹ See *Historic Documents*, No. XV.

CHAPTER VI.

THE GOVERNMENT AFTER THE DEATH OF
M. CASIMIR PÉRIER.

LEGITIMIST AND REPUBLICAN INSURRECTIONS.—PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION. —FORMATION OF THE CABINET OF THE 11TH OCT., 1832.

STATE OF MINDS AFTER THE DEATH OF M. CASIMIR PÉRIER.—IN THE GOVERNMENT.—IN THE DIFFERENT PARTIES.—LEGITIMIST INSURRECTIONS IN THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE WEST.—PRINCIPLE AND SENTIMENTS OF THE LEGITIMIST PARTY.—THE DUCHESS DE BERRY.—PRINCIPLE AND SENTIMENTS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.—THE PREPARATIONS FOR A REVOLT IN PARIS.—MANIFESTO, OR COMPTE-RENDU BY THE PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION.—ITS MOTIVES AND CHARACTER.—COURAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF THE CABINET.—M. DE TALLEYRAND THOUGHT OF FOR PRIME MINISTER.—JOURNEY OF M. DE RÉMUSAT TO LONDON.—M. DE TALLEYRAND REFUSES.—DEATH OF GENERAL LAMARQUE.—REPUBLICAN INSURRECTION OF THE 5TH AND 6TH OF JUNE, 1832.—ENERGETIC RESISTANCE OF THE PARTY OF ORDER.—THE KING TRAVERSES PARIS.—I REPAIR TO THE TUILERIES.—VISIT TO THE TUILERIES OF MM. LAFFITTE, ODILON-BARROT, AND ARAGO.—THEIR CONVERSATION WITH THE KING.—INCREASING WEAKNESS OF THE CABINET NOTWITHSTANDING ITS VICTORY.—ITS TWO FAULTS.—PARIS PLACED IN A STATE OF SIEGE.—ARRESTS OF MM. DE CHATEAUBRIAND, FITZ-JAMES, HYDE DE NEUVILLE, AND BERRYER.—ATTEMPT OF THE KING TO MAINTAIN THE CABINET BY ADDITIONAL STRENGTH.—M. DUPIN.—URGENCY OF THE SITUATION.—THE KING NAMES MARSHAL SOULT PRESIDENT OF THE CABINET, AND INSTRUCTS HIM TO FORM A MINISTRY.—THE DUKE DE BROGLIE IS SUMMONED TO PARIS.—HE REFUSES TO ENTER THE CABINET WITHOUT ME.—OBJECTIONS AND HESITATION.—MARSHAL SOULT MAKES A NEW PROPOSITION TO M. DUPIN, WHO DECLINES.—I AM OFFERED AND ACCEPT THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.—FORMATION OF THE CABINET OF THE 11TH OF OCTOBER, 1832.

(From May 16 to October 11, 1832.)

ON the 15th of May, 1832, while M. Casimir Périer still

lived, the 'Journal des Débats,' the staunch defender and almost the avowed organ of the government, said:—"It is a strange error to persist in confounding the system and ministry of the 13th March, as if the system originated and must become extinct with such or such a man. Not, Heaven forbid, that it enters into our thoughts to disparage in the slightest degree the immense services rendered by a particular man to the system. M. Casimir Périer has courageously accepted the mission of establishing the system which all enlightened minds and true citizens had acknowledged and proclaimed as the only means of saving France. He has fulfilled this mission with a degree of energy and talent that secure for him an immortal memory. But M. Casimir Périer did not create this system. He has only the merit of comprehending and frankly adopting it. The force of public opinion has guided him and his colleagues; the system made the ministry of the 13th of March, and not the ministry the system. The system took its birth in the moment of the Revolution of July. It is simply that of constitutional monarchy opposed to pure republicanism, or to republican monarchy, which is nearly the same thing. It existed before M. Casimir Périer assumed office, and will survive him, if unfortunately he is taken from France."

Two days after, on the 17th of May, M. Casimir Périer was no more, and the 'Moniteur,' in its official announcement of his death, used these words:—"The nation has attached itself to the system which the ministry of the 13th of March endeavoured to render triumphant;—the Charter at home, peace abroad. The

caprice of a few individuals would vainly seek to change this course. It is the wish of the country, expressed in the elections of 1831, and in the parliamentary majorities that marked the following session. Constitutionally, this system ought therefore to remain intact, as being in accord with the intention of the three constituent powers. Politically, it belongs to the nature of things ; it forms the basis of the new public right, consecrated by the treaty of the 13th of November.¹ Before Europe and the Chambers it is consequently a recognized system ; and good faith, as also the responsibility of the depositaries of the royal authority, demand its preservation from any attempt against the exercise of the principles confided to their care. Let France, as the widow of a great citizen, understand thoroughly that no change has taken place in her political destinies. She has made them for herself. She alone could change them, and has no desire to do so. Her earnest wish is for the Charter, and for peace. The government will remain faithful to the mission it has received for the preservation of these two blessings."

Malevolent and uneasy spirits, who think themselves wise because they are suspicious, read in this language anything but a desire to restore public confidence. It was, they said, the explosion of the King's jealousy towards M. Casimir Périer, and of his determination not to see, or permit to be seen, in his ministers, anything more than the instruments of his own policy, and to engross all the honour to his own person. Louis XIV.

¹ Adopted by the Conference of London, and ratified by the five Powers, to regulate the separation of Belgium and Holland.

said, "I am the State;" King Louis-Philippe means to say, "I am the government."¹ Trifling though specious pretexts were not wanting in support of this imputation. The sovereign had his impulsive impressions and intemperance of language which sometimes gave him the air of faults to which, in fact, he was a stranger. He loved popularity, and was inclined to believe that the public treated him with injustice: a double bias which he patriotically surmounted to maintain the policy he felt to be desirable for the true interests of France. But in this internal struggle he wished to have the merit of his sacrifice, and, above all, was desirous that France should thoroughly understand that if she enjoyed the benefits of order, legalized liberty, and peace, she owed them to him more than to others. Now, representative government has this inevitable result, that it is not the deliberations of Council, but the effect of the acted scenes that strike the public. It may be that the King's influence materially regulates the policy, but the ministers are always the ostensible agents. To them the honour of success attaches in common with the labours and perils of the combat: their entire destinies are pledged on the issue. Since, also, they are taken from the ranks of the country, they are its immediate representatives and selected champions for service and defence. It is natural that the country should turn its first attention towards them; it is even an essential advantage of the constitutional system that it should be so, and that royalty is thus removed from doubtful competitorship. But if the security of the throne is thereby strengthened, it may happen

¹ See Historic Documents, No. XVI.

that the personal pride of the monarch is wounded. If he suffers unjustly from this cause, if the part he really sustains in the adoption, maintenance, and success of good policy is not recognized by public opinion ;—if at the same time the current of popular ideas, and the bias of those by whom they are represented, tend to place him more and more in the background ; if some other self-esteem rises in direct opposition to the King's appreciation of his own importance, and disputes his legitimate claims ;—then immediately spring up those susceptibilities of influence and reputation, those suspicions of injustice and public ingratitude, those natural emotions of the human heart which the most sagacious monarch is unable to suppress entirely, and which, however little he may indulge in them, convey appearances that the most moderate, restrained, and constitutional conduct cannot remove. This was the point of difficulty not sufficiently remembered by King Louis-Philippe in his attitude and language, and for this he has often suffered misconstruction and injustice.

Kings, also, take too little heed of the rapidity with which the slightest impressions and inclinations they suffer to escape, while endeavouring to restrain them, furnish opportunities to their immediate listeners, of exhibiting anxious zeal, often considered by the public as a direct reflection of the royal mind. A few days after the death of M. Casimir Périer, I happened to be at the Tuileries in the Queen's drawing-room. A member of the Chamber of Deputies, a man of sense, extremely devoted to the King, said to one of the officers of the court, " What a dreadful scourge is this cholera, and

what a loss we have sustained in M. Périer!" "Yes, certainly," was the reply; "and in the daughter of M. Molé, poor Madame de Champlâtreux!" as if to extenuate by comparison with a very legitimate but purely domestic calamity, the public grief for the death of a great minister. If King Louis-Philippe had heard this ill-timed ebullition, he would undoubtedly have felt its inconsistency; but followers have impulses far beyond the desires of the masters they serve; and this courtier thought he should please by confounding M. Casimir with the crowd of victims struck by the prevailing plague.

Not only did the language of the King and his government, after the death of the great premier, offer no evidence whatever of such a sentiment, but their expressions in the 'Moniteur,' as I have just repeated, were remarkably unassuming. While promising to France a certain continuance of the political order and peace maintained by the cabinet of the 13th of March, there was no indication of claiming the merit for the King. His name was not even introduced. To France herself was ascribed the honour of the past and the hope of the future. "France has made her own destinies; she alone could change them, and has no desire to do so."

France, in truth, had no such wish; but her confused and wavering inclinations would have led to no permanent effect, if the defined and consistent resolution of King Louis-Philippe had not stepped in to aid the ministers he had selected, and the parliamentary majorities which those ministers had rallied round the throne. The King, the Chambers, and the Cabinet of the 13th of March, were all entitled to claim the policy

of order and peace as their own, for all had effectually joined in its support. The colleagues left by M. Casimir Périer behind him, had also a right to speak in their own names, for they were sincerely resolved to continue and defend his work as faithful heirs.

But no sooner was M. Casimir Périer dead, than the weight of the inheritance began to be felt, and the want of his presence as its guardian. It is a common remark that the place occupied by any one is not fully estimated until it is empty; and the void is more severely felt when the necessity of acting presents itself at the precise moment when the great actor has ceased to exist.

During the most prosperous period of the ministry of M. Casimir Périer, the hostile parties had never ceased to conspire. When they saw France assailed by the cholera, and the first minister himself stricken, they considered the moment to be favourable for redoubled efforts. During the month of May, 1832, while the head of the cabinet was struggling,—in the streets with anarchical terror, and in his bed with death,—the legitimists raised up civil war in the west; the republicans armed themselves for a combined insurrection in Paris; and the parliamentary opposition united to prepare, during the recess of the Chambers,—under the name of *Account rendered* (*Compte Rendu*), or *Manifesto to our Constituents*,—a general and solemn attack on the policy it had opposed throughout the session.

• Amongst the incentives which urge men to conspire, or rise openly for the overthrow of any established government, one of the most influential, perhaps the most predominant of all, is the idea of the right to restore

in the very heart of that existing government, legitimate authority in place of usurped power. Much has been said of the influence of personal views, and many persons think they give proofs of sagacity and sound sense in saying that self-interest is the sole spring of all human actions. These are but vulgar and superficial observers. History is at hand to show what amount of oppression, injustice, suffering, and misfortune men can endure when private objects alone are at stake, before they have recourse for deliverance to conspiracy and insurrection. If, on the contrary, they believe, or if even certain sections of men in society believe, that the party in possession of power, derives no inherent right to govern, either from its origin or nature, it may be held for certain that conspiracies and insurrections will perpetually spring up and be revived amongst them. So much are men swayed by the dominion of right ! To such extent does the instinctive dignity of their nature inspire them with a reluctance to submit to any authority which according to their ideas has no claim on their obedience, and to seek for it until their eyes find it far above themselves !

Such is the power of this feeling, that it can drive those who are possessed by it to the extremes of injustice and imprudence, silencing within them not only the voice of personal interest, of family affection, of common sense, of evident and fruitless peril, but even the appeal of patriotism and the duties which that strong impulse imposes on the children of the soil. After long and violent civil commotions, what the country seeks above all other objects, its general desire and imperious necessity, is the present and actual exercise of a just and sagacious

government, securing order and liberty, protecting all rights and interests with impartial equity, and directing with an able hand, both at home and abroad, the common interests of society. It is an infirmity belonging to all human transactions, that the best are often of mischievous origin, and that violence is to be found in the cradle of the most valuable institutions and the most indispensable authorities. But when authorities and institutions emerge from infancy, grow and expand in regular progression,—when government, more or less derived from force, or legitimate in its origin, performs its mission well, satisfying the desires and general wants of society,—what the country then requires and has a right to expect is, that conspiracies shall die, that popular outbreaks shall cease; that those who are discontented or desponding, shall keep themselves aloof, waiting the award of time; that in the interim that country may be allowed to enjoy its repose, prosperity, and liberty; that it may not be incessantly called upon to undergo the hard and painful labour of giving birth to a new government, destined, from the moment of its existence, no matter what may be its acts, to defend itself against a war to the death. But it is vain to expect, that with men who build exclusively on the origin and primitive title of authority, this patriotic appeal will conquer their ruling passion. Let it not be supposed that in presence of a government whose right to rule they solemnly deny, they will either acknowledge or reconcile themselves to its merits. On the contrary, they will be a thousand times more exacting towards it than they would have been with regard to the authority they proclaim as legi-

timate. They persist in seeing the original sin for which there is no redemption. They do more than this. In attacking it they will lay aside all calculation, not only of the perils of the enterprise, but of the chances of success. They will be as blind in the estimate of their own strength as in the pursuit of their object. They will rush headlong into desperate attempts, careless of the evil of once more replunging their country into the chaos and darkness of revolution.

What, then, must be the consequence when great examples of devotion and courage combine their influence with the empire of principles? It sheds honour on humanity that failing causes held to be lawful, produce heroes and martyrs. And when heroes and martyrs appear, the small number of the faithful is disregarded; still less do they calculate the weakness of means, and the uncertainty of hopes; enthusiasm comes to the support of duty; the pleasures of emotion and action supersede the joys of strength and the smiles of fortune; the devotees are satisfied and exalted by the sentiment of the danger they encounter for their leader or for their faith; they revel in their contempt for the dastards who desert the true cause. Politicians see with astonishment, in the maddest and most hopeless attempts, utterly void of all chance of success, prodigies of perseverance and energy, of talent and virtue.

It was with a double explosion of such adversaries that immediately on the death of M. Casimir Périer the cabinet that survived him found itself in close contest. The legitimists and republicans rose together, each demanding in the name of its own principle the exclusive

right of governing France. The leading adherents of the legitimist party, resident in Paris, M. de Châteaubriand, M. Berryer, and the Duke de Fitz-james, disapproved of the insurrection and endeavoured to prevent it. M. Berryer, in their joint names, repaired to the West to dissuade the Duchess de Berry, who had recently arrived there. Amongst the Vendean chiefs themselves, some of the most influential informed the princess that the enterprise appeared to them ill-timed, that arms and ammunition were deficient, and that they could neither promise a great rising nor reasonable prospects of success. At several intervals they deliberated, hesitated, and were on the point of renunciation. But passions in abeyance, which see a term to their inactivity, are the most ungovernable of all. From Scotland to Italy, from Italy to France, between the exiled King, Charles X. at Holyrood, the Duchess de Berry at Massa, and their correspondents in the departments of the south and west, the threads of the plot were knitted, the plans formed, and the agents in motion. Braving the perils of sea and land, devoting herself with untiring courage to a life of wandering and privation, the chief personage in the party and the plot had arrived at the appointed place, in the midst of her friends. A princess, a wife, and a mother!—these were powerful causes of illusion to herself and attraction to her followers. To come so inconsiderately and return without attempting anything would be worse than defeat; a second and more fatal abdication. There are impressions that decide the conduct of parties, and to which even those submit who condemn and deplore them. Prepared as it had been

for a long time, frustrated at Marseilles, and almost renounced in the West on the eve of execution, the legitimist appeal to arms at length declared itself, with the mother of Henry V. at its head, at the moment when the chief of the cabinet of the 13th of March descended to the tomb.

In the republican party, generals and soldiers, the situation and disposition were of the same character. Amongst them also the leaders had no desire for insurrection, and mistrusted its success. However animated may have been his hostility, I do not believe that M. de La Fayette engaged actively at that time, as he had done under the Restoration, in revolutionary plots. M. Armand Carrel, clear-sighted and scornful, looked upon them with repugnance and suspicion. M. Garnier-Pagès well knew that it was more convenient to oppose monarchy in the tribune by introducing the republic there, than to attack the King's government in the streets by parading the republican flag. Even M. Godfrey Cavaignac, despite the bitterness of his own passions, had too much good sense to abandon himself blindly to the passions of his prejudiced friends. But amongst the republicans, much more than with the legitimists, the sentiments and advice of the chiefs had little value. On all occasions they yielded to the majority, without the courage to separate from or restrain their movement. M. Casimir Périer dead, all the democrats, whether politicians or anarchists, thought their day had arrived, and resumed their practices of violence and aggression. The secret societies once more assembled; the *Friends of the People* burst open the seals affixed by authority on the

house where they had held their sittings. The commissary of police and the municipal officers who presented themselves were ill-treated. In the name of the sovereignty of the people as in that of legitimacy, in the streets of Paris as in the fields of the West, civil war was once more rekindled.

In presence of this ferment, eager to seek also for its due share in the chances of success which the death of M. Casimir Périer seemed to open to all parties, legal or illegal, the parliamentary opposition undertook an important act. The position was difficult : the tribune was closed ; the deputies could not, in the exercise of an incontestable privilege, come forward, each in his turn, according to the measure of his opinions and desires, and strike palpable though separate blows against the existing powers. They were reduced to speak in common, with a single tongue, and beyond the walls of the natural theatre in which all their voices had a right to be heard in succession. They found it no easy task to agree in one combined expression of very opposite intentions and ideas. The constitutional and dynastic oppositionists desired to remain under the standard of monarchy ; the republicans wished their own flag to re-appear. From this conflict, forced into concurrence, there resulted, under the title of "Account Rendered," a species of political *cantata* in prose, a vague summary of the vague ideas which the opposition had already vented in the Chambers or journals, and a monotonous repetition of the complaints they had so often repeated before. The moderation of M. Odilon-Barrot was insufficient to efface the harsh and aggressive character of this docu-

ment; and the literary tact of M. de Cormenin failed to embellish it with either novelty or eloquence. The production was pompously commonplace, although clever hands were engaged in its composition; and there it remained, cold and fruitless, though at the same time the act was full of rancour and hostility.

The mutilated cabinet resisted courageously all these attacks. In Paris it repressed the attempts of anarchical sedition; in the West it fought down the legitimist insurrection; abroad, it continued the negotiations for reassuring the peace of Europe, and remained faithful both in act and principle to the policy of the chief it no longer possessed. Nevertheless it felt itself weak, and lost ground daily. Its conduct was sound, but powerless. In stormy times and when circumstances are pressing, good intentions alone are not enough for government; it requires a certain measure of that superior natural and general authority derived either from acknowledged greatness of character, sustained brilliancy of talent, or the force of independent and exalted position. On these conditions alone power controls its adversaries, even while in conflict with them, and inspires its friends beforehand with confidence and zeal. These had disappeared from the cabinet with M. Casimir Périer; his policy survived him, but he left no successor; the Crown still held the same thoughts, supported by ministers of equal devotion, but it had lost its champion, as the majority in the Chambers had to mourn their chief.

The public felt the void more acutely than the ministers, or perhaps than even the Crown itself. On the 19th of May, while following the funeral procession

of M. Casimir Périer, M. Royer-Collard conversed with M. de Rémusat, and expressed to him his apprehensions for the future: "What is going to happen?" said he to him; "the position of affairs is very serious; who will be called on to reconstruct the cabinet? We have lost M. Cuvier,—a severe blow for science,—but we have not lost the Cuvier of politics, M. de Talleyrand. Will they think of him?"

Many other persons adopted this idea, rather as a possible and plausible measure rather than from a conviction that if brought into practice it would be salutary and efficacious. A man of important position and admitted talent was wanting; M. de Talleyrand was certainly both. No one asked whether his ability was suited to government, or to the free government of France, profoundly agitated. Diplomats enjoy the privilege of rising in the estimation of their country without having borne the burden of its affairs and internal trials. After the catastrophes of 1848, the Prince de Metternich and myself had sought refuge in London. One day I said to him, "Explain to me, Prince, I beg of you, how and why the Revolution of February accomplished itself in Vienna. I know how it happened in Paris; but in Austria, under such a government as yours, the affair is incomprehensible." "I have sometimes," replied he, with a smile in which pride and sadness were mingled, "governed Europe, but Austria, never." M. de Talleyrand might have made a similar reply to those who invited him to rule over France. He served his country well in London, but I suspect he would have found it incontrollable in

Paris. But when ministers are sought for, it is more frequently to escape from an embarrassment than to satisfy the public want. The great point to ascertain in this case was, whether M. de Talleyrand, on his part, had any desire to place himself at the head of the cabinet; whether he would accept the position which perhaps should have been submitted to him before suggesting any combination interfering possibly with his own views; and finally, whether, as ambassador, he was disposed to lend his co-operation to a new ministry pursuing the policy of the 13th of March, and to ascertain if he expected a speedy solution of the Belgian question, which, though considerably advanced, was not yet definitively settled. General Sébastiani, still unwell, and without any delusion as to his own personal danger and that of the cabinet, discoursed freely with M. de Rémusat on these points, and said to him one day, "Could you not help us in deciding on some course?" M. de Rémusat formed his resolution at once, and set out for London, without any specific mission or express proposal to M. de Talleyrand, but merely to converse with him, as he had talked with General Sébastiani, and to ascertain his ideas, both as to the future of the French cabinet, and the state of the Belgian affair, with its chances of arrangement.

M. de Talleyrand met the discussion sensibly and clearly. He had not the slightest wish to become minister in France. Satisfied with his position at London, his prevailing desire was to continue the work he was engaged in there, and which he always hoped to bring to the desired end, though often thwarted and

trammelled, and more by the events in France than by the opposition of Europe. All he required in Paris was a ministry that should maintain the policy of the 13th of March, and understand, as M. Casimir had understood, how to carry it out and ensure its continuance with authority and dignity, both on the part of the King and on that of the Chambers. He held this language with M. de Rémusat in perfect frankness, and with a marked desire that his resolution should not be misunderstood. In England, they congratulated themselves on his refusal. He was considered there as the most strenuous advocate for peace and a good understanding between the two nations. The probability of his recall had already caused some uneasiness. A quasi-official organ of the Whig cabinet, the 'Globe,' explained itself in these words, which were believed to be approved if not actually suggested by M. de Talleyrand: "We have received this morning the manifesto of the French deputies in opposition. We have not yet found time to examine it in detail; but we merely observe that it seems to be little more than a cold and dry repetition of the various points of policy, both foreign and domestic, on which the opposition has invariably combated the government of King Louis-Philippe. It is quite evident that the triumph of this party would rapidly lead to a general war. On his journey to the waters of Bourbon-l'Archambault, the Prince de Talleyrand must pass through Paris. It is not likely that at his age and with his habits he will undertake the rough task of first minister of France; but we hope, for the interest of both countries, and for the sake of humanity in gene-

ral, which so essentially demand a continuance of peace, that King Louis-Philippe will consult him on the formation of his cabinet, and on the choice of a President of the Council invested with full powers."

While this discussion on the new cabinet to be formed in Paris was going on in London, the entire establishment of 1830, monarchy and dynasty, king and ministers, were exposed to the most violent attack and the greatest danger they had yet experienced. The insurrection of the 5th and 6th of June, 1832, burst forth.

It is the vice and misfortune of revolutionary conspirators that they are condemned to the most contradictory falsehoods, and shift alternately from audacity to hypocrisy, and from hypocrisy to audacity. When the outbreak of the 5th and 6th of June, 1832, had failed; when it became necessary for the perpetrators to justify themselves for the part they had taken, or to defend their object, there appeared to be a concerted determination between all who had mixed themselves up with it, either directly or indirectly, to disguise its importance and misrepresent its true character. They all denied that there was either premeditation or political design. The death of General Lamarque, the courageous defender of liberty and national honour, (they said) had violently excited the people, and determined them, while surrounding his coffin in a mass, to render him a signal homage. If a contest ensued, it was not the friends of General Lamarque who took the initiative; they were insulted, provoked, threatened, and attacked by police and soldiers, by town-sergeants and dragoons. Here, an individual in a balcony refused to take off his hat as the procession passed; there,

a popular flag was thrown into the gutter. These incidents and others of a similar character, with the extreme precautions and offensive bravadoes of the agents or partisans of power, irritated and inflamed the crowd. The tumult began in different places,—involuntarily, accidentally, partially, and perhaps in more than one instance provoked by the officials of the police. Who struck the first blows? Who committed the greatest excesses? No one could tell; and now, this can never be ascertained; everybody lamented what occurred; but there was nothing to impute to the friends of General Lamarque, of the people, or of liberty.

Time has rolled on; light has risen on the past; France has changed her system and her master; King Louis-Philippe has fallen; the Republic has had its hour, during which its partisans could boast of rather than shrink from avowing it; with them, the crudity of assertion has superseded the hypocrisy of denial. But even before, and in much stronger terms after, the 24th of February, 1848, they have proclaimed, asserted, and demonstrated that the insurrection of the 5th and 6th of June, 1832, was a great republican attempt; they have multiplied their details and evidences. Their public and secret societies, *The Associated Union of July*, *The Society of the Rights of Men*, *The Society of the Friends of the People*, had all joined in the funeral procession of General Lamarque, bearing their titles inscribed on their flags. Cries of *Down with Louis-Philippe! Long live the Republic!* resounded as they passed along. It was to promote the cause of the republicans that the pupils of the Polytechnic School and other great public seminaries

placed themselves in their ranks. If some had been drawn in by the general enthusiasm without knowing its precise object, they were speedily enlightened. "But, in fact, where are they leading us to?" demanded one in the platoon in which he marched. "To the Republic," replied another, wearing the decoration of July, who commanded the party, "and assure yourself that we shall sup tonight at the Tuileries." When the assembly arrived at the square of the Bastille, an officer of the 12th light infantry advanced towards the first group, and said to its leader, "I am a republican; you may reckon on us." In truth, in less than an hour the honest republicans could easily perceive that they were neither alone nor masters in the procession. The red flag and the scarlet cap, those symbols of the reign of terror, were openly exhibited. "There were amongst them," said M. de La Fayette himself, "some young fanatics who would have killed me in honour of the red bonnet." Very simple indeed were those who had not foreseen this. With us it is the inseparable condition of republicanism to have for army such an array of madmen, accompanied by the lawless bands who march behind them. When the system of a republic assimilates neither with the ideas, the manners, nor the wishes of those classes who are the natural friends of order; when regulated and peaceable interests repulse it with dislike and suspicion;—that system is then condemned to the alliance, or rather to the contest of evil passions. Unable to bear liberty, it can only find strength in violence and subversion. The republicans of the 5th and 6th of June, 1832, stopped short of this extreme, but eight days of success would

have as assuredly carried them to it, as they subsequently did their disciples of 1848.

When defeat became palpable, and a continuance of the strife, even on the part of the most enthusiastic, resolved itself into a question of personal honour and faith beyond the tomb, then arose the instances of courage and devotion which reflect credit on the worst causes, and impart to them, even in utter overthrow, a formidable though fruitless strength. Almost at the same moment—on the 6th of June with the one party, and on the 7th with the other—a hundred republicans at Paris, in the cloister of Saint-Méry, and fifty legitimists at the castle of La Pénissière, near Clisson, in La Vendée, surrounded by enemies, by fire and ruins, resisted to the last moment, and died respectively with cries of *Long live the Republic! Long live Henry V.*, yielding up their lives as a human sacrifice, perhaps in the hope of thus advancing a future they were destined never to behold.

In this world there are only two great moral powers, faith and sound sense. Evil waits on the times when they are separated! They are epochs when revolutions miscarry or governments fall.

The defence of order against insurrection was as courageous and almost as impassioned as the attack: At that time, both the national guard, called in to put down the revolt, and the entire portion of the people unconnected with factious parties, were impressed with a sincere and active indignation against the conspirators who, without necessity or provoking cause, without motives they could openly avow, and for the sole gratification of their personal views or passions, disturbed the public peace, and

plunged the country once more into fresh revolutionary troubles before it had recovered from those already endured. The military chieftains who, under the cogent and laborious discipline of the Empire, had been taught respect and attachment to authority, were astonished at finding in these soldiers of a day—proprietors, shopkeepers, and artisans—such eager and determined ardour. A worthy representative of the old warriors, Marshal Lobau, with his rough features, blunt solemnity, and paucity of words, as if he were in a hurry to be silent, bore witness to the excellent conduct of these troops, hitherto strangers to him, and which at first he had hesitated to command. His chief of the staff, General Jacqueminot, quite as brave and more communicative, related with natural emotion the numerous instances of spontaneous and patriotic courage to which he had been witness. “Three of the leaders who acted under their orders, M. Gabriel Delessert, a citizen born a soldier,” said Marshal Lobau in his report, “and the Generals Schramm and Tiburce Sébastiani, have furnished me with complete details of what they effected with the national guard and the troops of the line: these reports have been read in the different guard-houses, in the coffee-rooms, and in the public squares with lively demonstrations of military and popular satisfaction.”

During the morning of June the 6th, while the struggle was still maintained on several points, the King traversed every quarter of Paris on horseback, passing in review the different troops he encountered, stopping wherever a crowd had assembled, received almost everywhere with triumphant acclamations, and presenting himself before

silent and suspicious groups, as if resolved by his calm resolution to defy their savage hostility. To the officers of his suite, who urged him to be more cautious, he replied, "Fear nothing; I have a stout cuirass in my five sons." A report was circulated on the following day that during this progress, a body of insurgents, within reach of the King and ready to fire on him, were as much deterred by his confident bearing as by a sense of their own danger.

As soon as I became acquainted with the insurrection, I repaired to the Tuileries, anxious to learn correctly what had happened, and to ascertain whether I could in any way assist in the re-establishment of public order. I found there several members of both Chambers, M. Thiers amongst others, animated by a sentiment similar to my own. The King had just arrived from St. Cloud with the Queen, to whom he had said, "Amélie, there is a disturbance in Paris; I am going there," to which she replied, "Then I go too." The Council of ministers assembled. We conversed in an adjoining saloon with all who came and went, whether belonging to the royal household, or strangers seeking and bringing news and opinions. It has been said that the number of these visitors was small, and that they appeared more disturbed than friendly. I do not recollect to have been so impressed. I have seen so much of the human weakness and duplicity, and am so accustomed to look for both, that when they exhibit themselves I scarcely pay them the compliment of remark. Of this I am certain, that amongst the politicians who assembled that day at the Tuileries, in the midst of serious inquietude, there was

a stanch adherence to the King's government and a firm resolution to maintain its authority.

On the very day of the royal progress through Paris, at the moment of the King's return, and while the Council of ministers was still sitting, his Majesty was apprised that three deputies of the opposition, who had all affixed their signatures to the *Account Rendered*, MM. Laffitte, Odilon-Barrot, and Arago, had arrived at the Tuileries, and requested admission to his presence. The King left the council-chamber, and hastened to receive them. The step on their part was opportune and honourable. Looking upon the insurrection as almost extinguished, and national order on the point of being completely restored, they came, with a sincere conviction and loyal purpose, to attempt with the King precisely what they had essayed with the public through the medium of the *Account Rendered*; namely, to urge the King to change his **system**, and to substitute the policy of leaving things to their course and of concession, which they called the policy of confidence, in place of the policy of resistance. They themselves signed a sort of copy of the conversation, which was long and animated. This copy has been published more than once; and no one, as far as I know, has ever disputed its authenticity. It was, in truth, little more than a paraphrase of the *Account Rendered*, under the more detailed and animated form of a controversy. M. Laffitte was mild and occasionally embarrassed; M. Odilon-Barrot, moderate, respectful, and almost affectionate; M. Arago, inconsiderate, bitter, and at certain moments so carried away, that the King said to him, "Monsieur Arago, there is no occasion to speak so loud."

On looking over today the accounts of that interview, I think, and all impartial readers will, I have no doubt, agree with me, that the King maintained the advantage throughout, in regard to depth of ideas, just appreciation of facts, and argumentative strength. He, however, committed an error, serious at the moment and aggravated by time. Whether from an impulse of personal pride, or to give additional power to the policy he maintained and to impress the certainty of its continuance, he claimed it with some impatience as his own exclusive work, giving thenceforward to the reproach ever afterwards levelled against him, a more plausible foundation than it actually possessed. Truth and prudence could have desired that, while justly vindicating his own share in the policy of order and peace, he had equally admitted the part taken by the Chambers, and by the majority in both formed in support of his government; by the advisers with which that majority had furnished him, and above all, by the eminent minister he had so recently lost, and whose energy he had found so essential and effective. At that moment, while conversing with MM. Laffitte, Odilon-Barrot, and Arago, King Louis-Philippe might have well remembered what he once said to M. d'Haubersaert, "I must tell you that if I had not found M. Casimir Périer on the 13th of March, I should have been compelled to swallow Salverte and Dupont entirely raw."

On this occasion I find, with reference to myself, in some publications of the day, a pretended fact, which I shall revive, contrary to my usual practice, and solely on account of the strange transformation it underwent

with progressive recitals. It was said at first, "At the moment when the carriage containing the three deputies passed the iron gates of the palace, a friend passing out from the interior approached them and said, 'Go quickly, Guizot has just left.'"¹ A little later, this invitation to the three deputies to oppose their influence to mine, became a hint to pause lest they should incur personal danger. "Just as the clock struck three, an open carriage, containing MM. Arago, Odilon-Barrot, and Laffitte, entered the court of the Tuileries. An unknown person, rushing to the head of the horse, seized it by the bridle, and exclaimed, 'Take care, gentlemen; M. Guizot is now leaving the King's apartment; your lives are in danger.'"² There is no calumny, however absurd, that does not find some one to relate, and others to believe it; nevertheless, I feel convinced that if the honourable men whose names are mixed up with this, had been aware of what was said, they would have shrugged their shoulders with extreme contempt; and I should have been surprised to find such extravagance repeated in a book intended to be serious, did I not know that party spirit explains everything, even to the credulity of otherwise rational people.

The cabinet appeared to have won a great triumph. It had subdued the boldest and most determined insurrection yet attempted in opposition to the new government. M. Casimir Périer himself had never encountered an equal danger. But the ministry over which he no

¹ 'La Fayette and the Revolution of 1838,' by B. Sarrans, junior, vol. ii. p. 384.

² 'History of Ten Years,' by M. Louis Blanc, vol. iii. p. 305.

longer presided had points of weakness that the struggle, though successful, brought into light. Almost before victory was secured, it adopted two measures, the evil consequences of which more than balanced the advantages gained. By declaring Paris in a state of siege, and by the summary arrests of M. de Châteaubriand, the Duke de Fitz-james, M. Hyde de Neuville, and M. Berryer, as accomplices in the civil war they had endeavoured to prevent, the ministers restored to the opposition, in a moral and legal sense, the ground it had lost in the streets, and reduced themselves to the necessity of defence against the parties they had vanquished.

The ablest and most independent lawyers differed amongst themselves, and such a diversity of opinion was not surprising, as to the legality of the state of siege established in Paris by the decree of the 6th of June; 1832. A few months later, and after the fall of the cabinet, when the question was debated in the Chambers, I requested one of the magistrates most profoundly versed in criminal jurisprudence, and my own particular friend, M. Vincens Saint-Laurent, at that time president of the Royal Court of Paris, to explain to me the different bearings of the case. He, in consequence, transmitted to me a note on the question, so complete and precise that I take pleasure in publishing it, as much for the interest of truth as in memory of the learned and impartial author.¹ Whatever might be the foundation for such a measure, the greater number of the members in opposition, deputies or writers, disputed its legality with a bad grace, at the moment of

¹ See Historic Documents, No. XVII.

a flagrant insurrection, when they had not only admitted without contest, but even urged the same act in the departments of the West, under a much less pressing danger. But, independently of the question of legal right as regarded the cabinet, there was also a question of conduct ; and in this lay their principal mistake. Even though the legality of declaring Paris in a state of siege, and of consigning many insurgents to councils of war, had been universally admitted, it would have been more judicious to have abstained from both proceedings. Government prosecuted the accused parties on account of recent, evident, and palpable facts ; and in the midst of a very general and animated expression of public feeling against the insurrection. It might have trusted the care of justice to the ordinary tribunals. Provided there was no time wasted in futile processes, the Parisian juries would in all probability have dealt more severely with the offenders than did the courts-martial in their rapid exercise, vexed and apprehensive that they should be looked upon as servile commissions.¹ And even if legal repression had failed, if the weakness of the juries had restored to the accused their natural arrogance, this alone would probably have excited an outburst of public in-

¹ Much probability is given to this conjecture by the number of condemnations against accused parties prosecuted on account of the insurrection of the 5th and 6th of June, as soon as the Court of Appeal had declared the incompetence of the councils of war, and ordered all these cases to be brought before the Court of Assize. I add to the *Historic Documents* (No. XVIII.) the list of these condemnations, amounting to eighty-two, the details of which I found in the '*Memoirs of M. Gisquet*,' at that time prefect of police ; a work which, from the nature and positiveness of the information it contains, has more claims to importance and historic influence than it has hitherto obtained.

dignation and alarm, whence the government might have derived the strength of which it stood in need. M. de Montalivet, sympathizing with the first cry of the friends of order in the midst of danger and combat, certainly performed an act of courage in pledging his responsibility for such a measure; but it was the boldness of a young and ardent defender of invaded society and monarchy; not the prudent firmness of an experienced and far-sighted politician. King Louis-Philippe on this point deceived himself less than his ministers; for at the first moment he rejected the idea of declaring the state of siege;¹ and I have already quoted words of M. Casimir Périer to prove that if he had lived, power would not have received the check which, in the name of the Charter, it was compelled to submit to by the Court of Appeal.

Perhaps a mistake of a different kind, the arrests of MM. de Châteaubriand, Fitz-james, Hyde de Neuville, and Berryer, was an error of no less importance. These gentlemen were hostile to the King's government, but they were not insurgents or conspirators. They neither wished nor believed that the present system would

¹ As a general theory, he had a repugnance to this measure, and refused to adopt it in November, 1831, when the insurrection of the working-classes at Lyons was still in progress. Amongst the 'Historic Documents' (No. XIX.) I insert a letter on this subject from the King to Marshal Soult, at that time employed to put down this rising.

To this letter I add another from Count d'Argout, then minister for Trade and Public Works, to Marshal Soult, dated November, 1831, which embraces the formal instructions of the cabinet on the question of the tariff of salaries and other relations between the employers and labourers. These instructions are perfectly conformable with sound practical sense and the principles of science. I have only recently obtained knowledge of this despatch.

continue, but they had no desire or expectation that plots and civil war should be called in for its overthrow. They sought other arms for that purpose; and it was not by dungeons and prosecutions that they ought to have been opposed. The Restoration, in similar circumstances, had furnished a wise and noble example. MM. de La Fayette, d'Argenson, and Manuel were undoubtedly more determined and formidable enemies to that political event, than MM. de Châteaubriand, de Fitz-james, Hyde de Neuville, and Berryer had either the power or inclination to show themselves against the government of July. From 1820 to 1822 the Duke de Richelieu and M. de Villèle had stronger grounds of accusation, and much more direct evidence against the first-named leaders of opposition, than the cabinet of 1832 could possibly collect against the legitimist partisans arrested by its authority. Nevertheless, the former were never imprisoned or brought to justice. The ministry of that day understood that the power which aspires to terminate revolutions, ought not to carry mortal war into the highest regions of society. It is by striking the most exalted heads that revolutionists endeavour to inflame the struggle and to compromise the people irrevocably in their cause. The political advocates of order and social peace should adopt a very opposite line of conduct. It does not become them to distinguish thus the parties they combat, or to signalize in such a decided manner their principal enemies. There was a want of tact and true policy in arresting these men of rank and importance, and who were almost immediately liberated; MM. de Châteaubriand, de Fitz-james, and Hyde de

Neuville, because the judges in Paris could find no charge against them, and M. Berryer, because a jury at Blois pronounced him innocent.

Under the pressure of these mistakes, and the weight of a position by which it was overpowered, the cabinet soon found itself weaker than before the insurrection it had put down; its enemies became impetuous and aggressive; its friends uneasy and impatient. General Sébastiani had no want of ability in dealing with persons; but the increasing complications of the affairs for which he was responsible, his frigid pride in debate, and some ill-timed expressions, had made him extremely unpopular; and what was worse, having only partially recovered from a severe illness, he was tired and exhausted; his qualities wanted the external recommendation which might have excused or enforced them. He had much judgment and courage, but no brilliancy or grace; he was obstinate without being imposing, and was moreover looked upon as too pliant with the King. M. de Montalivet, young and devoted, was also considered too yielding, or at least not sufficiently independent. His fortune had commenced at court, not in the Chambers, and political authorities have no taste for reputations not acquired under their own wings and influence. Since the death of M. Casimir Périer, Baron Louis took little interest in public business. He no longer felt the support he wanted, to conduct, as he desired, the finances of the State. Already old, he had introduced his nephew, Admiral de Rigny, into the cabinet, and having thus provided for the interests of his family, which he had much at heart, he was ready to leave, of his own accord,

an unsafe vessel. Violently attacked, the ministry was weakly defended, and deficient in resources for self-protection.

The King was anxious to rejuvenate and fortify his present cabinet, but had no desire for a change. When we possess what we like, we readily forget what we want. The advisers who continued round him after the death of M. Casimir Périer were faithful, courageous, judicious; all thought as he did, or allowed themselves to be easily persuaded; not one amongst them impeded him with obstacle or opposition. Wherein then lay their deficiency? They wanted influence and eloquence in the Chambers. If the King could reinforce them with one or two new members endowed with those gifts and devoted also to the policy of order and peace, he might obtain what he required, while keeping the men he preferred. M. Dupin naturally presented himself to his mind. The King sent for him to Saint-Cloud, and retained him there an entire day, endeavouring to induce him to join the cabinet, and promising to himself a material advantage in the Chambers, without making too great a sacrifice of his own influence in the government, or of his personal renown in Europe. But M. Dupin had also his susceptibilities and demands which the King had not foreseen. When impelled by circumstances he had often displayed boldly, in the service of the good cause, the natural and eloquent vein of his lively intellect; but he had no turn for great tasks and important responsibilities. Public functions gratified him far beyond political power. All general engagements or long and pressing obligations were repugnant to the vivacity of

his spirit, the whims of his disposition, or the calculations of his prudence. He liked to serve, but not to devote himself; and even when he did serve he kept himself as much disentangled as possible, resuming incessantly, by sudden inconsistencies, some portion or appearance of the independence he had seemed to sacrifice. He listened with perplexity to the King's proposal; he argued, objected, hesitated; suggested in reply, more or less obscurely, his reservations and demands;—amongst others, that two of the ministers, General Sébastiani and M. de Montalivet, should leave the cabinet, and that there should be a President of the Council;—a condition which, as he said, his friends had imposed on him as a law. The King hesitated in his turn, and after two or three conversations, interrupted by mutual objections, M. Dupin, to escape without positive acceptance or refusal, departed suddenly for the country. Repeated messages pursued him there. He returned, resumed the negotiation, appeared for a moment to yield to the urgency of the case; but upon fresh hesitations, whether arising from the King or from himself, he left Paris for the second time, leaving the King without much hope of inducing him to become minister, and with little regret that his efforts had not succeeded.

Within and without, the situation became pressing. The civil war of the legitimists in the west failed, like the republican insurrection in Paris, but it was not extinguished; and in the capital, with a cabinet deprived of present strength and hopeless for the future, commotion was ever ready to recommence. The affairs of Belgium were determined, but still in suspense. To clear

that question definitively, it became necessary to execute by force the treaty of the 15th of November, 1831, adopted by the Conference of London, and ratified by all the contracting powers, but to which the King of Holland refused to submit. The Belgian Chambers and King Leopold pressed urgently the completion of the treaty. M. de Talleyrand, who had taken Paris on his way to the waters of Bourbon-l'Archambault, insisted that a cabinet should be formed capable of accomplishing this work, and of resuming with Europe in general the confidence which M. Casimir Périer had established. To meet these emergencies an early meeting of the French Chambers had become necessary, and the cabinet, as it stood at present, was evidently unequal to what they would require. King Louis-Philippe neither anticipated nor forestalled this necessity; but when it was pressed upon him, he recognized and adopted it without remonstrance; he cast aside his regrets, his preferences, his mistakes, and commanded Marshal Soult, as President of the Council, to lay before him the programme of a new cabinet.

Both by character and position, the Marshal was well suited to this task, which he undertook with alacrity, and has several times accomplished with good success. He had no established ideas on political subjects; no decided party, no permanent adherents. I may even go further: his profession, his rank, and his fame enabled him to dispense with them. He conducted policy as he had commanded in war,—for the service of the State and the head of the State, according to their interests, and, for the time being, thinking himself only

called upon to succeed for them and for himself, and always ready, when occasion required, to change either his course or his allies, without the slightest hesitation. But with this indifference, or, as I may say, this voluntary aptitude for a species of polygamy in politics, he was not deficient in the spirit of government, in resolution under difficulties, or in perseverance in the enterprises of which he undertook the charge. It would have been equally dangerous to rely on his devotion or to mistrust his fidelity. He required securities and his own personal advantages: these obtained, he had no fear of responsibility, but, on the contrary, was ready to cover the King with his name, who found in him neither obstinate wishes nor inconvenient pretensions; but merely on some occasions certain spontaneous or premeditated jealousies, easily calmed down. In other respects his mind was rude and uncultivated, somewhat confused and incoherent, but at the same time judicious, fertile in resources, of indefatigable activity, and strong as his physical conformation. He possessed, moreover, in the practice of life, a natural authority, great in the army even with his equals, predominating with his subordinate administrators, and which he always knew how to bring into play in the political arena, with effective, though rather refined artifice, either to impose on his adversaries or to evade the embarrassment of discussion.

In naming Marshal Soult President of the Council, and in committing to him the formation of a new cabinet, the King was perfectly aware that he must yield up the principal elements of the old one, and that neither General Sébastiani nor M. de Montalivet could entertain any

doubts of their immediate dismissal. Notwithstanding his love of public office, General Sébastiani knew how to act when he found retreat inevitable, and he considered both his honour and ability pledged to give the best possible advice to the King and the country. He himself pointed out his successor in the department of foreign affairs, and urged the King to select the Duke de Broglie as the fittest person to maintain, with proper dignity in the Chambers and with Europe, the peace policy so firmly carried out by M. Casimir Périer, but still menaced by difficulties and dangers. M. de Talleyrand gave the same advice. He had no intimate acquaintance with the Duke de Broglie, but he knew the high esteem in which he was held in England, and he was confident of finding in him, as regarded his own particular mission at London, a loyal and effective ally. The Duke de Broglie was not then in Paris; after having presided at the general council of the Eure, he had returned to his estate. M. de Rémusat repaired thither immediately, to invite him, on the part of the King and Marshal Soult, to concert with them the formation of a new cabinet, of which it was already ascertained that M. Thiers would form a member.

The Duke de Broglie complied with this invitation, and on his arrival, appeared disposed to accept, under the presidency of Marshal Soult, the ministry of Foreign Affairs; but from the first moment he made my entry into the cabinet the *sine quâ non* condition of his own. The Marshal, those of the old ministers who were to retain place, and even the King himself, felt uneasy. All did me the honour of expressing themselves in highly

complimentary terms as to my personal character; but I was so unpopular. I had served the Restoration; I had been despatched to Ghent; I had deeply offended the revolutionary party by attacking not only their excesses, but their principles. My presence in the council would be a source of irritation which would aggravate the difficulties, already so weighty, of its position. The Duke de Broglie remained inflexible, and for some days the negotiation with him was broken off.

They then returned to M. Dupin. He had gone to his estate at Raffigny, at the foot of the mountains of the Nièvre. Marshal Soult despatched one of his aides-de-camp to him on the 5th of October, 1832, requesting him to come to Paris, and arrange in concert the composition of the new cabinet, of which he had lately promised to become a member. M. Dupin has himself published this letter of the Marshal, with his answer, dated the 7th of October,—a peremptory refusal, accompanied by a long explanation of his motives. Through all these returns to the attempts of the preceding month, the appeals to the reminiscences of some of the actors, and the reserve or ingenuity of the language, it was easy to discover a secret emotion of fear to undertake a mission that embraced great responsibility and risk: a marked preference for the part of a free political skirmisher, who, without deserting his camp, might select at will his moment of attack or retreat, and express his ill-humour if, during his absence, any combinations are planned without his concurrence or advice. In fine, M. Dupin formally refused not only accession to the ministry, but even the invitation to repair to Paris to discuss the subject.

There are always in negotiations of this nature, and in the misunderstandings by which they are embarrassed, motives more or less influential than those that are openly avowed. Either the men who are invited to join in the same work and refuse, have, in their inmost hearts, a conviction that they are not governed by the same principles and instincts; or some personal pretensions, some hidden jealousies, some permanent discrepancy of habit, relations, tastes, or manners, render the juxtaposition inconvenient, and the associated life impracticable. It is not alone accidental circumstances that regulate the sympathy or antipathy of minds; they would hesitate less to unite if they were not seriously opposed and divided.

Whether the refusal of M. Dupin was expected or not, it led to a second application to the Duke de Broglie. The uneasiness arising from my unpopularity had diminished; the King and Marshal Soult readily adopted their own view; mutual friends, especially M. de Rémusat, had successfully combated this vulgar objection in the naturally expanded and unfettered mind of M. Thiers. An expedient was thought of which almost neutralized its importance. Instead of calling me to the Home Affairs, I was offered the ministry of Public Instruction. In this department I might be considered a specialty. On the 31st of July, 1830, the Municipal Committee, so active under the popular movement, had appointed me to that office. The public thought I was suited to it, and my friends were of opinion that it suited me. On the 29th of September, 1832, M. Royer-Collard wrote to me as follows:—"I confess that I have no

ardent desire to see my friends subjected to trials which exceed mortal strength. The time to govern has not yet arrived. The age in which we live is devoted to anarchy for many tedious years. I am quite convinced that we shall not perish under it ; but so far is it from exhaustion, that it has yet many known and unknown phases to present us with." And again, on the 14th of October following, when he heard that the cabinet was formed :—" Since you are compelled to re-enter, as you say, into the furnace, I much prefer that it should be through the ministry of Public Instruction. You will march to the breach, but you will have the credit of the march. You are not placed there as a signal of attack. What can I say to you that you are not already acquainted with? You are thoroughly versed in the composition of our society, the diseased state of the public mind, and the contradictory principles of the new government. You will neither want courage nor prudence ; the latter quality in these days should be very predominant. You will have to gain a majority ; I am disposed to think that may not be impossible ; but it will require management. Remember me, I beg of you, to the Duke de Broglie ; you know how much I esteem and honour him. In his case also, I prefer the Foreign Affairs. Your two appointments are the best that could have been made."

I should not have shrunk from resuming the position of direct, avowed, and daily strife in which the ministry of the Interior had placed me in 1830 : neither did I hesitate more to undertake that in which my unpopularity, as was supposed, seemed, in 1832, to promise

less inconvenience to the Cabinet. It has been said, that I took pleasure in braving unpopularity. This is a mistake; I bestowed no thought on the subject. The aspect and intentions of the new ministry were perfectly agreeable to me. With the exception of M. Dupin, it presented a union of the men who in 1830 were the first to proclaim and support the policy of resistance to the spirit of revolution, and who since 1831 had assisted M. Casimir Perier to carry it on with consistency and vigour. The department of Public Instruction had besides a peculiar charm for me, both with reference to my reminiscences and to what I still hoped to effect. No obstacle interfered to prevent the completion of the cabinet; which assumed office from the 11th of October, 1832, allowing itself scarcely five weeks to prepare for the session of the Chambers, then immediately convoked for the 19th of the following month.

HISTORIC DOCUMENTS.

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No. I.

(Page 5.)

*Protest of the Deputies against the Decrees of the
25th of July, 1830.*

28th July, 1830.

The undersigned, regularly elected as representatives by the divisional colleges above named, in virtue of the royal decree of —, and conformably with the constitutional Charter and the electoral laws of —, and now actually present in Paris,—

Consider ourselves imperatively called upon by our duties, as well as by our honour, to protest against the measures which the advisers of the Crown have lately adopted for the overthrow of the legal system of election and the liberty of the press.

These measures, comprised in the decrees of the 25th inst., are, in the estimation of the undersigned, directly opposed to the constitutional privileges of the Chamber of Peers, the public rights of the French people, the functions and sentences of the courts of justice; and calculated to plunge the State into a confusion which equally compromises the peace of the present and the security of the future.

The undersigned, therefore, inviolably faithful to their oaths, protest with common accord, not only against the said measure, but against the acts which may consequently result.

And considering, on the one hand, that the Chamber of Deputies, not having been constituted, cannot be legally dissolved ; on the other, that the attempt to form another Chamber of Deputies, in a new and arbitrary manner, is a formal contradiction to the constitutional Charter and the rights possessed by the electors, the undersigned declare that they look upon themselves as legally elected to the Chamber by the divisional and departmental colleges in which they gained a majority of votes ; and as not liable to be replaced except by a new election carried on according to forms and principles in accordance with the law.

And if the undersigned fail to exercise effectually the rights and duties conferred on them by their legal election, it is solely because they are prevented by physical violence.

Here follow the names of the Deputies.

No. II.

(Page 9.)

Proclamation addressed to the French people by the Deputies of the Departments assembled at the Palais-Bourbon, after the invitation and arrival of his Royal Highness the Duke of Orleans at Paris.

July 31st, 1830.

Frenchmen,

France is free ! Absolute power elevated its standard ; the heroic population of Paris has beaten it down. Paris, under attack, has made the sacred cause triumph by arms which had succeeded already through the constitutional elections. A power usurping our rights and invading our repose, threatened at the same time liberty and order. There is no longer any apprehension for our acquired privileges ; no barrier between us and those we still demand.

A government which, without delay, can secure to us these advantages, is the first necessity of the country. Frenchmen, those amongst your Deputies who have already arrived in Paris have met together, and in anticipation of the regular concurrence of the Chambers, have invited a true Frenchman, one who has never fought but for France, the Duke of Orleans, to exercise the functions of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom. This, in their eyes, is the surer means of accomplishing, by immediate peace, the success of the most legitimate opposition. The Duke of Orleans is devoted to the national and constitutional cause, the interests and principles of which he has ever defended. He will respect our rights, for he will hold

his own from us. We shall secure to ourselves by law all the guarantees we require, to render liberty strong and permanent.

The re-establishment of the National Guards, with their personal intervention in the choice of their officers ;

The interference of the citizens in the arrangement of departmental and municipal administration ;

The trial by jury for offences of the press ;

The responsibility, legally organized, of the ministers and secondary agents of government ;

The position of the military legally settled ;

The re-election of deputies promoted to public situations.

We shall thus, in concert with the head of the state, afford to our institutions the developments of which they stand in need.

Frenchmen, the Duke of Orleans himself has spoken, and his language suits a free people. "The Chambers," says he, "are going to assemble ; they will debate on measures for assuring the sovereignty of the laws, and the preservation of national rights. The Charter will henceforward be a fact."

No. III.

(Page 49.)

Statement of the Condition of the Kingdom, presented to the Chambers on the 13th of September, 1830, by M. Guizot, Minister of the Interior.

Gentlemen,

The King has commanded us to lay before you a summary of the state of France and the acts of Government since the glorious Revolution which founded his throne while preserving our country.

Proud of its origin, the Government feels the necessity of declaring openly how it comprehends and proposes to fulfil its delegated mission.

It is the result of an heroic effort, suddenly attempted, to secure our liberties and national interests from the encroachments of despotism, superstition, and privilege.

In a few days the enterprise was accomplished, with a respect and consideration for public order and private rights until then without example.

Inspired with just pride, France has determined that such a noble triumph shall not be without fruits. She looks upon herself as delivered from the system of deception, doubt, and imbecility, by which she has been so long irritated and exhausted. She has reckoned on consistent and just policy which may open to her a vast career of activity and freedom. She desires to advance on that road with a regular and firm step.

It is in this character of the event from which it sprang,

and the hopes by which France is animated, that the Government seeks the rule of its conduct.

It feels called upon to draw its strength from the institutions which secure the liberty of the country; to maintain legitimate order by the progressive amelioration of the laws; to second without fear, in the bosom of peace resolutely protected, the development of all faculties and the exercise of all rights.

Such, in the estimation of the Government, is the policy calculated to produce the full fruits of our Revolution.

To realize it, a preliminary task was imposed. It became necessary to take complete possession of power, and to place it in the hands of men capable of securing the triumph of the national cause. Through the conquests of 1789, the social condition of France has been regenerated. By the victory of 1830, her institutions have received in a single day the reforms of which they stood in need. An administration everywhere in accordance with the present state of society and the Charter; an unremitting application of principles irrevocably consecrated: such is today the pressing necessity, the unanimous desire of the country. Many personal changes became therefore the first duty of the Government; by this step its presence was undeniably felt, and its accession proclaimed by itself. The work advances towards its completion. Time must decide on the merit of the selections. But we may even now form a correct idea of the extent and celerity of what has been effected. We shall briefly explain to you the principal results.

Although scarcely in the exercise of his duties, the minister of War has provided for the command of the military divisions and subdivisions. Seventy-five general-officers have been appointed, sixty-five are removed, and ten retain their posts: these last merited the exception by the promptitude and frankness of their adhesion.

At the same time, and from the 8th of August, the general-

officers employed in the ordinary inspection of the troops were recalled, and ten lieutenant- or major-generals despatched to the different corps, with orders to announce the accession of the King, to prevent disagreement, and to arrange the necessary changes amongst the officers.

Thirty-nine regiments of infantry, and twenty-six of cavalry, have received new colonels. Many substitutions have taken place in the subordinate ranks.

New commandants have been appointed to thirty-one important garrisons.

A commission of general-officers, on duty since the 16th of August, has examined the claims of officers to active employment. Their labour has made an important advance.

Measures have been adopted, since the beginning of August, for disbanding the Swiss regiments of the old royal guard and the line. They are now in rapid execution. The disbanding of the French battalions of the ex-guard and of the household of King Charles X. is completed.

To make up for the reductions thus occasioned, the effective strength of the infantry regiments of the line will be increased to 1500 men; that of the cavalry to 700; and of the artillery and engineers to 1200 and 1450, respectively, for each battalion.

Three new regiments—one of cavalry, under the title of *Lancers of Orleans*, and two of the line, numbered 65 and 66, with six battalions of light-infantry—are now in progress of organization.

Two battalions of gendarmes on foot have been specially embodied for service in the departments of the West.

A municipal guard has been instituted for the city of Paris. More than half the number of men of which it is intended to be composed are ready for active service.

The general commanding in Africa has been replaced. The national flag displays itself in the ranks of that army, which has shown itself as eager to welcome as worthy to march

under it, and will receive the rewards it has so valiantly earned.

Thus, at the expiration of five weeks, the personal composition of the army is renewed, or near the completion of renewal.

The marine required less extensive reforms. By its nature this service requires a combination of special knowledge and continued practical experience. Thus, the former government had been compelled to retain or admit officers who openly avowed opinions in direct opposition. They were eager to hail our revolution, which has fulfilled their desires. In that department few changes were therefore necessary. Nevertheless, certain abuses that had crept in have been abolished. Three rear-admirals, twelve captains of men-of-war, five captains of frigates, four lieutenants, and one ensign, have been allowed to retire on half-pay. A commission, under the presidency of the senior officer of the navy, is carefully examining the claims of the officers removed by the old authorities. A newly-created rank, that of Admirals of France, has secured to the naval service proportionate rewards, and has raised it from an appearance of inferiority, when compared with the army, which until now has exclusively held the dignity of Marshal of France. Finally, the illustrious commander of our fleet employed in Africa has received from the King, by his elevation to that step, the just recompense of his toils; and his companions will find, on their return to France, the promotion and distinctions they have so meritoriously earned.

In no department was reform more necessary or more ardently desired, than in the internal administration. The greater part of the officials employed, anxious or passive instruments of a system of fraud and violence, had incurred the just displeasure of the country. Even those whose efforts had tended to diminish the evil, were worn out in the thankless struggle, and had lost that moral ascendancy over the people, that prompt and easy confidence, which marks the great effi-

cacy of power, particularly when exercised in the presence of liberty. Seventy-six prefects out of 86, 196 sub-prefects in 277, 53 secretaries-general in 86, and 127 councillors of prefecture in 315, have been changed. In anticipation of the law to regulate municipal administration, 393 substitutions have already taken place; and a circular has directed the prefects to make as many more, without delay, as they may consider necessary, referring the definitive confirmation of these appointments to the minister of the Interior.

The minister of Justice has directed his whole attention to the composition of the bar, with reference equally to the supreme tribunals and the inferior civil courts. In the first, 74 general attorneys, advocates, and deputies, and in the second, 254 king's attorneys and deputies have been replaced. In the permanent magistracy, the government has hastened to fill up all vacancies, whether arising from resignations or any other cause. Under this head, 103 nominations of presidents, councillors, and judges, have already taken place. As occasions arise, these changes will be continued. The justices of peace are under scrupulous examination.

In the Council of State, and waiting the fundamental reform in preparation, the number of members actually engaged has been provisionally reduced from 55 to 38; of the latter, 20 have been changed. The Council of Public Instruction was formerly composed of 9 members; 5 are now discharged. A similar measure has been adopted with regard to 5 inspectors-general, and 14 rectors of academies, out of 25. Arrangements are also in progress to introduce changes into the colleges during the vacations, the convenience of which will be readily acknowledged. A commission has been appointed to send in a prompt report on the School of Medicine, and to prepare its re-organization.

The position of the minister of Finance, with regard to his personal staff, was peculiarly delicate. There is a wide distinction to be drawn between the principal financial agents

and other functionaries. Their affairs are mixed up, and interwoven with those of the state, and require time for disentanglement. Months are necessary to enable one receiver-general to replace another. The retiring officer has accounts to settle; his successor has to establish confidence. In the midst of a crisis which could not fail to shake public credit, it would have been dangerous to discharge men of acknowledged reputation, and who were still willing to serve in the Treasury. In other branches of government, a confusion of several days is an evil; in the financial department, a momentary embarrassment would be a national calamity. Caution is therefore rendered imperative by the nature of things and the public interest. The minister of Finance has conformed to this necessity. In other respects he has commenced a sweeping reform, which he will follow up with scrupulous attention.

You perceive, gentlemen, that we confine ourselves to a simple statement of facts, from which it will appear evident that a very extensive remodelling has already taken place in the personal administration of France; and if in any one particular service the change has been less rapid than in another, the difference has arisen from the more pressing interests of the state.

In removing the former officials, we have sought to replace them by men pledged to the national cause, and ready to devote themselves to its advancement. But that cause is neither narrow nor exclusive; it admits many shades of opinions, and accept the names of all who are able and willing to promote its success. In the course of the vicissitudes by which France has been agitated for forty years, many individuals have proved themselves, in opposite positions, honest and useful citizens. There is no period of our contemporary history that cannot furnish examples of able administrators, incorruptible magistrates, and courageous patriots. We have sought for them in every quarter, and have taken them wherever they could be found. Thus, out of the 76 prefects nominated by the King,

47 have occupied no official post since 1814; 29 have been restored. Amongst the last, 18 were successively dismissed since 1820. In the first list, 23 filled administrative duties before 1814; 24 are entirely new men, introduced to public life by recent events. The time has arrived for France to employ talent of every description, and to avail herself of all the honour that has grown and flourished in her bosom. Notwithstanding its predominant importance during a crisis, the selection of individuals has not engrossed the entire attention of the government. Measures have also been taken to afford to the executive administration the regularity and harmony with which it cannot dispense.

From the 6th of August, the minister of War has issued orders to check desertions, and to compel the return of soldiers who had quitted their regiments. He has also provided for the redemption of the arms and horses abandoned by the deserters.

Many movements of troops have taken place, either with the view of re-organizing different corps, or to collect forces on points where their presence was deemed profitable.

Insubordination has exhibited itself in certain regiments of cavalry and artillery, and in a single battalion of infantry; but prompt measures have been adopted to re-establish order, to tighten the bonds of discipline, and to do justice to all.

All the different branches of service in the army have been attended to. The corps of the old royal guard and the Swiss regiments have punctiliously received, in pay and stock, all that they could justly claim. The supplies for the army of Africa are completed to the 1st November, adopting from imperative necessity the contracts previously entered into. The reports of the new commander-in-chief of that force will suggest improved methods of regulating such an important branch of the service.

The arming of the national guards is one of the special objects of ministerial solicitude. Orders have been issued to

collect and supply, without delay, all available muskets. A great number have been already issued.

The most indefatigable activity is exercised in the administration of the marine. Our men of war furrow at this moment the most distant seas, to carry to all parts of the globe the news of our recent events. They will cause the national flag to be respected in every land; and will ensure universal protection for French navigators and French commerce. Cruisers are placed with this object at the entrance to the Straits of Gibraltar, and along the entire extent of our own coasts.

Our squadron will continue to second the operations of the land forces in Africa; it will secure communications between Algiers and France, and no supplies will be in danger of mishap.

The Council of the Admiralty is occupied with combining the materials for a complete legislation in the colonies. A commission will be appointed to enable the government to lay this plan before the Chambers without delay.

New works have been commenced at Dunkirk and other ports. Perfect discipline reigns in all quarters; order is universally maintained in our ships as on shore, in the workshops and arsenals.

The irregularity of communication, the removal of public officers, the amount and importance of general affairs, during three weeks, somewhat slackened the ordinary labours of the ministry of the Interior. Not only have they resumed their course, but no traces of that momentary suspension exist at present. A simplified arrangement of central administration has rendered correspondence more regular and effective. Instructions have been issued to all districts on matters of general and pressing interest, on the organization of the national guards, the administration of the oath of allegiance to public functionaries, the publication of the lists of electors and jurymen, the prisons, etc. etc. All the prefects are now at their posts. Authority is re-organized

throughout the kingdom, and in vigorous exercise. Undoubtedly there are obstacles still in the way; some degree of agitation continues on certain points. It has exhibited itself at Nismes, and is apprehended in two or three departments of the south. Those of the west, so long the theatre of civil discord, are still under the influence of old fermentation. It is the duty of the government not to lose sight of these possible incentives to disorder, and to that duty it will not be found wanting. Already preventive means are in progress. Troops have marched towards the south; others are cantoned in the west. An active, and at the same time unobtrusive superintendence is in exercise on all points. It will suffice to prevent an evil which scarcely enters the dreams of the most misguided enthusiasts. The promptitude with which the disturbances at Nismes were suppressed, is much more reassuring than those troubles were calculated to alarm.

Another source of anxiety presents itself. There is reason to apprehend that our revolution and its results may encounter from a portion of the French clergy, an exposition of sentiments in little harmony with those of the country. The King's government, gentlemen, is not unacquainted with the imprudent harangues of certain individuals, or their underhand practices in aid of societies and assemblies that infringe the law. It watches without fearing them; entertaining a sincere respect for religion and liberty of conscience, but at the same time fully aware of the extent of public authority, and resolved to vindicate its power. The distinctions between civil and spiritual order will be strictly maintained. Every infraction of the laws of the country, and every attempt to disturb the public peace, will be forcibly repressed, let the offenders be who they may.

The government relies on the co-operation of all good citizens to remedy an evil of another description, the importance of which cannot be mistaken. We are assiduously occupied in preparing the budget, which will speedily be presented

to the Chambers. But the collection of certain taxes has encountered serious obstacles during the last six weeks, which have disappeared altogether in regard to the customs. In that branch of revenue, a momentary interruption on two points of the frontiers—in the departments of the Eastern Pyrenees and the Higher Rhine—was immediately remedied. The direct taxes are punctually paid in all quarters, *or*, let us rather say, with praiseworthy readiness. But disturbances arose in some districts on account of the impost on liquors, which interfered with the amount levied. Also, out of a product of fifteen millions, calculated on from indirect contributions during the single month of August, there will be a loss of two millions. The government having determined to apply to this particular class of taxes such modified reductions as may be considered necessary, will introduce a bill into the Chambers arranged in concert with the commission appointed for that object. France may therefore expect that in the different services to which the budget applies, economy will be carried as far as the public interests permit, and no measures will be neglected that may tend to diminish the burden on the rate-payers. But the great duty of the government, and the most pressing interests of the public demand that the revenue of the state should be free from all doubt or apprehension of deficiency. It is upon the certain and regular collection of the taxes that public credit rests; and upon the extent and solidity of that credit, the rapid, easy development of the resources of the country and our national prosperity entirely depend. Undoubtedly, the credit of the Treasury is ample and secure, and will not fall below its liabilities. In the course of the present month it will readily furnish payment of more than one hundred millions, required by the exigencies of the public service. But to continue and improve, it is indispensable that the foundations of revenue should never be shaken.

Gentlemen, they will continue firm; neither will our social order be compromised by the momentary excitement which

has manifested itself at insulated points, and is denounced by the collective wisdom of France. France desires in her government, as in all other matters, amelioration and progress, but by regular and tranquil steps. Contented with the system she has won by conquest, she aspires above all other considerations to see it preserved and consolidated. She seeks to enjoy her victory, and not to engage in new struggles. She will know how to employ time profitably in the improvement of her institutions, and would regard every insurrectionary attempt as a blow struck at her rights and repose.

That repose, Gentlemen, the Government, strong in its position and in the support of the Chambers, will firmly maintain; and in so doing echoes the national desire. Already, at the first appearance of commotion, loyal citizens have anticipated authority in their readiness to suppress it, and success has proved as easy as decisive. The same result may confidently be looked for in future. The laws are not wanting for justice; power will not be wanting to the laws. Let the friends of advancing civilization and liberty cast aside all fear; their cause is in no danger of compromise from these transitory agitations. Social and moral improvements must result naturally from our institutions. It will develop itself freely, and will be eagerly seconded by the authorities. With each succeeding day, new assurances of friendship reach us from every quarter. Europe acknowledges and proclaims our government as the general guarantee of security and peace. Peace is also its own anxious desire. At home and abroad, it is resolutely determined to preserve the same character, and to fulfil the same mission.

No. IV.

(Page 62.)

*Report presented to the King on the 21st of October, 1830,
by M. Guizot, Minister of the Interior, relative to the
appointment of an Inspector-General of Historic Monu-
ments in France.*

Sire,

The historic monuments with which the soil of France is covered, are the admiration and envy of educated Europe. As numerous and more diversified than those of several neighbouring countries, they belong not only to a specific or isolated phase of history, but form a complete series without interval. From the time of the Druids to our own days, there is no memorable epoch of art or civilization that has not left illustrative vestiges on French ground. Thus, by the side of Gaulish tombs and Celtic stones, we have temples, aqueducts, amphitheatres, and other relics of Roman dominion, which may compete with the masterpieces of Italy. The ages of decline and darkness have also bequeathed to us their degraded and illegitimate style. But when the eleventh and twelfth centuries restored life and intelligence to the West, a new architecture appeared, which marks each of our provinces with distinctive features, although descended from one common origin ; a strange mixture of ancient Roman art, of oriental taste and caprice, and of the still confused inspirations of Teutonic genius. This form of architecture acted transitionally on the marvellous Gothic structures which, during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, succeeded each other without interruption, becoming from day to day more light, original, and highly decorated ; until bending at last under their own exuberant richness, they sank overweighted, and ended by

giving way to the elegant but transitory grace of the period of the Renaissance. Such is the spectacle presented by this admirable series of our national antiquities, and which makes our territory such a highly valued object of study and research.

France could never be indifferent to this remarkable portion of her glory. Already in preceding ages, the cultivated erudition of the Benedictines, and other learned societies, had pointed out in our monuments the source of much historical light ; but viewed with reference to art, not one appeared to estimate their importance.

At the close of the French Revolution, some accomplished artists, who had witnessed the disappearance of many precious relics, felt the necessity of preserving those that still remained. The Museum of the Little Augustines, founded by M. Lenoir, prepared the revival of historic studies, and brought into notice the accumulated wealth of French art.

The fatal dispersion of that Museum carried back the ardour of archaeologists and artists to the examination of localities. Science gained thereby additional extension and movement. Able writers joined the select members of our school of painting, to bring into general notice the treasures of *ancient* France. These labours, multiplied during the years that have recently passed over, have not failed to produce beneficial results in the provinces. Central points of study have been selected ; monuments have been saved from destruction ; sums have been voted for this object by general and local councils ; the clergy have been arrested in the lamentable transformations which an erroneous taste for renewal had inflicted on sacred edifices.

These efforts, however, have only produced incomplete results. A centre of direction was wanting, to secure, to give consistency and a regular plan to the good intentions manifested nearly throughout all France. This impulse can only emanate from superior authority, and the minister of the Interior, not satisfied alone with proposing to the Chambers an allotment of funds for the preservation of French monuments, is called

upon to indicate an enlightened direction to the zeal of the local authorities.

The creation of the post of Inspector-General of the historic monuments of France has seemed to me calculated to supply this want. The person to whom these functions will be confided, must chiefly occupy himself with the means of giving completeness and regularity to the intentions of the Government. With this object in view, he will have to visit successively all the departments of France; to acquaint himself on the spot with the historical importance and artistic merit of the monuments; to collect all the information he can obtain, bearing on the dispersion of titles, rights, or all special objects calculated to throw any light on the origin, progress, or destruction of each building; to ascertain the existence of such documents in all dépôts, archives, museums, public libraries, or private collections; to put himself in direct communication with the authorities and individuals who devote their attention to the historical study of each particular locality; to enlighten proprietors and holders in possession on the interest attached to edifices, the preservation of which depends on their care; finally, to stimulate, while directing the efforts of all departmental and municipal councils, so that no monuments of indisputable merit should possibly perish through ignorance or precipitancy, or until competent authorities had tried every available effort to secure their preservation; taking care also, at the same time, that the good intentions of officials or private individuals should not be wasted on objects unworthy of their solicitude. This correct estimate, either of zeal or indifference for the safety of the monuments, can only be arrived at by means of the multiplied associations which the inspector-general alone can bring together; it will prevent all opposing claims, and will impress on the most exceptionable minds a conviction of the necessity under which the Government finds itself of watching with incessant activity over the interests of art and history.

The inspector-general of historic monuments will prepare

during his first and general circuit, an exact and complete catalogue of the isolated edifices and relics which are worthy of serious attention from the government; he will accompany this catalogue, as far as possible, with drawings and plans, and will successively forward all these details to the ministry of the interior, where they will be classified, and referred to as occasion may arise. He will select in each principal locality a correspondent, to be recommended to the minister, and will place himself in official communication with the local authorities. Notices will be forwarded to the prefects of departments, at first of the instructions given to the inspector-general of the historic monuments of France, and afterwards of the extract from the general catalogue which concerns his locality. The prefect will convey this knowledge to all councils and authorities interested in the subject.

The inspector-general of historic monuments will be required to renew his circular visits as often as possible, and will regulate them every year according to the information he may receive from the prefects, and other correspondents recognized by the government. When it becomes necessary to have recourse to the funds appropriated to the preservation of French monuments, or to draw from the analogous expenses voted by departments or townships, the inspector-general will be consulted. The yearly allowance of this officer is fixed at *eight thousand francs*.

The tariff of his travelling expenses will be the subject of future consideration.

I am with respect, Sir,
Your Majesty's very humble and faithful Subject,
The Minister-Secretary for the
Department of the Interior,

GUIZOT.

Approved; at the Palais-Royal, this 23rd of October, 1830,

LOUIS-PHILIPPE.

No. V.

(Page 66.)

1. *Decree of the Emperor Napoleon I. (20th of February, 1806) to determine the destination of the Churches of Saint-Denis and Saint-Geneviève.*

TITLE II.

7. The church of Saint-Geneviève will be finished and restored to public worship, in conformity with the intentions of the founder, under the mediation of Saint-Geneviève, the patron saint of Paris.

8. It will preserve the destination assigned to it by the Constituent Assembly, and will be consecrated to the burial of the high dignitaries and officers of the empire and the crown, the senators, and grand-officers of the Legion of Honour; and, in accordance with our special decrees, of those citizens who, in the career of arms, administration, or literature, may have rendered eminent services to their country. Their bodies will be embalmed and interred within the church.

9. The tombs deposited in the Museum of French monuments will be transported thither to be arranged in chronological order.

10. The metropolitan chapter of Notre-Dame, increased by six additional members, will undertake the duties of the church of Saint-Geneviève. The care of the church will be specially confided to an archpresbyter, selected from amongst the canons.

11. Service will be solemnly performed on the 3rd of January, the festival of Saint-Geneviève; on the 15th of August,

the festival of Saint-Napoléon, and the anniversary of the completion of the Concordat; on All-Souls Day; and on the first Sunday in December, the anniversary of the coronation and of the battle of Austerlitz; also on all occasions when interments take place in compliance with the present decree. No other religious functions shall be exercised in the said church without our special approbation.

12. Our ministers of the Interior and of Public Worship are entrusted with the execution of this decree.

2. Decree of King Louis XVIII. (12th December, 1821), to confirm and extend the restoration of worship in the Church of Saint-Geneviève.

LOUIS, BY THE GRACE OF GOD, KING OF FRANCE AND
NAVARRE,

To all who may receive these presents, greeting;

The church commenced by our grandfather, King Louis XV., and dedicated to Saint-Geneviève, is happily finished. If it has not yet received all the decorations necessary to complete its magnificence, it is nevertheless in a state which permits the celebration of divine service; for this reason, not to retard longer the fulfilment of the intentions of the founder, and to re-establish, in conformity with his wishes and our own, the worship of the patron saint whose intercession has ever been invoked by our good city of Paris in the hour of need, and on the report of our minister of the Interior and privy Council, we have decreed, and do decree, as follows:—

ARTICLE I.

The new church founded by King Louis XV. will be immediately consecrated to the exercise of divine worship under the patronage of Saint-Geneviève. With this object, it is placed at the disposal of the Archbishop of Paris, who will

appoint provisionally the ministers he may think proper to select.

ARTICLE II.

Future arrangements will determine the regular and permanent service to take place in that church, and the exact nature of such service.

ARTICLE III.

Our minister, the Secretary of State for the Interior, is entrusted with the execution of the present decree.

Given at our Castle of the Tuileries, this 12th of December, in the year of grace one thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, and the twenty-ninth of our reign.

By the King: (Signed) LOUIS.

The Minister, Secretary of State for the Interior.

(Signed) SIMÉON.

No. VI.

(Page 93.)

*Circular addressed to the Prefects (29th September, 1830), by
M. Guizot, upon the Elections to the Chamber of Deputies.*

Mr. Prefect,

In conformity with royal decrees of the 13th, 15th, 28th, and 29th of September, 1830, one hundred and eleven electoral colleges have been conyoked. Nearly 60,000 electors will exercise their rights; more than one quarter of the Chamber of Deputies will emanate from a new election.

This election, although partial, will suffice to indicate the general condition of France. It is looked forward to as an important event. It will contribute powerfully to determine the character of our revolution, and will foretell the future.

In such a conjuncture, Mr. Prefect, you will not feel surprised that I should address you more particularly on the duties of administration. Its intentions and duties must of necessity conform.

These duties are simple. The mischievous policy of a power too weak to dispense with artifice complicated while disfiguring them. A national government confides to France the choice of her deputies. It does not hold the administrative authorities responsible for the votes concealed in the electoral urn.

To secure perfect liberty of suffrage, while rigidly maintaining legal order, comprises its entire ambition. With the Charter, elections henceforth *will be a fact*.

You will perceive, Mr. Prefect, the scrupulous impartiality you are expected to exercise. The time is not yet far removed when public authority, placing itself in opposition to

private interests and consciences, endeavoured to make the country betray itself, and to suborn it as a false witness. By thus misapplying its mission and exceeding its rights, it compromised also its own legitimate influence. It is only by a reaction of justice, policy, and moderate views, that executive administration can receive the necessary moral authority **which constitutes its chief strength.** Power must respect **itself** to obtain permanence.

Thus, Mr. Prefect, whatever importance the government may attach to the result of the elections, never cease to bear in mind that it waits that issue with too much confidence to attempt even indirect control. It is solely by the punctilious discharge of your duty that you are to influence public opinion.

•

Besides which, does not France thoroughly understand her position? Satisfied and proud under a revolution she has herself effected, she only desires now to reap the fruits. She wishes to enjoy her conquest in peace. Liberty combined with order, progress in repose, improvement without contest: these are the advantages she could not hope to obtain from the extinguished government; and these she may confidently expect from that which she has substituted in its place. Her long perseverance, her generosity in victory, seem to establish for her a claim to all the benefits of increasing civilization and a regular constitution. But she will not permit these advantages to be postponed through weakness, compromised by imprudence, or destroyed by intemperate passions. Her entire strength is under the control of her judgment.

The elections will furnish evidence to this effect: such is my conviction. Those which foretold three months ago the fall of absolute power, elevated France to a high pinnacle in the opinion of the world. Those now in preparation will continue to attest, after victory, all that fifteen years of slow amelioration and progressive struggles for liberty can give to a nation in added experience, prudence, and resolution.

• France, Mr. Prefect, will act, and the Government will watch for her. Your task is to assure freedom to opinion and strength to the law. In accomplishing this, you also will bear an honourable part in the result of the elections. The laws which regulate electoral questions in our country, have been cleared up and settled by experience and debate.* The modifications introduced into that branch of the legislature by the temporary enactment of the 12th of September, ought not to lead to any essential difficulties. If, however, any points appear to you obscure or undefined, do not hesitate to consult with me.* I will at once acquaint you with applicable precedents and my own opinion. You are aware, in the meantime, that the rule, in these cases, lies in the text of the laws and in the practice of the royal courts. You will, therefore, be held responsible for the decisions you may form. They will be referred to the tribunals. The Court of Appeal, and not the minister of the Interior, is the appointed guardian of justice.

You now see, Mr. Prefect, that nothing is required from you beyond a religious observance of the existing laws, and this is already assured by your loyalty and patriotism. You can publicly announce the views of government, which are neither concealed nor anxiously enforced. Created by the nation, it has no mistrust of its source, but confides in the people's support with mutual reliance. Follow this example, and let the administrators be conscientious to impress the same character on the elections. The government will not be weakened by such a course. Under the happy constitution we now enjoy, authority may venture to appeal to liberty itself, and will increase its own strength by protecting freedom.

Receive, Mr. Prefect, the assurance of my perfect consideration.

The Minister Secretary of State for the
Department of the Interior,

GUIZOT.

No. VII.

(Page 229.)

MEMOIR OF MADAME DE RUMFORD, BY M. GUIZOT.

Written in 1841.

Five years ago, in a good and pleasant house, no longer in existence, and in the middle of a beautiful garden, now replaced by a street, a select and varied society was in the habit of assembling two or three times a week. In this circle were included members of the fashionable world, philosophers, scholars, foreigners, and natives; men of the old times and men of to-day; old and young people; members of the government, and the opposition. Amongst those who were thus associated, many met in no other place; or if they did meet occasionally, it was with mutual coldness and forced toleration. But there, all evinced towards one another extreme politeness and almost cordiality. Not that any one was attracted by a special interest or object which compelled dissimulation or reserve. It was not a house of political or literary patronage, where people went to push their fortunes or prepare success. A taste for good company, a desire of participation in the daily incidents of social life which form the amusement of the idle world and the relaxation of the busy;—in these consisted the only incentive and charm that collected at the residence of Madame de Rumford such crowded and eager assemblies, and amongst them so many distinguished men of different classes and opinions.

Fontenille, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Turgot, or D'Alembert, if they could return amongst us, would be greatly surprised at seeing such a house and its habits looked upon as either strange or rare. It was the general spirit and customary life of

their day;—a period of noble and liberal sociability which brought into play many important questions and matters, extracting only the gentler elements, the action of thought and hope, leaving to its heirs the burden of trial and practical experience.

When this inheritance became available, and the present generation entered on the stage of the world, the eighteenth century, so recently closed, was already at a great distance. An immense abyss, the Revolution, separated us from it, engulfing an entire past of several ages, the eighteenth included. Not one survived of the distinguished characters who had formed the power and glory of that great epoch. The saloons of Paris, at once the theatre and implement of their success, that brilliant society, so passionately devoted to pleasures of the mind, had disappeared at the same time. Instead of courting mutual association and acquaintance as formerly, with one concurrent feeling,—the nobility, the clergy, the bar, men of business, and men of letters,—all classes belonging to the old system—or rather their ruins, for ruin alone remained of everything—separated from and almost shunned each other, concentrating themselves within the habits and interests of their individual position. The dispersion and isolation of coteries succeeded to the impulses of associated ideas. Emigrants, members of the Constituent Assembly and National Convention, Imperial functionaries, and men of letters, divided themselves into small circles, each living and thinking apart from the rest, with mutual indifference or malevolence.

The eighteenth century had also its own exclusive circle. A distinct coterie like the rest, but the sole inheritor of the ruling character of the time, the only faithful relic of the manners and tastes of that philosophical association which had itself perished in the ruin of the more extended society it had subverted.

A woman of seventy-nine years of age, two academicians,—

one eighty-two and the other seventy-six,—formed in 1809 the sole remaining central points of the community, which in 1769 so many, and such powerful leaders of public opinion had assembled and retained around them. The drawing-rooms of Madame d'Houdetot, of M. Suard, and of the Abbé Morellét, were almost the only asylums in which the spirit of the old century still reflected itself faithfully and at perfect ease. Not that the memory of that age was disparaged elsewhere, or that many did not still claim to belong to it. How could the new men, the children of the Revolution and the Empire, repudiate the eighteenth century? But how little did they resemble it! Politics absorbed their faculties,—practical, substantial politics. All their thoughts and energies were incessantly occupied with the affairs of their master or with their own. They had no leisure, no meditation; their lives consisted of movement and labour, varied by labour and movement. The eighteenth century also took an interest in politics, but from taste and not through necessity. Politics considerably occupied their minds, but never engrossed their lives. They reflected, argued, and projected much, but indulged in little action. At no period have political questions engaged such general and expanded intellectual prepossession; and perhaps no period was ever less familiar with the spirit of policy properly so designated; a single spirit, prompt, judicious, resolved, light in thought but serious in action, which sees nothing but facts and is anxious for results alone.

Apart from this opposition between science and practice, what an immense abyss exists between the policy of the last thirty years and that which was attempted half a century earlier! What had become of the doctrines, the hopes by which a whole nation,—nay, even all nations, had been excited and charmed? How did the men of business of the nineteenth century fulfil the promise of the philosophers of the eighteenth? Some boldly, and others with timidity and embarrassment, deserted the ideas and institutions the very

perspective of which had made their fortunes. Despotism, a learned and reasoning despotism, aspiring to erect itself into a system, beheld in its service the children of the most profound theories of liberty. Many persons of honourable feeling, attached in their hearts to their ancient faith, protested from time to time, but without effect, against the insults and attacks by which they were surrounded. The greater number, by defending Voltaire against Geoffroi, and the unbelievers against the devout, looked upon themselves as quits with philosophy and liberty. But what would the philosophers have said, or even Voltaire himself, in spite of his contempt for metaphysics and his complaisance for power, if they had been present at a dinner given by the Archchancellor, or at a sitting of the Imperial State Council? Can it be believed that the eighteenth century would have recognized itself in that society, or have accepted its successors as true representatives?

There was no greater resemblance between them either in manners, turn of mind, tone of thought, habits, and external forms. Men of the world as well as scholars, the philosophers of the eighteenth century had passed their lives in the most delightful and brilliant circles of that very society they attacked with bitterness. They had hailed and celebrated it, they had participated in all the enjoyments of its elegant and agreeable existence; they had indulged in all its tastes, habits, and refinements, in all the susceptibilities of a civilization at once decrepit and regenerated, aristocratic and literary; they belonged to that old system demolished by their very hands. But the philosophers of the second generation, the true offspring of the Revolution and the Empire, had no connection with that class, and had only known to destroy it. Between them and the select society of the eighteenth century, there existed no common tie. In place of the drawing-rooms of Madame Geoffrin, Mademoiselle de Lespinasse, Madame Trudaine, the Maréchale de Beauveau, and Madame

Necker, they had lived in public assemblies, clubs, and camps. With them, events of terrible significance had replaced the pleasures of society and the successes of the Academy. Far indeed from being fashioned for the enjoyment of social intercourse in an easy, idle life, everything connected with them bore the impress of the action and overwhelming times through which they had passed. Their manners were neither elegant nor gentle. They conversed and entertained abruptly and rudely, as if always in a hurry, and without leisure to attend to the conventionalities of life. If corrupt, they subsided into gross and cynical selfishness; if honest, their outward demeanour, without reference to their virtues, wanted the finish and harmony that seem exclusively peculiar to the habitual and tranquil enjoyment of a situation or a sentiment. They had little taste for conversation, reading, interchange of visits, and all those pursuits without definite end,—those semi-superfluous relaxations in which but recently so many persons had found occupation, half serious and half frivolous, for their minds and time.

Amongst these men of the new system, a few philosophers and writers alone, chiefly without office and suspected by the Imperial government, felt the necessity and sought occasional opportunities of assembling together, to converse, to inquire, and to enjoy in common the pleasures of intellectual recreation. They formed a liberal society, professing intense admiration of the eighteenth century, and flattering themselves that in them it was continued. But chiefly springing from the Revolution, they bore the stamp of that period, much more deeply impressed than that of its predecessor. Although men of totally different ideas and origin were mixed up with them, taken altogether the revolutionary spirit predominated in that circle, with its merits and defects, more independent than elevated, and more severe than independent; friendly to humanity and its advancement, but mistrustful, envious, and unsociable towards all who shrank from its yoke; uniting to the

prejudices of a coterie the antipathies of a faction. The circle, moreover, was extremely concentrated within itself. There was little mixture of different classes and habits; little familiarity with men of the world, properly so named; nothing that recalled the composition and action of the old philosophic society. All the little crotchets of literary professionals exhibited themselves there without restraint; not to speak of a certain indefinable discrepancy of manners, alternately familiar and laboured, equally destitute of reserve and freedom. Either I am much deceived, or in the assemblies of the *Philosophic Decade*, and notwithstanding a community of many ideas, the masters of the eighteenth century I have just named, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Buffon, Turgot, D'Alembert, and even Diderot and Rousseau, the least worldly of their time—would have sometimes felt themselves strangers out of place.

In very different saloons, in the suburb of Saint-Germain, and in the midst of the remains of the aristocracy, almost recovered from their overthrow, they would not at first have felt the same surprise. They would have recognized there the manners, style, and all the forms and social appearances of their own age. Perhaps also they might have been gratified by finding some traditions of the old system, and the tie of common reminiscences so powerful even amongst the most opposite dispositions. But, on the other hand, how many weighty objections would have driven them away! What a decided opposition of sentiments and ideas! In vain would they have sought some traces of the openness of mind, the liberality of heart, the taste for intellectual pleasures and progress, which fifty years before so remarkably distinguished a leading portion of the French nobility, and had so powerfully contributed to the advancing action of the age. Instead of these, they would have found a return of inordinate pretensions, and aristocratic pedantry; a bitter repentance for having ever temporarily abandoned it; a puerile anxiety to return under its yoke, to reassume the livery of old customs and maxims; an

arrogant antipathy to progressive knowledge, the culture of the mind, the philosophers, and all that resembled them.

In some corners, nevertheless, of this camp of the old *ré-gime* ;—opposition to the Imperial government, the influence of M. de Châteaubriand, the single fact of independence as regarded a despot, and of enthusiasm for a celebrated writer, restored an impulse of moral and political generosity, operating as a sympathetic link between the survivors of the aristocracy and the relics of the philosophy of the last age. Undoubtedly Montesquieu and Voltaire would have found themselves more at their ease in the drawing-room of Madame de Duras, than in that of the Archchancellor; and M. Suard conversed with M. de Châteaubriand under less restraint than he would have felt with Chénier. But this restricted coterie, more liberal and animated, was then nearly lost in the great aristocratic assembly. Religious convictions divided its members from the philosophers, with whose political ideas they were disposed to concur; and in spite of certain points of contact, and a frequent similarity of sentiments, wishes, tastes, and manners, they appeared, after all, more as opponents than allies, giving themselves up to the movement of reaction, the object of which was the eighteenth century.

Another circle, still more confined, it is true, came even nearer to that epoch, and as far as they were able reproduced its image. In this were collected the remains of that portion of the left-hand side of the Constituent Assembly, which in 1789 had declared for constitutional monarchy, neither more nor less; and in which were seated MM. de Clermont-Tonnerre, de la Rochefoucauld, de Broglie, Mounier, Malouet, etc.; a pure and patriotic party, whose ideas had commenced and wound up our revolution, but were unequal to its full accomplishment. Amongst these lovers of sense and probity, the greater part of those who remained faithful to their cause and principles, either keeping aloof from the Imperial government, or serving it with restraint and dignity, formed

themselves, at the houses of Madame de Tessé, the Princess d'Henin, and others, into a small select society, elegant in manners, liberal in opinions, void of all aristocratic folly or revolutionary bitterness; bound by habit to the old system, by sentiment to the new condition and necessities of the country.

It seems that the philosophical relics of the eighteenth century also found here their point of union; and that the few surviving members blended in with this coterie, where they often visited and encountered friends. But a real difference prevented a perfect amalgamation and complete revival of the bygone age. Politics had been the principal, almost the only topic of the Constituents; the link and predominant feature of their association. Issuing from the philosophy and literature of their time, they were neither literary nor philosophical. They paid respect to letters and doctrines, but in a secondary sense, and as people who have pleasures and affairs of superior importance. Now, the true school of the eighteenth century, that which constituted its centre and impulse, was essentially philosophic and literary. It took an interest in politics, but merely as one of its subjects of reflection, as an application of ideas, proceeding from more remote sources, and leading to very different results. In our days, purely devoted to politics as we are, we look upon that study as man's most attractive and important occupation; and it is almost solely because the eighteenth century originated constitutions and called nations back to liberty, that it appears illustrious in our eyes. Narrow-minded presumption! A field infinitely more vast and diversified than worldly society expands itself before the human faculties, and during its days of power and splendour, is far from feeling satisfied, or exhausting itself in the study of man's relations with his kind. Indisputably political in its desires and results, the eighteenth century embraced a wider scope, and enjoyed in its ideas, and in their truth and manifestation, a pleasure totally independent of the use to which they might be applied by publicists or legislators. Herein lies the true

character of the spirit of philosophy, essentially different from that of politics, which latter only attaches itself to ideas as they bear on social facts, and for the purpose of exclusive application. Certain minute fractions and sections of the eighteenth century, the economists for example, devoted themselves specially to politics; but the age in general, the society of the age in its extended sense, aspired above all other considerations to intellectual conquests and enjoyments of every class under every signification, and at any price. The imagination of Voltaire, of Rousseau, or of Diderot, would have found itself in prison, if it had been restricted to forms of government and the political destiny of nations.

The last contemporaries of these great men, the survivors of the philosophic school, M. Suard and the Abbé Morellet were assuredly not gifted with such active and expansive ideas. M. Suard had no ardent desire to acquire or impart knowledge. Although literature alone had opened to him the doors of the world, he was more a man of fashion than a man of letters. In disposition, diffident, idle, inclined to aristocratic refinement and disdain, as long as he could lead an honourable life, mixed up with tender interests and agreeable relations, he cared little to display his talents or to win a name. As soon as labour ceased to be necessary, he left or resumed it as a recreation; reading and composing at leisure, without definite object, for his gratification alone, with a sort of intellectual epicurism, but divested at the same time of either vanity or indifference. The studies of the Abbé Morellet had been more profound and persevering, but extremely confined. He had almost entirely devoted himself to political economy and a few applications of what he had learned at the Sorbonne. It might be supposed that both he and M. Suard would have been fully satisfied with the society of the Constituents, the traditions of their time, their elegant manners, their esteem for letters, and their political principles. But this was not the case. After the example of their masters, they both felt intellectual

necessities extremely varied in character. They took a more disinterested interest, if I may use the expression, in the ideas and movements of the human mind ; more exempt from any particular bias or approximate application. Separated, as we have seen, from all the coteries I have previously enumerated, they only extended half-sympathy to that which came the nearest to their own views and reminiscences. They required one that should present a more faithful and complete reflection of their times, and the society in which they had been formed.

Such was, in effect, their own. A circle composed of some old associates of the same origin and taste, M. de Boufflers, M. Dupont de Nemours, M. Gallois, etc. ; of some academicians whose canvass M. Suard had supported ; of some rising young men whose talent he encouraged with exalted benevolence ; of some members of the Senate, or other public bodies, who made profession of independence ; and of a few foreigners, who would never forgive themselves if they quitted Paris without knowing the last contemporaries of Voltaire and his age. They met on Thursdays at the house of the Abbé Morellet, and on Tuesdays and Saturdays at that of M. Suard. Sometimes more frequently on a select occasion. On the Wednesdays, Madame d'Houdetot gave a dinner to a certain number of guests, who received a general invitation, and could go when they pleased. They generally amounted to eight or ten, and sometimes more. There was no attempt at display or extraordinary fare. The dinner was nothing more than an excuse for meeting together. When it had concluded, Madame d'Houdetot, seated in her large arm-chair by the corner of the fireplace, with her back bent, her head inclining towards her chest, speaking little in a low tone, and moving with difficulty, joined to a certain extent in conversation, without suggesting the topic ; not obtruding herself as mistress of the house, but kind, considerate, and easy, taking a lively and curious interest in all that was said, in literary discussion, in anecdotes of society or of the theatres, in the slightest in-

cident and the most trifling witicism: a striking and original mixture of age and youth, of tranquillity and excitement.

At M. Suard's there was less ease and freedom. Discussions *à côté*, between immediate neighbours, seldom took place. The conversation was almost always general and sustained. Such was the rule of the house, and every one observed it. This led to a certain degree of coldness and restraint, particularly at the commencement of the evening; but as a compensation, full and unrestrained liberty was permitted in a more *important* matter. M. Suard never dreaded or interdicted *any particular subject*. All were open to discussion at his house; *never was perfect freedom of thought and language more openly permitted and called for by the master of a house*. Those who have not witnessed the extent to which this indulgence was carried, can form no adequate idea on the subject; and many who have, forget how timid, at that time, were people's minds, how reserved their familiar intercourse, and to what an extent, when the slightest approach to politics manifested itself, controversy became frigid and language official. A censor of the day pointed out to one of his friends a certain passage in a play he had been ordered to examine. "You see no allusions there," he said; "the public will see none; nevertheless there are some, and I shall take good care to expunge them." From 1809 to 1814, this censor presented a general type. Every one conducted himself as if allusions existed where none would discern them, and on all political or exclusively philosophical subjects, conversation inclining to serious received a death-blow. M. Suard never allowed this mortal stroke to penetrate into his drawing-room. No man was ever more free from political intentions or plots, more moderate in his opinions and desires. He had neither taste nor talent for active business; but liberty of thought and speech comprised his honour and his life. He would have felt degraded in his own eyes had he denounced either, and he maintained both for the general advantage of

his guests. In other respects, the conversation at his parties was neither deficient in extent nor variety. The field was not closed against any special propensity or habit. Philosophy, literature, history, art, antiquity, modern times, foreign countries;—all subjects were received with indulgence and attention. Young and new ideas, even though little in accord with the traditions of the eighteenth century, were not contemptuously rejected. Though unpalatable, they were pardoned in behalf of the intellectual exercise excited by their novelty. Movement was felt to be preëminently essential. In ideas and actual knowledge, the members of that circle lived on an exhausted fund. The same persons, reflections, and anecdotes, were incessantly recurring. Activity, far from being real, had neither progress nor result; but they felt that sincerity and disinterestedness of the mind which form, perhaps, the principal charm of thought and conversation. They met and conversed without necessary or compulsive object, influenced by the sole attraction of intellectual intercourse. This certainly could not be considered the serious mission of devoted friends to truth and science; but it was still less the narrow egotism or mean employment of mere utilitarians, who never speak or act without a special purpose and with a definite end in view. It is true, they neither sought nor set forward ideas for their intrinsic value alone; they required and demanded social gratification, but nothing more.

Such was the peculiar feature that thirty years ago distinguished this particular coterie from all others, and gave it the truest, and indeed the only resemblance to the society, which half a century earlier had animated the French capital, and Europe in the name of Paris. A cold and colourless copy. Fifty years before, the circle of philosophers was not exclusively contracted round two old men. It was to be found everywhere: amongst courtiers, churchmen, lawyers and financiers. Haughty in one quarter, complaisant in another; sometimes teaching, and at others amusing its fol-

lowers; but at all times fresh, active, and confiding; recruiting and warring in all quarters; penetrating and attracting all classes, tastes, and pursuits. This great movement was not confined to Paris. It branched out from that centre into general expansion, and returned with augmented force. Grimm addressed his correspondence to the Empress of Russia, the Queen of Sweden, and the King of Poland; to eight or ten sovereign princes;—all greedily for the smallest facts and reports emanating from the great workshop of intellectual labour and enjoyment. But it was not absolutely necessary to be a ruling potentate to maintain a correspondent in Paris. In Germany, in Italy, and in England, private individuals, rich and curious, were anxious to have their own, through whom, from month to month and week to week, they received information, whether correct or erroneous, of all that was said, done, or thought in Paris. D'Alembert, Diderot, and Grimm himself were applied to, to recommend correspondents of inferior pretension; and many young men, without fortune or name, on their entry into literary life, found through that source a means of existence, as they now do in the public journals.

An extensive society such as this, was certainly very different from the small, weak, and isolated philosophic circle of 1809, and furnished an idea of intellectual intercourse far beyond that supplied by the drawing-room of M. Suard. Nevertheless the foundation, if not the celebrity,—the direction, if not the movement, were exactly similar. There was the same taste for the pleasures and improvement of the mind, equally removed from pure meditation or selfish appliance. The same mixture of seriousness and levity; the same yearning after new action, without any ardent desire of innovating on the social positions of life; the same propensity to entertain political questions and interests, with the same preponderance of the literary and philosophic spirit, over the spirit of practical policy. The great picture had ceased to exist, but the surviving outline was faithful and pure.

Madame de Rumford had been educated in the midst of the world, of which the various coteries I have just enumerated formed the last remains. Her father, M. Paulze, at first receiver-general, and afterwards contractor-general of finance, a man highly accomplished in the science and skilful in the practice of his profession, married the niece of the celebrated comptroller-general, the Abbé Terrai, who held the knowledge and experience of his nephew in high estimation. The latter frequently supplied his uncle with sound advice on the administration of the finances, which was well taken and understood, for the Abbé Terrai was a man of quick perception, but very badly followed; as could not fail to happen in the case of a minister who wished to live in harmony with the entire court, and who was supplied by the country with means insufficient to satisfy at the same time the exigences of the State and the caprices of all the world. A long correspondence between the Abbé Terrai and M. Paulze has been preserved, or at least a considerable portion of it, in the family of the contractor-general, and contains some extremely curious details on the financial measures of that period.

Three great administrative epochs may be reckoned in French history. The first was created under Louis XIV., in the seventeenth century. The second, in the eighteenth, from 1750 to 1789, entered into the paths of scientific progress and universal civilization. It was in our days, and originally through the impulse of the Constituent Assembly, that administration received its systematic form, and assumed its destined place in society as well as in government, and, unless I deceive myself, will continue to increase in alliance with free institutions.

The second of these epochs conferred on France, according to my ideas, benefits little known and appreciated. The first place must be accorded to the great problems of moral order. I am neither astonished at, nor do I complain of this preference. These questions, proposed at that time with so much brilliancy

and effect, eclipsed all others. Administration was forgotten and lost in politics. Its labours and projects were unimportant, in the midst of the destruction, according to some, and the regeneration, in the opinion of others, of general society. But a great fact dates from that time ;—the creation of sciences which soar above administration and reveal to it the laws of the facts it is called on to regulate. No one has yet had a glimpse of, and may not perhaps be able to discover hereafter, the entire part which these branches of knowledge are destined to act in the world. An immense part, although it cannot and ought not to stand in the foremost rank. The principal honour belongs to the eighteenth century, and constitutes its most original work.

The theoretical portion of this work had nothing to complain of on the score of success. It created a great sensation at its birth. The various schools of economy, their systems and debates, have always powerfully attracted public attention. But the practical part of French administration during the second half of the eighteenth century,—the general spirit by which it was governed,—its respect for science and human nature,—its efforts to secure, on the one hand, the empire of principles over facts, and, on the other, to direct facts and principles to the general advantage of society,—the positive results of these efforts,—the numberless and inestimable improvements accomplished, commenced, prepared, or meditated at that time in every department of public service ; the labours in a word, and the merits of the administrators of every class and rank who then held in their hands the affairs of the country,—all these achievements have been too much obliterated by the storms and triumphs of politics, and have thus been deprived of their just proportion of gratitude and fame.

The house of M. Paulze was one of the centres of these useful studies and salutary reforms. It was there that Turgot, Malesherbes, Trudaine, Condorcet, and Dupont de Nemours, met in familiar intercourse ; and there, in conversation at once serious and unstudied, without learned preparation, and

with no object but truth, questions were proposed, facts related, and opinions discussed. M. Paulze did not alone contribute his personal knowledge. He had established in the contractor-generalship a particular office, the duties of which were to collect statistic details on the taxation and commerce of France, the exports and imports of the harbours, and all other points connected with the national resources. To promote the same object, he kept up a diligent correspondence with many foreign merchants and bankers. These documents were freely communicated to the enlightened men who frequented his house. The Abbé Raynal, amongst others, a particular friend of M. Paulze, collected from them the greater part of the facts and details he has accumulated in his 'Philosophic History of the Indies,' and which are the only portions of his work that still retain their importance.

This society and these conversations contained nothing that could apply to the education of Mademoiselle Paulze, or even indirectly influence the formation of her character. But by living and gradually expanding in such an atmosphere, she obtained two acquirements, comprising the most salutary instruction that infancy can imbibe and bequeath for the regulation of future life,—regard for serious studies and respect for personal merit.

She had scarcely completed her thirteenth year when the Abbé Terrai wished to contract a marriage for her at the court. Her father, little disposed to second this fancy, preferred one of his colleagues in the contractor-generalship, M. Lavoisier; and the Abbé Terrai submitted with a good grace. The marriage was celebrated in the chapel of the contractor-general's hôtel, on the 16th of December, 1771.

On quitting the house of her father for that of her husband, Madame Lavoisier changed the horizon without alteration of habits. To the action of economic science succeeded the science of physics, and the society of profound scholars to that of practical legislators. Professors of one particular pursuit con-

marked contempt for the interest which men of the world may appear to take in their labours; and if the question were solely comprised in a judgment of their scientific merit, the feeling would be founded on reason. But the regard and taste of the public for science, with the frequent and animated manifestation of this sentiment, are highly important to science itself, and play an important part in general history. The periods when this sympathy, though a little tinged by ostentation and frivolity, have been strongly displayed, have ever been times of scientific advance; and to take things in a comprehensive sense, natural history and chemistry have profited as much by the social habits of M. de Buffon and M. Lavoisier as by their learned discoveries.

Whether from affection for her husband, or through a natural tendency, Madame Lavoisier associated herself in his labours as a companion or disciple. Those even who only became acquainted with her long after the season of youth had passed, were able to discover under a cold and somewhat repelling manner, almost entirely occupied with her love of society, that she was a person capable of being strongly moved by any particular sentiment or idea, and of giving herself up to it with enthusiasm. She lived in the laboratory of M. Lavoisier, took part in his experiments, copied notes under his dictation, and supplied him with translations and designs. She learned to engrave, that he might be sure of a scrupulous assistant. The plates to the 'Treatise on Chemistry' were really executed by her hands. She published, at her husband's desire, the translation of a work by the English chemist, Kirwan, 'On the Strength of Acids and the Proportion of the Substances that compose Neutral Salts'; and she had acquired such a complete mastery of the science they cultivated together, that when, in 1805, eleven years after M. Lavoisier's death, she was desirous of collecting and publishing his scientific memoirs, she undertook and completed the work alone, with the addition of a preface simply written and totally divested of pedantic assumption.

A domestic interior thus regulated by reciprocal affection and pursuits, an ample fortune, much general esteem, an excellent house in the Arsenal, frequented by men of the most distinguished reputation, all the enjoyments of the mind, of riches, and of youth,—here were indeed combined the ingredients of a happy and brilliant existence. This enviable life was suddenly assaulted and crushed, in common with all that surrounded it, by the thunder of the Revolution. In 1794, Madame Lavoisier saw her father and her husband ascend the scaffold on the same day, and only escaped herself, after a short imprisonment, by retiring, with exemplary patience, into the most complete and silent obscurity.

From the first outbreak of the Revolution, M. Lavoisier, although favourably disposed to reforms in the State, had contemplated the future with alarm. He was a man of just and even mind, modest and gentle in character, who pursued with disinterested ardour, and in the bosom of a happy domestic life, his noble and useful studies, which were too much interrupted by political storms to excite any favourable hopes for their tranquil continuance. In June, 1792, the King offered him the ministry of Public Taxes. M. Lavoisier declined the office in the following letter, replete with elevation of mind, simplicity, and rectitude :—

“ Sire,

“ It is neither from pusillanimous fear, foreign to my character, nor from indifference to the public interest, nor, let me candidly own, from my conviction of personal inability, that I am constrained to decline the token of confidence with which your Majesty desires to honour me, by the offer of the ministry of Public Taxes. A witness, since I have belonged to the national treasury, of the patriotic sentiments of your Majesty, and of your tender solicitude for the happiness of your people, of your inflexible sincerity of principles and inalterable probity, I feel more acutely than I can express how much I renounce in losing the opportunity of be-

coming the organ of communicating these noble sentiments from your Majesty to the French nation.

"But, Sire, it is the duty of an honest man and good citizen not to accept an important post, unless in the hope of fulfilling all its obligations in their fullest extent.

"I am neither a Jacobin nor a Feuillant. I belong to no society or club. Accustomed to weigh everything by the measure of my reason and conscience, I have never allowed my opinions to be biassed by any particular party. I have sworn, in the sincerity of my heart, fidelity to the Constitution you have accepted, to the powers established by the people, and to you, Sire, who are the constitutional King of the French nation ; to you, whose virtues and difficulties are not sufficiently appreciated. Convinced as I am that the legislative body has exceeded the limits traced out for it by the Constitution, what could a constitutional minister effect ? Incapable of compromising his principles and conscience, he would appeal in vain to the authority of the law to which all Frenchmen are bound by the most imposing of oaths. The resistance he might recommend, through the means afforded to your Majesty by the Constitution, would be set forward against him as a crime. He would perish the victim of duty, and the very inflexibility of his character would become the source of new misfortunes.

"Sire, permit me still to consecrate my vigour and my life to the service of the State in less elevated posts, but where I can discharge functions perhaps more useful, and more enduring. Devoted to public instruction, I shall endeavour to enlighten the people on their duties. A soldier-citizen, I shall carry arms in the defence of my country and the law, and for the protection of the irremovable representative of the French nation.

"I am, with profound respect, Sire,

"Your Majesty's most faithful and obedient subject,

"Etc. etc. etc."

The illustrious scholar assumed too much when he asked permission to employ his life in an effort to "enlighten the people." He was sent to the scaffold in the name of the ignorant and oppressed nation !

He left his whole fortune to his widow, and she partly owed the preservation of it to the able attachment of a faithful servant, towards whom she evinced, to her last moments, the most devoted gratitude.

In 1798, when a cruel and shameful proscription, directed against herself, implicated several of her friends, and amongst the number one of the most intimate, M. de Marbois,—a letter of credit from Madame Lavoisier upon her banker in London, reached them in the deserts of Sinamary.

When these proscriptions ceased, when order and justice once more returned to tranquillize and restore social intercourse, Madame Lavoisier resumed her position in the world, surrounded by an entire generation of distinguished scholars, the friends, disciples, and successors of Lavoisier. Lagrange, Laplace, Berthollet, Cuvier, Prony, Humboldt, and Arago, were delighted, while paying honour to his widow, to find in her house, in return for the reputation they brought to it, the enjoyments of elegant hospitality. M. de Rumford came with the rest. He was then in the service of the King of Bavaria, and extremely popular as a man of scientific acquirement. His mind was elevated, his conversation overflowing with interest, and his manners gentle and kind. He attached Madame Lavoisier, by adapting himself to her habits, her tastes, and, we might almost say, to her reminiscences. She expected to find once more, in some degree, her former happiness. She married him on the 22nd of October, 1805; delighted at offering to so distinguished a person a handsome fortune and an agreeable home.

Their characters assimilated badly. Youth alone in the midst of affectionate enjoyment, can reconcile itself to the loss of independence. Delicate questions sprang up between them;

reciprocal misunderstandings began to awaken. Madame de Rumford in this second marriage had formally stipulated in the contract that she should be called *Madame Lavoisier de Rumford*. M. de Rumford, who had consented to this, became dissatisfied with it. She insisted on the point. "I looked upon it as a duty, a tenet of religion," she wrote to a friend, in 1808, "not to give up the name of Lavoisier. . . . Trusting to the promise of M. de Rumford, I should not have had the stipulation entered as an article in my civil engagements with him, if I had not desired to place on record a public evidence of my respect for M. Lavoisier, and of the generosity of M. de Rumford. It is incumbent on me to persevere in a determination which has ever been one of the conditions of our marriage; and in my heart I have a profound conviction that M. de Rumford will not condemn me for this, and that after having taken time to reflect, he will allow me to continue in the fulfilment of a duty which I look upon as sacred."

Here was again a hope deceived. After some domestic differences, which M. de Rumford with a little tact might have rendered less notorious, a separation became necessary, and was amicably arranged on the 30th of June, 1809.

After that time, and during twenty-seven years, no event, or we may even say, no incident, disturbed Madame de Rumford in her delightful mode of existence. She gave herself up entirely to her friends and to the society, alternately extended and restricted, which she received at her own house with a singular mixture of rudeness and civility, ever evincing great knowledge of the world and excellent qualities, even in her eccentricities of language and whims of authority. Every Monday she gave a dinner, to which not more than ten or twelve persons were usually invited. On that day, the most distinguished Frenchmen or foreigners, frequenters of the house or incidental guests, assembled at her residence in a sort of extemporaneous intimacy, quickly established between minds so highly cultivated, through the pleasure of serious or witty

conversation, ever varied and refined, which Madame de Rumford herself enjoyed rather than joined in. On Tuesday, she received all who presented themselves. On Friday there were large parties, composed of very different persons, but all belonging to the best company of their class, and unanimously attracted by the excellent music, in which was combined the most celebrated artists and the most accomplished amateurs.

Under the Empire, besides its general charm, the house of Madame de Rumford had a special recommendation. Thought and speech were not there looked upon as official. A certain freedom of spirit and language predominated, without political hostility or reserve; liberty of mind, the habit of thinking and conversing at ease, without caring for the comments or interpretation of authority;—a valuable privilege at that time, more so than can be estimated at present. We must have breathed under a pneumatic-machine to feel the complete enjoyment of free respiration.

When the Restoration came round, in the midst of party movements and parliamentary debates, it was no longer liberty that was wanting to men of taste and intelligence. Another evil weighed heavily upon them,—the evil of party spirit, animosities, and prejudices,—a loathsome and pernicious inflection which shuts up every horizon, spreads over everything a false light, contracts the understanding, sours the heart, deprives the most enlightened minds of that expansion of ideas and generosity of sentiments which sat so gracefully upon them, and robs their lives of as much enjoyment as it diminishes the riches of their nature and the charms of their disposition. This scourge of society in free countries penetrated very sparingly into the house of Madame de Rumford. As freedom formerly, so did equity now, find an asylum there. Not only did men of the most opposite principles meet there in constant intercourse, but urbanity reigned amongst them. It seemed, as if by tacit convention, that all disagreements, antipathies, and variances were left at the door of that

drawing-room, and that avoiding by mutual concert all subjects likely to bring them into collision, their minds remained as unfettered, and their hearts as tolerant, as if they had never enlisted under the yoke of partisanship.

Thus, at the residence of Madame de Rumford, and through her controlling desire, the social spirit of the age and world in which she had been brought up, was faithfully perpetuated. I know not whether our descendants will ever see again a similar society, such exalted and graceful demeanour, such action of thought and facility of intercourse, a taste so animated for the progress of civilization and for the exercise of mental powers unmingled with those bitter passions, those inelegant and harsh manners, which often accompany and render painful or impracticable the most desirable intimacies. What was wanting to the eighteenth century,—what it possessed of superficiality in ideas and feebleness in principle, of folly in assumption and of vain pretence in creative power,—experience has signally developed, and taught us to our cost. We know and feel the evil which that memorable epoch has bequeathed to us. It has preached doubt, selfishness, and materialism. It has touched with an impure hand, and withered for a time, the noblest and most beautiful elements of human nature. But if the eighteenth century had done no more,—if this had been its chief characteristic,—can it be believed that it would have led to such important consequences, and have shaken, as it has, the social frame of the world? It was, in fact, far superior to its cynical scepticisms. Why do I say superior? It was directly opposed to them, and continually giving them the lie. In spite of the weakness of its morals, the frivolity of its manners, the barrenness of some of its doctrines, and its critical and destroying tendency, it was still a sincere and impulsive age, an age of faith and disinterestedness. It had faith in truth, for it claimed for truth the right of governing the world. It had faith in humanity, for it acknowledged its faculty of self-improvement, and wished to see it exercised without fetters.

It bewildered and abused itself in this double confidence, and attempted things beyond its strength and mission. It judged erroneously of the moral state of man, and the conditions of social life. Its ideas, as well as its acts, were infected by the contamination of its vices. But this being admitted, the original and predominating thought of the eighteenth century, the belief that man, truth, and society, were made for each other, mutually worthy of the union to which they are called,—that just and wholesome creed rises beyond all other points of its history. It took the lead in proclaiming this faith, and laboured for its establishment. Hence the power and popularity it has acquired throughout the world.

From that source also, to descend from great considerations to small ones, from the destiny of man to the character of a drawing-room,—from that source were derived the attractions of the age, and the charm it imparted to social life. Never before had all the various classes which form the select portion of a great people, however different their former history and present position, been seen to forget so entirely their antecedents and personalities, to mingle and associate in the interchange of the most delightful habits, to study exclusively mutual complaisance, to enjoy and hope together during half a century, destined to wind up by the most terrible dissensions.

This is the rare and delightful fact of which I witnessed the gradual extinction in the surviving drawing-rooms of the eighteenth century. Madame de Rumford's was closed the last of all.

It closed naturally, without check or alteration, ever consistent and like itself. Men have their inherent points of character, and maintain them to the end; the selected breach in which they prefer to die. Marshal Villars envied the Duke of Berwick the cannon-shot that killed him. Every orator in the British Parliament looked with a jealous eye on Lord Chatham, as he fell back exhausted in the arms of those who stood near him, in the midst of a sublime effusion of eloquence. The

President Molé would have rejoiced to have died in his place, while vindicating the State against faction. Vespasian said, "An Emperor should die standing." Madame de Rumford had passed her life in the world, in seeking for herself and in offering to others the pleasures of social intercourse. Not that the world entirely absorbed her cares, or that when occasion required she was not ever ready with serious and valuable counsel for her friends, and with liberal benefactions to relieve the unfortunate. But the world and society were her leading objects; she lived in her drawing-room. It may almost be said that she died there, on the 10th of February, 1836; having been surrounded, the evening before, by those in whose presence she most delighted, and who will never forget either the attractions of her house or the steadiness of her friendship.

No. VIII.

(Page 249.)

Report on the audience given and the answer delivered, on the 17th of February, 1831, by King Louis-Philippe to the Deputies of the National Congress of Belgium, who came to Paris to announce the election of his Royal Highness the Duke of Nemours, as King of the Belgians.

Paris, February 17, 1831.

Friday, at noon, the deputation from the National Congress of Belgium repaired to the Palais-Royal, and were received at the head of the grand staircase by two of his Majesty's aides-de-camp, where the Minister of Foreign Affairs was in waiting, and by whom they were conducted to the throne-room. The King received them seated on the throne, with the Duke of Orleans on his right-hand, and the Duke of Nemours on his left. Her Majesty the Queen was present, as were also their royal highnesses the Princes, her sons, the Princesses, her daughters, and the Princess Adelaide, the King's sister. The ministers and aides-de-camp of the King surrounded the throne. The President of the Congress then delivered the following speech :—

“ Sire,

“ The legitimate organ of the people of Belgium, the sovereign Congress, at their sitting of the 3rd of February, elected and proclaimed King his Royal Highness Louis-Charles-Philip of Orleans, Duke of Nemours, second son of your Majesty ; and has confided to us the mission of offering the

crown to his Royal Highness, in the presence of your Majesty, his guardian and sovereign.

“This choice, received with the acclamations of a free people, is a homage rendered to the popular royalty of France and the virtues of your family. It cements the natural union of two nations without confounding them; it reconciles their personal desires and interests with the interests and peace of Europe; and while affording a new support to Belgian independence in the honour of France, secures to other States a fresh element of strength and tranquillity.

“The constitutional covenant on which the crown of Belgium depends is now completed. The nation, in its acknowledged independence, awaits with impatience the ruler of its own selection, and the benefits of the constitution it has sworn to adopt. Your Majesty’s answer will complete its well-founded expectations and our ardent hope. The accession of your Majesty has proved how thoroughly you appreciate the power of a truly national desire, and the sympathy of the French people is a pledge of their warm adhesion to the suffrages of Belgium.

“We remit to your hands, Sire, the official decree of the election of his Royal Highness the Duke of Nemours, and a copy of the Constitutional Act, as settled by the Congress.”

The President then proceeded to read the Act of the Congress, expressed in the following terms :—

In the name of the Belgian nation, the National Congress decrees :—

ARTICLE I.

His Royal Highness Louis-Charles-Philip of Orleans, Duke of Nemours, is proclaimed King of the Belgians, on condition of his accepting the Constitution as it shall be declared by the National Congress.

ARTICLE II.

He shall not assume possession of the throne until he has solemnly taken the following oath, in presence of the Congress :—

“I swear to observe the Constitution and laws of the Belgian people, to maintain the national independence, and the integrity of the territory.”

At Brussels, in the Palace of the Nation, the 3rd of February, 1831.

The President of the Congress,

E. SURLET CHOKIER.

The Secretaries, Members of Congress,—

The Viscount Vilain XIV.,

Liedtz,

Henri de Brouckère,

Nothome.

The King replied to the deputation as follows:—

“Gentlemen,

“The desire you have been instructed to convey to me in the name of the people of Belgium, by the presentation of the Act of the National Congress, electing my second son, the Duke of Nemours, as King of the Belgians, has impressed me with sentiments which I request you will become the organs of conveying to your generous nation. I am profoundly moved by finding that my constant devotion to my country has inspired you with this desire, and I shall ever feel proud that a son of mine should have been the object of your choice.

“If I listened only to the promptings of my heart, and my sincere inclination to comply with the wishes of a nation whose peace and prosperity are equally important to France, I should accept the proposal with eagerness. But however bitter may be my regret in refusing my son to your desire, the imperative nature of the duties I have to fulfil imposes on me this painful obligation; and I feel called upon to declare, that I cannot accept for him the crown you are commissioned to offer. My first duty, above all others, is to consult the interests of France, and, consequently, not to endanger the peace I hope

to preserve, for the happiness of my own country, for that of Belgium, and all the other States of Europe, to whom it is equally precious and indispensable. Exempt from all ambition myself, my personal wishes entirely accord with my duties. The thirst of conquest, or the honour of seeing a crown on the head of my son, shall never induce me to expose my country to a renewal of those evils that war inevitably brings in its train, and for which the advantages we might possibly gain, important in other respects, could afford no compensation. The examples of Louis XIV. and Napoleon would suffice to preserve me from the fatal temptation of erecting thrones for my sons; and to make me prefer the satisfaction of maintaining peace, to all the renown of the victories which French valour could not fail to secure once more to our glorious standards.

“May Belgium be free and happy! May she never forget that it is to the concurrence of France with the great Powers of Europe, that she owes the prompt acknowledgment of her national independence! And let her always rely with confidence upon my support to protect her from foreign attack or intervention. But at the same time, let her protect herself from the scourge of intestine discord, and avoid that peril by the organization of a constitutional government that shall maintain a good understanding with its neighbours, and protect the rights of all, by securing a faithful and impartial execution of the laws. May the sovereign you elect consolidate your internal safety, and may the election act as a guarantee to all other nations, for the continuance of peace and general tranquillity! May he thoroughly understand the duties he will have to fulfil, and may he never forget that public liberty will be the best foundation of his throne; as respect for your laws, the maintenance of your institutions, and the fidelity with which he keeps his engagements, will be the surest means of preserving it from all hostile attempts, and of securing you at the same time from the danger of new revolutions!

“Tell your countrymen that such are my wishes in their behalf, and that they may rely to the utmost on the affection I bear them. They will ever find me ready to evince it, and to preserve in my intercourse with them the relations of friendly neighbourhood, so essential to the prosperity of the two adjoining countries.”

No. IX.

(Page 262.)

*Letter from General Chlopicki, addressed to the Emperor
Nicholas. (December, 1830.)*

Sire,

The deliberative assembly (Diet), notwithstanding the talent, and even the popularity of its members, is too weak to restore tranquillity in the midst of the tempest. Convinced of this truth, and the more so that I have before my eyes the experience of the days of terror which have recently passed over, I have determined to reunite in my own person the executive power in its fullest extent, to save it from becoming the prey of a crowd of exciting agents and public disturbers, who, timid in the hour of danger, possess nevertheless the art of deceiving the multitude by falsehoods, and of perverting the noble sentiments of the people to their own purposes. An enemy to anarchy, after having seen it overthrow three forms of authority, I have proposed to myself to support the Provisional Government by an organized force, and to entrust the commanding power to a single person, surrounding him with the strength of the army and the obedience of the people.

This measure, Sire, has already re-established tranquillity in the public mind. The soldier conforms himself to military discipline, the citizen returns to his habitual occupation; all entrust without fear their dearest possessions to an authority which desires the general good, and will strive henceforward to accomplish that noble end. In a word, commotion

has ceased, and the traces of disorder have disappeared. But, Sire, these sentiments, which in the course of a few hours have armed the entire capital, and have united the army under the same standard ;—these sentiments which, like an electric spark, penetrate through every palatinate, and produce there a similar effect,—these sentiments, I repeat, glow with fervour in every heart, and will never be extinguished but with their last sigh.

This, Sire, is our true position : the nation sighs for moderate liberty, and has no wish for its abuse. But through that medium it also looks to be protected from aggressive spoliation. It sighs for a constitution suited to practical life. Finding itself, by an unprecedented concurrence of circumstances, in a situation perhaps too daring, it is not the less ready to sacrifice everything for the noblest of causes, national independence. But, Sire, it has no thought of severing the ties by which it is united to your august will. The Provisional Government has already recognized the necessity of sending to St. Petersburg two deputies, who have been commissioned to lay at the foot of your Imperial and Royal Majesty's throne, the expression of the desire and hope of the nation, that the Polish provinces hitherto incorporated with the empire, should be allowed to participate in the liberties enjoyed by the kingdom.

Deign, Sire, for the sake of humanity, and in remembrance of the benefits you have showered upon us at the commencement of your reign, to receive with gracious condescension the prayers of which they are the interpreters ! May that Poland, already grateful to your Imperial and Royal Majesty for the good intentions you have ever evinced toward her,—may she, I say, approach you with the love she preserves in her heart for her august regenerator ! May her destiny be accomplished ; and may you, Sire, fulfilling the promises of your predecessor, prove to us by new benefits that your reign is but the uninterrupted continuance of the reign of him who gave

back vitality to a portion of ancient Poland ! The enjoyment of the liberties secured to us by the Charter, is not a concession to be accorded by the Throne ; it will be no more than the simple execution of a contract entered into between the king and the nation, and confirmed by a reciprocal oath.

Well knowing, Sire, your magnanimous disposition, I venture to hope that the deputation, which has no object but peace, will accomplish the desired end. The labours of the Provisional Government are devoted to the internal organization of the country ; its decrees will be respected as if they were my own, to the moment of the assembly of the Senate and the Chamber of Nuncios, to whom will then be conveyed the responsibility of ulterior measures.

Sire, in my capacity as an old soldier and a true Pole, I have presumed to lay the truth before you, for I feel convinced that your Imperial and Royal Majesty will deign to listen to it. You hold in your hand, Sire, the destinies of a whole nation ; by a single word you can raise it to the summit of happiness or plunge it into an abyss of misery.

Full of confidence in the generosity of your heart, Sire, I venture to hope that no effusion of blood will take place ; and I shall consider myself the most fortunate of men, if I am able to attain the end I propose by a close reunion of all the elements of good order and strength.

No. X.

(Page 276.)

*Memorandum presented on the 2nd of May, 1831, by the
Conference of Rome to Pope Gregory XVI.*

It appears to the representatives of the five Powers, that in regard to the States of the Church, and for the general interest of Europe, there are two leading points to consider :—

1. That the government of these States should be placed upon a solid basis by ameliorations planned and announced by his Holiness himself from the commencement of his reign.

2. That these ameliorations, which, according to the edict of his Excellency the Cardinal Bernetti, will establish a new era for the subjects of his Holiness, may, by an internal guarantee, be protected from the changes inherent in every elective government.

II.

To accomplish this salutary object, which, from the geographical and social position of the States of the Church, involves the interest of Europe, it seems indispensable that the organic declaration of his Holiness should emanate from two vital principles :—

1. From the appliance of the ameliorations in question, not only to the provinces in which revolution has manifested itself, but to those which have remained loyal, as well as to the capital.

2. From the eligibility of lay candidates to judicial and administrative employment.

III.

The ameliorations themselves should embrace the present judicial system, and also that of municipal and provincial administration.

A. With respect to the judicial system, it appears that the entire completion and consequent development of the promises and principles of the *De Motu Proprio* of 1816, present the safest and most efficacious means of redressing the general complaints on this most important point of social organization.

B. On the subject of local administration, it appears that the re-establishment and general organization of municipalities elected by the inhabitants, and the foundation of municipal franchise to regulate the action of these municipalities for the local interests of the different townships, ought to form the indispensable basis of all administrative reforms.

C. In the second place, the organization of provincial councils, whether a permanent administrative council, intended to assist the governor of the province in the execution of his duties, with suitable privileges, or whether consisting of a less numerous assembly, selected entirely from the new municipalities, with the view of being consulted on the most important affairs of the province, seems extremely useful in carrying on the reform and simplification of provincial government, in controlling the administration of the townships, in assessing the taxes, or in conveying information to the central authorities on the actual wants of the province.

IV.

The immense importance of a well-regulated state of national finance, and of such an administration of the public debt as shall furnish the necessary guarantee for the monetary credit of the government, and would at the same time contribute essentially to augment its resources and assure its independence, appears to render indispensable a central establishment in the capital, entrusted as a supreme court

of accounts, with the control of the compatibility of annual service in every branch of civil and military administration, and also with the supervision of the public debt, accompanied by the necessary powers for carrying out the great and salutary objects proposed for accomplishment. The more such an institution has the character of independence and the impress of a cordial understanding between the government and the country, the more it will respond to the beneficent intention of the Sovereign and the expectation of the people.

It appears that to achieve this end, the members of the above-named court should be selected from the local councils, and should form, with the agents of the government, a *junta* or administrative council. Such a *junta* might form, or not, a section of a Council of State, chosen by the Sovereign from amongst men eminent either by their birth, their fortune, or their ability.

Without one or more central establishments of this description, intimately connected with the leading persons of a country so rich in aristocratic and conservative elements, it appears that the nature of an elective government would necessarily take from the reforms which will constitute the enduring glory of the Sovereign Pontiff, that stability which is so universally and powerfully felt to be wanting, and which will be the more firmly cemented as the benefits conferred by his Holiness are intrinsically important and precious. *

Rome, May 21, 1831.

No. XI.

(Page 278.)

I do not insert here the actual text of the five edicts of Pope Gregory XVI., which occupy more than two hundred pages in quarto, and run into details containing neither interest nor instruction for the French public; but I give a summary of their essential contents, drawn up on the spot, and at the moment of their promulgation.

The edict of Pope Gregory XVI., dated the 5th of July, 1831, is divided into three titles. The first regulated the administration of the townships; the second that of the provinces; the third confirmed, while amending, certain arrangements established by the *motu proprio* of Pope Pius VII., of the 6th of July, 1816, and which had fallen into disuse.

The old division of the territory into seventeen delegations of the first, second, and third class, was provisionally maintained.

Rome and its dependencies (La Comarea) were placed under a special system; a superintendent, whose duties were analogous to those of our prefects, administered each of the provinces under the title of Prolegate. These magistrates were all laymen. The edict provides, as an exceptional measure, that Cardinals might be placed at the head of delegations of the first class. A *governative* association, composed of four proprietors born or domiciled in the province, and having exercised there either administrative duties or the profession of an advocate, took their places next to the Prolegate, and joined in all debates on public affairs. Questions of local finance were decided by a majority of votes. In others, relating to

general administration, the governative association had only a consulting voice; but the opinions of its members, when opposed to that of the Prolegate, were ordered to be signed, registered, and transmitted to the superior authorities.

Every delegation was divided into districts, and at the head of every district, *governors* discharged functions analogous to those of our sub-prefects, and acted as corresponding intermediaries between the *Prolegate* and the *gonfalonieri*, or mayors of the townships.

In the principal town of each delegation, under the presidency of the Prolegate, a provincial council assembled at stated epochs. The number of the members of these councils was proportional to the population of the provinces: none could consist of less than ten members. The councillors were named by the Sovereign, but taken from a list of candidates presented, in triplicate, by electors selected at the free choice of the municipal councils.

The provincial councils regulated the budget, audited the accounts of the provincial expenses, assessed the taxes of each district, ordered public works, adopting plans, and superintending their execution by engineers placed under their control. During the interval of these sessions, a committee of three members, appointed by the majority, remained in permanence, provided for the carrying on of the measures decreed by the councils, and exercised its control over the acts of the Prolegate and the *governative* association.

Title II. of the Edict of the 5th of July, 1831, regulated upon analogous principles the administration of the townships. All had municipal councils of forty-eight, thirty-six, or twenty-four members. The last number applied to towns with only one thousand inhabitants. The boroughs and smallest villages had also their councils composed of nine members, and vacancies occurring from deaths or other causes were filled up by recruits selected without superior interference by the councils themselves.

Well-arranged combinations, suitable to the spirit of the different localities, settled the mode of election to the municipal councils. There was no aiming at uniformity or *one common* principle. If in any particular township the old franchises appeared preferable to the new legislation, it was lawful to claim the continuance or restoration in full vigour of the earlier statutes.

The assembly of the councils was to take place as often as the necessities of the township demanded, and on the convocation of a single member, who was only required to specify the object of his summons. The gonfalonieri and the ancients (the mayor and his assistants) were appointed by the Sovereign, but from a list of candidates, presented in triplicate, and selected by the municipal councils.

Finally, Cardinal Bernetti, when sending the edict of the 5th of July, 1831, into the provinces, expressly invited the *governative* associations to make known to him the wishes of the inhabitants as to the reforms required in the different branches of public service. He announced the intention of his Holiness to receive them with due regard. A road was thus opened to ulterior progress which the people might legally follow.

The edicts for judicial reforms were conceived in the same spirit with this decree of the 5th of July for the amendment of administrative order. An organic regulation of civil justice appeared on the 5th of October, and was followed on the 31st of the same month by another much more completely developed, which established upon entirely new bases, criminal prosecutions, the hierarchy, and the powers of the tribunals. These two legislative acts, the most important that were passed during the pontificate of Gregory XVI., provided a fundamental reform in judicial proceedings, and dissipated the evils most generally imputed to the Papal government.

The heaviest reproach against the system in force throughout the Roman States for the administration of justice, was the multiplicity of exceptional courts. In the single city of

Rome there were not less than fifteen different jurisdictions, the powers and arbitrary forms of which plunged the litigants into an inextricable labyrinth, and delayed inordinately a final decision on the subject in dispute. Of these exceptional tribunals, that of the Pope's Auditor (*Uditore Santissimo*) continued in exercise even in 1831, as an outrageous monument of injustice and absurdity. The jurisdiction of this functionary had no limit either in civil or criminal proceedings. He could at will interrupt the course of a trial at any stage, and annul, or reverse the judgment passed; as a last resource. This right never ceased. The oldest litigations were renewed; and without fresh evidence in the case, or reason assigned for altering a sentence, a family saw itself daily deprived of its most assured possessions. And as if such an instrument of arbitrary power was yet insufficient, the Pope reserved a personal right of revoking all judgments, and of sending them before extraordinary commissions created *ad hoc*. Powerful families might thus supply themselves with complaisant judges, chosen without regard to their capacity, or knowledge of the matter; and the inhabitants of the provinces, taken from their natural magistrates, might be dragged to Rome to defend their property against unexpected attacks.

This incredible abuse found advocates amongst the lawyers residing at Rome. It secured the fortune and importance of that class, in which were comprised liberals of the highest reputation; and could not be done away with without provoking interested clamours.

The edict of the 5th of October, 1831, suppressed the jurisdiction of the *Uditore Santissimo* and the personal interference of the Pope in civil causes, which were all remitted to their natural judges in the order established by common law. It suppressed also, in like manner, the exceptional courts, and permitted no appeal from adjudicated causes except in case of an error of the legal forms, or a false application of the statute.

In France, legal truth springs from the arranged order of the

jurisdictions; and the decision of the judges of appeal is looked upon as superior in value to that of the judges in the first instance. In Rome, legal truth proceeds from the majority of judgments. There are three degrees of jurisdiction, and two concurring sentences decide the question in debate. If a second court confirms the sentence pronounced by the first, it then becomes definitive; if it reverses it, either of parties can appeal to a third tribunal, to which belongs the definitive settlement of the litigation, unless the forms of process have been violated. In that case, there is still an appeal to the tribunal of the *Signature*, the privileges of which are analogous to those of our Court of Cassation (Appeal), and which crowns the judicial edifice, since the monstrous power of the *Uditore Santissimo* is no longer seen to soar above it.

In the provinces, the three degrees of jurisdiction established under the new organic regulation of the 5th of October, 1831, were :—

1. The *governors*, or local magistrates, who correspond to our justices of the peace, but with more extensive powers.

2. The civil courts established in every chief town of a delegation. They were to be composed of five judges, and replaced the prætors, who formerly decided cases only in the second prosecution. In a country where unfortunately corruption abounds, the collegiate organization of tribunals was a great public benefit. The obligation was imposed on judges of all degrees, not to pronounce judgments until after discussion, to explain the reasons on which they were founded, and to reduce them to the current language. Until then, two Latin words, *obtinuit* and *petiit*, inscribed on the petition of the parties, contained the entire summary of the sentence, delivered without hesitation, and in the absence of all pleading.

3. Two superior tribunals, called Courts of Appeal, each consisting of a president and six judges, were established, one at Bologna, for the Legations; the other at Macerata, for

the Romagna and the Marches. The inhabitants of these provinces were not required, as formerly, to carry their appeals to Rome. This was a most important advantage, which they could not fail to appreciate warmly, but which were viewed with very different feelings by the legal practitioners of the metropolis.

The provincial courts, in every degree of jurisdiction, were composed exclusively of laymen.

In Rome and the Comarca, its immediate district, the administration of justice underwent reforms of equal importance. By the organic regulation of the 5th of October, 1831, twelve jurisdictions, composed entirely of prelates, were suppressed. These remained only in exercise,—the tribunal of Capitol, that of the A. C., and that of the Rota.

The tribunal of the Capitol, a municipal magistracy, was presided over by the senator of Rome, and composed of three advocates. It decided, in the first instance, and in common with the tribunal of the A. C., all causes in which laymen alone were interested. The plaintiff might, at his own choice, carry his cause before either of these courts. The tribunal of the A. C. (so called by a contraction of *Auditor Camerae*) was composed of five advocates and three prelates, divided into two sessions. The appeal in the first degree was taken from one to the other. If the sentences were conformable, all ulterior proceedings were stayed; in case of disagreement, the cause was then carried before the tribunal of the Rota, the court of appeal for Rome and the Comarca. The *Rota Romana*, as before, was to be formed exclusively of prelates, and continued to pass sentence in Latin. But the forms of trial were simplified and amended. The sovereign authority could no longer select arbitrarily from amongst its own members those who were informed on special cases, only, and thus constituted private committees. All causes were to reach the different chambers by the regular channel, and to be tried there according to collegiate forms.

The ancient reputation of the *Sacra Rota Romana* for intelligence and integrity had suffered no decrease. That court enjoyed general celebrity throughout Italy and in foreign lands. Catholic Europe participated in its composition. Germany, Spain, the Milanese, and Tuscany, appointed auditors of the Rota; and after the Revolution of 1830, Monsignor Isoard continued there as the representative of France.

The supreme tribunal of the Signature surmounted the edifice of the Roman judicial system, and as we have already said, its prerogatives resembled those of the Court of Cassation in France.

When to these improvements are added the suppression of fees which in all the courts the litigants had to pay to the judges, their secretaries, and their servants; and the obligation imposed on the attorneys and advocates of reducing the proceedings of the court to the language in common use, it cannot be denied that the reform, if not complete, was very extensive, and that Pope Gregory XVI. and his minister Cardinal Bernetti, had entered resolutely on the course which the memorandum of the 21st of May had opened to them.

The organization, the number, the competence, and the hierarchical qualities of the tribunals being settled by the edict of the 5th of October, a second decree on the 31st regulated the mode of proceedings. The first Article restored to vigour the code established by Pius VII., a work of profound wisdom, which had distinguished his pontificate, but had been unfortunately allowed by his successor to fall into disuse. Since 1816, experience had suggested some improvements which were included in the edict of the 31st of October. This great work was the result of consultation, continued during several months, of the most eminent lawyers of the Roman States; and in such a matter we cannot but believe that they exerted their abilities to the utmost. The Pope and his minister, far from repulsing the aid they might derive from public knowledge and opinion, united their co-operation,

and the article terminating the new edict expressly commanded all the tribunals to make known their views and ideas officially to the Secretary of State's office, on the question of such reforms and amendments as the system of legal proceedings might still appear to them capable of receiving.

Five days after the publication of the code of civil process, the pontifical Government promulgated an organic regulation for criminal cases, (on the 5th of November, 1831,) a work even more extensive than its immediate predecessor. For the first time, by this decree, fixed and invariable rules were laid down for the conduct and issue of all criminal prosecutions. The accused were no longer to be taken from their natural judges. Defined rules, quite opposed to arbitrary practice, settled with minute precision all that regarded the judges, the courts, the forms of trial, the proofs of crime or misdemeanour, the examination of the accused, and the verification of the testimony of witnesses. Formerly the trials were carried on with closed doors in the absence of the accused. He had an advocate who was not allowed to be present either at the discussion or the production of evidence, and who was merely allowed to furnish memorials in behalf of his client. Pius VII. had ordained, in 1816, that sentences should be explained, and that the judges should only prescribe the punishments laid down by law. These arrangements, forgotten under Leo XII., were restored in full vigour by the edict of the 5th of November.

If the publicity of the pleadings was not complete, at least the accused and his defender were made acquainted with the full proceedings against them, and could call into court all the witnesses necessary to the defence (Art. 386, 389, and 394). When sentence was passed, the accused was to appear before the judges, accompanied by one or more counsel (Art. 406). He was placed in presence of the complainant, of the prosecutor, and the witnesses, whose depositions he was permitted

to question (Art. 417). The accused party declared innocent was immediately set at liberty, and could not be prosecuted again on the same charge (Art. 445). Every sentence, either capital or modified, was subject to appeal. The process to be carried on the same form as in the first instance. The same tribunals, whether in Rome or in the provinces, took equal cognizance of civil and criminal cases.

Thus the Conference of Rome had only assumed, by its memorandum of the 21st of May, to obtain from the Holy Father, in favour of his subjects :—1. The secularization of his government; 2. Municipal and provincial institutions protecting local interests; 3. Judicial reforms favourable to liberty; and on these three points, the pontifical edicts of the 5th of July, the 5th and 31st of October, and the 5th of November, accorded more than the Powers had hoped for, after the refusal of the Pope to enter into any mutual understanding with them on the subject. It seemed even as if his Holiness intended to take into consideration the fourth suggestion of the memorandum, respecting the central junta to be established at Rome, to maintain order in the finances, and regularity in all the different branches of administration. An edict of the 24th of November, 1831, appointed a permanent committee to examine the accounts of every department. That committee, under the title of Assembly of Revision, was to be composed of a cardinal president, four bishops, and four lay deputies, selected in Rome or from the provinces. All questions were to be freely discussed and decided by a majority of votes. The general superintendence of the receipts and expenses of the State, the investigation of the budget, and the settlement of accounts, fell within the scope of its duties. It was also to take charge of the liquidation and redemption of the national debt, and to exercise generally the functions of our Court of Accounts. In Article 23 of this edict, the Assembly of Revision was instructed to inquire into, and submit directly to his Holiness, all reforms that appeared necessary in the

general system of finance, as were also the provincial assemblies and the judicial bodies, according to the extent of their respective powers.

2. LETTER FROM M. ROSSI TO M. GUIZOT.

Rome, 10th April, 1832.

My dear Friend,

I cannot tell you how much your letter has gratified me, although the arrival of your admirable speech on the foreign relations of France had previously convinced me that I was not entirely forgotten. I have watched for an opportunity of writing in reply, but owing to the cholera, people come from Paris, and nobody goes there. You thought of me, and you were not deceived in supposing that I occupy myself with Italy; this is my daily subject of meditation, and will continue to be so, while I have a breath of life. I understood your system as you equally penetrated my vexation. We cannot stop the murmurs of the patient, though the physician is compelled to be inexorable. But enough of the past. You ask me both for my dreams and reasonable hopes. Let us leave the dreams on one side. All the world indulges in them, but to expect their fulfilment is quite another matter. To commit them seriously to writing is much worse still. All they are fit for is, to wile away an evening by the corner of the fire, when we have nothing else to do. My rational expectations are more easily told. I was in hopes that, while maintaining peace, France would exercise over certain portions of the Peninsula a diplomatic intervention, tending to prepare for this unfortunate country a better future, to heal many wounds, to put an end to many calamities and sufferings, and to secure to France herself a more lasting and substantial influence than that derived from a hundred thousand

bayonets. I expected that through French interference, some kind of *oasis* at least would spring up in Italy, wherein men who respect themselves might live and breathe, while waiting patiently a more complete perspective for themselves and their children. The States in which this appeared to me possible, were Piedmont, the Papal dominions, and even the kingdom of Naples. But let us not speak of the last, which would occupy too much time. Allow me to say a few words on the other two. With respect to Piedmont, my hopes have nearly vanished. I have a strong conviction, derived from facts, that the system which has hitherto prevailed in that country is as Jesuitic, anti-Italian, and anti-French as can be expressed in language. If any one thinks the contrary, he pays himself with fine words. Once more, on this point I have positive information. The government of Piedmont is against us. Moreover, the whole country knows, sees, and thoroughly believes this. What has apparently been done, is utter mummery, of which it would be absurd to speak. How has this happened? Could it not have been prevented? Or rather, have we refrained, from fear of displeasing too much, or exciting the jealousy of the gigantic neighbour. It is idle to say so. Thus things remain as they are, and the Sardinian States endure them under the . . . of a coming revolution. When? how? and with what success? Heaven only knows; but the elements are there, and their energy *va crescendo*. At this moment, when the French system is more firmly established at home and abroad, can they or will they attempt this enterprise in an underhand manner? Will they try to modify the Piedmontese system? I ask you the question. But since you desire to know what I hope, I reply that I hope for very little, though I shall rejoice to find myself deceived. I am, my dear friend, as little of a Jacobin as you are; but you have the coolness of a man who has reached his goal; I the impatience of one who is only starting. In spite of this, I see with deep regret, and through increasing obstacles, opinions displaying themselves beyond

the Alps, contrary to those I profess. This is again a positive fact, and believe me, more extensively in action than can be readily believed. I said in September, 1830, at Paris, to M. M——, and here, at a subsequent period, to B——, that I did not expect six months would pass without a rising of some sort in Italy. I was not mistaken, and assuredly I was not in the secret, if secret there was. Notwithstanding the apparent importance of certain assurances, I should never have advised such a course; I am not child enough to have done so.

Let us now come to the Roman States. I disapproved of the first revolution, although most legitimate in principle. When it took place, I would have wished to see it otherwise directed. But what can a man do at a distance of two hundred leagues? It is useless now to dwell on the past. But I may tell you, in evidence of my candour, that the tone of the first French diplomatic intervention gave me utter displeasure. Today I see things in a different light. I recognize France, her dignity, her importance, her principles. I do not delude myself as to what we may possibly do. I think I can foresee the extent; nevertheless I am not at all one of those who are either sorry for or condemn your interference. Thus, on this point, instead of being weakened, my hopes are confirmed. But, in fact, what do I look for?

I hope that all are thoroughly convinced that the revolution, in the sense of a profound incompatibility between the *existing system* of the Roman government, and the nation, has penetrated into every heart in this country. Any idea contrary to this is a pure fallacy. Evacuate Italy tomorrow, leaving things as they are, and the result will show itself the day after. The question is no longer confined to the Legations and the Marches.

Adopting this view, I hope that honest and indispensable changes will be strongly insisted on.

I hope that in the first of these changes will be included a form of administration, if not exclusively, at least essentially laical; a parochial and provincial municipality which shall

not be a delusion ; a central council at the seat of government, composed, in part at least, of men selected from the provinces, and whose opinions are necessary in questions of internal regulation, taxes, etc. ; a radical change in the administration of justice, the effects of which would be incalculable on the public mind, and could alone reconcile the people to the Pope's government ; a legislative commission empowered to prepare without delay the reform of the civil, criminal, and commercial laws ;—this is another of the urgent necessities on which the people will never cease to insist ; and, finally, a system of public authority which shall neither crush the country underfoot, surrender it up to anarchy, nor leave it at the mercy of a hired and shameless soldiery. I am fully aware of the difficulties of the last arrangement. There is however a method of getting rid of the mercenaries by the enrolment of a militia which would supply all the necessary guarantees to the government and the country. The elements are there, if properly called into play. It is impossible to explain the matter in detail in a letter already too long.

In conclusion, I should like to hope, although I can scarcely venture to do so, that some means may be found of obtaining these concessions. Let us not deceive ourselves. Rome is always Rome. While we are in Italy, all will go well ; but afterwards ? Sound, constitutional, direct, and positive guarantees are what you require, and will never obtain. Neither the Pope nor Austria desire that you should. What then will remain ? French influence, stipulations, and the presence of the King's embassy at Rome. This is something certainly ; but seriously, is this all ? The moment your troops depart, the Apostolic party, numerous, powerful, and irritated, will possess—or believe that it possesses—the field. When material guarantees are wanting, we require at least those of men, of their characters, opinions, and inclinations. Of these there are some that Rome will refuse to employ ; she will say they are her enemies, engaged to act against her. Others (and they are easily

found) will be either the avowed or concealed enemies of the new system, and of France. In fact, what is the question at issue? To produce harmony between a government which submits against its will, and a people that can never feel confidence in the Government. To effect this, men are wanted, acceptable on the one hand to the authorities, and on the other, well esteemed by the country, equally prepared to restrain both parties, to promote the progress of the new system in good faith, and without alarming opposite opinions;—men, to whom the country may, in a manner, confide its secrets, without the fear of seeing them abused, and the Court of Rome may whisper its alarms, without the dread of their being betrayed to the enemy. But, once more, where are such men to be found?

Let us not forget that if the country, thinking itself trifled with, breaks out anew after the departure of the French, the movement will rapidly become more general and serious; for every one firmly believes that the tricoloured flag is displayed in Italy in favour of the people, and that, if necessary, it would return accompanied by overwhelming forces. Declarations and protests would go for nothing. I have no occasion to allude to the consequences. We have only to reflect whether they would accord with the policy of France.—My dear friend, I close my letter with one word more. If you are told that in Italy ill-concerted acts will be attempted, leading to injurious results, you may believe the assertion. It is perhaps founded in truth. But if you are assured, on the contrary, that such attempts will not be made, and that their elements no longer exist; that there are no combustible materials which any man, at any time, may approach with a match and explode into a conflagration,—whether advantageous, destructive, enduring, transient, partial, or general, it imports but little—but still a conflagration tending to embarrass the system of France;—reject the idea altogether.

You now see that my hopes are so moderate that you may almost consider them timid, and below what may be expected

from the influence that France has the right and power of exercising.

If I had told you that, following the example of Belgium, I hoped to see the Marches and Legations form themselves into a country self-governed, under the sovereignty of the Pope, and paying to him an annual tribute guaranteed by France, England, and Austria, what would there have been so strange in that? It would perhaps be the only reasonable method of putting an end to a state of things which may become more menacing from day to day. But I do not go so far; I shall consider myself too happy if I see the little I expect carried into effect.

No. XII.

(Page 282.)

1. M. CASIMIR PÉRIER TO THE COUNT DE SAINTE-AULAIRE.

February, 1832.

Count,

In reply to the letter you have forwarded to me, recommending your son, and although it contained nothing more than your despatches acquainted me with, I wish to add to my official communication of this morning, a few private and more specific instructions.

I must confess I felt surprised at your supposing that you saw in the intentions of the King's government the idea of a collision which it has strenuously endeavoured to avoid ;—nothing could be more opposed to our views ;—and in occupying for the present a portion of the north of Italy, our sole wish is to be able to withdraw our troops without delay. But this we can only do when the honour and dignity of France permit. We have entered Italy because, from the moment when the Austrians made their appearance there, our national interests and self-respect were in danger. We cannot be suspected of favouring revolts that we have always condemned ; but we are bound to see a territory respected, the occupation of which on the part of Austria we cannot suffer even for a moment. The simultaneous occupation by our own troops, remedies to a certain point the evil we wish to avoid ; but we hope that the Court of Rome will comprehend the difficulty of such a position, and that notwithstanding the qualified refusal you have transmitted to us, it will no longer feel called upon to oppose a

measure which the King's government, in perfect accord with England, looks upon as indispensable.

It is also quite necessary to add, that if the Powers are anxious to maintain peace, as they assure us, they should give some proof of their sincerity, and not raise up embarrassments in the way of perhaps the only administration that offers them guarantees, and if it has chances of success, has also active enemies, ready to profit by momentary difficulties to attempt its overthrow.

I therefore repeat to you, Count,—impress these arguments with your utmost power upon the Holy See; point out its true interests. Labour, in fine, with consistency and firmness, according to the spirit of the instructions transmitted to you this day by the King's government, and for the object from which its opinions and wishes will never deviate. We have, up to this period, done much to avoid war, but we expect from our allies loyalty and frankness. We reckon, Count, on your earnest and valuable co-operation in this emergency, and the success we expect in consequence will add to the obligations which the King's government has already contracted towards you.

I send back your son, who has expressed a wish to rejoin you without delay, and will repeat all that I have here expressed.

Accept, Count, the assurance of my high consideration.

2. FROM M. CASIMIR PÉRIER TO THE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND.

February, 1832.

Prince,

I have delayed longer than I wished, my reply to the two private letters you have done the honour to address to me, for

we found the first debates on the budget long and disagreeable. Up to this, we have succeeded in all the important points. We have principally to fight the Chambers on the retrenchments and economical reductions that may prove embarrassing to the government. For the rest, we are unanimously resolved to struggle to the last not to make ministerial questions of such as purely appertain to finance; and we shall persevere in our efforts to consolidate within, that political system the strengthening of which you, Prince, have so powerfully aided in our foreign relations.

I received yesterday, with the Belgian ratifications you have forwarded, your despatch of the . . . I have noticed with the greatest satisfaction what you tell me of the speech of Lord Palmerston, which has been transmitted to me this morning. The King's government congratulates itself warmly on the conformity of views and sentiments from which the two countries may anticipate such happy results. This frank and sincere manifestation will answer many objections and prove substantially useful. We find in it a fresh pledge of that harmony between France and England which we shall always endeavour to establish upon solid foundations; we discover a confirmation of our system of foreign policy, thus justified by such a signal success in its most important object.

My first official despatch, Prince, will give you ample details on the affairs of Italy; but in compliance with your desire, I hasten to tell you today that we have reason to expect the compliance of his Holiness with the pressing instances we have laid before him, and that he will withdraw his qualified refusal to permit us to occupy Ancona, the intelligence of which was communicated by the son of M. de Sainte-Aulaire.

Our troops have received orders to enter Ancona provisionally, unless it so happens that the Austrians have anticipated them. In that case, they will take possession of Civita Vecchia.

We shall not swerve from the plan we have laid down;

namely, to convince Austria that we cannot consent to her occupation of the Romagna, except as a temporary step, and to show the Holy See that we are resolved to obtain the concessions so solemnly promised to the five Powers.

In conclusion, without departing from this constant desire, we do not intend to diverge from our political system, which we are anxious to render moderate and just, as well as firm and worthy of France; and we shall avoid, as long as we can, a collision against which our utmost efforts have always been directed.

No. XIII.

(Page 298.)

Of Charity, and its Place in Woman's Life. By MADAME
ELIZA GUIZOT. *Written in 1828.*

Women are often heard to lament the narrow limits within which their lives are restrained. They compare them with the vast and varied existence of men. They accuse the laws of society, and almost the decrees of Providence, which condemn them to inaction and obscurity.

From what classes of society do these complaints and reproaches proceed? Is it from those in which women have to endure the heaviest sufferings, where the brutality of a husband sometimes endangers their days, or his misconduct brings down the most abject misery on helpless children who can only weep, or where his loss plunges his whole family in utter destitution? No: the women who are condemned to bear those heavy burdens are not given to deplore with bitterness the condition of their sex; their minds have not enough of idle liberty to feel contracted in the sphere assigned to them by the will of God; and when they are able to reflect for a moment on their destiny, it is repose and not action that they invoke.

We alone, the fortunate exceptions of our age, exclaim against the condition of women, as settled by divine and human decrees. And yet when and where has that condition ever been what is in our own days and in France? When has the father ever evinced more affection, the brother more tender regard, the husband superior confidence, the son a

greater degree of gentle respect, or a general state of society affording more care and protection?

Can we possibly regret that period still so near us, when domestic life obtained but little honour and consideration; when the visits, the conversation, the interests and pleasures of promiscuous society occupied the entire day; when men and women abandoned for frivolous, transitory, and culpable connections, the powerful and pure ties which spring from divine institutions, and can alone produce an enduring and real happiness?

I feel confidently, that even amongst those women who are dissatisfied with their actual condition, the greater part would be unwilling to exchange it for that external and worldly existence which overwhelms the soul with so many dangers and such scanty gratifications. It cannot be to waste their endowments thus in vain indulgences, and affections without restraint or dignity, that God has so liberally bestowed on them the gift of pleasing and the power of love.

But still it must be admitted, that this empire of the drawing-room accorded to women in the last century, was precious to many amongst them, less to satisfy irregular passions than to animate a life which appeared at the same time too short and too slow. *Ennui*, that plague of those who know no other, is the true evil of which women complain who are born in the affluent classes of society, and for whom all things are easy; to *ennui* we ought to ascribe the uneasy and painful discontent by which they are afflicted. Is it necessary to adduce an evident proof? Never do this disease and the complaints it engenders exhibit themselves with such intensity as in those times at once idle and active, in which the course of events fails to keep pace with the expansion of intellect; and when we are driven to seek within ourselves, and not in the exterior world, the nourishment of moral energy; a more painful contingency to women than to men, as they have fewer occasions for its exercise and less numerous resources to occupy their

attention. Let society, on the contrary, be strongly agitated, let the most engrossing interests be every day called in question and lives endangered;—in such moments when activity, intelligence, and even physical strength become so precious, we never hear women regret being worse treated in these respects than men. Relying on their natural protectors, they no longer inquire why they stand in need of them; and in days when the highest powers of their soul reach their fullest exaltation, when they are in the enjoyment of all that is permitted to their being, they no longer dream of expressing astonishment that they are not allowed more.

But how are we to believe that times of trouble and social overthrow can be periods favourable for women, or conducive to their moral comfort; and that systematic order produces a heavy and sad condition which condemns them to struggle vainly against the noble and legitimate necessities of the mind? Let us search the depths of our hearts; let us be sincere. This oppression and bitter weariness of soul, is it not a fault rather than a misfortune? If there are certain uses of the faculties denied to us by our natural weakness and the rules of society, have we cultivated all those with which we are lawfully endowed? If many doors are closed to our activity, have we knocked at all that can open to us? Because God has spared us the necessity of physical labour, do we not release ourselves from the moral duty of occupation? Because we are not called on to assume a part in the affairs of our country, do we not consider ourselves released from all public responsibility? It is a common error of women of the world to believe that they have fulfilled their mission on earth when they have discharged their family duties. Undoubtedly these duties comprise the great business of their lives; the wife, the mother, who is compelled to devote herself to them entirely, performs her whole task with credit; neither God nor man demand from her more. But in the affluent classes of society, the woman who has most at heart these dear and sacred

duties, trusts nevertheless to the hands of strangers a thousand cares that would absorb the time she might employ to more advantage. How many free, disengaged hours remain to her after she has done all that her husband, her children, and her household demand from her? These are the hours when want of occupation becomes such a heavy burden, and these I would redeem in the name of duty and for the advantage of our immortal hopes.

Many women, I know, are content to trifle these hours away, and flatter themselves by this subterfuge to evade the burden. Experience rapidly dispels the illusion. *Ennui* never yields to fruitless activity, to a movement without object or result. Besides which, time, *the price of eternity*, has not been given to us to lose. We have received it to be employed in our moral improvement, and in doing all the good we can on earth. If we waste this precious gift, as if we had no desire but to escape from it, where shall we find it again in the moment of need, when life is closing on us, and memory, fading to extinction, returns with anxiety to the years we have wasted? The violence of the passions, and the frailty of human nature, may perhaps extenuate before the Sovereign Judge, many serious errors and omissions; but a whole existence frivolously idle,—the ignorant and futile neglect of gifts received from God, and the obligations they impose,—a selfish indifference for the interests of our fellow-creatures,—where shall we find a justification of these sad delinquencies? where even look for an excuse? The world itself, with all its idle thoughtlessness, condemns an unprofitable life, and bestows no consideration on those who do not sometimes seriously employ their faculties and their time.

There is a more dangerous habit, for it has superior elevation, if not of wasting time, at least of employing it contrary to the intention of Providence. This is to give ourselves up entirely to enjoyments of the mind, to refined intellectual researches solely for themselves, without external application or

utility. A very seductive temptation to exalted souls, for it feeds them with generous emotions and lofty thoughts, but will count for very little in the day of retribution. The development of our faculties, considered in the light of a means, is a duty; taken as an end, it becomes a beautiful but fatal illusion. Undoubtedly, the pleasure of study, of inward meditation, of holy contemplation, can never be designated as either trifling or unworthy. These are sublime necessities and instincts, pledges of our glorious origin and still more glorious destiny, but which nevertheless ought not to engross our lives; neither do they comprise our whole mission on earth. Perhaps there may be a chosen few, destined by a special vocation to conceive and preserve in their solitary thoughts the highest as well as the most mysterious truths, to whom it may have been commanded to be only what it has been given to them to be, and to develop, in a few isolated cases, the faculties and virtues so difficult to acquire in general commerce with mankind. Although without visible or immediate action, such beings exercise sometimes an important influence over the destinies of the human race, arresting imagination and supplying examples, who could undertake to say that their career has been idle or their passage through life profitless? But such is not the common vocation, the ordinary duty. Every one acknowledges in his conscience the law which prescribes to him the exercise of the gifts he has received. God, who has sown the seed everywhere, has a right to expect a universal harvest. What then will be our excuse, whose condition has been made easy by Providence, if we enjoy its benefits but neglect the corresponding duties? Is it that our days may pass in idle indulgence that God has granted to us the comforts of affluence? Is it to gratify our vanity or empty fancies that he has attached certain privileges of consideration and influence to particular social positions? Is it that no fruit may be produced by our hand, that he has lavished on us the leisure which has been so sparingly granted to many of our fellow-

creatures? Has he only intended to supply us with food for our understanding, and perhaps our pride, when he has surrounded us with all the facilities of education, and all the aid of lights bestowed on others? This cannot be supposed, unless we would conclude at the same time, that we live only for this *world which passes away*, and for ourselves alone; that our destiny is essentially selfish and transitory.

But if we carry our thoughts to a more distant and a higher elevation, if we consider ourselves as God's labourers, if time is nothing but a means, and life the road to eternity;—all that happens at the present must thus be connected with our expectations for the future. We have received nothing for such a limited period, for such narrow interests; all the gifts of God, even the most trifling in appearance, have been given to us for the purpose of salvation, for the salvation of our fellow-creatures as well as for our own, and for which an account will one day be required at our hands.

What means have we then, of employing, according to the intentions of Divine wisdom, our leisure, our resources, and our faculties?

There is one which in its immense extent satisfies and even exceeds all these conditions;—the exercise of charity. Not of that restricted, superficial charity which contents itself with giving food and clothing to the unfortunates thrown by accident in our way, but that forecasting, exalted charity, which anticipates all misfortunes, addresses itself to all wants, to the miseries of the mind as well as to the sufferings of the body, and nourishes, *not with bread alone*, all that it takes under its protection.

The present moment is opportune, for never was the exercise of this grand and genuine charity more necessary and more easily indulged. Despite its faults, despite its moral weakness, the last age possessed an immeasurable and original merit. It loved man; it loved the whole race of men. Justice for all, sympathy for all, a desire for the dignity and

happiness of all,—humanity ; to say all in a word, and taking that word in its most extended sense,—humanity comprised the holy and powerful idea which, in the midst of many follies and evils, has produced so much advantage, and will lead to such profitable advancement in modern society. This idea has been strangely interpreted, disfigured, travestied, and obscured ; criminal and odious under the name of *equality*, ridiculous under that of *philanthropy*. It has resisted and survived all ; after innumerable trials, in spite of many reactions and errors, it has continually re-appeared and resumed its empire. The spirit of humanity, respect for man under any condition and feature of his destiny,—herein is comprised the true essence of the last century, the new and productive inspiration which animates the world now, and will preside over its future destiny.

Let charity then make haste ; its time is come ; the spirit of humanity prepares its exclusive work ; it is for her that such pains are taken to seek out incessantly all the privations and sufferings of society, to bring them into light, to propagate with ardour that desire for amendment, that thirst for improving the condition of the world, which characterizes the epoch in which we live. For a long time the rich, the powerful, the prosperous of the earth, forgot the poor and weak. It is not so now. On every side the helpless and destitute are placed in front or come forward themselves ; from all quarters the most flattering promises are required and made. I trust they may not all prove corrupting or deceitful. I hope that the reform, already so considerable, in the condition of the destitute poor, will continually increase ; and that with the progress of worldly comfort, the advancement of morality will be blended. But here, as elsewhere, I feel convinced that we shall promise much more than we are able to perform. I am satisfied that we shall bring to light more sufferings than we can assuage, that we shall excite more expectations of happiness than we can ever satisfy. And when science and political

institutions have reached their limits, to what power shall we address ourselves to accomplish what has been left undone, if not to charity? Charity alone can undertake to cure, or at least to alleviate, so many miseries which without her will have only been sought out to suffer them to fall back once more upon themselves.

To you, O God, I know, to you alone it belongs to pour upon so many human wounds the truest of balms, the balm of faith and hope in you and you alone. But you permit, you command charity to consecrate its efforts to this work; and never, I venture to say, in the midst of the brilliant perspective now open to the eyes of all, never has its zeal been more indispensable, and never will it have more brilliant opportunities of exercise than in these days in which we live.

Never also, it must be confessed, have greater facilities and more success been offered to its efforts. Ardent and indefatigable in herself, charity had formerly to struggle with many obstacles, and frequently acted by chance, in the dark, without knowing much of the facts with which it had to deal, or of the result of its labours. Thus it has sometimes been accused of failing in the proposed object, and of increasing the ills it intended to cure. To-day it is everywhere seconded and encouraged; not only can it rely on the co-operation of the law and the administrative authorities, but new and brilliant lights are everywhere shed upon its progress. The most powerful, the most distinguished men occupy themselves in obtaining for her all the information she may require, in solving every problem that intercepts her path. The improvement of the state of humanity, the alleviation of human misery, has become a science, the extent and means of action of which are studied, and carefully explained, and will prevent henceforward, in great part at least, a deeply lamentable result, the errors of good works,—an added mischief springing from a pious and benevolent intention.

At the same time too that charity, thus elevated to the

rank of a science, attracts the most enlightened minds to its service, it obtains innumerable agents throughout society. A power which satisfies at the same time the two conditions imposed on every human undertaking,—unity of purpose and division of labour,—a spirit of association penetrates every day more thoroughly into the exercise of charity. The spirit of association is not repulsed by lofty theories, and disdains not the lowest co-operation. Like those wonderful machines the most complicated springs of which can be moved by the hand of an infant, it admits weakness, inexperience, even ignorance itself to assist in accomplishing the designs of science, in realizing the inspirations of genius; and it secures thus to the greatest undertakings means of execution, and to the most obscure efforts their full proportion of efficacy.

Let us, then, hear no more of pretexts or excuses. In these days, all who have time to spare can employ it most profitably. Women have time; they have also what imports still more to the success of charity; they have affection, sympathy, imaginations easily moved, tears that flow promptly, tender and touching words,—all the qualities, in fact, that human beings can comprehend, reciprocate, and almost love, although they are only interchanged at casual intervals. Viewed in this light alone, charity actually does the good it promises, and confers another benefit which it had no previous thought of including. We think too little of this. The spirit of science and regulated forms controls our minds. Proud of our methodical skill, of our settled civilization, we incline to believe that all things may be calculated, and administer themselves; that with printed lists, committees, and distributions, all the good required can be readily accomplished. The unfortunate are not so easily consoled, or by such limited appliances. Science and administration assist, but are unable to complete, the undertaking. Charity wants something beyond intelligence or well-regulated activity: it demands a sympathetic soul, which thinks of more than mere

physical relief, which applies itself to render its gifts affectionate as well as useful, and excites, at every moment, between the benefactor and the object relieved, a mutual emotion, the sole pledge of the moral efficacy of their intercourse. This is the feeling that women can exclusively infuse into the exercise of charity; by this quality alone can they adorn it with the charm and animation which the scientific coldness of the age tends to destroy. But it is not alone the leisure of time, it is the leisure of the imagination and the heart that women can offer to those who are in misfortune. Their happy destiny does not thus entirely exhaust the faculties of their nature; incapable of contributing to the service of their country either strength or knowledge, they are commissioned to spread abroad the infinite treasures of affection and sympathy; placed below men in reason and foresight, they elevate themselves by the power of love to the Being who rewards faith, and fulfils hope, but who reserves to charity alone the privilege of being immortal like himself.

My own conviction is profound; I am anxious to impart it to other women; I am desirous that they should see in charity a part of their mission in this world, as I feel assured they will find in its exercise a remedy for the evil of which they complain, the vacuum in their time and in their souls. But this double advantage can only be gained on one condition; that of restraining within a neighbouring and limited sphere the ambition and labour of charity. Where there is so much to do, many hesitate to commence: there should be no such doubt. Some wish to accomplish all: it is wiser to attempt but little. I have lately read Dr. Chalmers's work on 'Civic and Christian Economy.' He demonstrates with convincing clearness the folly of always wishing to act on the grand scale, of despising little works, the only works that are sure of a result. Without speaking of the moral danger that attaches itself to projects so brilliant that we congratulate ourselves on having conceived them, and from the flatter-

ing aspect of which we descend reluctantly to practical charity and her humble exertions, is it not evident that no one person, no woman in particular can command a sufficiency of time and resources of every kind to meet such a varied and extensive task, and that benefits which, directed to a single point, would prove efficacious, lose nearly all their virtue when promiscuously divided? Thus, I repeat with firm confidence, and supported by the authority of Chalmers, it becomes an imperious duty to limit, and regulate by strict observance, the exercise of compassion. It is most painful, I know, to see misfortune close to us, to be separated from it by nothing but an imaginary line, and yet to have our hands tied and our relief withheld. The heart revolts at the sight, and we accuse ourselves of injustice. But if this reserve in the hopes and works of charity is the condition of its true success,—if activity and fortune which suffice for the relief of families in our immediate vicinity, cannot fail, in the circuit of a vast city, to be swallowed up like a drop of water in the ocean,—to exhaust themselves unperceived even by the miseries which have absorbed them,—is it not an extremely false calculation, even for the interest of the poor, to abandon ourselves on every occasion to the feelings which a near view of their misery excites? There is no one, however severe may be habitual theory in their case, that can always resist their prayers, or hear without yielding at the moment, these emphatic words, *I am hungry*. Well then, I ask,—if all the street alms thus bestowed in Paris during a single year, could be collected at the expiration of that time, and distributed with order and intelligence, would not an infinitely superior degree of advantage prove the result? But to act thus her office, must benevolence silence charity? There have been many disputes on the relative meaning of these two words: parties have even adopted and made them rallying-points. It would be easy, I think, to rectify all this by giving them their natural and true meaning. The expressions *benevolence* and *charity*, unless

I deceive myself, by no means imply the same intentions or acts. Benevolence does not appear to me to resemble the charity of philosophers more closely than charity represents the benevolence of devotees. Benevolence I consider the science of charity, the light that feeds its fire, the reason that supplies its sentiment. Benevolence and charity are neither similar nor opposed; they exist apart, but they join hands in action; the severe exigences, the wise combinations of benevolence, are not strangers to the christian soul of Chalmers, when he interests himself in the actual condition of the poor, and, above all, with a view to their eternal welfare. The emotions of charity that impart to actions imposed by duty the charm and reward of affection, were not wanting to the philanthropic heart of Howard. Let us keep things in their right place, and words to their true meaning, and let us endeavour, with the example of these illustrious friends of mankind, to unite the lights of reason to the emotions of the heart, science to love, and benevolence to charity.

It is not necessary to suppose, that to succeed in this object the efforts must be ever painful, or that we must be eternally condemned to look, if not with an unmoistened eye, at least with a careless glance, on all the miseries we do not help to console,—miseries perhaps even more appalling than those we remove. The more we give, the more our gifts will increase. This has been often said, but not yet to the extent of its truth. Charity becomes fruitful in proportion as it is judiciously regulated. Distribute, I repeat, without discrimination, and the result will be too insignificant to encourage ourselves, or to excite strongly the zeal of others. Endeavour, on the contrary, to confine your efforts to a particular class of misfortune, or to a special locality, and you will soon see the wounds healed, and the aspect of the place changed. Let the amount of what can be accomplished by a single person or society be correctly estimated, and soon other individuals and associations will range themselves by the side of the first, eager

to explore the ground as yet unappropriated, to supply the wants that have been inevitably passed over. Trust to the spirit of justice inherent in the heart of man, and which can never suffer, by the side of misery relieved, the sight of misery completely forsaken. What others have done for that misfortune, we ought to do for this, as difficult to endure, as easy to assuage. Here is a neighbouring street which has received certain benefits from certain of its inhabitants. That which I inhabit is under the same privations, and has a right to the same relief. Thus, from neighbour to neighbour, improvement will propagate with virtue, and *the spirit will renew the face of the earth.*

We have lately seen how important it is to divide labour, and to do our own work without encroaching on the province of another. The misfortune and heroism of the Greeks had deeply moved all hearts: on every side an anxious desire was manifested to fly to their assistance. The Greek Committee ordered Collections. The women took charge of them, and applied themselves to the task with the ardour and irregularity, the confident precipitation, so natural to their character. What happened in consequence? Some persons were asked six times, others not at all; certain streets were visited repeatedly, while many were entirely neglected. Complaints arose from all quarters. The ill-humour produced by these repetitions or omissions, checked and impaired the proposed effect. The contributions fell far short of what had been anticipated. What was then decided on? The operations of the collecting ladies were defined; special localities were assigned to all where they were to address their applications; each had her appointed district, and no one was permitted to go beyond it. The effect of this regulated proceeding, this understood combination, soon became apparent. A little more order in the noblest of impulses would have preserved for the day of triumph and repose many sons of Greece, and would have saved their wives and children from

death, and perhaps from a fate of much greater terror. This division of labour, and this modification in design, are absolutely necessary, that all may know correctly what they have to do, and acquit themselves of their appointed share. Much time is thus saved in avoiding uncertainty, in preventing double occupation, and especially in allowing each person to select that portion of the work the most congenial to individual tastes, habits, and position. Whoever acts alone is obliged to carry out a certain undertaking or to give it up entirely. In societies, on the contrary, and particularly in those that confine themselves to limited projects, however little one may do, that little advances the general success; one hand cannot set the wheel in motion, although it may contribute to accelerate its pace. It may be difficult to find ten persons who can give an entire day in the week to the interests of a neighbour; ask only for an hour, and thousands will present themselves; thus a greater aggregate of time will be employed in the service of the unfortunate, and no particular or private duty will suffer thereby.

Another motive still more important, as higher in character, commands us to limit within reasonable bounds the sphere of our benefactions. All the wants of man are not confined to his material life; there are some more noble and delicate, and for these reasons, as Dr. Chalmers remarks, they are less distinctly perceived, less vividly felt by those who experience them; unlike physical wants, which become more imperious the less they are satisfied, the necessities of our moral nature extinguish themselves under privation. That beggar weeps for bread, because he has not eaten through the day; here is another who desires not to emerge from his wretchedness and apathy; he has not been *satiated with justice*, but he *neither hungers nor thirsts for it*. If then we can trust to the impulse of nature, which induces the unhappy to impart their woes to those who can in some measure console them;—if without

serious danger or injury we can wait until the poor communicate to us their corporal sufferings, it is not so with their intellectual privations; let us not hope to learn these from themselves; they are more ignorant of them than we are, or if they are aware of the fact, it gives them no uneasiness. Let us take care not to be satisfied in trying to cure their social wounds with the means and remedies that suffice for other and different cases. What would be the use of hospitals into which the sick refused to enter? Where would be the advantage of schools and lectures, if those for whom they are intended, passed daily by the doors without going in? The feast was prepared, says the Evangelist, but the invited guests refused to attend. Shall we content ourselves, as did the master of that house, by filling the hall at hazard, and shall we leave to their vain excuses those for whom it was placed in order? No; let us rather compel them to enter, but as charity compels. Let us seek them out, show them the hidden treasure they despise, and teach them to understand its value; let us pray, entreat, and invade, as Chalmers ingenuously expresses himself; let us penetrate into the interior of families; let us teach that mother, compelled by her inevitable labour to be absent the whole day from her children, that there are safe asylums where they may pass their hours in innocence, sheltered from the contagion of evil habits, and in training for the exercise of good ones. Let us give the Gospel to that old man deprived of motion, and whose days pass on in senseless torpor. Let us send that boy to school, who wastes his strength in quarrels, and his intelligence in lies. Let us find a good apprenticeship for that young girl, who wanders through the streets, selling cakes and flowers, and exposes to unmerited insults a face still conscious of a blush. Let us induce the master of the family to employ in justifiable recreation the hours he consumes at the ale-house: let us speak to him of his duties, of his true interests, of his wife, his children, and their future; let us appeal to those simple, honest feelings which are ever within

the reach of man's heart, as they are connected with the most powerful and most natural of his ties. Then, perhaps, order may revisit that domicile, domestic bonds will reassume their sway, misery will recede, and a family be restored to peace, to virtue, and consequently to that God who rejoices in good, and *remembers man and the son of man.*

Undoubtedly, if we could congratulate ourselves on such a result, if we had accomplished nothing else in our lives, we ought to thank Divine goodness for selecting us to such a task ; and might exclaim with St. Paul, "I have fought the good fight, I have finished my course ; henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness."

The difficulties, I know, are great ; there will be many unpleasant attempts, with fruitless labour, and disappointed hopes. When we place ourselves in contact with the poorer classes, at every instant we jostle against obstinate prejudices, coarse and injurious doubts ; but who except women will undertake to struggle with them ? Women appear as if suited to the contest by their nature ; their very weakness here supplies them with strength ; the most impious and ignorant man of the people cannot in them behold a master ; in their mouths exhortations assume the character of prayers, reproaches are blended with affection ; they can speak with vivacity and urgent remonstrance, freed from all apprehension but that of failure. The miseries of private life, of the interior of the household economy, impress women more powerfully than men, for they take from them their entire happiness, the whole enjoyment of their lives. Let them once be felt, and the tenderest sympathy of the soul must follow. Their hearts will almost rend asunder at the sight of a mother who moans the loss of her son ; and the bereaved parent, overpowered by their tears, will forget the vanity of their rank, and the luxury of their riches. They will, in short, be women, and nothing more. • Men could not act thus ; they can never achieve this quick and natural association. Women have also

another advantage in their attendance on the poor. Men who are charged with the execution of the laws, as the representatives of Divine justice on earth, cannot always be indulgent. Compelled to punish, they are seldom permitted to tolerate or pardon; and yet, what would become of poor, weak human nature, if it were always judged by the strict balance of justice? Our mission is less inflexible. It is not in society but in souls that we are required to re-establish order, and in our appointed task patience can effect more than severity. If rigour befits those to whom strength is given as their portion, it can never belong to women, weak beings in themselves, and dependent on man for support. Which of us can venture to say that she would have been all she ought to be, if her father had been cruel, her mother corrupt, her brothers indifferent, her husband deranged? Who can say what would have become of that frail creature, had she been deprived of all the succour that has sustained her? And if she feels justly how much she is indebted to the propitious circumstances of her life, can she ever want pity for the errors of her neighbours?

Finally, a formidable word, the word *equality*, is incessantly repeated in our ears. What terrible passions and insensate hopes does it not awaken! Undoubtedly their object will never be accomplished; they will not disturb the world with daily pretexts of regulating happiness by a uniform standard. But let us abstain from opposing them by force alone; even a just administration of the laws will fail to effect a cure. For that purpose we want charity,—friendly, sympathetic, and ardent,—not only in relieving the sufferings by which our hearts are touched, but in expelling envy and anger, in introducing amongst different classes the gentle and easy relations which form the true peace of society.

Inequality of position will never disappear from the world; hospitals, distributions of aid, manufactories for employment, all the conceivable resources of philanthropy and benevolence, will not suffice to ensure its endurance without murmurs.

Lazarus would not have been *very* grateful had he collected but a few "crumbs that fell from the rich man's table." At this time, men more than ever expect something beyond gold from their fellow-men; they ask to be known, acknowledged, loved, and treated as brothers. Let us take from inequality all its bitter and repulsive features; let us seek out the poor; let us teach them that the abodes of luxury which excite their displeasure, are occupied by inmates who think of their wants, their misfortunes, and are ever studying how to alleviate them. Let us be pardoned for our wealth, as we shall never forget that they are destitute; let us be allowed without jealousy our places in society, as we extend our hands to them; let us enjoy our happiness, as we weep over their privations. The work should be energetically commenced: "behold, now is the accepted time! behold, now is the day of salvation!" Our beautiful France, in profound peace, calls loudly for amelioration. Never were circumstances more favourable. A moment may perhaps arrive when we shall feel deep regret if we allow this opportunity to escape. If that moment comes not for our country, it will assuredly come for ourselves. The time is short, even when undisturbed by commotion; we hasten rapidly towards the place from whence there is no return; "let us work while it is day." Are our hearts depressed or unoccupied? The labour of charity is the surcest consolation under life's troubles, the sweetest pastime in the hours of weariness. If our own lot in this world is happy, can we ever do enough for those who sigh for a participation in the same blessings?

No. XIV.

(Page 301.)

Extract from the 'Moniteur Universel' of the 5th of April, 1832, on the riots and murders that took place at Paris, on the occasion of the Cholera.

While speaking of the agitation excited in the public mind, under the pretext of attempts to poison, imputed for the last two days to the retailers of wine, we might have thought that the inhabitants of Paris, aware that the attention of government had been drawn to that particular point, would rely upon its anxiety to discover the source and propagators of these alarms, or to discover the perpetrators of such crimes, if they had really occurred.

Nevertheless, fresh alarms have been spread abroad, and in consequence of suspicions as unfounded as they are cruel, violence has been committed on peaceable individuals; exasperated groups have even put to death inoffensive citizens, held up to popular fury by the name of *poisoners*, applied to them without foundation.

Government has adopted the most strenuous measures, first to prevent repetition of this detestable outrage, and secondly, to ascertain all the facts that have been used to mislead the minds of the people to this fatal extent.

Experienced chemists have been ordered to analyse the wine of every description collected by a great number of retailers, in the houses of nearly one hundred and fifty. In

some wines of inferior quality they have discovered nothing but a small infusion of cider.

Vials, bread, sugar-plums, and meat, seized and pointed out as being poisoned, have also undergone a similar analysis. They have been found to be free from all venomous substance.

Individuals arrested upon public clamour have been repeatedly visited and interrogated. Nothing has resulted but the most convincing proofs of their innocence.

Thus, the most scrupulous investigations have demonstrated, in a manner that admits of no dispute, the falseness and absurdity of the circulated reports.

Nevertheless, upon the faith of these vague alarms, our fellow-citizens have been insulted, beaten, or assassinated.

Yesterday a government clerk was stopped and murdered in the street of Saint-Denis. He was a man deserving the esteem of all who knew him.

This morning a physician, passing through the street of Lafayette, to the Barrier of the Combat, to make, in conjunction with a veterinary surgeon from Alfort, a post-mortem examination on the body of a dog, was assaulted by a crowd, and only escaped, with another individual, an inspector of public health, by seeking refuge in the nearest barrack.

On the 4th, at five o'clock, groups assembled on the Place de Gréve, pursued, under the name of *poisoner*, a man who took refuge in the Hôtel de Ville, from whence they endeavoured to tear him by open violence. Two persons were seized by some madmen, and thrown, it is said, into the river, near the Bridge of Arcola. An armed force arrived, the crowd was dispersed, and fresh outrages prevented. A man was threatened by another party because he carried a bottle in his hand. A commissary of police came up and drank some of the contents to satisfy the crowd, who yielded to this demonstration. The prefect of police has issued the following proclamation, which will satisfy the public.

“Let the heads of families, the proprietors of workshops

and all good citizens second the efforts of the authorities, and minds so treacherously misled will be brought back to more rational ideas. With regard to the agitators who have made these vain alarms a pretext for tumult, the laws watch them, and the government will support the laws.

“This evening, tranquillity is entirely restored. We cannot too often repeat, that at the moment when we are writing there has not been discovered, after the most active research, the slightest appearance of truth in the reports of poisoning. Let the public then be satisfied, and no longer listen to the falsehoods that have led to such fatal results.

“This avidity to feed on the most groundless rumours, this sanguinary cruelty which signalizes itself by violence and murder, are unworthy of the French nation. Orders have been spread to arrest the authors or abettors of the crimes committed. The first duty of the government is to protect the lives of the citizens ; let us hope that fresh enormities or renewed attempts may not render necessary the measures which that protection will provoke. If it were otherwise, all honest and enlightened citizens, repeatedly cautioned not to conceal from the hands of justice the real criminals who are lost in the crowd, would understand that it is their bounden duty not to increase, by a feeling of idle curiosity, the numerous assemblies who are thus tainted with crime.”

No. XV.

(Page 301)

*Discourse of M. Royer-Collard, delivered at the Funeral of
M. Casimir Périer. (May 19th, 1832.)*

The inexpressible sadness of this ceremony is more eloquent than our vain words. A few days only have passed since we witnessed the extinction of the most expanded intelligence of the age; and now that a great heart is stricken, a lofty soul escapes to its rest. The mortal remains are before our eyes; they are about to be enclosed in the tomb; they receive in this moment our last farewell.

What can I say to you, gentlemen, that you do not already know and feel with poignant regret? How did M. Casimir Périer suddenly elevate himself to the foremost rank of statesmen? Had he gained battles, or did he rather illustrate his life by important labours? Not so; but he received from nature the most brilliant and least disputed of all her gifts, a character energetic even to heroism, with a mind endowed with those marvellous instincts which form, as it were, the divine portion of the art of government. Providence had marked him with this double sign; by this he was destined to take the lead amongst the men of his age, when his hour arrived. It required the extraordinary circumstances under which we live to reveal to France, to Europe, to posterity, the high vocation to which M. Casimir Périer was called; we could not estimate it; he was ignorant of its extent himself. Rising from an advocate for constitutional liberty to the rank

of a minister and head of the cabinet, under a revolution that he had done nothing to provoke, he has often said,—and I honour him for the sentiment which the disinterested probity and just bearing of his mind made him rapidly comprehend and avow,—that if order is the debt of every government, it is pre-eminently that of a newly established authority, for which order is the surest pledge of safety without, as of stability within.

Order, then, was the dominating thought of M. Casimir Périer; peace will be the reward;—to that great idea he devoted himself. I repeat, gentlemen, he devoted himself: therein lies his heroism. At every risk he was resolved to maintain order, without considering that he might lose himself; without trusting too confidently to success; without bestowing a thought on the personal glory that would ultimately attend his efforts. In this exalted career, supported by the wishes, the confidence, and almost by the unanimous acclamations of his countrymen, he fought to his last day with intrepidity that never wavered. When his strength was subdued, his soul remained unconquerable.

The glory of M. Casimir Périer is pure and unassailable. Emerging like a meteor from the clouded days in which everything around us seems to be obscured or sinking, it will endure and increase; for it is not the transitory or artificial work of any particular party to which he attached himself. He served the cause of justice, of civilization, and of true liberty throughout the whole world. He has fallen too soon! May the honest citizens,—the friends of humanity that he had united together,—complete his work! Let us elevate above his tomb the standard of order; this will constitute the noblest tribute we can render to his memory.

2. *Portrait and Character of M. Casimir Périer ;*
by M. de Rémusat.

He was extremely tall in stature ; his manly, regular features presented a union of clear intelligence and refinement, contrasting strongly with the imposing energy by which at intervals he was animated. His gait, his demeanour, his gestures, were somewhat hasty and imperious, and he said himself with a smile, "How can a man of my height be expected to yield?" A portrait painted by M. Hersent, and a medallion sculptured by M. David, give a tolerably correct idea of his physiognomy. During his last years, the expression of his face was altered and bore the impress of suffering rather than exhaustion. He had days, or rather moments, of painful prostration, from which he was instantly roused by any external excitement, any pressing necessity, or any trial that involved his honour or conviction. Within him, a calculating mind and a fervid temperament were engaged in a perpetual struggle. To this he owed an important portion of his influence. Ever vehemently *touched himself*, he reacted powerfully upon others, alternately *subduing them by force, and moving them by his own emotion*. His thought flashed upon his mind like a sudden illumination ; it took possession of him with such overwhelming vehemence that it carried him completely away, so that his compressed and hurried speech could only follow it with difficulty. Nevertheless, his ideas were so clear, and his impressions so ardent, that he conveyed their full meaning on the instant, and communicated around him the excitement under which he laboured himself. It was by this earnestness in the tribune that he obtained such influence over listening assemblies ; and of him, above all public orators, it might have been said that his eloquence was exclusively action, and that the language constituted the man. These internal emotions and contests imparted a degree of impetuosity to his manner which deceived people as to his true character, and prevented them from ob-

serving that his reason continued calm, and that the spirit of observation and calculation scarcely ever deserted him in his dealings with men. Almost always he presented the spectacle of a powerful mind struggling in vain to impart to the idea it wishes to convey, the full measure of its own vivacity and strength. He could never satisfy himself that he had sufficiently or completely conveyed his own impressions; for what we do invariably falls short of what we feel.

The mind of M. Casimir Périer was more indebted to experience than to study, and found resources in his own activity of which he skilfully availed himself. He rejected methodical labour and could never endure indolence. He wished to act, but in acting he never ceased to reflect; he continually fell back upon self-examination, considering and revolving his own ideas as if to confirm himself in his view, and to consolidate his judgment. Caring little for theories, he proceeded always on certain general principles that he seized by instinct, and on which he entirely relied. He trusted to his first glance; "I want many things," he said, "but I have courage, tact, and good fortune." At the same time, he reasoned interminably on all his resolutions. Resolved on great undertakings, his daily decisions cost him much anxious forethought. He hesitated for a considerable time, postponed as long as he could, and never decided on his course without a struggle. But when once he formed his resolution, it was unalterable, for he was both circumspect and intrepid. In government, he possessed undoubtedly one of the rarest of gifts, a strong will; but that will, perhaps, was restricted within too limited a scope.

M. Périer had his moments of unreserve, but his confidence was neither habitual nor sustained. In general he judged the characters of men harshly; his language was without indulgence, although his heart was void of rancour. Never, I dare to affirm, has he been detected in a desire of inflicting the slightest injury on his political enemies, although he lavished

on them bitter reproaches and haughty contempt. His passion was to conquer, not to wound ; and he felt a difficulty in understanding, while he saw with surprise, the illwill he alternately excited by disdain and success. He was disposed to judge men more by their interests than their passions, and, according to my idea, attached too little importance to the amount of evil thoughts and actions that cannot be imputed to prearranged calculation. The human heart is often disinterested in evil.

Nevertheless, he had tenderly attached friends. He easily won over those he approached ; he inspired devotion without trusting to it too much ; he made himself loved while he was at the same time feared. To those who knew him intimately he was captivating, and in familiar intercourse, although it was necessary to refrain from too much freedom, he was agreeable and entertaining. Nothing was more easy for those who knew him, (I should rather say for those who loved him, for we only thoroughly know those we love,) than to tell him the truth, and the whole truth. He sought advice, and asked for it always, careless of being contradicted, but solicitous only not to be misunderstood. In the world he was distant, cold, and somewhat uneasy ; in his own domestic circle he was lively and humorous ; he laughed occasionally with the joyous burst of the youths of another age, and amused himself with a thousand puerilities of social life, despised at present when the affectation of solemnity is the prevailing fashion of the mind.

No. XVI.

(Page 308.)

*Letter from M. de La Fayette to M——, on the Death of
M. Casimir Périer.*

We find in the ‘Memoirs of M. de La Fayette’ (vol. vi. p. 660) a letter addressed by him on the 16th of May, 1832, to a person whose name is left in blank, and which runs thus:—“Poor Casimir Périer died this morning at eight o’clock. He leaves behind him in one of the two great divisions of France and Europe, profound regrets and an exalted reputation; in the other, sentiments of bitterness which will subside in proportion as it becomes better known that he was not the chief agent of the deplorable system adopted at home and abroad. Already the ‘Moniteur’ of this morning claims the idea for the just owner.¹ For ourselves we feel nothing but sentiments of private esteem and friendship; and as much as lays in our power, we are anxious to prevent any attack upon his memory beyond condemning the administration of which he was the organ. . . . It has been often repeated that I had conversed with the King on our present condition. Many patriots, even amongst the most ardent, pressed me to adopt that step. I refused, because I was thoroughly convinced of its inutility, and I saw many objections.”

¹ In this letter there is an anachronism, which the date of M. de La Fayette’s letter (a date fixed with certainty by the first sentence) renders difficult of explanation. The ‘Moniteur’ of the 16th of May said nothing whatever on the policy of M. Casimir Périer, who was still alive when it appeared. It was the ‘Moniteur’ of the 17th of May that contained the article to which the letter of M. de La Fayette of the 16th alludes.

No. XVII.

(Page 331.)

Note upon placing Paris in a state of siege by a Royal Decree of the 6th of June, 1832, by M. Vincens de Saint-Laurent, President of the Chamber of the Royal Court of Paris.

§ I. The law of the 10th of July, 1791, respecting the maintenance and classification of fortresses and military posts, the police of fortifications, and other matters appertaining thereto, considers fortresses and military posts under three conditions : the state of peace, the state of war, and the state of siege.

The state of peace is the ordinary condition under which the civil authority preserves all its prerogatives in their full independence.

The state of war ought to be declared by a decree of the legislative body ; or in the interval between the sessions of that body, by the King. It leaves to the civil powers their usual privileges, but on condition of acceding to such incidental measures as the military authorities may consider necessary for the safety of the place.

With respect to the state of siege, three articles of the law must be considered. Article 11 points out the causes which lead to it ; Article 12, when it terminates ; and Article 10, of its consequences as far as the military authority is concerned. The text runs as follows :—

“ART. 11.

“Fortresses and military posts will not only be considered in a state of siege from the moment when attacks commence, but

as soon as when, by the effect of their investment by the enemy's troops, communications from without to within, and from within to without, are intercepted at the distance of 1800 toises from the crests of the covered ways.

“ART. 12.

“The state of siege will continue until the investment is raised; and in case the attacks have already commenced, until the works of the besiegers have been levelled, and the trenches repaired or placed in a state of defence.

“ART. 10.

“In fortresses and military posts, as soon as they are placed in a state of siege, all the authority with which the civil officers are invested by the constitution for the maintenance of internal order and police, will pass over to the military commandant, who will exercise them exclusively on his personal responsibility.

On this law we must observe:—1. That it applies only to fortresses and military posts. 2. That it admits a siege to proceed only from attack or entire investment, without awarding to the government the right of declaring any place in a state of siege that is not so invested. 3. That it does not express whether or not the authority of the tribunals for the suppression of crime passes over to the military authorities.

§ II. The law of the 10th of Fructidor, year V., makes all townships in the interior, without distinction between those that are fortresses or military posts, and those that are not, liable to the state of war and state of siege, in the following terms:—

“ARTICLE 1.

“The executive Directory cannot declare the townships in the interior of the republic in a state of war, unless previously authorized by a decree of the legislative body.

“ARTICLE 2.

“The townships of the interior will be in a state of siege as

soon as, by the effect of their investment by the troops of foreign enemies or rebels, the communications from within to without, and from without to within, are interrupted at the distance of 3502 mètres (1800 toises) from the ditches or walls. In this case the executive Directory will apprise the legislative body of the fact."

This law merely extends the conditions of the law of the 10th of July, 1791, to towns that are not fortresses or military posts. It consists only of the two preceding articles.

1. Under its exercise the state of siege can only result from actual investment, and not from a declaration of the government.

2. Since it does not say when that state is to cease, it is evident that, resulting from the fact of the investment, it ought to terminate, as under the law of 1791, when the fact that has given rise to it exists no longer.

3. This law, silent upon the consequences which the state of siege must of necessity produce as to the relative privileges of the civil and military authorities, necessarily refers itself on that point to the preceding law of 1791. A law of the 19th of Fructidor, year V., enacted in pursuance of the *coup d'état* of the evening before, while annulling the proceedings of a great many electoral assemblies, sentencing to banishment several members of the national representation, and recalling various recent acts, contains in its last article a provision giving back to the Directory the power of declaring a township in a state of siege. But it must be remarked that this power has never legally belonged to that authority. It is probable that it may have usurped it, and that the law of the 10th of Fructidor, year V., had been passed to put an end to that usurpation. Under these circumstances, the law of the 19th cannot be considered as conveying to the government the right of declaring a state of siege. Nevertheless, the decrees of the 26th of March, 1807, declare the towns of Brest and Antwerp in a state of siege.

§ III. Before proceeding further, it must be observed :—

1. That the law of the 10th of July, 1791, cannot be appealed to in justification of the decree of the 5th of June, 1832, because, according to its tenour and express terms, it relates exclusively to fortresses and military posts ; and Paris is neither the one nor the other.

2. That the law of the 10th of Fructidor, year V., is equally inapplicable, since it requires for the state of siege positive investment, and the interruption of communication within and without ; and these circumstances were not in existence as regarded Paris on the 5th and 6th of June, 1832.

3. That, according to both these laws, the state of siege ceases with the investment, by which alone it was caused ; and thus the decree we are now discussing can still less be based upon those laws, as its date, and above all, its promulgation, was subsequent to the suppression of the revolt.

§ IV. But the legislation was specially modified by the decree of the 24th of December, 1811, relative to the organization and duties of the staff of different posts. Three articles of this decree must be recited here.

“ ARTICLE 53.

“ The state of siege is determined either by a decree of the Emperor, by investment, by an open attack, by surprise, by internal sedition, or, finally, by assemblies within the radius of the investment, not authorized by the magistrates.

“ In the case of a regular attack, the state of siege does not terminate until the works of the enemy are destroyed, and the trenches placed in a state of defence.

“ ARTICLE 101.

“ In places under a state of siege, the authority with which the magistrates were invested for the preservation of order and police, passes entirely into the hands of the military commandant, who either exercises them entirely himself, or delegates a specific portion to the magistrates according to his discretion.

"ARTICLE 103.

"With respect to all offences which the governor or commandant has not considered it proper to leave to the decision of the ordinary tribunals, the functions of the officer of judicial police are to be discharged by a provost-marshal, and the ordinary tribunals are replaced by military tribunals."

If we compare these articles with the corresponding provisions of the law of 1791, we are struck by the following discrepancies:—

1. An investment or regular attack has ceased to be the sole fact determining the state of siege. It may now result either from a surprise, from illegal assemblies within the military radius, or from internal sedition, all of which are circumstances that do not of necessity bring with them, as investment or siege, properly so defined, does, the interception of communication within and without. The state of siege may also be declared by a simple decree of the head of the government.

Some persons confound the state of siege with the state of war, and starting upon the principle that the right of declaring a place in a state of siege is a natural consequence of the right of declaring peace and war, have thought that the constitution of the year VIII., bestowing the latter power on the chief of the government, gave him also a right to declare any town in a state of siege. It is under this point of view that M. Merlin, in his 'Repertory of Jurisprudence,' considers the decrees which before that of 1811 declared various places in a state of siege. According to this opinion, the decree of 1811, referring the declaration of a state of siege to a decree of the Emperor, was no innovation, and amounted to nothing more than the exercise of the anterior laws, and of the constitution itself. But this opinion cannot be maintained in face of the texts of the laws of 1791 and of year V.

Other persons, again, have argued that the decree which declares the state of siege ought to be founded on one of the

circumstances enumerated in Article 53. This is a manifest error. The alternative form in which that article is drawn up, places beyond all doubt, that any one of the causes therein recited, suffices to determine the state of siege; and moreover, these circumstances are of a nature to require that the state of siege should commence, and the military power be strengthened, as soon as they exist, and without waiting for a declaration of the government, which in a majority of cases would incur the risk of being too late. The state of siege, which may be called fictitious, arising from a simple decree, ought undoubtedly to be regulated by weighty causes; but these causes may exist before or after investment or sedition.

2. According to the law of 1791, the state of siege ceased with the investment, and in case of actual siege, after the destruction of the enemy's works and the repair of the breaches. The decree has a provision in the last case, but is silent on all the others.

It seems impossible not to extend this provision to the case of investment already provided for by the law of 1791, and to the new cases of surprise, illegal assemblies in the neighbourhood of the place, and internal sedition. Analogy requires this, and there is nothing in the decree to lead to a contrary decision. When the cause ceases, the effect should cease also.

But the state of siege pronounced by the government can only terminate as it began. It belongs to the government alone, from its knowledge of the dangers that have provoked the measure, to calculate how long those dangers are likely to endure, and, as a necessary consequence, the duration of the remedy opposed to them.

3. The law of 1791 transferred to the military commandant the entire authority of the civil officers for the maintenance of internal order and police. The decree, while repeating this provision, substitutes the word *magistrates* in place of the words *civil officers*: and in a second article more explicitly

expressed, it deprives the ordinary criminal jurisdiction of its functions, and transfers them to the military courts.

Are these provisions contradictory to the law of 1791, or are they in fact its legitimate execution?

It has been urged that they are innovations; that the law of 1791 contained no displacement of jurisdiction; and this opinion is built on the omission of the words 'tribunals' and 'justice.'

It may be replied with advantage, that the words 'civil officers' used in the law, and the word 'magistrates' used in the decree, are synonymous; that by civil officers, the law means to include the functionaries of judicial as well as those of administrative order; that the necessary authority for the maintenance of order and internal police, transferred by the law of 1791 to the military commandants, must include, in part at least, the authority of the ordinary tribunals.

Article 103 of the decree is then only the development and regulation of the principle laid down by Article 101 of the same edict, and by Article 10 of the law of the 10th of July, 1791. Moreover, this law has always been exercised in the sense that the tribunals of a besieged town only continued to perform their ordinary functions by the authority of the military commandant.

§ V. It is upon this decree that the legality of the ordinance of the 6th of June must depend.

The objections, very different in character, that have been raised, have been, for the most part, mixed and confounded together. It is necessary to distinguish them clearly, that they may be the better understood. They reduce themselves to the four following:—

1. The ordinance of the 6th of June rests solely upon a simple decree;
2. It even exceeds the terms of that decree;
3. In all cases, it cannot be retroactive.
4. The decree has been adopted, at least in part, by the Charter.

The question of retroactiveness was the first raised, and for some time considered as the principal one. It could scarcely be otherwise. The organs of the opposition, having themselves solicited that measure for La Vendée, and having lauded the government for adopting it, could scarcely, at the first moment, adopt the idea of disputing its legality. It was this question of retroactiveness that the Royal Court decided by its sentence of the 7th of June, 1832.

But the circle of attack soon extended itself. The right of the government was the next point questioned; the legality of the decree, and the competency of the military courts. On these grounds the counsel for Geoffrey pleaded before the Court of Appeal.

§ VI. The first objection is in fact no objection at all. The constant practice of the Court of Appeal, and of all the Royal Courts, has always recognized in the Imperial decrees the power of law, unless they had been disputed within ten days after their promulgation on the plea of being unconstitutional, but had, on the contrary, been received and acted upon as established laws.

Before the Court of Appeal, the public ministry, wishing undoubtedly to place their argument on a more respectable basis than the usurpation of the legislative power which drew so much reproach on Napoleon, maintained that the decree was intended for the execution of the law of the 10th of July, 1791, with which it was in strict conformity. This plea derived advantage from the fact of the opposite counsel endeavouring to show innovation in the article relative to juridical affairs, in which, as has been proved, § IV. No. 3, there was none. But this argument ought not the less to be rejected, because the decree did innovate upon an important point in no longer requiring positive investment as a condition for declaring the state of siege, as is also explained at § IV. No. 1.

§ VII. The second objection separates itself into two branches.

At first it was said that the decree of 1811 applies only to fortresses (places of war) and military posts, and could not, in consequence, apply to Paris.

This proposition is based upon the ordinary meaning of the word *places*, which is always used to designate fortresses, or places of war; and also upon the fact that many articles in this decree, by their object and the terms in which they are expressed, evidently mean places of war and no others. Without denying these points, it appears that the following considerations firmly establish a contrary opinion.

1. The decree of 1811, if its title is referred to, relates to the organization and duties of the staff of *places*; it regulates, amongst other matters, the privileges and duties of military governors and commandants in relation with the civil authorities. Now, according to Art. 12, governors can be appointed in the principal places of war and towns of the empire; according to Art. 8, military staffs may be established in garrison towns without fortifications. The privileges and duties of these governors and military staffs can only be regulated by the decree. The decree therefore does not apply exclusively to places of war.

2. As soon as the decree interposed, the government acknowledged the state of war and the state of siege, not only as regarded places of war, according to the law of 1791, but for all towns or townships whatever, according to the law of the year V. How then can we maintain that the decree which regulates, or, if the phrase is preferred, modifies the causes and results of that state, is not to connect itself equally with the one and the other of the preceding laws?

3. Towns that are not fortresses or places of war, can be, if not besieged, at least invested or attacked by the enemy. Was not Paris attacked in 1814? These towns therefore are susceptible of the state of siege as much as fortresses are; and when the decree of 1811 gave the government the power of declaring the state of siege even before any investment or

warning of danger, it must have equally extended it to all places, whether fortresses or not, that were liable to be exposed to attack.

§ VIII. The second part of the objection consists in saying that the state of siege could not be declared after the cessation of the tumults that occasioned it.

This objection with regard to legality could have no weight, unless, according to the terms of the decree, the right of declaring a town in a state of siege was subordinate to the fact of investment, surprise, or sedition. But it is not so, and it has been explained, § IV. No. 1, that the right was conceded to the discretion of the government, always understood to include the responsibility of the ministers who might counsel such a measure.

This responsibility gives rise to another question, on the necessity or convenience of declaring a state of siege after the revolt has been suppressed, and the perturbation has ceased ; but this question has no judicial feature, and is exclusively parliamentary.

§ IX. It has been said, in the third place, that the ordinance cannot act retrospectively, and submit to arbitrary judgment offences committed before the declaration of the state of siege.

This difficulty must be solved by the principles of legal practice, which require that everything relating to forms and competence should be regulated by the law in force at the epoch of the prosecution ; and not by the law in vigour at the time when the offence was committed ; principles established by many sentences, and also by a decision of the State Council of the 5th of Fructidor, year V., relating, it is true, to a civil process, but which applies even more forcibly to the present question, that it has for its object the appropriation to the administrative authority, as a consequence of laws empowering it to take cognizance of disputes relative to national property, the right of adjudicating on difficulties that had existed before the enactment of these laws.

There can be no doubt that in the case we are now arguing, it is an ordinance and not a law that is in question. But while we admit that the ordinance cannot retroact upon the law, it must also be acknowledged that the effects of an ordinance, when it is conformable to the law, ought to be regulated by the same principles which determine the effects of the law.

The objections raised against the application of these principles to the question of the state of siege, are almost entirely founded on the importance of the question itself, and the extent of the consequences connected with it. But, in a judicial discussion, the magnitude or insignificance of the results ought not to influence the decision.

The public ministry, before the Court of Appeal, relied also on another argument, namely, that the ordinance which declares a state of siege does not of necessity create it; that the state pre-existed in the facts which called for the ordinance, and that the ordinance merely proclaims it; whence they deduced that the consequences of the state of siege, and especially the judicial arrangements, must go back to the moment when these facts commenced. But this line of reasoning has the damaging inconsistency of confounding the state of actual siege with the state of fictitious siege; of supposing that the government cannot declare a town in a state of siege until it finds itself invested, a prey to sedition, or in some one of the circumstances recited in Art. 53 of the decree. This is incorrect, as the point has been explained above, § IV. No. 1. There is danger in this confusion which it is important to designate. As under this system, the declaration of a state of siege, in respect to a town which has been invested, but of which the investment has ceased, would be evidently illegal, since according to the laws of 1791, and of the year V., and even according to the decree of 1811, the state of siege ceases with the investment, it would be perfectly natural to conclude from thence, in the silence of the decree, that the declaration of that state

for a town that has been disturbed by sedition, after the sedition has ceased, is similarly illegal. The disturbances of the 5th and 6th of June may be adduced, not as justifying the legality of the decree, but as justifying its opportunity ; not as constituting the state of siege, or bestowing on the government the right of declaring it, but as explaining the extent to which it has exercised that right.

§ X. In conclusion, has not the Charter abrogated the faculty bestowed by the decree on the government, of declaring the state of siege? Has it not, at least, abrogated the particular provisions of that decree which substitute, during the state of siege, the jurisdiction of military tribunals for the ordinary courts? This is the last objection raised against the ordinance of the 6th of June.

There can be no question here of an express abrogation, no article of the Charter having literally abrogated Articles 53 and 103 of the 24th of December, 1811.

With respect to tacit abrogation, it is a principle adopted by all legal authorities, that it ought not to be admitted but with great reserve and discrimination, because it would tend to shake the moral force with which the laws require to be environed to assume their alteration lightly ; to establish tacit abrogation, it is requisite that the new law should be incompatible with the old one.

Without disowning this rule, it has been maintained that a law which permitted the government to place, by a decree, a town non-invested, in a state of siege,—that is to say, to subject it to an exceptional law, to place it in some degree beyond the constitution,—was contrary to and incompatible with the Charter.

It has been maintained also that this was pre-eminently true in the provision of Art. 103 of the decree which changes, in places under a state of siege, the order of jurisdictions ; and here the opponents of the question have not confined themselves to a general opposition of the principles of our new

public code, but have appealed particularly to Articles 53 and 54 of the Charter of 1830, which declare that no accused party shall be taken from his natural judges, and that no commission or extraordinary tribunal shall be appointed, on any pretext or under any denomination whatever.

Tacit abrogation, in virtue of the general principles proclaimed by the Charter, is an argument that has been frequently used, both before and since the revolution of July, to establish the abrogation whether of Article 291 of the penal code, relative to assemblies of more than twenty persons, or of the law which subjects printers to a license, or of that which requires security from the publishers of journals.

Article 53 of the Charter is explained by Article 54, which says:—"In consequence, no extraordinary tribunals can be established." What is contained in both articles amounts to this,—a prohibition to create for the future any tribunals beside those which are acknowledged by the present laws. What is there in such a restriction incompatible with a change of competence settled beforehand, for certain specific cases, by a pre-existing law?

A second principle of legal practice, as generally acknowledged as the preceding one, is that general laws are never held to abolish special and exceptional laws, at least those that have a formally expressed application. What can be more exceptional than the decree of 1811? what more general than the Charter? It has evidently allowed the continuance of the decree on which it has bestowed no attention.

A last consideration presents itself, if we consider the consequences which would have ensued from the abrogation resulting from the Charter. This abrogation must apply without distinction to every state of siege, not only to that established by a simple ordinance, but also to that determined by actual investment; not only to unfortified towns, but equally to places of war. Who cannot at once see the danger that must ensue from the free and complete continuance of the ordinary jurisdiction in a besieged fortress?

§ XI. Of all the questions here enumerated, the sentence pronounced by the Court of Appeal on the 29th of June, 1832, in the case of Geoffrey, has only decided on the merits of one, the abrogation by the Charter of Article 103 of the decree of 1811.

The solution this question received, induced the Court to dispense with examining the others, and to enter into certain explanations. It however considered itself called upon to declare, at the head of the sentence, that the laws and decrees which regulate the state of siege ought to be executed in all the provisions that are not contrary to the formal text of the Charter. It seems by that course to have wished to decide implicitly in favour of the government some of the questions argued before it.

We must not at the same time forget that the Court has not indicated whether or no the government, by declaring Paris in a state of siege on the 6th of June, had confined itself within the limits of its powers, it has not in fact dealt with the second objection above alluded to at § V.

Neither has it decided the point of retroactiveness.

Finally, we cannot deny that the Court of Appeal, while seeming to admit in certain cases the right of the government to declare a state of siege, has nevertheless opposed it on the question of competence. The government, in fact, did not confine itself to declaring a state of siege, leaving the tribunals of both classes of jurisdiction to pronounce on its consequences; the Minister of the Interior, in his report to the King which preceded the ordinance of the 6th of June, and the Minister of War, in the instructions issued, on the 7th of June, to the commandant of the first military division, expressly intimated that one of the principal objects the government had in view was the displacement of the ordinary jurisdiction.

No. XVIII.

(Page 332.)

*Table of the Sentences pronounced by the Court of Assize,
against individuals prosecuted on account of the Insurrec-
tion of the 5th and 6th of June, 1832.*

In consequence of the insurrection of June, the jury has condemned eighty-two persons to various penalties, to wit:—

- 7 to death:—Messieurs Cuny, Lepage, Lccouvreur, Tonprian, Bainsse, Lacroix, and Forthom; these sentences were all commuted to transportation.
- 4 to transportation:—Messieurs Colombat, the same who was arrested by M. Vidocq, and escaped from Mont-Saint-Michel in 1835; Jeanne, O'Reilly, (whose sentence I have since caused to be commuted), and Saint-Etienne.
- 4 to hard labour in perpetuity.
- 5 ————— for ten years.
- 1 ————— for eight years.
- 1 ————— for seven years.
- 1 ————— for six years.
- 5 ————— for five years.

(In general these punishments were commuted to a detention for a uniform period.)

3 to ten years' detention.

2 to seven years' detention.

(Messieurs Thielmans and Marchand, chiefs of the Gaulish Society.)

2 to six years' detention.

4 to five years' detention.

1 to eight years' seclusion.

3 to six years' seclusion.

(Amongst these there was included M. Vigoureux,
whose pardon I obtained in 1835.)

4 to five years' seclusion.

10 to five years' imprisonment.

3 to three years' imprisonment.

1 to two years and seven months' imprisonment.

5 to two years' imprisonment.

16 to eighteen months, thirteen months, a year, six
months, three months, and one month of im-
— prisonment.

Total 82

(*Memoirs of M. Gisquet, formerly Prefect of Police,* written
by himself: vol. ii. pp. 281-283.)

No. XIX.

(Page 333.)

1. *From King Louis-Philippe to Marshal Soult, at that time in Mission to repress the Insurrection of Lyons.*

Paris, Nov. 29, 1831, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

I have received, my dear Marshal, your letter dated from Mâcon, on the 27th, and reply on the instant. All your arrangements appear to me excellent, and such as I expected from you. You ought already to have received the decrees you require, both for disbanding different national guards of Lyons and its suburbs, and for the mobilization of the national guards of the neighbouring departments, with the power of changing them from one to the other. You are thus furnished with all these facilities.

With respect to declaring Lyons in a state of siege, the question appears to me to call for mature deliberation, and I have convoked the Council for half-past eight this evening, that it may be well discussed before I decide on the measure. I shall suspend all definitive judgment in the meantime, but I hope this step may be unnecessary. I think the only contingency under which it would be advisable, is in case opposition should be made to the entry of the troops into Lyons, or that the entrance should be subjected to conditions. It would then become necessary to surround, blockade, and attack, and consequently the state of siege would become a fact calling for declaration. But if, on the contrary, as I hope and believe, and above all, as I ardently desire, the gates of the city of Lyons will be opened without either a blow struck or a con-

dition demanded, and that the troops will enter without our having to deplore a fresh effusion of our precious French blood,—then the measure of placing in a state of siege would seem to me superfluous, and I should apprehend that in spite of the gentleness with which you would accompany its execution, it would lead to serious alarm and dangerous irritation.

The great point, the culminating object of our business, is to enter Lyons without striking a blow and without conditions. Effect this, and all, if not absolutely ended, will then be certain of a happy conclusion. Undoubtedly, a general disarming will be necessary, with the accompanying measures. There must be severity, above all, towards the companies of engineers and others of the military who have quitted their colours and remained in Lyons; but you are aware, at the same time, that when I say *severity*, it is not *executions* I mean to imply; and I know that I have no occasion to repeat this to you. I have the fullest confidence in your moderation; above all other points it is always necessary in success, for at that moment extreme suggestions are poured in from all quarters, and chiefly from those who held themselves aloof during the struggle. True policy should be wise without weakness, and firm while divested of violence.

You know how entirely I am your friend,

LOUIS-PHILIPPE.

2. *The Minister of Commerce and Public Works to his Excellency Marshal Soult, in mission at Lyons.*

Paris, Nov. —, 1831.

Dear Marshal and Colleague,

I think it may be useful to place before you the origin of the dispute, which has excited the operative population of Lyons, and has led to the deplorable events that have consequently occurred.

At Lyons the manufacturers have no large workshops : they give the silk prepared for each piece to the master-labourers, who weave it at home in frames supplied by themselves. Each master-labourer has usually in his dwelling-place several of these frames. On one he works with his own hands, the others are used by his children, or by associated workmen taken into his service.

The manual labour of the weavers is settled by measurement and not by the day. The manufacturer and the head-workman have to agree as to the price of this manual labour, and another arrangement has then to be made between the head-workman and his companions to ascertain how much salary at this rate of payment will remain to the subordinate, and how much to his employer, etc. etc.

It is well to remark here, that the domiciled master-workman, the owner of the frames, is a more responsible and more orderly person than the more numerous body of associated labourers, a class of floating population incessantly circulating from Lyons to Avignon and Nismes, and on which there is little dependence to be placed.

It is possible that their demands upon the master-workmen may have induced the latter to increase their pretensions, and that when the manufacturer has become exasperated, the labouring men have rapidly had recourse to extreme violence.

For some time, both the master-workmen and the inferior labourers have complained that the scale of payment for manual labour was too low ; that they could not live upon their wages ; that they had a right to demand more, and that the authorities ought to interfere ; they have also urged that at different intervals, and even so late as 1811, tariffs had been established, in concert with the authorities, or guaranteed by them ; and that no mutual reliance or security could be established until this example was followed, and a tariff recognized and proclaimed ; so that the manufacturer could no longer attempt to force on the most inferior amongst the

workmen a reduced scale of wages, which would end by becoming the law for all.

It would be useless now to repeat how these demands have been set forward and received ; how some have thought to obtain the tariff by conciliatory measures ; how a great number of manufacturers have refused to acknowledge it ; and how the workmen, believing themselves to be in legitimate possession of it, have looked upon the recusants as infringers of a treaty and a public regulation.

Under no circumstances whatever can a tariff be acceded to. The public authorities have no right to regulate the scale of wages ; no law sanctions such interference ; and in the legitimate maintenance of order now so universally and justly called for, the example of 1811, as well as those of 1793, which have also been named, cannot be admitted as legal precedents. I repeat, no law sanctions the establishment of a tariff for manufactories. If treaties have been entered into, they can only bind the individuals concerned. The administrative authority, so far from subjecting any one to them, cannot even interfere with the contracting parties. The tribunals alone could take cognizance of their disputes ; and with regard to those who are not parties to any given transaction, no judge could impose on them a tariff they were totally unacquainted with. If they should be induced to award a sentence, it would be reversed by the Court of Appeal.

It is as well to add, for the prevention of future misunderstandings, that at Lyons they seem to have forgotten an extremely explicit law, applicable to cases when it has been considered legal to convoke a general meeting of the manufacturers, and to appoint commissioners. Assemblies of employers are prohibited, and can confer no controlling power whatever. The meetings of workmen by which they were preceded, were even more irregular, and further, came under the provisions of Art. 415 of the Penal Code, for they were evidently combinations to increase the price of labour. But laying aside what

is past, unless by such reference to prevent its repetition, and by looking at a tariff with regard to the possibility of its being established, a knowledge of the following points is of material importance. Whatever may be the condition of the workman, it does not depend on the employer to ameliorate it, and there is great injustice in supposing that a refusal to increase the rate of wages springs from cupidity or pure want of feeling.

The manufacturers of Lyons depend on the orders received ; those from foreign countries are considerable, and on this alone depends the activity or stagnation of the trade. The number of frames in constant occupation augment or diminish in proportion as the demand from Russia, England itself, and above all from America, increases or diminishes.

But Lyons at the present moment suffers under a general opposition, above all for the plain silks, the monopoly of which they have lost. Not only does England provide them for home consumption, but Zurich, Basle, Creveldt, and Elberfeldt manufacture them to a great extent and at a much lower rate than they can be supplied from Lyons ; furnishing them to foreign places which until now knew no other market. Orders still came to Lyons in preference, but on condition of not paying more than in other manufactories ; this condition of course can be accepted or refused, but it cannot be altered. It is founded on the evident nature of things.

When the reduction of the price of manufactured material is thus imposed, it becomes necessary for the manufacturer to study economy ; he may sacrifice a portion of his profit, but he cannot afford to sell at a positive loss. If the workman is content to receive the wages offered to him, the offers of foreigners are accepted, and Lyons becomes busy. If the workman has no means of livelihood, and cannot take as a resource the salary which circumstances allow, the commissions then are refused, and the trade is forcibly suspended.

It will be said that this division of the sum paid being

settled by the employer, he reserves a profit to himself, while the labourer works at a loss. But it cannot be so, for the employer gains nothing if the trade ceases. It is evident that he offers to the labourer the highest wages he can afford, rather than reject the commissions altogether. Besides which, even though he could be compelled to admit a settled tariff, if he found it impossible to make it answer, and preferred no commissions to a certain loss, no power in the world could force him to give employment to his workmen ; the tariff therefore can in no case be a guarantee, and it is most essential that this should be thoroughly understood.

Finally, Marshal, I think it necessary to call your attention to the point from which we start. The first time that the Prefect mentioned the tariff, he stated that the manufacturers of Lyons had not been exposed to the same interruptions of trade which had afflicted other localities ; that all the hands were employed, and that more were wanting for several thousand frames for which work was ready : thus the complaint was confined to the single point that labour was underpaid. This is a much less distressing position than that of many towns in which the workshops were closed. Those towns have endured their privations, without disturbing the public peace, and it is much to be lamented that at Lyons, where work abounded, a much more favourable state of affairs has led to such a contrary result.

Accept, Marshal and dear Colleague, the assurance of my high consideration.

The Peer of France,
Minister for Agriculture and Commerce,
COUNT D'ARGOUT.

In conclusion, my dear Marshal, no tariff can be established at Lyons. 1. Because the measure is illegal. 2. Because it could not be binding, as no tribunal has power to recognize it, and compel the manufacturers to conform to its

conditions. 3. Because, even under the supposition that the measure were legal, and that the tribunals possessed the faculty of sanctioning its execution by sentences, there is no power on earth that could compel a manufacturer to give employment to his labourers, by paying them wages which reduced him to the necessity of selling at a loss. The consequence of the tariff sanctioned by M. Dumolard has therefore been to stop work altogether, and to deteriorate instead of ameliorating the condition of the workmen.

The resolution adopted by the President of the Council and myself in regard to M. Dumolard, has been this:—We have apprised him of the illegality of the measure he had approved; we have enlightened him on the violent results to which it must lead; we have informed him that we are not disposed to abolish the tariff, as we wish to avoid a crisis at Lyons, but that we leave him the credit of repairing the evil it has already caused. He must explain to the labourers the mischief it will do to themselves, and when they are thus prepared, he must abrogate the tariff, or allow it to fall quietly into disuse. Such are, dear Marshal, the details I have thought it necessary to submit to you. It appears to me very essential, now that the revolt has actually taken place, to leave no hope to the workmen (as soon as they return to order) that any kind of tariff whatever will be established, for as long as they either have one, or the hope of obtaining it, Lyons will be continually exposed to fresh disturbances. They will display themselves as soon as the manufacturers, dissatisfied with a tariff that constrains them to work without some profit, shall cease their orders to the labourers.

END OF VOLUME II.

